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                             ABSTRACT 
 
     The Laird rams, built from 1862-1865, reflected concepts of naval power in 
transition from the broadside of multiple guns, to the rotating turret with only a 
few very heavy pieces of ordnance.  These two ironclads were experiments built 
around the two new offensive concepts for armoured warships at that time: the 
ram and the turret.  These sister armourclads were a collection of innovative 
designs and compromises packed into smaller spaces.  A result of the design 
leap forward was they suffered from too much, too soon, in too limited a hull 
area.  The turret ships were designed and built rapidly for a Confederate Navy 
desperate for effective warships.  As a result of this urgency, the pair of twin 
turreted armoured rams began as experimental warships and continued in that 
mode for the next thirty five years.  They were armoured ships built in secrecy, 
then floated on the Mersey under the gaze of international scrutiny and suddenly 
purchased by Britain to avoid a war with the United States.  Once purchased, 
they were largely forgotten.  Historians rarely mention these two sister ironclads 
and if mentioned at all, they are given short shrift.  Built with funds obtained in 
part through the Confederate Erlanger loan, these ironclads were constructed at 
Lairds shipyard in Birkenhead and represented an advanced concept of ironclad 
construction through new proposals involving turrets, the ram, heavy guns and 
tripod masts on an armoured ship, as advocated by Captain Cowper Coles, R.N.  
They proved too much of a leap in one design but when their roles caught up to 
the revised designs, the ships were modified to meet new requirements.  After 
several mission and design changes they then performed to standard. This 
belated success occurred when the concept of the ideal armoured warship was 
in flux throughout the middle Victorian years.  
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                       INTRODUCTION  
 
           The Laird Rams and the evolution of the ironclad warship     
                                      
     The two ironclad sister ships built by Lairds shipbuilders of Birkenhead during 
the American Civil War, have been largely overshadowed by another ship built by 
Lairds, the famous raider C.S.S. Alabama.  Constructed after the equally famous 
H.M.S. Warrior and predating the ill-fated H.M.S. Captain (also a Lairds ship), the 
Confederate-intended Birkenhead ironclads were built in response to the combat 
proven monitors of the Union fleet, yet were more capable of an ocean going role 
(at least for coastal warfare) than the low-hulled Union turret warships.  As they 
were nearing completion, the rams became the focus of intelligence gathering and 
diplomatic manoeuvre which ended when the two Birkenhead-built turret ships were 
acquired by a reluctant government in Whitehall.  The move proved fortunate.  They 
were built in time to provide Britain with an extra edge against potential rivals as 
larger British broadside ironclads were nearing completion.  
     Yet, advances in naval gun manufacture led one observer to note: ‗The ship 
may be cased with armor [sic] which today is shot-proof; but tomorrow it may be 
pierced with ease by shot or shell thrown by some new iron monster‘.1  More than 
just the new guns, the British press warned that a new projectile would make 
ironclads like the celebrated Warrior and her sister the Black Prince obsolete ‗and 
then our ironsides will take their place with Brown Bess among a class of antiquities 
which will be pronounced rusty‘.2  With proper forging techniques, bigger guns could 
be crafted in the iron makers‘ workshops (both smoothbore and rifle) capable of 
firing a larger powder charge which could propel a larger projectile at increased 
                                            
1
 James Phinney Baxter III, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship. (Originally published 
Cambridge, MA, 1933, Annapolis, 2001), 204. 
 8 
velocity and range.3  Jules Verne would write (in 1863) of the ‗absurd duel between 
armour and cannonballs, as to which would resist and which would penetrate‘.  
Verne predicted that the cannonballs (and shells) would triumph in this contest he 
called ‗a noble rivalry‘.4   
     Displayed at Woolwich Arsenal is an armoured target from that era before steel, 
when iron was supreme.  Here was a testament to the transition from the primacy of 
iron plates to the heavy gun as the ultimate factor in naval warfare.  The shield was 
some 12 inches thick, originally cast in two separate plates, and fitted one below 
and one above to create a single gunport at the centre.  The gunport was the 
obvious aim point for a range test circa 1868.  The thick armour was not penetrated, 
but it was noticeably cracked and scalloped in appearance.  The impact from shells 
and balls distorted the shield, giving the target an appearance more granular, not 
unlike wet clay.  The armour was not dented much, but in some places it looked as 
though it had been scooped out, as if by hand.  The iron was able to keep the shells 
out…but, barely.  This target, in a way, represents the dilemma faced by naval 
architects and navies of that era.  The experts did not know when the continuous 
experimentation and exasperating drive to outdo the latest advance in armoured 
construction and competing gunnery progress would end.  Iron armour was made 
ever thicker and, consequently; guns became larger, massive beasts and were, 
appropriately, dubbed ‗monsters‘.  As a result of this industrial race between 
enough iron to protect, and sufficient power to overcome an armoured belt, naval 
                                                                                                                                  
2
  ‗Note on Naval Estimates‘, Wrexham Advertiser, 23 March 1861, 3 
3
 Howard J. Fuller, Clad in Iron, The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval 
Power. (Annapolis, 2008), 143, 240. 
4
 Jules Verne, Paris in the Twentieth Century. (New York, 1996), 133. 
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architects struggled to create the ultimate ironclad which was usually superseded 
by another industrial advance before the ship had been completed by the builders.       
     The mid-nineteenth century return of the ram as a weapon was, at best, 
secondary to the heavy gun.  The ram added shock power to compensate for the 
lack of accuracy and muzzle velocity typical of the heavy gun of the early 1860s.  
The heavy rifled gun could achieve greater impact when ranges were decreased, 
and the ram offered a potential battle winning advantage when contact was made.   
This combination was dramatically unveiled on 8 March 1862, when the 
Confederate ironclad Virginia drove her bows into the hapless wooden sloop U.S.S. 
Cumberland at Hampton Roads.  The salvaged Confederate frigate, remade into an 
ironclad equipped with heavy guns and an underwater iron prow, threatened to 
upset the naval balance of power.  In the press, the proto-typical modern warship 
briefly became the mast-less, steam-driven, iron-shielded, broadside frigate more 
associated with men-of-war built in the Confederacy.  In Britain, Punch first depicted 
an American armourclad arriving in the Channel as a casemate ironclad ram, not 
the low-hulled turret equipped Monitor.5    
     The naval lessons of the Civil War were ambiguous.  The ram, in Confederate 
service, usually proved to be a successful weapon when contact was made with the 
hull of a smaller and stationary Union warship.  Those events were rare and 
Confederate armoured vessels lacked the speed and maneuvreability essential in a 
fight against superior numbers and in the shallow waters of the rivers and estuaries 
of the Southern States.  The Confederacy did not have the industrial capacity to 
make adequate armoured warships, either of the quality or the numbers required to 
defend against a United States Navy which grew in size and capability as the war 
progressed.  Under wartime conditions, the Confederates could only produce a few 
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dozen armoured vessels of varying worth.  These casemate ironclads, although 
innovative in design, suffered universal flaws in construction, especially the 
underpowered engines.  One Confederate naval officer, referred to these 
homemade ironclads as ‗miserable make-shift vessels‘.6  Fitted with rams, these 
Confederate armoured casemate warships were too heavy and too slow to drive off 
(and keep away) Federal steam-propelled frigates, sloops, light auxiliaries, and 
ironclads contesting their waters.  Unlike the ever-changing armour and heavy 
guns, the ram was limited by the length and weight restrictions of its host.  Although 
some Confederate ironclads were fitted with spar torpedoes, draught prevented 
their use against their more nimble Union adversaries.  The Confederate home-built 
ironclads were both too heavy for effective use against a determined enemy in 
shallow waters and too unseaworthy for a deep water role.  
     The ram was considered a potent weapon by commentators of that era including 
American naval Chief Engineer J. W. King, who remarked that two Russian 
monitors, hampered by slow speed and the lack of ‗iron spurs for ramming…must 
therefore be considered weak vessels, fit only for operations in shallow water‘.7  
Punch had taken notice of the new naval weapons and in a sketch, depicted John 
Bull fitted with a suit of armour.  The breastplate was cast as the bow of an ironclad 
complete with a pointed iron cone, a clear threat to any potential opponent unwise 
                                                                                                                                  
5
 ‗A Trifling Chronological Error‘, Punch, 26 April 1862, 163. 
6
 James Dunwoody Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe; or, How the 
Confederate Cruisers were Equipped. II. (London, 1883, reprinted 2009), 202, 203. The 
Confederate casemate ironclads suffered from weight and armament overload and all were too 
large for their underpowered engines.  Referring to the ironclad C.S.S. Tennessee, which 
defended the Alabama port of Mobile, Bulloch noted ‗she had neither the speed nor the ability to 
reverse quickly which are so essential in an armoured vessel with a fixed battery and designed to 
be used also as a ram‘. 
7
 Chief Engineer J. W. King, USN. European Ships of War and Their Armament, Naval 
Administration and Economy, Marine Constructions and Appliances, Dock-Yards, Etc. 
(Washington, 1877), 168. 
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enough to venture too near the determined looking seafarer.8  The iron spur was a 
weapon which reappeared from the annals of ancient warfare only to fade back into 
irrelevancy when heavy guns became more accurate, steam engines became more 
reliable, and higher speeds were achieved for these men-of-war.  The ram was a 
slow moving weapon, ideal for attacking a slow moving enemy vessel.  The 
locomotive torpedo was yet another weapon that doomed the ram.  Only when the 
combination of speed, gunnery and the subsurface threat matured, did the dead-
end design feature of the ram fade away completely.   
     Until that time, the Laird-built armourclads were cutting edge weapons platforms 
built in a hurry, for a country desperate for anything better than what they had 
available in home waters.  The South needed purpose-built iron vessels of superior 
workmanship and engineering if it was going to overcome the lag in industrial 
output.  Only the workshops of Britain could offer the capacity to make armoured 
warships which could switch from defensive coastal roles, to a more offensive 
capability.  
     Construction on the Laird rams began in secret, as the Confederate States 
urgently needed armoured warships to lift the blockade.  Early defeats on the 
battlefield and the incessant manpower demands of the army meant the South was 
unable to provide vital components for her navy from domestic resources.  
Stopgaps were attempted but, even with imported British components, the South 
could not achieve a suitable armoured force to effectively defend all key harbours 
and coastal areas from an expanding Union Navy.  The Confederacy needed British 
expertise and industrial capacity.  By 1863, the South no longer had resources or 
time enough to build up the infrastructure needed to finish an adequate number of 
                                            
8
 ‗Vulcan Arming Neptune‘, Punch, 19 April 1862, 157.  
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ironclads to hold back the Federal juggernaut and lift the blockade.  Britain held the 
logical answer to the dilemma.  Based on their reputation for quality workmanship 
with iron steamers, and the expanding industrial capabilities along the Mersey, 
Lairds was the obvious choice.  This firm was so known for its quality of work during 
this era, that Jules Verne wrote that it was this yard (although he referred to them 
as ‗Leard‘) that built the steel hull plates for his mysterious submarine Nautilus 
featured in his now classic work of science fiction, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea.9  
The French writer mentioned that the fictional submarine was built in secret, of 
components sent to a disguised address.10  Subterfuge, especially when associated 
with an advanced weapons system, worked better in the realm of fiction than had 
been the case with Lairds and the two ironclads built for the South, but the fiction 
was derived from factual events during the construction efforts of 1862-1863.     
       
The ships are ordered 
 
     In 1862, Commander James D. Bulloch, C.S.N. arranged with shipbuilders 
Lairds, to construct two ocean-going ironclads in Birkenhead.  The two sisters 
were identical at 224 feet, 6 inches in length, 42 feet 4 inches in beam and 
protected with a main armour belt of 4½ inches of iron over teak planks.  Each 
had an armament of four 9-inch muzzleloading rifles which were housed in two 
turrets (two guns per turret) behind ten inches of iron plating on the turret faces.  
Fitted with three masts, sails would (theoretically) assist the steam engines on 
long voyages.  The second ship of the class would be fitted with two 
experimental tripod masts in an effort to reduce braces and ropes required for the 
                                            
9
 Jules Verne, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, (New York, 1966), 94. 
10
 Ibid, 94. 
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sailing rig and thus, allowing for greater arch of fire for the turrets.  With a 
displacement of 2,751 tons, the two engines on each ship were estimated to 
drive the ironclads at what was then a respectable speed of 11 knots.11    
     Commander Bulloch went to great lengths to arrange the details of a sale to a 
French firm who were intending to resale the ironclads to Egypt.  This was a 
paperwork blind, but the Union spies, sponsored by American diplomats and 
supported by wealthy ship owners from Boston and New York, tirelessly 
followed-up every lead and rumour to ferret out the truth.  Bulloch‘s subterfuge 
was not working.  A severe winter had forced Lairds to put up temporary sheds 
on the site and gas lamps were installed to speed additional work during hours of 
darkness.  Reportedly, the ironclads were intended for Egypt however this ruse 
failed to explain the urgent need for the vessels.  Clearly the armoured men-of-
war were intended for the Southern States.  Bulloch worried over the delays as 
the ‗whole character of the work was new, and builders cannot make close 
calculations; great labour and unexpected time required to bend armour-plates; 
and the most important part of the work, the riveting, is far more tedious than 
anticipated‘.12                                    
     The hulls were built with a submerged bulbous iron ram bow to assist the 
smashing power of the four heavy guns.  The first of the class was to have been 
commissioned as the C.S.S. North Carolina yet she floated upon the Mersey with 
the false Egyptian name El Tousson.  Her sister, the Mississippi, was built as hull 
                                            
11
 ‗The Rebel Pirates. Ironclads on the Mersey. Description of the Vessels‘, New York Times 
(NYT), 16 September,1863, 1, 2, TNA, ADM 1/5842, Admiralty Correspondence, ‗Specification of 
Cowper Phipps Coles Masts‘, 10 April,1862, Patent No. 1027, was for Coles tripod masts design 
referred to as, ‗Improvements in Masts for Ships‘.    
12
 James Dunwoody Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe; or, How 
the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped. I. (London, 1883, reprinted, 2012). 391, 395. 
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number 295 and launched on 29 August, 1863.  She was christened as the 
Egyptian man-of-war, El Monassir.13   
     Confederate Navy Secretary, Stephen Mallory, put much hope in these ships 
and stated that ‗they could restore to us New Orleans‘.14  Bulloch wrote the 
secretary to caution that New Orleans was too difficult to reach without 
supporting vessels to aid operations around the tricky mud flats which dotted the 
Mississippi River.  Instead, Bulloch imagined that the armoured rams would 
surprise the inhabitants of Portsmouth, New Hampshire by bombarding the navy 
yard there.15  Frank J. Merli writes in The Alabama, British Neutrality, and the 
American Civil War, that among historians, the consensus holds that the Laird 
rams did not represent as great a crisis in U.S. affairs with Britain as had the 
Trent Crisis.  This view is too dismissive of the slower-building crisis over the 
Laird rams.  Merli‘s statement is based on a weaker U.S. Navy in 1861, and it 
also fails to take into account the well-developed Northern Intelligence network in 
operation in Britain by 1863.  Although the crisis over the Birkenhead rams was 
not as immediate as had been the Trent affair, it was a dangerous time, when a 
diplomatic miscalculation or overreaction could have produced damaging 
consequences.       
     In Richmond Virginia, one newspaper wrote of ‗Bright visions…conjured up of 
the blockade broken and the enemy‘s cities bombarded‘, when the rams 
appeared off the North American coast.16  These hopes were dashed through the 
candid letters sent by the United States Minister to the Court of St. James, 
                                            
13
 The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, (ORN). 
II, 2, (Washington, 1921), 584-586. 
14
 Ibid, 407. 
15
 Ibid, 455, 456. 
16
 ‗An Important Confession‘, Daily National Republican, 3 November 1863, 1. 
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Charles Francis Adams, to the Foreign Secretary, Earl John Russell.  The 
loopholes in British neutrality laws, chiefly the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, did 
not prevent the sale of men-of-war and armaments to a non-combatant nation.  
Regarding the seeming inability of the British Government to prevent the 
impending departure of these two armoured rams from the Mersey, Adams 
issued his famous demarche to Lord Russell: ‗It would be superfluous in me to 
point out to your Lordship that this is war‘.17  Adams overstepped his position by 
continuing to preach to Lord Russell, when he wrote ‗If Her Majesty‘s 
Government have not the power to prevent the harbours and towns of a friendly 
nation from being destroyed by vessels built by British subjects, and equipped, 
manned, and dispatched from her harbours…then all international obligations, 
whether implied or expressed, are not worth the paper on which they are 
written‘.18  
     Russell would reply to Adams: ‗there are passages in your letter…that plainly 
and repeatedly imply an intimidation of hostile proceeding towards Great Britain 
on the part of the Government of the United States unless steps are taken‘. 
Russell‘s response was firm when he stated that Her Majesty‘s government 
would not ‗overstep the limits of the law‘ and warned ‗will not shrink from any 
consequences of such an action‘.  Adams quickly apologized and allowed the 
issue of the Laird rams to run their course through Whitehall without additional 
drumbeats of war.19  London ordered Treasury officials to seize the two rams on 
9 October 1863, after it was feared that foreign agents would stage a ‗forcible 
                                            
17
 David Hepburn Milton, Lincoln‟s Spymaster: Thomas Haines Dudley and the Liverpool 
Network. (Mechanicsburg, 2003), 91. 
18
 Amanda Foreman, A World on Fire. Britain‟s Crucial Role in the American Civil War.  (New 
York, 2010), 522. 
19
 Ibid. 522. 
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abduction‘ of the El Tousson while she was underway from Birkenhead on her 
anticipated trial run.20   
     As Howard J. Fuller demonstrates in his work, Clad in Iron, Lairds and other 
privately owned shipyards provided both industrial capacity and a pool of skilled 
labour that the Royal Dockyards could not surpass.21  The British Government 
needed Lairds and could not afford to alienate them.  The acquisition of the two 
rams would strengthen the Royal Navy by denying them to the other power which 
had wanted to purchase them - the United States.  Prime Minister, Lord 
Palmerston had warned the First Lord of the Admiralty, stating: ‗If the Federals 
get them they will strengthen the Yankees against us if they should be disposed 
and able next year to execute their threatened vengeance for all the Forbearance 
we have shewn [sic] them; if we get these Ships they will give us Moral as well as 
maritime strength‘.22  The confiscation of the armoured sister ships was resolved 
with a purchase by the Treasury to prevent their entering service for the 
Confederate Navy. The seizure also prevented additional damage to the already 
strained relations with the United States.  After months of legal arguments, the 
Admiralty acquired the two incomplete vessels on 8 August 1864.23  Although 
designed for another navy, when acquired, these two ironclads served in a 
coastal defence capacity as well as in the role as training ships and testing 
platforms for the Royal Navy.  Of equal importance for Britain, a vital shipyard 
was not fiscally damaged, and skilled hands were employed instead of suffering 
                                            
20
  LOC, ‗Correspondence Between Her Majesty‘s Government and Messr. Laird Brothers 
Relative to the Iron-Clad Rams‘. United States Serial Set, Number 1397, Senate Executive 
Department No. 11, Volume 4, 41st Congress Appendix No. XIII, (Washington, 1869), 264, 267, 
276. 
21
 Fuller, Clad in Iron, 15-17, 22. 
22
 Ibid, 232. 
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a long work stoppage due to government intervention. This move was also one 
whereby Britain strengthened her navy in terms of ironclads in the advanced 
stages of construction, without appearing to give in to Union threats.   
     Fuller also contends the Laird rams were purchased for the Royal Navy, not 
merely in response to Union diplomatic pressure, but to augment the number of 
British ironclads available to counter other potential threats, especially from 
France.  The additional need to strengthen the fleet against a French build up 
was well expressed in James P. Baxter‘s classic The Introduction of the Ironclad 
Warship.  Regarding the mid-1860s state of European armourclad design, Baxter 
points out that the advantage regarding ‗compactness, and homogeneousness 
would be on the side of France-individual power on the side of England:-a 
superiority-nowhere‘.24   
     The Laird-built armoured rams have been given less attention by historians, 
indeed they are almost always mentioned with the Alabama and in terms of the 
U.S. diplomatic efforts to halt their acquisition by the Confederacy.  When the two 
sister ironclads are mentioned, the information is confused and the assessments 
are usually brief and almost universally indifferent.  In his 1984 overview, The 
Fighting Ships in the Royal Navy AD 897-1984, E. H. H. Archibald summarized 
their service in a few lines: ‗They had been acquired for the wrong reasons, and 
there was no really useful role for them to play‘.25  Others were not so quick to 
condemn.  Writing during the time when they were still in service, Captain S. 
Eardley-Wilmot, R. N., gave a more complimentary assessment, claiming that 
had they gone to sea under the command of an experienced Confederate officer, 
                                                                                                                                  
23
 Arnold A. Putnam, ‗The Building of Numbers 294 & 295: The Laird Rams‘. Warship 1999-2000. 
Edited by Antony Preston, (London, 1999), 14. 
24
 Baxter, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship, (2001), 319. 
25
 E. H. H.  Archibald, The Fighting Ships in the Royal Navy AD 897-1984. (Poole, 1984), 111. 
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‗skillfully handled, they should have made short work of the Northern monitors, to 
which in all points of construction they were greatly superior‘.26    
 
In Service 
 
     Both Laird-built ironclads were purchased for the Royal Navy with the H.M.S. 
Scorpion commissioned first and the second ram hoisted her pennant later that 
month (October 1865) as H.M.S. Wivern.27  They were valuable additions to the 
armoured squadrons of the Royal Navy but were poorly adapted to a blue water 
role.  The Wivern was the first of the sisters to have any activity of note when in 
October 1867, she sent a boat crew to Holyhead to search for members of a 
Fenian plot.28    
     Several years later, the Laird rams were already outclassed and ill-suited for 
work in home waters.  The noted naval architect Edward J. Reed remarked (in 
1869) that the Scorpion and Wivern were considered ‗the weakest of our 
armourclad fleet…have never exceeded 10 knots at their very best.‘  Despite this 
claim, the Scorpion was able to slightly outpace her sister as she reached 10½ 
knots on at least one occasion.  Their flat bottoms, which were more suited for 
operations off the American coasts or on the Mississippi River, made them ‗bad 
                                            
26
 Captain S. Eardley-Wilmot, R. N. Our Fleet To-Day and its Development during the Last Half-
Century. (London, 1900), 125. Howard J. Fuller, ‗John Ericsson, the Monitors and Union Naval 
Strategy‘, IJNH, 2 (December 2004), 18.  The Monitors were, according to Fuller, part of the 
‗conflicting aspects of Union naval strategy which a single ship design could not possibly hope to 
resolve‘.  Fuller makes a distinction in naval missions for these ironclads; between Coastal 
defence against enemy warships, and coastal assault against enemy fortifications.             
27
 Baxter, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship, (2001), 320-321. 
28
 ‗Kelly and Deasey-Searching a Greek Vessel‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 2 October 1867, 4. 
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sailors‘… as they ‗rolled up to 27 degrees each way in a heavy sea‘.29  The ships 
were refitted to compensate in some ways for their low silhouette and poor 
seakeeping when not head on to the wind.  As with other ironclads of that era, 
steering and performance underway had to be worked out through drill and while 
on fleet exercises.  The turret ship was less compatible with sails and rigging 
than the broadside ironclad and this merger slowly fell away as the two Laird 
rams were reshaped with almost every trip they made to the dockyard, especially 
in their early years.   
     As other ships entered service, the Laird rams were assigned duties as 
coastal defence vessels.  The Scorpion was first to leave British waters, 
steaming (sometimes under tow of an escort) to her new home at Bermuda in 
1869.30  The Wivern was ordered to Hong Kong due to problems with Russia 
over Russian border tensions with China.  Wivern left Devonport, steamed up the 
channel and anchored at Spithead to correct ‗defects in her machinery‘ and to be 
fitted to carry two 2nd Class Torpedo boats.  She would not receive the boats or 
extra equipment needed by them as the boats added too much load to the low- 
hulled ironclad.31  Edward Reed was quick to warn ‗the Wivern is utterly unfit to 
carry extra top-weight of any kind‘ and the Admiralty sensibly put the torpedo 
boats aside of her outbound voyage.  The naval architect continued to force his 
opinions when he publically stated ‗for general service in China waters she is, in 
my opinion, dangerously unfit‘.32  Reed also gave his opinion that ‗the low-decked 
ships hitherto built are not seagoing, in the proper sense of the term, although 
                                            
29
 Edward James Reed, Our Iron-clad Ships. Their Qualities, Performances, and Costs. (London, 
1869, reprinted Cambridge, 2011), 96, ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Times, 14 February 1880, 
8.   
30
 ‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 15 December 1869, 2. 
31
 ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Times, 14 February 1880, 8. 
32
 ‗H.M.S. Wivern‘, Times, 20 February 1880, 12. 
 20 
proposals have been made to use them for sea service‘.33  Reed was grouping 
all coastal defence ironclads under in the same characterization, but the Laird 
rams had been modified several times since their first commissioning in 1865.  
Bulloch stated that he had ‗designed these ships for something more than 
harbour or even coast defence‘ and based in the colonies they would get more of 
a chance at occasional active service.34  Despite Reed‘s misgivings, in early 
1880, Wivern sailed for the South China Sea via Suez, as the Royal Navy 
needed the larger broadside ironclads for duty in home or Mediterranean waters.   
     The Wivern steamed to Hong Kong although that port had, according to one 
source, ‗little to fear for years to come‘ as reportedly no enemy armoured vessels 
were stationed in the Far East, but Russia posed a growing threat.35  With 
coastal defence ironclads positioned at key British ports in Asia and Australia, the 
Royal Navy was prepared to defend her stations in eastern waters and pursue 
hostile cruisers with similar warships or larger armoured frigates until the enemy 
vessels were sunk, driven into neutral ports, or bottled up in their own defended 
harbours.         
     At Bermuda, the threat of war with the United States had largely declined after 
the resolution of the Alabama Claims in 1872, although international 
emergencies did occasionally occur and required heightened vigilance for those 
warships of the Royal Navy assigned to the western Atlantic.  The Scorpion 
would rarely get underway and she ended her days at the island fortress in 1901 
as a target ship.  Raised and repaired for her intended final voyage to a 
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Canadian shipbreaker, she sank while under tow in 1903.36   Her sister continued 
in service as a quayside auxiliary until she was no longer of any use to the Hong 
Kong Naval Base.  After 57 years of intermittent service, the ironclad was sold for 
scrap to a Chinese firm in the summer of 1922 and broken up the following 
year.37    
     Intended for another country‘s navy, the Laird rams never fired a shot in anger 
and served in a Royal Navy which never had a clear, active duty role for them.  
Despite this, they stood watch at the distant fortress bases, ready for service in a 
littoral combat role if needed.  Their forward presence allowed for larger, more 
modern armoured ships of the Royal Navy to remain on home station, the 
Mediterranean, or assigned to cruising duties to protect Britain‘s interests in 
waters increasing populated with ironclads from rival powers.  When combined 
with such innovations as the submarine telegraph, modern dry docks, mines, 
torpedoes, and quick firing weapons, they provided an essential fit into the 
colonial base infrastructure.  Unwanted at home, while overseas they were able 
to retain sufficient combat value until the close of the ironclad era.    
     The primary question I will address in this thesis: were the Laird rams 
failures?  Historians regard them as unsatisfactory men-of-war but they were only 
partial failures and that, primarily for only the first years of their existence. 
Archibald‘s comments that they entered service with the Royal Navy for the 
‗wrong reasons‘ and they had ‗no really useful role‘ is flawed on both counts.38  
The ships were acquired ‗for prudent reasons‘, as their procurement by Britain 
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prevented a serious breech with the United States at the height of the Civil War.39  
As Eardley-Wilmot noted, the Laird rams were ‗superior‘ (in construction) to the 
Union monitors, and in this sense gave the Royal Navy a qualitative seagoing 
edge relative to the Federal turret ships, but also in regards to the French fleet.40    
     Although France reportedly had made some advances in ‗technological 
innovations‘ in the early 1860s, debate continues as to how effective those 
developments actually were.41  As these advantages are not considered to be an 
accepted fact, the ‗relative truth‘ is likely a temporary advantage which was 
overcome by a catch up phase in British armoured shipbuilding.  In 1871, Lairds 
would remark that preparing a force of complicated ironclads would take longer 
to make ready for active service than less complex wooden ships, but the skills to 
build those ironclads were acquired by the Birkenhead shipbuilders through rapid 
adaptations and innovations.  The Laird rams were their first armoured ships 
launched at their Merseyside yard, and the experience gained by building those 
warships under a pressing timeline established a trend.  The management and 
workforce acquired the expertise to produce more ironclads to follow; both for the 
Royal Navy and foreign powers.42 
     Not originally intended to fly the White Ensign, the Laird rams were the first of 
over a dozen armoured ships constructed in British yards to foreign orders but 
acquired by the Royal navy during times of international tensions.  Oscar Parkes 
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criticized the Laird rams as ‗among the worst of the bad bargains‘.43  Referring to 
a time when the rams were under construction (1863-1864) Stanley Sandler 
claimed the ironclads were of ‗very problematical worth‘.44  He also claimed these 
sister ships were ‗useless away from protected waters‘ but affirmed, the roles the 
Confederacy intended for these vessels (breaking the blockade and coastal 
operations) were ‗admirable.‘45  These assessments need further qualification.  
When originally acquired, the Lard rams did not perform well in the fleet, but 
when utilized in a role more suited to their original design characteristics, they 
proved up to the tasks.        
     I will highlight the shortcomings, as discovered in their initial voyages, in the 
first chapters and will address modifications, and especially role changes, to 
illustrate their successful mission adaption in the second half of their service 
lives.  I will mainly focus on their twenty years in service from the time of their 
commissioning in 1865 until the conclusion of the 1885 Afghan crisis, when they 
had important, but mainly overlooked deterrent roles. 
     This thesis will set out to fill in the gaps between varying assessments and 
correct misperceptions regarding these warships.  They were not ideal ironclads 
but they did provide useful service far longer than larger, more expensive 
armoured vessels from that time.  I approach this thesis with the objective of 
describing the impact of the Laird rams on the Americans (during the Civil War), 
but later on the Royal Navy, Admiralty, and public in two stages:  firstly, their 
early years while in British waters (including their construction) and, the second 
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stage, following their assignment to overseas naval bases.  I will illustrate 
through government records, secondary works, and contemporary press 
accounts, a view overlooked by historians. The Laird rams played a significant, 
but largely forgotten role as coastal defenders at distant bases.  This was the 
mission for which they were most suited.  Created in haste and with a vague 
concept of use along the coasts of North America, they were not designed solely 
for a blue water role.  They were sent out and left on distant stations, ready 
should Britain have need for them in colonial service. 
    Chapter one will outline the reasons Lairds was the shipyard chosen by the 
Confederates to build armoured warships to contest the Union fleet, as the South  
was hampered by a limited industrial base and a fragile transportation system.  
The Southern States did not have the ability to build an armoured force of 
suitable size or technical capability to counter the Federal ironclad threat, and the 
proximity to the Liverpool transportation systems, coupled with the abundance of 
skilled labour, gave Merseyside an unparalleled advantage for the hard-pressed 
Confederates.   
     Chapter Two will describe the difficulties both Confederate and Union agents 
faced while the rams were being built.  Central to this area is the confusion, legal 
limitations, and varying interpretations of neutrality as both combatants sought 
the good will of the British government, financial support of British banking 
houses as well as armaments and manufacturing expertise from Britain‘s 
industrial firms.  Espionage and subterfuge were employed by the combatants as 
both the Federals and Southerners were competing largely in Britain for similar 
products and in many cases, with the same provider, over hard to obtain 
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resources.  It was a race to acquire, as much as a race to prevent the acquisition 
of key weapons.                    
     The Third Chapter will showcase the Laird ironclads in service with the Royal 
Navy.  Their début as armoured cruisers in the Channel Fleet was a dismal 
failure due to both their design limitations, and lack of a clear mission.  Britain 
possessed the two ironclads but did not know how to employ them.  One British 
newspaper mentioned the two ironclads and described how ‗A Naval Revolution‘ 
had taken place in the 1860s when shipyards in Britain and France ‗set to work 
hammering and clinking at once‘.46  Numbers of armoured warships mattered 
during times of increased foreign tensions.  Building the latest ironclad was one 
important component of calculations of national power.  Using them with some 
effectiveness had to be determined after the Admiralty put them through their 
trials and exercised with a fleet of recently commissioned but usually dissimilar 
types of armourclads.               
     Chapter Four will examine the evolution of roles for the two turret ships during 
the 1870s and early 1880s. In the archives of the National Maritime Museum 
annex at Woolwich Arsenal, the plans of a modernized Wivern documented her 
mid-life transformation from a fully rigged warship into a more lethal variation, 
reliant on steam propulsion almost exclusively.  Freed from a canopy of canvas 
and shrouds, this ironclad, and her sister, were remade into powerful coastal 
warships equal to most foreign seagoing rivals.  Not suitable for home 
squadrons, they were sent out to defend key naval bases on the edge of empire.  
This concept is referred to in today‘s military parlance as ‗Forward Presence‘ and 
the Scorpion and Wivern performed admirably in that role.  This assignment of 
naval assets, especially in the case of the Lairds-built rams, was not made until 
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later in their service lives.  When remade to take advantage of their design 
features and placed in a role more suited to colonial duties, they gave good 
service.   
     As coaling stations and dockyards became essential elements for power 
projection capabilities on a global scale, the Royal Navy required defences 
tailored for the needs of key installations far from home waters.  The factors 
involved in preparing for an effective harbour and coastal defence, proved to 
have ‗peculiar difficulties‘ throughout the British Empire.47  It was in this colonial 
coastal defence role, where the two ironclads rams found the right fit for a variety 
of local missions on foreign stations.  Commenting on the issues of an efficient 
harbour defence, the Adelaide South Australian Register of 3 June 1875 
remarked that the scheme for defence had to ‗be adjusted in varying proportions 
according to the character of the harbour to be defended‘.48          
     Another feature of this chapter will also highlight the role of the submarine 
telegraph as a tool for imperial defence planning in the 1870s-1880s and the rise 
of military intelligence as a permanent feature of the imperial administration in the 
age of near instance communications.  As telegraphic communications networks 
spread across the Empire, the Admiralty was able to dispatch squadrons to crisis 
areas at key moments (including during the 1878 Russian war scare), but was 
also compelled to retain powerful warships for coastal defence tasks to provide 
protection for colonial bases while the fleet was away.   
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     Cable landings and coaling stations offered Britain both security and more 
points vulnerable to attack by potentially hostile foreign cruisers.  To meet this 
challenge, Colonial defences were improved, with fixed and mobile assets 
provided for layered protection against potential adversaries.  When recalled to 
periodic active duty from reserve, the Laird rams served as armoured defenders, 
and with the smaller gunboats and torpedo boats, were tasked with safeguarding 
colonial waters during times of crisis.  Requiring smaller crews, these ironclads 
provided colonial military authorities with on-station firepower for short durations 
without tying down major warships needed for offensive missions away from the 
main British colonial bases.  Alfred Mahan warned that unless the treasury of a 
nation was ready to take on the burden of ‗practically unlimited expenditures, 
bigger ships mean fewer ships‘.49  The two Laird turret rams served a valuable 
deterrent role at key bases and they were able to fill that role with minimal 
expense to the exchequer.   
     Chapter Five, will discuss the role these coastal defence ironclads played in 
securing the key naval bases of Bermuda and Hong Kong as other navies also 
expanded to carry out their imperial missions.  Britain had to use all available 
armoured vessels in order to safeguard her key ports and still retain sufficient 
forces for policing work.  During the 1885 Russian war scare, the Laird rams 
were available for service as reserve training ships, and ready for colonial 
defence purposes.  The role of small training ships as proposed by Reed, was 
termed a ‗most valuable suggestion‘ by Major A. Moncrieff in his 1875 proposals 
for the composition of harbour defence forces.50       
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     As the Russian Pacific base at Vladivostok grew in strategic importance and 
more of the Czars warships were assigned there, the Admiralty in London 
assigned more British warships to the Far East to counter the Russian build up.  
British naval intelligence efforts during the 1880s were focused on attack 
planning against key harbours and coastal installations during times of war, and 
methods for attack and defence were examined in detail.  This chapter will also 
discuss the threat of commerce raiders during the 1880s, and the utility of the 
coastal defence warships as a safeguard against the enemy cruiser.  Another 
issue discussed is the development of the naval mine as a weapon for improved 
colonial defence.  Envisioned as an area denial weapon, the mines also needed 
protection by boat crews, which in turn needed the protection of the smaller 
ironclad coastal defence ships in order to provide the layered security of key 
home and colonial bases. 
     The conclusion will detail several Admiralty intelligence plans for both coastal 
defence and coastal attack operations against would-be rivals.  These plans from 
the 1880s, demonstrated how important the coastal attack role was for the Royal 
Navy during these years and how ships like the Laird rams could not be released 
for these missions as they were too valuable in their defence roles.  This 
assessment is completely opposite of Ian Buxton‘s view that ‗it was strategically 
unsound for a major power to build coast defence vessels‘.51  They were 
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essential, but overlooked parts of what Lawrence Sondhaus referred to as ‗the 
naval deterrents of yesterday‘.52   
     Though obsolete, they remained useful until their final days.  Only when quick 
firing weapons, the improved Whitehead Torpedo, and the heavy steel guns 
came into service, were these warships rendered non-effective. Reclassed as 
Coastal Defence Ironclads by early 1892, these guardships were still on limited 
duty until the end of the century.53  Deprived of permanent crews, the guardships 
were stopgap protectors until emergencies called them back into service or the 
occasional drill or squadron evolution was required.  Both Laird-built sisters 
served in the less-than-preferred, but useful (perhaps even expendable) role as 
guardians of vital forward operating bases in the more distant corners of the 
British Empire until the end of the ironclad era.   
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                        CHAPTER ONE 
 
          Industry and Innovation: Building the Laird Rams 1862-1863 
 
     The two Lairds armourclads, built from 1862-1865, reflect concepts of 
naval power in transition, from the broadside of multiple guns to the rotating 
armoured gun platform with only a few pieces of ordnance.  During these 
years, the ironclad was a new innovative weapons system, armed with guns 
of increasing size and ballistic power.  The design of ironclad men-of-war 
was understood during these years to represent what had been termed a 
‗revolution‘ in naval affairs.  The standard of what constituted sufficient 
armour and superior firepower was rapidly changing, and governments 
searched to create a suitable ironclad design which could ‗stand such shot 
as improved science will bring to bear against them‘.54  The Lairds-built 
armoured vessels were bold attempts to answer that design dilemma.                                      
     The Lairds ironclads were built around offensive concepts for warships at 
that time: the ram and the turret.  The sister ironclads were a manifestation 
of both innovative designs and compromises, packed into what was then 
considered to be a moderate sized hull.55  They were hybrid men-of-war, 
designed and built for a Confederate Navy, desperate for effective armoured 
vessels.  The builder, though highly experienced in the art of iron 
shipbuilding, improvised as construction on the two vessels progressed.  
                                            
54
 Colin F. Baxter, ‗Lord Palmerston: Panic Monger or Naval Pacemaker?‘ Social Science, 47, 
(autumn, 1972), 205. Baxter quotes from the October 1860 London Quarterly Review, 296-297, 
re: the ‗Revolution‘ of ironclad shipbuilding.  Also see: ‗Iron-Plated Frigates‘, Dublin Evening 
Packet and Correspondent, 2 October 1860, 2, and the ‗Revolution‘ in ironclad construction: ‗The 
gorgeous Line-of-battle ship [sic] which inspired our youth…is doomed‘.      
55
 Warren F. Spencer, The Confederate Navy in Europe. (Tuscaloosa, 1983), 83.  
 31 
Confederate and Union officials in Europe also adapted to circumstances by 
using legal precedent and subterfuge to accelerate or stop the building of 
these potentially decisive warships.56           
     Rarely mentioned by historians, and usually then only in the context of 
the Civil War, these two sister ironclads have been dismissed, largely based 
upon limited accounts of their early years.  Yet, they were game changers, 
not only in terms of a potential fight against armoured warships, but also for 
technological advancement and the precedent they offered for international 
relations.  They were ‗first‘ in several aspects of the development of the 
ironclad, during their building stage and later during subsequent refits.   
     These armoured vessels, built by Lairds of Birkenhead, were intended to 
buy time for the beleaguered Confederacy during the Civil War and would 
have complicated the Federal prosecution of the conflict.  Because of this, 
completion and planned deployment of these warships was pursued by the 
Confederate Navy with skill and urgency; while the Union sought all 
diplomatic means to prevent their acquisition by the determined foe.  
     The Laird rams, were of vital importance for both the North and the 
South, and the Union efforts to block their sortie from the Mersey estuary 
strained relations between London and Washington to the breaking point. 
Union Navy Secretary Gideon Welles received reports that caused ‗serious 
apprehensions‘ among some of his admirals on blockade duty over fears 
the Lairds-built armourclads should leave the Mersey under Confederate 
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colours.57  The fears were justified as Confederate Navy Secretary Stephen 
Mallory intended to use the vessels to raise the blockade, and at the 
outbreak of the war, regarded the procession of ‗an iron-armored [sic] ship 
as a matter of the first necessity‘.58   
     Completed in 1865, the two Lairds ironclad rams were seen as failures.  
Reed, described them as being perhaps the poorest examples of British 
armoured vessels.59  The comparison was made largely against broadside 
ships, as the Laird armourclads, were considered when building, to have 
‗possessed a combination of qualities‘.60  The qualities and shortcomings of 
the two turret rams would come to light during their sea trials, subsequent 
voyages, and refits in the late 1860s, but they were among the first 
seagoing turrets ships built, and represented a bold evolutionary step for 
warship design.  The experience gained by Lairds during the construction of 
the rams also advanced Britain‘s technological edge over France during the 
ironclad race between the two powers in the early to mid-1860s.61                    
     Indeed the Lairds armourclads were failures but only as they were 
originally (and incompletely) constructed.  A more inclusive answer needs 
episodic qualification as the ships were adapted to new weapons and role 
changes throughout their service lives.  This chapter will attempt to illustrate 
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efforts to build, under some secrecy, two of the most advanced warships of 
the 1860s.   
     These two warships were known in both the American and British press 
as the ‗Laird rams‘ but that description is somewhat of a misnomer.62  The 
first portion of the identifier is correct and without contention, for they were 
built by the Lairds shipyard of Birkenhead and incorporated design features 
from those master shipbuilders.  The pair of Lairds armoured vessels were 
blends of innovative design features, merged with more accepted forms of 
propulsion and weapons.  The Confederates selected Lairds to build the two 
warships primarily for two factors: location and reputation. 
     In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain was the determining factor in terms 
of finance and industrial products necessary to fight a modern war.  By 
1860, Britain produced 53% of the world‘s iron, 50% of its coal, and took in 
almost half of the raw cotton produced globally for her cloth mills.63  Britain 
was acknowledged as the leading industrial and mercantile power, with 
economists referring to her as the centre of global trade.  Britain‘s markets 
and financial houses held the world‘s purse strings and her industries had 
the capacity to build and transport every deadly instrument for the arsenals 
and navies of both the North and the South.  This was certainly true for 
warship construction, and the Southern States sent agents to Britain to 
acquire men-of-war in the shortest possible time.   
     Confederate flag officer Josiah Tattnell served as the commander of a 
hodgepodge of requisitioned tugs, packet steamers and the few 
underpowered ironclads outfitted and armed to defend the Confederacy‘s 
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coasts and confided to a visiting British journalist during the war:  ‗Long 
before the South has a fleet to cope with the North, my bones will be 
whitening in the grave‘.64 
     British shipyards and factories had the means, both in terms of capacity 
and skilled hands, to make up for what the secessionists lacked.  British 
neutrality laws were also less strict than were those of France, as French 
subjects were prohibited from assisting with the armament of a warship 
intended for either of the American belligerents in ‗any manner whatever‟.65  
The ambiguity of British legal definitions of what constituted equipment and 
armament, left the door open for the Southerners to seek out shipbuilding 
contracts in the leading industrial nation on earth.  The French were 
expanding their dockyard capabilities but, as one Confederate Naval officer 
noted: ‗a practical man who wanted a first-class ship and engines, or a large 
quantity of well-made arms for quick delivery, or a batch of great guns in 
which he could feel confidence, or any heavy iron or steel work, would 
almost instinctively come to England to supply his want‘.66   
     The major British iron shipbuilders had a clear advantage of established 
reputations based upon long-nurtured mechanical skills.  London was a 
major shipbuilding centre however, the real strength lay in the builders‘ 
yards near the coal and iron ore further north. Rail rates for transporting coal 
and iron were high; yet, labour costs were lower in other parts of Britain than 
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in the south of England.  The advantages in experience and reputation 
which had long proven beneficial to the yards and workshops on the 
Thames, changed in the mid-1850s with the advances in iron shipbuilding.  
London‘s specialized shipbuilding trade unions were slower to adapt to 
changes in iron manufacture.67  The linkage between shipping, rail and 
manufacturing firms in closer proximity to the coal fields, cast Merseyside to 
the forefront.  The region offered an enticing list of capabilities for the 
Americans (both Confederate and Union) interested in ships and equipment 
for their navies and weapons for their armies.68  Shipyards on the Thames 
were not an option for the Confederate Navy‘s ironclad program, as the 
shipyards were too close to the U.S. Mission in London and Union spies 
could too readily gain access to any ship under construction on the river.69  
Unlike the commerce raiders, armoured warships could not be disguised as 
merchant vessels while under construction.    
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     The shipbuilders on the Thames created quality vessels for the higher 
prices charged but another factor prevented their selection by the 
Confederates.  London had a higher proportion of shipwrights skilled in 
wooden shipbuilding and smaller numbers of boilermakers and ironworkers.  
The yards in other areas of the United Kingdom could build iron ships faster 
than the highly unionized shipbuilders of London.70  Time was a crucial 
factor for the Confederates, and they were willing to sacrifice some issues of 
quality in favour of having an armoured warship ready for service at the 
earliest possible moment.                
 
Selecting Lairds  
 
     The Lairds shipyard was an ideal choice to build ironclad warships as they 
were early pioneers of iron steamship construction, and remained innovators in 
the trade during the era.  Beginning as a boilermaker in 1824, the grandfather of 
the clan William Laird, expanded into iron shipbuilding five years later.71  One of 
the first iron steamers in the United States, the John Randolph, was purchased in 
1834 from Lairds for use around Savannah.72  The engine was built in Liverpool 
by Fawcett, Preston and Company and shipped to America with the hull sections 
of the Randolph.73  The sections of the ‗well arranged‘ hull were made from rolled 
boiler plate, fitted together by a five man work crew sent out by the shipbuilder to 
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create the 100 foot long vessel.74  This utilization of boiler plate, and similar 
construction techniques, revealed a natural progression of Lairds from the 
manufacturer of boilers into the field of iron shipbuilding.  The success of the 
Randolph prompted her owner G. B. Lamar, to acquire two more iron steamboats 
from Lairds in 1836.75  Lairds established its reputation in America as a premier 
builder of the most modern steamships to be had.  This reputation would grow 
beyond Savannah as more clients recognized the durability of the iron-hulled 
steamship.   
     In 1839, the British government ordered its first iron-hulled steamship, the 
packet Dover, from Lairds shipyard, officially known as the Birkenhead Iron 
Works.76  The iron-hulled steamer/auxiliary gunboat Nemesis was built by the 
shipyard, somewhat in secret, in 1840 for the Bengal Marine of the East India 
Company.  Begun in a likely speculative venture before she was acquired for 
Indian service, the then largest iron vessel in the world, was sold in what one 
writer described as ‗a piece of inspired salesmanship‘ and provided vital gunfire 
in the First Opium War.77  Additionally, the Nemesis served as proof that Lairds 
could discreetly build warships which could influence decisive outcomes in 
distant waters against a numerically superior enemy.78  After over two years of 
service in Chinese and Indian waters, the Nemesis docked in Bombay and her 
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hull was examined.  Although the iron plates of her flat bottom were dented and 
some were bent inward several inches as a result of her striking rocks and 
occasionally going aground, she remained remarkably seaworthy.  Despite the 
mishaps, her six watertight compartments had contributed to her strength and 
durability on distant coasts.  An official report stated the Nemesis remained ‗as 
tight as a bottle‘.79   
     In the tense aftermath of the Texas Revolution, Lairds built the 778 ton iron 
warship Guadalupe for Mexico in 1842.80  The ship sailed for Mexico with British 
officers and crew and in so doing, presented the British Government with a legal 
dilemma contrary to the neutrality law enacted by Parliament in 1819.  Mexico 
and Texas had become rivals as a result of an ill-defined border between the two 
republics, and the Laird ship with another iron-hulled steamer built in London, 
(both vessels had British crews), gave Mexico a qualitative naval superiority.  
This issue was resolved due to the client failing to adhere to the financial terms of 
the contracts.  The ships were transferred to British owners before they reached 
the waters of the Gulf of Mexico following repossession due to non-payment. 81 
     The Royal Navy laid down its first iron-hulled frigate from Lairds, but she 
would not enter service in her intended role.  This ship was commissioned in 
1846 as a troopship after the Admiralty became uneasy over the use of an iron 
hull in a man-of-war.82  Beginning with gunnery experiments against the small 
iron steamer Ruby at Portsmouth that year, cannon fire had proven (for the 
moment) that iron did not have sufficient durability to withstand shot at close 
range.  Wooden hulls received damage but timbers could be easily replaced. 
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Early iron hull plates used in the target ship were ‗open and very jagged‘ 
following shot from 32-pounder Smoothbore Muzzleloaders (SBML) and 8-inch 
guns which had raked the Ruby from end to end.  The guns ‗so tore the ribs and 
plates that it was evident that a similar vessel so situated would be in danger of 
being instantly sunk by one well directed shot‘.83  
     Lairds would build their frigate-turned-troopship to the best standards of 
modern iron construction then available.  In spite of her iron construction, the ill-
fated H.M.S. Birkenhead sank on 27 February 1852, after striking rocks at the 
aptly named Danger Point on the Cape of Good Hope, resulting in the loss of 
over 400 lives.84  It was later determined that modifications to convert her for 
duties as a troopship had weakened her iron structure and contributed to her 
rapid break up on the rocky coast of South Africa.  Openings were cut into the 
bulkheads ‗to make more easy the passage from compartment to compartment in 
the hold‘.85    
    This tragedy did not severely damage the reputation of the shipbuilder on the 
Mersey and almost 300 vessels, many of iron hulls, had been built by the Laird 
family from 1829 to 1861.86  Lairds had expanded briefly across the Mersey and 
took on another Liverpool yard at Dingle in order to build mortar vessels for the 
Royal Navy during the Crimean War (1854-56). This temporary move was in 
response to the Birkenhead facility being remade into a more complete 
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shipbuilding operation, purpose-built for the limited riverfront space available.87  
The designs of London architect, James Abernethy, recast the Birkenhead yard 
with four graving docks and a gridiron platform, which allowed repair of ships at 
low tide when space was not available in the docks.88  New workshops, 600 feet 
by 60 feet, were erected during the Crimean War and lined the outer confines of 
the shipyard.89  The workshops were ‗requisite for carrying on the business of 
building and repairing ships of iron and wood, and of making boilers and 
repairing machinery‘.90  By 1861, the privately-held Lairds shipyard had arguably, 
become ‗the most complete of the kind in the country‘ and had grown into an 
important shipbuilder employing 3000 men, complete with workshops which 
manufactured boilers and marine engines of 80 to 450 horsepower.91  The 
shipyard was a late entry into the field of marine engine manufacture, and did not 
produce its first steam engines for ships made at their adjoining slipways until 
1857.92  One noted civil engineer remarked in 1866 of his colleagues, that men of 
John Laird‘s type, ‗had to acquire our professional knowledge as best we could, 
often not till it was wanted for immediate use, generally in haste and precariously, 
and merely to fulfill the purpose of the hour‘.93   
     The men who built iron-hulled ships, boilers and steam engines to propel 
them, learned by doing.  This knowledge was won through application of the 
shipbuilders‘ arts, business acumen, and the special ability to lead the thousands 
employed.  Rising costs and constrained construction schedules brought on by 
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iron shipbuilding moved Lairds to embrace new methods in labour saving 
machines while, simultaneously, maintaining the benefits of a hands-on 
management style.  One account hailed the owners/operators of this shipyard as 
reaching a point of achievement which placed them second to none in the United 
Kingdom.  When compared with other shipyards in Britain, this Merseyside 
industrial hive was renowned for its reputation for craftsmanship and was 
recognized by the British Government and foreign customers for the iron 
steamers it built.94  By the middle of the nineteenth century, private shipbuilders 
in Britain achieved an advantage when securing Admiralty contracts.  Although 
the work was divided between commercial shipbuilders and the Royal dockyards, 
‗at all times a part only of the naval tonnage of Britain was built in the Royal 
dockyards; the rest of the construction was let out by contract to private firms‘.95    
     The spirit of constant improvements in shipbuilding and management 
methods made Lairds a shipbuilder sought by both American combatants.  By 
mid-1861, it was apparent that the Civil War would not be over after a short, 
single campaign.  That year the Laird sons, William, John the younger, and 
Henry, had assumed day-to-day operations at the shipyard as their father took 
his seat as the Liberal MP for Birkenhead.  John Laird had retired from 
shipbuilding to support local projects and had stood for Parliament, winning his 
seat in December 1861.96  This was the city Laird and his family had been the 
driving force in recreating from a collection of villages into a manufacturing 
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centre.97  By mid-century, Birkenhead was ‗the city of the future with expectations 
which the reality by no means disappointed‘.98  A planned municipality, complete 
with parks, sewers and gas lines put in before the streets, houses and shops 
were built, this booming, shipbuilding city was, second to much larger Liverpool, 
the other contributor to Merseyside. The expansion of shipbuilding, 
manufacturing and trade on both side of the river was termed ‗the grandest 
monument which the nineteenth century has erected to the genius of Commerce 
and Peace‘.99 
     Commerce would take precedent over peace and Lairds had honed their skills 
in order to build warships for both the Admiralty and others.  Lairds was chosen 
to build the Confederacy‘s pair of sister ironclads not only due to their reputation 
for expert craftsmanship and business skills but also for their willingness to work 
with the secessionists.  They also had the ability, as demonstrated by the 
Nemesis, to work in secrecy.100  The Lairds-owned Birkenhead Iron Works was 
the obvious choice. However, an experience gap existed which had been 
overlooked when construction began in 1862.  Lairds had never completed an 
armoured warship before this contract.101                                                                                                     
 
Securing the Contract 
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  The Laird family business was too proficient to be ignored without 
consequences, and the contract was an avenue for influence with industrial 
leaders as well as with some government elites in Britain.  Through financial 
arrangements with British industrial concerns, the warring Americans could link 
key leaders in Britain to their cause or deny access to their opponent.  This bitter 
lesson was to be learned by the Union after Confederate purchasing agents in 
Britain secured contracts with key manufacturers early in the war.  
     The Union was first off the blocks but stumbled badly in the race to acquire 
British-built men-of-war.  Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy, Gustavus Vasa 
Fox, favoured the idea of building two double-turreted ironclads in Britain with 
which the Federal Navy could attack the key South Carolina port of 
Charleston.102  This plan was relayed through John T. Howard of New York who 
had approached Lairds to seek their estimates.  Fox proposed a pair of ironclads 
which would be equipped with two revolving turrets and protected by iron plates 
4½ inches thick on each low-hulled vessel.  The turrets, or ‗towers‘ as he called 
them, would house  a single 11-inch gun in each,  fitted to a hull which had a 
proposed length of 205 feet, a beam of 47 feet, and a draught not to exceed 14 
feet, later reduced to 12 feet.  The ironclad as envisioned, was ‗not a sea boat‘, 
but was intended as an ocean-going floating battery.103   
     These armoured vessels were to have a deliberately low-hull height above 
water in order to present a harder target for the gunners of Confederate forts and 
shore batteries.  The Fox-Howard ironclads were designed as mastless steamers 
and were equipped with one rudder at the bow and another at the stern to insure 
steering, if one section was damaged by shellfire.  These were not defenceless 
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iron steamers devoid of armament.  Resembling a New York ferryboat, these 
armourclads were designed to get into a contested harbour and return without 
having to come about if mauled by enemy batteries.  In Charleston, Confederate 
defences were positioned as close as 300 yards from the main channel, but with 
these ships, the twin rudder ironclads would have been able to go astern and 
quickly maneuvre away from the guns if the action was too mauling.104  
     The Assistant Secretary wanted them ‗finished complete, with guns and 
everything appertaining‘.105  The letters from Fox to Howard and his subsequent 
discussions with Lairds clearly revealed that a British shipbuilder was asked to 
build two men-of-war for a belligerent, not to provide unarmed iron-hulled vessels 
which could be converted into warships once acquired by the United States 
Navy.106   The eldest of the Laird brothers, William, travelled to New York and 
arrived on the Cunarder Persia on 21 May 1861, with the intention of securing a 
contract to build two ironclads for the government in Washington.107  The attempt 
failed.  
     Had Fox engaged William Laird to build ships for the United States in those 
uncertain days in the summer of 1861, the Birkenhead Iron Works would have 
had a contractual obligation to the North.  The Assistant Secretary had given in to 
pressure from Welles to have a fleet of armoured ships built only in the United 
States as the Navy Department was pressured by Congress to support Union 
shipbuilders.  Washington lost its best opportunity to kill off the Confederate 
Navy‘s efforts in Britain before they matured into custom-built cruisers and the 
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much more dangerous ironclad rams.108  Had the Union utilized a few contracts 
to keep shipyards such as Lairds busy with orders for Union armoured warships, 
the Confederates would have been frozen out of the British ironclad market or, at 
the very least, greatly constricted, as Lairds was already engaged with an 
Admiralty contract and had building capacity for a few more ironclads during the 
early-mid 1860s.109   
     In that era, business relationships were considered confidential undertakings 
and governments only reluctantly intervened.  Lairds would later claim ‗It is a rule 
well recognized in all Trading Establishments, that an Order whilst under 
Execution is the property of the person giving it, and that a builder has no right to 
make public the orders or instructions of his employers‘.110  John Laird, the senior 
member of the shipbuilding firm (until 1861) was to state that contract negations 
were ‗of a confidential character‘ and his decision to keep that confidence was 
also influenced by what he termed in 1863, ‗the present state of law in 
America‘.111  Lairds were anxious to protect their American clients (both 
Confederate and Union) from American prosecution. 
     Despite the blockade, the relationships between the representatives of the 
Confederate Government in Britain, key ship owners/financiers like Liverpool-
based George Trenholm (a native of South Carolina), and Merseyside merchants 
and shipbuilders, served the South well in the laissez-faire approach to business 
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then prevalent.112  Where the North was restricted by too much bureaucratic 
oversight and interference, the Confederate agents in Liverpool had a free hand 
to make contracts and allow the merchants and shipbuilders to speculate in the 
arms trade with only minimal direction from the Confederate Government in 
Richmond, Virginia.  By early 1862, Southern agents had successfully linked 
Lairds with the Confederacy for the duration of the War.  The Union would pay a 
heavy price for delay and official Washington intransigence.  
     James D. Bulloch was the Confederate Navy‘s key officer assigned to Britain.  
His desk was located at the offices of the Southern shipping and financial 
magnate George Trenholm, at 10 Rumford Place near the Liverpool 
waterfront.113  This office was the epicentre of Confederate operations in both 
Britain and continental Europe.  The selection of Bulloch as the Confederate 
Navy‘s purchasing agent was perhaps the best foreign posting made by the 
Southerners during the war.  As a former Lieutenant in the peacetime U.S. Navy, 
Bulloch had gained experience in American men-of-war, merchantmen, and 
select mail steamers on scheduled runs from New York.114  After resigning his 
commission, he rose rapidly in the merchant marine to command steamers along 
the eastern and Gulf coasts of the United States.115  In December of 1861, 
Bulloch, having joined the new Confederate Navy, led the Greenock-built 
steamer Fingal through the blockade with stands of Enfield rifles, pistols, 
gunpowder, medicines, blankets, sabres and four cannon: enough arms to equip 
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a division.116  At no time during the remainder of the war, was a cargo of 
weapons and military supplies in such quantity ever again shipped through the 
blockade.117   
     While in Savannah, Bulloch saw the river steamers, in the service of the 
Confederate Army, conveying men and supplies to the fortifications down river.  
One such iron-hulled vessel was the vintage Chatham, another Lairds-built 
steamer still in operation after over twenty years of service.118  Bulloch needed 
only look over the side of the Fingal to see efficient and dependable examples of 
the iron shipbuilders‘ art.  Lairds was a preferred choice for the Confederate 
Navy‘s chief purchasing agent in Britain even before his return.  Bulloch‘s 
attention to duty, his discretion, and his drive for results made him irreplaceable 
for the Confederate war effort.  He would never again go to sea in the service of 
the South, neither through fault nor failure, but as the cost of his success in the 
Fingal and subsequent efforts in Britain. 
     The Liverpool merchants, A. E. Byrne & Co., were the go-betweens who 
introduced Bulloch to shipbuilders and brokers.119  Andrew and Thomas Byrne 
assisted Bulloch in obtaining ships and contracts for his blockade runners, 
cruisers, and armourclads.120  Andrew Bryne had purchased the Fingal for 
Bulloch, and they were paid a 1 per cent commission by Lairds for the contract to 
build the Rebel cruiser, C.S.S. Alabama.121  Although their role is not fully 
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understood, A. E. Byrne & Company may have introduced Bulloch to the Lairds 
when he first came to Liverpool.  Bryne & Co. were also paid a commission by 
Lairds (likely a higher rate than that for the more conventional Alabama) when 
the Birkenhead firm secured the contract to build the two rams for the 
Confederacy.122  The amount of commission paid by Lairds to Bryne & Co. for 
the two Bulloch armourclads is unknown, but in 1870 the Dutch Consul in 
Liverpool, Mr. J. W. S. May, brought legal action against Lairds for their failure to 
pay him a 2½ per cent commission for the Dutch turret ship Prins Hendrik Der 
Nederlanden and other smaller coastal ironclads the Birkenhead shipbuilder was 
engaged to build for the Royal Netherlands Navy.123                               
     During the Civil War, the closely attuned interdependent merchants on 
Merseyside proved to be a valuable source of expertise for the Confederacy.  
Access to both key industrial leaders and material needed for the war effort 
proved to be a pivotal diplomatic, and especially, mercantile victory for the South. 
Without these business agreements, which were nearly as ironclad as the 
armoured ships themselves, Lairds and their associates would not have become 
as dependent on the South for their profits as they eventually came to be.  
Washington lost leverage just as the Confederate gained their desperately 
needed entrée to British shipyards and factories.  The Birkenhead Iron Works 
proved to be a vital link to the chain of access.  In May 1861, Mallory, obtained 
permission from the Congress of the Southern States, then meeting in 
Montgomery, Alabama, to construct armoured vessels in Britain or France.124  
Mallory intended the armoured vessels to be equipped with Armstrong 
breechloaders, but he informed Bulloch the armament required careful 
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investigation and if the breechloaders were not suitable, then other guns of ‗equal 
merit‘ could be substituted.125       
     Following the Battle of Hampton Roads in March of 1862, Bulloch entered into 
a contract with the Laird Brothers for the construction of two armoured rams at a 
cost of £93,750, each.126  The timing of the Lairds contract was ironic as it was 
influenced by Bulloch more than by the battle between the American ironclads. 
The contract was signed soon after Bulloch‘s return to Britain following his 
voyage on the Fingal which had been his priority, as previous instructions from 
Mallory ordered him to deliver the urgently needed supplies to Savannah.127  
     The design of the ironclads had been modified from William Laird‘s proposed 
armoured men-of-war first offered to the Union in 1861.  Each ship was now 
designed with a length of 224½ feet, a beam of 42½ feet and a draught of 15½ 
feet forward, increasing to 17 feet aft, with engines, coal, guns, equipment and 
supplies loaded. The hull and armour weighed 1870 tons, with armour alone 
comprising almost a sixth of that amount.  Equipment comprised another 860 
tons for a total displacement, when all combined, of 2750 tons.128  Armour plate 
4½ inches thick, protected the sides of the vessels with thinner 3 inch plates 
forward comprising the bow and 2 inch plates aft for the stern.  The armour belt 
descended 3¼ feet under the waterline and provided extra protection against 
enemy shot or attack by a ram.  Teak added to the already robust design with 
                                                                                                                                  
124
 ORN. II, 2 (1921), 64, 68, 70-72. 
125
 Ibid, 64. (Also see:   William N. Still, Jr. Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads 
[sic]. (Columbia, 1971), 9-11)   
126
 Parkes, British Battleships. (1966), 78. 
127
 ORN, II, 2 (1921), 65. 
128
 Parkes, British Battleships. (1966), 78, 80. 
 50 
thick 10 inch planks on the sides and 8 inch planks providing backing at the bow 
and stern.129   
     Each ship was heavier than the original 1861 design and the concept for their 
employment had also changed.  No longer intended to force their way into 
Charleston harbour around the forts guarding the entrance, these ironclads were 
modeled with a new objective.  The Laird ironclads were refashioned to attack 
Federal warships near the American coasts and to raise the blockade of 
Southern ports.  Attacking land defences was now but a secondary consideration 
and these armourclads were built to stand up to the Union monitors then coming 
down the ways.         
     The Laird sons had a flair for ship design.  William headed the drawing 
department at his father‘s yard, but the other brothers would soon take over 
crucial positions in the firm as the business grew.  During the Crimean War, John 
the younger visited friends in Marseilles, also observed French builders in 
Toulon, and would later copy some of their business practices.130  Henry was the 
principal design talent, having apprenticed in the drawing department of the 
French yard of Messagerie Maritimes (also known as the Messagerie Imperiales) 
of La Ciotat near Marseilles.131  Although the shipyard was described as ‗nothing 
warlike…a mere shipyard of an ordinary kind‘, after the Crimean War, it was 
visited by a Russian engineer who was on a mission to observe its operations in 
order to obtain ideas for the redevelopment of a shipyard in Russia.132  
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     The La Ciotat facility did not remain ‗ordinary‘ and by early 1859, was 
developing an iron shield designed to protect the single cannon and men for 
each of the eleven light gunboats it was constructing for the French 
Government.133  The shield of armoured plates moved with the gun as it rotated 
on a swivel platform, and the oval iron ‗shed‘ was designed to deflect enemy 
shot.  The mechanism that rotated the gun shield was itself armoured, and its 
separate iron cap was designed to turn when struck and thus not fully absorb the 
impact of a direct hit.134   
     These French ideas for a rotating iron gun shield were undoubtedly observed 
by Henry Laird who incorporated this design knowledge into his work when he 
returned to Britain.  He took over the drawing department of the Birkenhead Iron 
Works from William after his return from the Continent, and it was probably he 
who was instrumental in designing and modifying plans of the armoured ships 
which would later become Bulloch‘s rams.135 The willingness to apprentice and 
collect data on French shipbuilding practices gave the Lairds a keen appreciation 
of the rapidly changing aspects of their art and an insight into the latest building 
techniques.136 
     The British press remarked on the flurry of activity at the Birkenhead Iron 
Works, confusing a suspected Confederate cruiser (later named the Alabama) 
with an ironclad Lairds‘ had under construction.  In 1862, the Sheffield 
Independent observed:  
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     „It had been known for some time that a large and powerful iron vessel was   
     being constructed at the dockyard of Messrs. Laird, Birkenhead; but monsters  
     of the deep are so much the order of the day at this establishment that no one  
     troubled his head much about this new production, or cared to remark the  
     extra thickness of the plates which were being used‟.137  
 
Although the newspaper did not give particulars of the warship under 
construction, the headline clearly identified her intended customer as the 
Confederacy.138   
     Bulloch was fortunate as he had contracted with a yard daily gaining 
experience in the art of armoured warship construction.  The practice of differing 
paces of work was not usual in British shipyards during the nineteenth century in 
order to satisfy the more profitable foreign contracts.139  The work on an 
armoured warship intended for the Royal Navy provided the Birkenhead Iron 
Works with a large work force which could flex to speed up work on the two 
armoured turret ships intended for Bulloch.  The armoured ship ordered by the 
Admiralty was allegedly delayed to advance the work on the two smaller 
ironclads.  The work on Admiralty contracts in private shipyards was reported in 
the British press as ‗subordinate‘ to the work on foreign contracts and lesser iron 
projects such as bridge work.140  Lairds were allegedly ‗just jogging on‘ at a 
steady pace on the frigate H.M.S. Agincourt while the Confederate rams were 
pushed forward with ‗spirit‘, but the claim was based on superficial evidence as 
the rams were then in the earlier stages of construction.141  The Admiralty had 
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also contributed to the delay on the Agincourt and other iron steam frigates under 
construction for the Royal Navy, to await gunnery trials against the different 
varieties of armour plate then being produced in Britain.142         
     Historians refer to the ships built for the Confederates with the shipyard 
numbers assigned in the builder‘s book, but rarely mention the ships assigned 
between the numerical gaps linking those ships built for Bulloch.143  The 
contracts between the Confederate ships was an unintended benefit for Bulloch 
as the Union spies mistakenly attributed some of the work to his mission, 
whereas they were contracts for the Admiralty and private shipbuilders. 144              
     The Confederate commerce raider Alabama was the 290th vessel laid down 
by Lairds and was referred to by her number during most of her time at the yard.  
She put to sea as the unarmed steamer Enrica on 29 July 1862.145  Hull 291 was 
ordered on 2 September 1861, and laid down on 30 October in the Lairds‘ 
already crowded yard.146  This vessel was Lairds first armoured warship, the 
Agincourt, second of the Minotaur class, and was among the largest ironclads 
constructed to that time.147  Agincourt had a length of slightly more than 400 feet 
and was to become one of the longest single screw armoured men-of-war ever 
constructed.148  Hull 292 was the 140 ton steamer Defiance, intended for the river 
trade in China.149  This small paddle steamer was soon in operation for her 
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owner Liverpool shipper James Breazley, whom John Laird would later 
lightheartedly refer to as ‗a most suspicious character‘ after local newspapers 
speculated that the Defiance would soon sail not to the Far East, but towards the 
Confederacy.150  In addition to shipbuilding, the Birkenhead Iron Works had also 
established a good reputation for repairing damaged steamships and overhauling 
local tugs and ferryboats, with work praised for thoroughness.151    
     Hull 293 was the paddle tug Columbus, built for Henry Cruse and his partner, 
a Mr. Downham of the ‗Hercules Steam Tug Company of Liverpool‘ in late 
1862.152  Proclaimed as the fastest tug on the Mersey, she was fitted with two 
steam engines which combined at 90 horsepower, to propel her at a top speed of 
14 knots and contributed to her ‗first-rate towing qualities‘.153              
     On 10 June 1862, Bulloch received instructions from Mallory directing him to 
negotiate contracts and begin construction of two ironclads in Britain.  This 
dispatch was dated 30 April but had been delayed by the necessity of 
circumventing the Federal Blockade.  Bulloch had already consulted with the 
‗eminent‘ shipbuilders (Lairds) and had sought plans for two ironclads to be made 
by the same firm, saving £1250 off the price of each vessel.154  As they were built 
from the same set of plans, the result was a savings in both cost and time.155  
Here again, the Lairds‘ business acumen reduced costs for their client and 
prevented any slack in the construction schedules.   
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     The 10 June dispatch from Mallory was belated official approval for the verbal 
agreements Bulloch had made with Lairds to build two ironclads for the 
Confederate Navy.  These two vessels would be referred to by their builders 
numbers ‗294‘ and ‗295‘, a practice that aided the accounting shorthand for the 
various parts and components that went into each ship and also assisted 
Bulloch‘s efforts to obscure the intended end user of the two armoured men-of-
war.  In addition, Bulloch had also entered into a verbal agreement with the 
shipbuilder to facilitate sub-contracting for the armour plate work.156  Lairds 
allowed for the blending of business alliances to speed the work on the ironclads.  
Through the Birkenhead shipbuilder, Merseyside was closely linked to the 
Confederacy‘s naval building efforts.       
   
Return of the Ram 
           
     The second identifier used by contemporary accounts to describe the sister 
armourclad warships under construction at Lairds in 1862 was the moniker of 
‗ram‘.  The latter part of the description is misleading for the ram was but an 
auxiliary weapon of the ships, whose key features were the armoured gun 
turrets.  This throw-back weapon from the ancient Hellenic time of oar-powered 
vessels, had returned to the industrial world of the 1860s due to the advances in 
marine engine manufacture and improvements in the art of metal casting.  The 
iron-hulled, steam-powered ship, fitted with a reinforced prow, could achieve a 
predetermined velocity and would (in theory) deliver a blow against an enemy 
vessel without incurring substantial injury to herself in the process. The ram did 
not overcome the heavy gun, but it permitted a means to deliver a critical strike 
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against a stationary or slow moving enemy in a sea fight.  This was a close 
contact weapon from which there was no assured defence.   
     The ram remerged as a conceptual naval weapon with the adoption of steam 
as more than an auxiliary form of propulsion.  The return of the ram has several 
points of origin, with one deriving from an early nineteenth century maritime 
tragedy.  In 1834, the officer commanding the U.S. Navy Yard at Philadelphia, 
Captain James Barron, proposed that the Navy Department consider his patent 
for the construction of a steamship fitted with a ‗prow‘ or ram.157  Barron claimed 
that the idea came not from ancient history but from the loss of the Nantucket 
whaling ship Essex in 1820.158  That event resulted in the ship sinking after being 
rammed by a whale, and influenced not only Barron, but Herman Melville and 
served as the inspiration of Moby Dick.159  In 1839, Nicolas-Hippolyte Labrousse, 
a Lieutenant in the French Navy, observed the H.M.S. Archimedes demonstrate 
the then new form of steam propulsion, the screw propeller, and realized a 
screw-driven ship could effectively carry a ram.160  In February 1843, the French 
Navy conducted tests at Lorient with a ram attached to a chest weighing some 
fifty tons.  The weighted ram would slide down an incline to crash against 
stationary targets simulating wooden and ironclad ships.  The test results proved 
a ram would inflict damage against the side of another ship, but iron shipbuilding 
was not ready for the realities of a purposeful collision at the required speeds.161   
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     In Britain, Vice Admiral G. R. Sartorius, R.N., proposed the building of ram 
equipped armoured men-of-war to make Britain safe from a French invasion.  
The admiral proposed steam batteries, armed with heavy guns and a ram, to 
challenge an enemy fleet and render wooden warships particularly vulnerable.  
The steam battery as it existed in the mid-1850s did not have sufficient speed or 
maneuvreability to be of service in a sea fight.  His proposal was ridiculed in the 
British press and his steam rams were compared to ‗a couple of infuriate 
buffaloes‘.  The ram equipped armoured men-of-war were dubbed ‗experimental 
baubles‘, concepts for Emperor Napoleon III to waste his money upon as ‗an 
absurd means of revolutionizing the whole system of modern warfare‘.162  The 
proposal to build a screw-driven warship equipped with an armoured prow, would 
remain an idea until the seagoing ironclad came of age.  For the Royal Navy, the 
steam ram came into its own in 1861 as a counter to the more expensive 
armoured steam frigates.163                                          
     The ram equipped steamship became a reality during the first year of the Civil 
War in 1861, when the Confederacy and the Union converted or built ships fitted 
with rams (both ironclads and unarmoured vessels) to fight in close range 
encounters.  The ram was best suited for work in the shallow coastal waters and 
rivers, especially along the Mississippi.164  Although rams were fitted to a mixture 
of steam vessels fighting in American coastal waters in the 1860s, the screw 
propeller made the iron spur a viable weapon as both could be almost completely 
submerged and impervious to enemy fire.                        
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     John Laird‘s name would forever become linked with the ram.  The firm he 
and his sons had grown into a leading builder of armoured warships, was 
acknowledged for their proficiency in providing international clients with this 
weapon of secondary importance, whereas his real impact was in the 
construction of the oceangoing turret ship.  A feature incorporated into the two 
Laird rams were six main watertight bulkheads, with a special emphasis on the 
forward compartments, built to take the impact of ramming.165  These athwartship 
bulkheads also gave the ironclads structural support and were designed to 
prevent the sides from crumpling when the ram ‗struck a heavy blow‘.166   Other 
iron bulwarks were positioned longitudinally to provide each ship with about 
twelve watertight bulkheads, divided at key positions with sliding doors, which 
were also able to ‗resist the pressure of the water.‘167  
     With the launching of the French ironclad, La Gloire in 1859, Britain and 
France embarked on their ironclad race, and the ram reappeared spontaneously 
from the annals of ancient history.  After Britain responded to the iron threat 
across the Channel with the ironclad frigates H.M.S. Warrior and her sister, Black 
Prince, the shipyards building iron-hulled warships for the Royal Navy built ram 
bows almost instinctively.168  Rapid evolution in the size of naval ordnance was 
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not matched with improved accuracy, as guns grew to hurl larger shells against 
iron hull plates of increasing thickness.  Battering mattered in terms of guns and 
the ram.169  John Scott Russell, the builder of the S.S. Great Eastern, would later 
remark that the ram was the true decisive weapon for a warship: ‗give her the 
stem is the order of battle…‘170  
     Britain‘s first iron-hulled ram warship, the frigate H.M.S. Resistance, was 
launched from the yard of Westwood & Baillie of Millwall, London, on 11 April 
1861.171  Over 100 feet shorter than the Warrior but with a beam almost as wide, 
Resistance was according to one London newspaper, ‗Ungainly…Indeed, to call 
her simply ugly is a flattery to which we are unwilling to stoop‘.172  Other British 
newspapers showed less invective as they focused on her offensive capabilities 
and strength of construction.  The 12 April 1861 edition of the London Morning 
Post remarked the ironclad ram would ‗be comparatively invulnerable even to the 
modern improvement of rifled gunnery...her power would be tremendous even if 
opposed to a fleet of timber-built vessels‘.173  The following day, the Newcastle 
Journal remarked of her: ‗a better built ship was never sent afloat‘.174   
     Royal Navy ocean-going ironclads of the 1860s were as varied an assortment 
of designs as were many armoured warships of other nations during that time of 
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transition.  They were not all graceful nor ungainly, just as they were not all 
handy nor good sailors.  One British Admiral who served in many Royal Navy 
ironclads of this era precisely summoned up the deception of appearance over 
performance noting: ‗Good looks do not always accompany good qualities in 
naval architecture any more than in other things‘.175  When placed in 
commission, the Resistance (referred to affectionately by her crew as ‗Old 
Rammo‘) and her sister, Defence, had one distinction other ironclads lacked.  
Their long single gun decks were painted in the black and white chequered 
pattern of the old wooden frigates.  This nod to the familiar Nelsonian paint 
scheme was short-lived and they were covered over in black around 1862.176   
     The hulls of the 294 and 295 were built with a submerged iron ram bow to 
compliment the heavy guns.  The shape of the ram was as an arch, curving 
upward from the keel, similar to that of the Resistance.177  Union warships 
equipped as rams were of mixed hull design, with some extensions also curving 
upward from the keel, and other appendages or ‗overhang‘ extending from the 
prow downwards to rejoin the forepeak midway down the submerged bow.178  
The ram, as first used in the Civil War in America, was a tacked-on afterthought.  
The first steam-driven armoured vessel to enter combat, was the converted 
icebreaker/towboat restyled as the C.S.S. Manassas.  Taken to a New Orleans 
dockyard, cut down, and fitted with a rounded deck, the one inch thick iron 
plating was intended to protect her until she could close with an enemy vessel.179  
Equipped with a single 32-pounder SBML limited to fire ahead only, the little 
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ironclad was also fitted with a cast metal projection at her bow described as, ‗a 
formidable mass of iron…in the form of a knob‘.180    
     In the early hours of 12 October 1861, the Manassas, with a small 
Confederate flotilla of converted wooden gunboats, attacked Union warships at 
anchor in the stretch of the Mississippi River just north of the Gulf of Mexico, 
known as the Head of the Passes.181  At 4:40 a.m., the Manassas came down 
through the fog to strike the steam frigate U.S.S. Richmond, as the larger 
warship was coaling.182  The Richmond had been struck a glancing blow on her 
port bow and suffered only a small hole, five inches in circumference when the 
ram collided.183  Only three planks had been stove in two feet below the 
waterline, and the damage was not the catastrophic hull-tearing smash which the 
Confederates hoped for.184  The Manassas got the worst from the encounter as 
the force of impact caused her to ‗vibrate like an aspen‘.  The impact also caused 
one funnel to fall on her turtle-back upper deck, one of her two engines was 
rendered inoperable, and the ram was broken off.185 
     When the ironclad C.S.S. Virginia buried her prow into the Federal sailing 
sloop U.S.S. Cumberland, on 8 March 1862, the action confirmed the steam ram 
had become a viable weapon in close quarters naval combat.  The sloop sank in 
broad daylight in the anchorage of Hampton Roads, the wide estuary referred to 
as a ‗natural naval amphitheatre‘ where several rivers empty into Chesapeake 
Bay.186  The Virginia had delivered the dramatic blow in front of thousands of 
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opposing Confederate and Union troops lining the shore.  As Labrousse had 
predicted, the ram had overcome a numerically superior enemy and had been 
proven to be a seemingly essential weapon for the armoured warship. 
     A lack of machine works compelled the Confederates to hammer rams out of 
scrap iron, with whatever blacksmiths were available.  Mistakenly, the 
Confederates devoted valuable dockyard resources and skilled manpower to the 
task of making the ram a designed extension of the hull instead of a disposable 
spur used once as a shock weapon and then forgotten to focus on what really 
mattered in a sea fight: Gunnery.  As the war progressed, the ram on 
Confederate ironclads was tapered into the prow with at least one Southern 
ironclad (Atlanta) carrying a saw tooth fixture on the bottom edge of the ram to 
cut down into a Federal warship.187 
     The ram, as fitted to seagoing ironclads, was of different design but the 
feature also degraded the performance of many warships while at sea.  The 
overhanging fixture on most Confederate and some Union river and coastal 
warships would have undoubtedly kept the head of many of them submerged into 
the waves had they ventured out from their harbours.  By late 1862, the Federals 
were rethinking the design for their oceangoing armoured men-of-war, with the 
ram fashioned to reassemble the undershot curve of European ironclads.  The 
steam frigate Roanoke, was reassigned from Hampton Roads to the Brooklyn 
Navy Yard and cut down to take iron plates and three Ericsson turrets.188  The 
Roanoke also had a ram fitted to the forward plates which had extended several 
feet forward of the stem.  A solid piece of iron was fitted to the tapered iron bow 
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frames and the spaces in between ‗filled up with solid timber, all firmly bolted 
together‘.189   
     As the Laird rams were under construction at the Birkenhead Iron Works, the 
Union was struggling to complete a formidable ironclad frigate in New York.  The 
ram Dunderberg, was originally intended as a combination ironclad with 
casemate and twin turrets for her 15-inch guns.190  The twin turrets design of the 
Laird rams may have influenced this massive Federal armoured vessel as the 
Birkenhead-built ships and the Dunderberg were designed to house two guns in 
each turret, with 11-inch Dahlgren guns also carried below the turrets in the 
casemate of the New York ironclad.191  An additional indication of competing 
designs influencing the builders of the Dunderberg and the Laird armourclads, 
was similarities involving the ram and hull.  The hull of the massive 378 foot iron 
ship taking shape in the yard of shipbuilder W. H. Webb, was ‗dead flat the whole 
length‘ and similar to the Laird turret ships, but she also had armoured 
subsurface extensions from the casemate that protected her wooden hull.  These 
armoured belts were capable of ‗presenting a resistance to the enemy‘s rams or 
projectiles‘. The forward weapon namesake of this Union ‗ram-frigate‘ was 
described as:  
 
     „About as formidable a looking object as one can conceive; the entire forefoot  
     of the vessel is prolonged thirty feet from the hull proper, and, rising easily up   
     from the keel about half the distance from the waterline, is there rounded,  
     presenting a blunt end in shape like the profile of an axe edge‟.192  
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     With this prow plated over with iron, and the hull compartmentalized, the great 
warship was seemingly impervious to catastrophic damage at the bow.  The 
wooden body of the ram was noted to project ‗inside of the hull almost as far as it 
does outboard‘ but this bulk was not considered as essential to the ship‘s 
structural integrity for ‗even should the whole of it be knocked off in an affray the 
builders say that the hull will be water-tight‘.193 
     In Britain, the ram was intended for a unique purpose and was of different 
construction than the American-made counterparts.  In the House of Commons, 
debate occurred between those who favoured forts as additional protection 
against a possible French invasion, and those who maintained that the Royal 
Navy was still Britain‘s best defence.  On 10 July 1862, while debating the 
question of funding expanded fortifications, the question was broached over the 
need to raise troops for those positions.  One MP, Sir Frederic Smith, sought to 
‗strike a blow‘ against the forts with their new heavier guns, and permanent, well- 
trained garrisons to man them, ‗before it had taken too deep a root‘.194  France 
would not be able to amass an invasion fleet of warships and wooden-hulled 
transports without being detected.  The guns of the Royal Navy were ready to 
meet the French warships in the Channel and the French transports would have 
been vulnerable to British ramming attacks as, ‗three or four steam rams would 
be able to run into and destroy a great number of them‘.195  The concept called 
for the use of the ram as a shock weapon, with the heavy cannon on British 
ironclads keeping their French armoured opponents busy in a gun dual.  The ram 
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was a cheap secondary weapon, a supplement to armour plate and the gun, and 
when properly utilized, able to defeat funding for land defences. 
     As stated, the British-built ram mounted on her first generation ironclads, was 
different in construction from those in America.  The description of the fabrication 
of the ram on each of the two Lairds-built turret ships contracted by Bulloch is 
limited, but another ironclad built in Scotland during the Civil War offers a likely 
model.  Confederate naval officer, Commander James North had contracted with 
the Glasgow shipbuilding firm of James and George Thomson to build an 
ironclad frigate mounting 20 guns in broadside and fitted with a ram.196  The iron 
prow of this ‗Scottish Sea Monster‘ as she was dubbed, (She was referred to by 
the Thomsons‘ as the ‗No. 61‘, her hull number) extended from the keel and 
curved upward, midway from the bottom of her bow, along the stem to the 
waterline.197 
     This ironclad was beyond the Confederates in every respect.  With more than 
4700 tons displacement, her draught of 20 feet would have kept her out of every 
harbour in the Southern States.  Requiring an impossible to obtain complement 
of approximately 520 men, she would have been a veritable ‗Flying Dutchman‘ 
never able to travel to her intended homeland.198  The keel of ‗North‘s Ship‘ was 
an iron plate 14 inches in height and 4 inches thick extending forward to receive 
the ram.199  The ram on British-built armourclads was not a bulky iron wedge 
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fixed to the bows, but a knife-like projection blended into the bows to permit 
better performance at sea.  Forward from the collision bulkhead on ‗No. 61‘, bent 
iron plates referred to as ‗breast hooks‘ less than an inch thick, were placed 
about three feet apart and then riveted to iron frames also positioned forward of 
the collision bulkhead.  This iron webwork formed the structural fabric which 
would support the ram.  The ram itself was ‗to be made of the greatest possible 
strength on the most effective plan, so as to resist as much as possible the shock 
of collision‘.200  
     Commander North‘s ironclad was built with a network of iron frames creating 
a shock absorber for the larger casting which was the contact point of the ram.  
The ram on the Lairds turret ships was likely constructed with a similar support 
structure to fit into the swan breast curve of the prow.  The curved extension was 
‗to be forged solid of the best hammered scrap iron and formed as a projecting 
beak below the waterline to give the blow when the vessel is used as a ram‘.  
The ram was cast as a single forging of varying measurements calculated from 
the height of the deck to ‗the point of the beak‘.201   
 
The Turret  
 
     In the spring of 1862, Lairds began construction of the 294, the first purpose-
built turret ship in Britain.  However, the designation of the first British-built 
armoured ship with a rotating turret is properly assigned to the Glasgow 
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shipbuilders, Napier and Sons and their ship built for the Royal Danish Navy, the 
Rolf Krake.202   
     The armament of the Laird rams, or more accurately the housing of the guns, 
proved problematic, at least initially.  Bulloch had originally favoured building 
fixed turrets amidships for the few large Rifled Muzzleloaders (RMLs) to be 
carried aboard the two ironclads as the main armament.  He had concerns that 
permission could not be obtained which would allow the utilization of Coles 
patented design for rotating turrets.  As a result, the original plan called for the 
fitting of three non-moveable turrets, equipped with steam valves to raise and 
lower the gunports.203  This idea was discarded when Captain Coles reached an 
agreement with Lairds in December 1862, whereby each ironclad ram built for 
Bulloch were authorized to be fitted with two of his turrets, although in a slightly 
modified form.204  The belated approval granted to Lairds to use the Coles turret 
patent, placed Napier in the position as the ‗first‘ shipbuilder in Britain to build an 
armoured ship with a rotating turret.  On 28 August 1862, Napier signed a 
contract to build a warship fitted with two Coles‘ turrets.205   In July 1863, the Rolf 
Krake became the first turret ship to be commissioned in Europe.206        
     On 10 December 1862, the three Laird brothers and Coles agreed to the 
construction and fitting of two armoured copulas or ‗Shield and patent apparatus 
&c‘ to the 294, then building at Birkenhead.207  Coles was paid a fee of £209, 17 
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Shillings per each ship (295 was covered under a separate contract signed the 
same day) with the contracts denying Lairds permission to place the Coles 
shields in any other ship, and did not imply a warranty on any rotating gun 
structure.  These licensing agreements did allow for the installation of each turret 
‗with or without any subsequent modifications improvements additions or 
alterations‘ as approved by Coles.208 
     The contracts granted Lairds permission to use the Coles turret, but also gave 
the shipbuilders (and Coles) the legal ability to match their contractual obligations 
with advances in design to give the two rams the most up-to-date armoured 
copulas.  This flexibility was recognition, by all parties, that advances in naval 
gunnery and metallurgy were an almost daily occurrence, and the ships would be 
the best Lairds had built to date.  The then ‗established axiom…that to stand still 
is retrograde‘, was fully understood by Lairds and Coles, as the Captain‘s ‗shield‘ 
had evolved since his patents were taken out in March and September 1859.209 
     The original Coles‘ turret was an armoured cone, and closely resembled the 
modern single gun mount carried on today‘s frigates and destroyers.  It was 
according to Coles, ‗a large convex shield covered all over with thick iron and 
mounted upon a platform or frame which is capable of revolving after the manner 
of a turntable, and which also carries the gun upon any suitable carriage‘.210  The 
turntable or ‗Rollerway‘, distributed the weight of the heavy iron shield and 
enclosed armament upon the iron rollers in order to avoid the reliance, ‗upon 
spindles as in American Monitors‘.211  John Ericsson‘s Monitor carried the turret 
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upon her main deck and was turned by hoisting the iron cylinder (complete with 
guns, slides, crew and ammunition, etc.) upon her great central iron spindle, the 
lower edges of the turret making a slight contact with the deck when rotated.  
Once positioned at the required angle from the beam, the entire cased armament 
platform was lowered to the deck, ready to fire.212 
     By 1862, the Coles turret was remade into a similar-sized iron cylinder 
capable of housing one or two guns.  Unlike the Ericsson model, the Coles turret 
was fitted over a hole in the main deck and extended below to rest upon the 
rollers.213  This turret also had a central iron spindle. The spindle was not a 
hoisting mechanism, but rather a device to secure the turret to the interior of the 
ship and provide an auxiliary means (via a capstan) to rotate the shield, if 
damaged in combat.214  One American periodical scoffed at the Coles turret, 
calling its machinery as ‗delicate, compared with the duty required of it, as 
watchwork‘.215  Intricate perhaps, but the Coles shield performed admirably.  It 
was easily turned, not by steam but by manual rotation through hand winches 
which linked the gear teeth near the turntable to identical iron teeth under the 
turret base.216   
     The Coles and Ericsson turrets were also different in their above deck 
construction.  Both had evolved as round iron cylinders with gunports, and iron 
gratings on the turret roof for ventilation, but the construction of each type of 
armoured shield was different in notable ways.  Coles‘ design had benefited from 
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the September 1861 tests aboard the floating ironclad battery, H.M.S. Trusty, at 
Shoeburyness.217  Although the ironclad had been commissioned too late to see 
action in the Crimean War of 1854-56, the experiments with Coles iron gun shield 
cast the Trusty as the first ship in the world to carry an armoured turret.218  
     When battered by solid shot from 68-pounders and rifled shell, the Coles 
shield held up well with only a single plate being destroyed, and that one not 
properly fitted in place.219  The armoured shield had been fired at by one hundred 
rounds from a 100-pounder Armstrong gun (reportedly only 33 rounds struck the 
turret), at the close range of 400 yards, and ‗shot after shot was seen to strike the 
shield, glance off rapidly and fall into the sea without affecting any apparent 
injury‘.220  The 99th round made a deep indentation, and the 100th round hit the 
same spot, tearing away the plate.221  The other plates were not impervious and, 
indeed, some damage had occurred to the other iron panels though they were 
merely riddled, not completely torn away.  Clearly, more armour was required 
inside the turret wall and on the exterior face by the gunports if sufficient 
protection for the gun crews inside the copula was to be achieved.  Despite the 
drawbacks, the Coles turret gave ‗so much satisfaction‘ that it was worthy of 
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more serious consideration as a method of housing guns aboard some of 
Britain‘s warships.222 
     The Admiralty was suitably impressed by the latest round of tests with Coles 
armoured copula aboard the Trusty and ordered another test with bigger guns.  
Days after the Shoeburyness experiments against the floating battery, another 
version of the Coles turret was built.  The turret was expanded in diameter to 
carry two heavy guns instead of the single 40-pounder carried in the Trusty 
turret.  A wooden mockup was built aboard the hulk Hazard for further tests.223  
Both the Coles and Ericsson designed turrets initially progressed at a similar 
pace, but the press of the Union war requirements freed Washington bureaucrats 
from the need of more trials.  On 4 October 1861, Ericsson and the U.S. Navy 
contractually agreed to begin construction of his turret ship, the Monitor.224   
     Britain was not far behind.  Less than a month after the Confederate and 
Union ironclads Virginia and Monitor fought a draw at Hampton Roads on 9 
March 1862, the Admiralty ordered (on 3 April, 1862) that work at the Portsmouth 
Dockyard, on the 121 gun ship-of-the-line H.M.S. Royal Sovereign be halted.  
The steam-driven three-decker was to be remade on the stocks, and work crews 
were reoriented to cut her down to her lower decks in order to follow a new set of 
plans.225  She was to be fitted with armour plate and four of Coles iron shields 
with five heavy guns. The forward copula was slightly larger as it carried two 
heavy guns and the others a single heavy gun each, all mounted on the 
centreline.  Britain would convert this three-decker into the Royal Navy‘s first true 
turret warship.  When commissioned in 1864, the Royal Sovereign, armed with 
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five identical pieces of heavy ordnance, would predate the all big gun 
Dreadnought by more than forty years.226 
     The next step was to construct a purpose-built iron turret ship rather than 
convert pre-existing wooden hulls.  The Admiralty quickly followed up the Royal 
Sovereign conversion with an order to build an iron-hulled armoured man-of-war 
equipped with Coles turrets.  The London-based iron shipbuilders Samuda 
Brothers received the contract on 8 April 1862, and the Prince Albert was 
planned as the first turret warship built from the keel up intended for service in 
the Royal Navy.227  This ship however, was not completed until 1866 and she 
retains the distinction only with the caveat first designed.  Another turret-
equipped ironclad would be Britain‘s first.  That ‗other‘ was also designed from 
the keel up to carry her guns in iron shields.  The only exception was the other 
ship was not originally intended for Queen Victoria‘s fleet.228   
     Upon initial glance, the Coles and Ericsson turrets were only similar in 
appearance: both usually housed two heavy guns, but the turret of the Monitor 
was smaller in internal dimensions, 20 feet in diameter and a height of 9 feet.229  
The Coles turrets for the Laird rams were 23 feet in diameter and stood only 5 
feet above the deck when placed aboard.230                               
     The Monitor‟s turret had been assembled from curved plates, each a single 
inch thick and bolted onto each preceding plate to form a laminated armoured 
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cylinder 8 inches thick.231  Turrets used by the U.S. Navy would grow in diameter 
as heavier guns were fitted to successor monitor-type ironclads, but the 
construction methods remained the same during the 1860s.  A turret for a Union 
warship would be built around a circular oak frame with each of the eleven 
curved iron plates fitted around the wooden pattern which resembled ‗the 
skeleton of a giant cistern‘.232  Each inch-thick plate was an ‗iron board‘ 9 feet in 
length, 3 feet wide, and bent to the required curve on a hydraulic press.  After 
each succeeding plate was curved on the press, it was wheeled to the turret shell 
where a pine stick with white paint on the end was trust through the rivet holes on 
the previous plate to mark the exact spot where the next holes were to be 
punched through by machine.  With each plate fitted in like manner, the layers of 
each ‗course‘ were positioned to overlap with the plates on the layer below to 
prevent an alignment of the plate juncture, or to ‗break joints‘ so as to prevent a 
joint becoming a single vulnerable place for an enemy shell to strike and 
weakened the structure of the entire turret.233      
     The great engineer Isambard Kingdom Brunel reportedly told Coles as early 
as 1855, ‗You only need a breechloader to make your shield perfect‘.234  This 
was a vision of the effective use of limited space in a turret interior, but a suitable 
gun was a generation in the future.  During the Trusty tests, breechloaders failed 
as ‗vent-pieces, if made of steel are broken and driven through the breech-screw; 
or if made of wrought iron, they are bent into an oval form…and jammed tight into 
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the annular surface of the closing screw‘.235  The mechanisms of early 
breechloaders were too delicate for the demands of black powder and the 
service conditions of the 1860s.  Metallurgical arts had not yet advanced to 
enable the casting of breech mechanisms which could stand the high heat 
required of rapid firing and safely meet the effectiveness needed in combat 
conditions.  Thus the muzzleloader in all its forms remained the weapons of 
choice throughout the 1860s.  
     The two guns carried in the forward cupola on the Royal Sovereign, changed 
the turret into a more suitable armoured platform with room for the crews to work 
the heavy guns and pass up shot and powder from below.  Gone was the original 
capsule shape of Coles early designs.  The sides of the dual gun turret (and 
three single gun turrets) on the Royal Sovereign were not inclined inward but 
perpendicular in order to provide more space for heavier guns than the 40-
pounder tested in the armoured shield aboard the Trusty .236  Bulloch reported in 
a dispatch to Richmond that ‗even Captain Coles has straightened up his turrets‘ 
to make room for the new guns, but he kept the same floor plan of his earlier 
shield.237  Unlike the Ericsson model on the Monitor, the rivets on the Coles 
turrets were likely recessed into the curved plates.238  The earlier Coles sloped 
capsule-like turret would return when steel breechloaders made the advanced 
design concept viable.  Without the need for crew space to load the heavy 
muzzleloaders of the 1860s at the edge of the gunport, the sloped turret and the 
breechloader would reemerge in a complementary blend of form and function as 
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steel became the substance of both the shipbuilders and gunmakers at the end 
of the ironclad era.   
     The circular plates of the iron shields fitted on the Royal Sovereign would not 
serve as the identical pattern of turret built for the Laird ironclads as those were 
changed to meet the requirements of a Confederacy deficient in the means of 
rapidly constructing and repairing ironclads.  The willingness to modify a 
patented design showed Coles as an inventor ready to make changes as 
required.  He was likely eager to get the Laird ironclads at sea and into action to 
prove his concepts under fire. 
     The Coles turrets constructed for the Laird rams were built around an iron 
skeleton of T-shaped beams spaced apart at 20 inch intervals fitted over an inner 
½ inch thick iron skin of boiler plate.239  Teak wood filled in the spaces between 
the inner skin and the support beams.  Over this iron and teak blocked frame, 
was a metal basket of  ¾ inch iron strips to hold the pieces together, and outside 
of this was another 8 inches of teak.240  East India teak had been selected due to 
its elastic qualities. Teak did not warp with changes in temperature; a necessary 
feature for ships operating in warmer climates.241  In December 1863, Scientific 
American observed the Royal Navy‘s preference for ‗the universal teakwood, like 
unto which there is none other in John‘s (Bull) opinion‘.242  Over the outer teak 
layer of the turret, were fitted the iron plates each 5½ inches thick to resist enemy 
shot and shell.243  These vertical plates were arranged in a 21-sided polygon to 
provide for time-saving fitting, and to prevent repair delays if damaged in combat.  
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The mechanic deprived South did not have the industrial equipment required to 
reroll damaged armour plate (especially not plate of that thickness) nor the skilled 
manpower in sufficient numbers for overly complicated dockyard repair work.  
     Around the gunports of the modified turrets, another course of plates, each 
4½ thick were fitted to provide 10 inches of iron armour around the turret 
faces.244  Bolts ran the entire distance from the turret exterior to the thin boiler 
plate within to bind the entire structure together.  The armour on the Trusty had 
(except for the one plate torn away) suffered ‗only one or two screw nuts off, and 
a very few bolts started‘ inside the vessel as a result of her pounding during the 
Shoeburyness tests.245  Loosened screws and bolts represented a danger of 
broken bits flying off upon impact during action, and ricocheting around the turret 
interior injuring the gun crew.  The thin inner lining of iron sheeting inside the 
turrets on the Laird rams would have gone some way in mitigating this danger.            
      The turret interiors were also modified to meet the requirements of Bulloch 
and his (unofficial) sponsor, the Confederate Government.  Coles suggested 
(perhaps to Lairds) that the turntable of the turret be staggered in such a way as 
to allow for proper balancing when the guns were run out.246  Another 
modification was an incline for the slides which would allow the heavy guns to 
become ‗Self-Acting‘ after firing.247  Recoil would shove the guns back into the 
turret, but after reloading, the guns would, with the aid of gravity, slide back to a 
ready position with muzzles protruding from the gunports.  A few quick 
adjustments by the crew as directed by the gun captain to align with the next 
target, and the RMLs would be ready to fire again.   
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     The above deck hull bulwarks attached to the ships sides were armoured 
flaps, five feet tall and hinged at the lower edges to fall outboard, thus permitting 
an arc of fire for the turrets on each beam.248  The ‗novel‘ bulwarks were topped 
by a wooden rail (likely teak) which was ‗removable at pleasure‘ to clear another 
support which held the moveable iron sides upright until the guns were 
needed.249  The flaps would fall from each side to give ‗the required sweep of the 
guns in training‘ for broadside fire, or slightly off beam forward and aft.  The clear 
path of fire for the guns was limited, as the forward turret was restricted by the 
foremast and forecastle and the guns in the aft turret by the mizzen and poop.250     
     The guns would have been positioned abreast 4½ feet apart in each turret, 
with oval gunports capable of allowing the muzzle of each gun, 12 degrees of 
elevation and 5 degrees of depression.251  Depression was restricted to those 
few degrees as the ports were only five inches above the deck and only of 
sufficient width to allow a crewman to seen an object beyond the side of the 
barrel.252   
 
Armour Plate 
 
     The iron plate produced for the Laird rams was primarily from local sources.  
On 3 September 1862, Thomas Haines Dudley, the U.S. Consul at Liverpool, 
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wrote to U.S. Secretary of State, William H. Seward, to report on the early 
progress made on the Lairds ironclads.253  Dudley, a Quaker lawyer from New 
Jersey, was perhaps the most able American diplomat of the war and provided 
the Union with a steady flow of usually accurate intelligence on Confederate 
activities in Britain.254  According to Dudley‘s sources, the Mersey Steel and Iron 
Company in Liverpool, was producing 1500 tons of armour plate most of which 
was intended for the Laird rams, with the remainder to be shipped to the 
Southern States.255  The size of the plates directly associated with the Laird rams 
were not mentioned, but others created for the Confederate Navy offer an 
indication of what was likely a standard size of plate to speed production.  Some 
plates, viewed by Dudley, measured 18 feet in length, were a foot wide and 2¼ 
inches thick.  This rapid output was respectable considering sections of the 
Mersey Steel and Ironworks had been torn down and rebuilt to make way for a 
railway then building south to the Liverpool docks.256 
     The Mersey Steel and Ironworks had originated in 1812 and had grown over 
five decades into a cannon and armour producer of international reputation.  
Ericsson, the Swedish inventor/designer of the U.S.S. Monitor, had previously 
designed two 12-inch iron prototype heavy guns for installation on the U.S. steam 
frigate Princeton, in the early 1840s.257  One gun, the ‗Peacemaker‘, was cast in 
America, and the other known as the ‗Oregon‘, was cast at the Mersey Steel and 
Ironworks. The Mersey-built gun was reportedly still in use during the Civil War, 
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but the ‗Peacemaker‘ burst with tragic effect during a trial voyage down the 
Potomac River on 28 February 1844.  That explosion killed the U.S. Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of the Navy, four others and wounded several more. 258   
Ericsson‘s reputation unjustly took a battering as a result.     
     The Mersey works were also tasked with crafting huge iron pieces such as the 
propeller shafts, for the ironclads H.M.S. Achilles and Northumberland.259  This 
manufactory cast and crafted the 40-ton stern post for the Agincourt, their 
expertise being possible by steam-driven hammers described as being of 
‗immense‘ size.260  The steam hammer, invented by James Nasmyth in 1842, 
was one of the wonders of the Industrial Revolution.  So great was its 
transforming impact, one historian wrote ‗For myself, I would be prouder to say 
that I was the inventor of that motion, than to say I had commanded a regiment at 
Waterloo‘.261  The Nasmyth steam hammer grew apace with the rush of 
industrialization, and the impressive appearance of one such engine was 
described in a New York periodical as looking ‗like the gateway of a Gothic 
church‘.262  The skill required to work those great machines was prized by the 
factory owners, as a well-trained hammer man could crush down on a piece of 
iron or steel with a force which caused the entire structure to shake, or he could 
feather down gently for a light tap.  With skilled hands so close by, Lairds would 
undoubtedly have contracted with the Mersey works to also craft the stern posts 
and critical propeller shafts for the two rams building in his Birkenhead yard.           
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     The Mersey Steel and Ironworks was something of a misnomer in the early 
1860s as the first metal was not the preferred metal.  An advertisement from a 
September 1865 edition of the Liverpool Daily Post, listed the products of the 
‗Mersey Steel and Iron Company‘ with iron forgings and castings of ‗the highest 
quality and largest size‘ and armour plate available for the Admiralty or for export 
‗with dispatch and care‘.263  Steel was mentioned almost as an afterthought.  
Steel was utilized only in small batches and usually for very select purposes.  
Lairds built the first steel-hulled yacht in Britain in 1858 with plates cast by 
Mersey Steel and Iron; she was the ‗very neat screw-steam‘ yacht Deerhound 
built for the Duke of Leeds.264  That same year, Lairds had built the paddle 
steamer Ma Roberts for Dr. David Livingstone‘s African explorations up the 
Zambesi River, with ‗puddled‘ steel plates also supplied from the Mersey 
works.265  Ironically, the Deerhound was present when another Lairds-built ship, 
the raider Alabama was sunk in the engagement with the Union steam sloop 
Kearsarge in the Channel on 19 June 1864.266 
     A British newspaper from September of 1863, mentioned one of the Lairds-
built turret ironclads as having a steel ram.267  This report was false as steel was 
a lightweight material in ship construction and was too brittle except the small 
batches used as armour piecing caps on some shells.268  In 1856, William Clay, 
the managing director of the Mersey works, experimented with Bessemer 
converters but the metal produced was not satisfactory and was referred to as 
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‗rotten hot and rotten cold‘.269  Nevertheless experiments with other processes 
continued, and hard steel (usually for machine tools) was manufactured at the 
Mersey factory during this time.  The preferred method then in vogue was not 
Bessemer‘s but a more labour intensive system to create puddled steel known as 
the ‗Rieppe patent.‘270  
     Iron used for the Laird rams also came from other suppliers as the Mersey 
works were unable to provide the entire requirement within the strict 
timeframe.271  John Brown of the Atlas Ironworks in Sheffield provided some 
armour plates for the Agincourt then building at Lairds.  It is likely that 
arrangement was also carried out with the two ironclads built for Bulloch.  The 
Lairds turret ships were constructed with iron from another outside source as a 
weight savings measure.  Iron from the Yorkshire foundry known as the Low 
Moor Ironworks, provided the thin, light but tough plates, used to fabricate the 
watertight bulkheads.272  The Low Moor works were well known in America for 
their high quality iron used in such items as railway carriage axles, ‗semi-steel‘ 
locomotive tyres, and the ‗best qualities of boiler plate‘.273  
 
Building begins   
     The keels of the 294 and 295 were laid down in April of 1862 and consisted of  
                                            
269
 ‗Experiments with Bessemer‘s Process‘ SA, 12, 1 November 1856, 64. 
270
 ‗To Make Steel from Pig Iron‘, SA, 3, 10 November 1860, 308. 
271
 ‗Liverpool News‘, Glasgow Herald, 2 July 1864, 7.  
272
 ‗Launch of Her Majesty‘s Ironclad Frigate Lord Warden‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 30 May 
1865, 3, ORN, II, 2, (1921), 224. 
273
 ‗Patent Railway Axles-Interesting Chance in Extending a Patent‘ SA, 4, 14 April 1849, 235, 
‗Semi-Steel Locomotive Tires [sic]‘ SA, 4, 5 January 1861, 3,‘The Exhibition of Iron and Steel‘,  
SA, 16,  15 June 1867,  374.  
 82 
an iron plate 2 feet, 3 inches in height, and a width of 11/16th of an inch.274  A 
Dublin newspaper described the, ‗two iron-clad shell-proof rams, of peculiar 
shape and construction, rising into shape adjacent to the where the famous ‗290 
was put together‘.275  The Birkenhead shipbuilder was utilizing every spare space 
and hand to maximize output.  With the Alabama gone from British waters that 
summer, the men of Lairds were fully engaged with the Agincourt and especially 
Bulloch‘s turret rams.   
     Patrick Barry‘s work, Dockyard Economy and Naval Power, provided 
descriptions of many shipbuilding firms and ironworks in operation in Britain in 
the mid-1860s.  Although this account provides rare photographs of the 
shipyards, iron foundries, engine shops, and rolling mills, in operation at that 
time, a photo of Lairds is conspicuously missing from Barry‘s work.  Originally 
published in 1863, the author saw the Laird rams under construction but, 
because any photograph could be used as evidence against the shipbuilders, he 
left what appears to be a deliberate hole in this account of British iron 
shipbuilding and armour manufacturing firms.  Nevertheless, Barry provides a 
rare glimpse of the rams under construction, and he describes the first of the pair 
building in No. 3 slip and the hull of the second ram was then being assembled in 
No. 4 slip.276  The shipyard, crisscrossed with traveling cranes mounted on iron 
rails, conveyed the iron plates and frames to the workmen labouring in the 
adjacent slips.  The steam cranes were likely built by the engineer James Taylor 
in his Britannia Ironworks, near Lairds shipyard in Birkenhead.  His steam cranes 
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were of such utility that they were used not only in British ports but in harbours 
around the world.277  
     The 6,621 ton ironclad, Agincourt, was laid down in Graving Dock No. 3 of 
Lairds.278  The interior of the shipyard was taken up by the slips, graving docks 
and cranes.  Along the exterior wall of the works, were sheds and shops for the 
engineers, fitters, boilermakers, and other artisans who made the vital 
components and frames for each ironclad.279  The works ran parallel along 
Church Street, the main entrance was bordered on the south by Mersey Street, 
and on the north by the railway station which linked Birkenhead with the industrial 
centres of Manchester and Birmingham.280  A tunnel connected the railway with 
the shipyard through a ‗cartway‘ which provided direct access for heavy 
equipment and individual iron sections which had been forged in other 
workshops outside the confines of the shipyard.  These cartway rails merged with 
the rails for the traveling cranes and provided a means by which heavy armour 
plates, engine parts, boilers etc. could be shunted around the shipyard in an 
almost continual flow.281   
     The buildings which housed the machine shops and furnaces for bending 
plates and bending frames, were three stories in height and shielded the 
shipyard and workers from the growing city of Birkenhead, and prying eyes, 
eager for an up close look at the progress on the ironclads.  The river was a 
different matter.  A ferry traveled from the railway station at the north of the 
Lairds yard to Liverpool.  Another ferry landed near Mersey Street on the south 
                                            
277
 ‗Obituary‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 15 September 1894, 13. 
278
 ‗Iron-Case Shipbuilding‘, London Evening Standard, 10 February 1863, 3. 
279
 (WA), Birkenhead Map, Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton (1875) 
280
 (No Author), ‗Description of the Birkenhead Iron Works‘ The Practical Magazine, (1874), 3. 
281
 Ibid, 3. 
 84 
side of the Birkenhead Iron Works, permitting a limited view of the two iron men-
of-war under construction.282  At a fare of only two pence, the Mersey would have 
been crossed by a ferry every 30 minutes.283  Anyone determined to survey the 
progress on the Laird rams would have regular and cheap access from the river.           
     Aside from the keels, the frames of the 294 and 295 were the starting point of 
construction for the two vessels.  The ‗large and spacious apartment‘ section of 
the yard, known as the moulding loft, was where frames were bent and fashioned 
to required specifications.284  There, angle iron 5 inches by 3 inches, was heated 
and hammered into shape on heavy blocks, each frame held in place by pegs 
previously positioned around a chalk outline indicated by either letters or 
numbers.285  Once completed, each frame was perforated at predetermined 
intervals by a punching press for an assigned number of rivet holes, then hoisted 
by heavy crane and positioned around the keel to form the skeleton of each 
ship.286  In late 1862, the Continental Iron Works in New York City were building 
three monitors for the Federal Navy.  Details of their fabrication suggests some 
basic similarities of iron construction techniques likely utilized at the Birkenhead 
Iron Works.  A September 1862 article from Harpers New Monthly Magazine 
described the fitting of plates to the ribs to form the iron hulls: 
     „These plates and ribs are riveted together in the most elaborate  
     manner…bent each to its exact shape and the countless holes have been    
     punched, every one being to a hair‟s-breadth in its appropriate place, before  
     the pieces are brought to the stocks where they are built up.  Upon each  
     vessel are a hundred or two hundred workmen, seeming to cling like bees to  
     its sides.  Little portable furnaces at short intervals are heating the rivets,  
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     which boys are carrying around to the places where they are needed‟.287  
 
The hive-like semblance was a familiar sight at Birkenhead when the frames of 
the Laird rams were ‗spaced 21ins apart‘ from the centre of the keel plate, during 
the formation of the skeletons of the sister ironclads.288  
 
Other Design Features 
 
     Steering in battle was a concern, as the exposed wheel on any warship was 
likely to be shot away in a close fight.  The 294 and 295 had a double wheel on 
the poop, but this station would have been abandoned in action.  When in battle, 
the ship would have been steered from a safer position below decks via a double 
wheel, positioned aft of the forward turret and forward of the boiler room.289  
Bulloch suggested an armoured oval ‗Sentry Box‘ plated over with 5½ inches of 
iron, be placed on deck over the steering gear directly below.290  From this 
armoured box (iron over the ever-present teak), the commander of the ram could 
direct his ship from his slightly elevated position forward of the funnel.  
Additionally, armoured casing around the funnel base provided some added 
protection as the rear of the conning tower was likely unarmoured, but also of 
sufficient height to provide a view over the top of the forward turret.291 
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     The shape of the stern was built with defence as the primary consideration.  
The stern was not squared off to allow room for the Captain‘s cabin as on 
traditional warships, but rounded and bluff to give protection to the aft section of 
the ironclad.  Bulloch acknowledged the, ‗peculiar shape is not pleasing to the 
eye‘ but unlike the graceful ironclad frigate Warrior, and other first generation 
oceangoing British ironclads, the rudder and the screw were almost completely 
submerged.292  This somewhat mitigated the danger of exposed propellers, 
‗inviting well-aimed shots‘ from enemy gunners.293  With the bluff stern extending 
aft in an oval curve, and a ram bow extending forward of the somewhat rounded 
prow, they were not slender but similar to other British-built ironclads of the mid 
and later 1860s: ‗full-breasted and full-buttocked as a canal barge‘.294  
     The 294 and 295 were built to ‗a very uncommon form‘, yet this design was 
intended to blend offensive and defensive aspects into a seagoing armoured 
turret ship equipped with the best heavy guns available in Britain.295  This stern 
design had appeared in the Royal Navy with the ironclad H.M.S. Achilles 
(launched in 1863) and contributed to an improvement in handling.  The large 
overhanging stern of the wooden navy (and converted ironclads) was done away 
with and substantial weight savings achieved as a benefit.296 
     The 294 and 295 had many unique features however the propulsion systems 
were not innovative, but typical of many British warships of the 1860s.297  A pair 
of Horizontal direct-acting engines were installed on each of the Lairds turret 
ships, and the engines were equipped with a single cylinder, 56 inches in 
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circumference, with a stroke of 33 inches.298  The Laird rams had four 
rectangular boilers per vessel, typical of those carried on warships of that era.299  
The boilers, each with six furnaces, were built for a pressure of 20 pounds per 
square inch (another source reported that that the pressure was slightly higher at 
22 psi), also considered typical for British warships of the mid-Victorian years.300  
Although greater steam pressure was used in Royal Navy warships during this 
era, the higher pressure was not considered worthy of risk, in terms of the wear 
and tear on the machinery, especially in a climate warmer than Britain, as higher 
steam pressure would wear on the engines and ‗require more care on the part of 
the engineers‘.301        
     The comparison of the Laird rams with their half-sister, the armoured turret 
ram Prins Hendrik Der Nederlanden, offers a key reference point to determine 
likely similarities, as the three ironclads were built by Lairds within months of 
each other.  Constructed from 1864-1865 for the Royal Netherlands Navy, the 
Prins Hendrik was a slightly larger copy of the two ironclad ships ordered by 
Bulloch, and the Dutch ship would more closely resemble the 295 with her then-
unique fore and main masts, when commissioned.302  The Prins Hendrik was 
equipped with four box boilers for a total grate area of slightly more than 208 
square feet.  The two Confederate-intended rams had a larger grate area of 250 
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square feet in their boilers but the Dutch ship could produce an additional five 
pounds of steam pressure per square inch, and her engines were more powerful 
at 400 horse power.303  The Birkenhead Iron Works continued to modify their 
construction techniques, and constantly sought ways to improve upon their latest 
designs and shipbuilding practices.  Before the Birkenhead ironclads of the mid-
1860s were launched, innovation and change were daily practices, and the 
experience of building each hull (mostly side-by-side) gave the skilled workmen, 
designers, foremen, and owners, an invaluable knowledge pool which permitted 
them to build armoured warships of increasing complexity.                      
     Lairds engines were not advanced, but were well-built and known for their 
reliability: ‗From their simplicity, these engines are kept in repair at a very modest 
cost, and they are also very economical in fuel, and for these reasons they 
appear likely to be very generally adopted‘.304  Available records reveal that the 
two engines constructed at Lairds for the 295 were engine numbers 80 and 81.305  
This implies that engine numbers 78 and 79 were built for the 294.  These 
engines were made from ‗one set of patterns‘ arranged on the second floor of the 
Engineer‘s Fitting and Erecting Building, in an area reserved as the Pattern and 
Millwrights shop.306   
     The engines were likely of the familiar ‗Penn Trunk Engines‘ design, so 
named for the well-known marine engine manufacturer, John Penn of 
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Greenwich.307  Penn developed his engines to resolve the problem of linking the 
crank shaft to the propeller shaft, by placing the connecting components directly 
on the end of the piston.308  Installation of the horizontal direct-acting engines on 
a large British ironclad warship of the time (such as on H.M.S. Minotaur) 
frequently placed the cylinders of each engine on the port side of the shaft, and 
the condensers on the right side, to provide balance. 309   
     The trunk engine also had the advantage of components of limited height, 
allowing the whole of the machinery to fit below the waterline and thus, protected 
from shot and shellfire.  Penn-built engines were known for their high quality of 
iron castings and careful workmanship.  In 1854, Penn had discovered that by 
fitting the hardwood, lignum vitae, in strips at key positions in the shaft tube at the 
stern, the addition would greatly reduce the wear not only of the shaft tube, but 
also the bearings.310   
     The London-based engine builder, Maudslay, Sons and Field, was considered 
the senior of the marine steam engine manufacturers in the United Kingdom 
during this era, and was seen as the ‗mecca‘ for early precision tool makers such 
as James Nasmyth.311  During the Crimean War, Maudslay, and Penn built one 
hundred and fifty sets of engines for an urgent Admiralty order for shallow 
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draught gunboats.  The use of interchangeable plans for this order was the ‗first 
example of mass production in marine engineering‘.312  By the mid-1860s 
Maudslay, Sons and Field, and Penn each employed approximately 1500 skilled 
workers and were both considered ‗easily the foremost in world‘ in the field of 
marine steam engine manufacture.313  Lairds was new to engine building, having 
only added that capability when the new Birkenhead Iron Works was constructed 
in 1857.314  Limited experience in engine building was likely why the Laird rams 
had engines of 350 horsepower (total per each ship), adequate for the size of the 
294 and 295 but not sufficient for the larger ironclads then building for the Royal 
Navy.315 
     The two Laird rams were each fitted with a single shaft to drive a single 
screw.316  Some experimental ships such as the iron battery H.M.S. Meteor 
(1858), were fitted with three screws but results were not favourable, as the 
Meteor experiment was an attempt to merge the machinery drive techniques of 
the factory shop floor with the engines of a warship.317  The ships were not 
suitable for sea service as they were criticized as being ‗unable to sail, steam or 
steer‘ and were considered ‗not altogether satisfactory‘.318  For serviceability and 
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performance, most British ironclads of the 1860s relied on the dependable large 
diameter single screw propeller.319     
     The engines on the 294 and 295 rotated the shaft at a maximum of 70 
rotations per minute and turned the single, three bladed 14 foot, 6 inch screw at a 
maximum speed of slightly more than 10 knots.320  The screw was fixed at a 20 
degree pitch and the three blades allowed for a measure of improved 
performance at speed, but the pitch and the drag produced by the third blade 
would later prove a detriment when the Laird rams attempted to operate under 
lower speeds or sail alone.321  The screw was fixed and could not be disengaged 
and hoisted on deck as with other British warships of that era.  Due to the 
propeller configuration, the Lairds ironclads were impaired under sail and slight 
steam as ‗screw drag‘ scooped up water at slow speed.322  The 294 and 295 
were built as men-of-war with an eye toward labour savings while at sea.  
Although they operated efficiently while under adequate or full steam, they lacked 
the requisite qualities of endurance and were therefore not suitable as long range 
commerce destroyers.  They were compromises of design and restricted to only 
a moderate speed for the whole of their lives.            
     The sails were problematic for ironclads, and especially for the low-hulled 
turret ships.  Bulloch favoured a new system of self-reefing topsails as another 
way to keep down the required number of crewmen.  In a dispatch to Mallory, 
Bulloch included a set of drawings for his armoured ships with specifications ‗as 
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minute as they can well be made‘.323  The Laird rams were equipped with sails to 
provide maximum canvas over an area which could be handled without too great 
a reliance on well-trained seamen (another vital resource sorely lacking in the 
Confederate States).  Bulloch explained with an almost resigned air, his 
willingness to try a novel masting plan: ‗The object in this peculiar rig was to get a 
good amount of canvas in such a shape as to require the smallest possible 
number of seamen, properly so called‘.324   
     Bulloch was not the first to adopt this ‗peculiar‘ yard and sail system. The first 
British patent for this method dated from 1806, and the designs were periodically 
modified.  In 1850, Royal Navy officer H. D. P. Cunningham took out a patent for 
rolling topsails around their yards.325  Cunningham‘s, ‗application of mechanical 
science‘ was preceded by others, but his had the added benefit of coming along 
at the right time.326  The discovery of gold in both California and Australia enticed 
many an able seaman to desert his ship for the mining camps.327  To make up for 
the loss in men, the ability to reef sails from the deck of a merchantman was 
adopted as a method to keep down crew numbers and prevent clippers from 
being abandoned in the harbours of San Francisco and Melbourne. 
     Double topsails served as a pattern for the Laird rams, and the iron steam 
frigates, H.M.S. Resistance and her sister the Defence, were the first in the Royal 
Navy to carry them.328  The two steam frigates employed these yards and sails 
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(as did other British warships in the early 1860s) in what was known as the 
‗Cunningham System‘ where (theoretically) the upper part of the sail was rolled 
up as the yard was lowered ‗similar in its effects to the spring blinds to a window 
of a railway carriage‘.329  This proved to be better adapted to the less pressing 
demands of commercial sailing ships than the unforgiving stresses of a man-of-
war.  The concept proved a failure as wet sails wadded up when the yard was 
lowered, quickly fouling other rigging.  The Royal Navy discarded Cunningham‘s 
invention after only a year in service.330   
     Despite years of modifications, and new methods for masting and improved 
arrangement of yards and ropes, the blend of sail and steam was never fully 
successful on men-of-war fitted with turrets.  Rotating gun platforms offered the 
advantage of a readily moveable armament but stays and shrouds restricted the 
angle of fire.  As armour grew thicker and guns grew heavier, masts became 
more of a concern regarding the centre of gravity on a turret ship.  Masts and 
yards also took time to clear away for action.  Yet despite the masts, yards, 
rigging and canvas being a cluttering inconvenience in regard to the room 
needed to work the guns, they remained an accepted form of auxiliary motive 
power to supplement the engines and single screw.  Another decade would pass 
before navies began to permanently discard sails and the armoured warships 
would be altered to take on a form more suitable to their key attributes of 
protection and firepower.           
     
Main Guns and Secondary Armament 
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     The question of which type of guns would be carried on the Laird rams was 
not resolved immediately, as Bulloch was following the latest ordnance advances 
and gunnery tests.  Acknowledging ‗the whole matter of armored [sic] ships and 
their armament being still in a transition state‘, he wanted optimal firepower 
combined with the need for reliability, safety, and most importantly, ease of 
handling.331  Lacking sufficient hands, many gun crews manning the Confederate 
ironclads in America had come from the artillerymen of the army.332  Quickly 
pressed into service in the crowded, unfamiliar environment of an armoured 
warship, the artillerymen would have needed a familiar weapon to work in the 
closed-up spaces of a turret.  Bulloch decided on a set of two 9-inch RMLs, (each 
gun weighing 11 tons) per turret built by the Confederacy‘s preferred British 
ordinance manufacturer, former Royal Artillery officer, Captain Alexander T. 
Blakely.333   
     The Blakely rifles were the model for heavy guns made in the Confederacy 
under the direction of ordnance expert and naval officer, Lieutenant John M. 
Brooke, C.S.N.  The Blakely and Brooke guns (copied by other ordnance 
manufacturers) were recognized by iron banding around the breech, which 
provided extra strength for the larger powder charges needed to hurl the heavier 
shells against armoured warships, and by a method of rifling within the bore 
known as ‗hook-slant‘.334  Brooke guns provided the main armament of most 
ironclads built in the South, but the Blakely rifle was a weapon of choice for 
Confederate cruisers.  The Alabama and Florida were among those commerce 
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raiders that carried at least some Blakely guns on their world-ranging voyages.335  
Blakely produced heavy guns that were so technologically advanced, 
Confederate General Beauregard, the commander of the garrison at Charleston, 
wrote of two 600-pounder Blakely RMLs as being ‗magnificent specimens of 
heavy ordnance…different in construction from anything I had ever seen‘.336      
     Bulloch was not an ordnance expert, but he sought to maintain a flow of 
heavy guns to the Confederate Navy from dependable sources.  Those were the 
RMLs as manufactured by subcontracted firms in Britain under the direction of 
Captain Blakely.  One business contracted to produce heavy RML Blakely guns, 
was the Liverpool engineering firm Fawcett & Preston, which had manufactured 
the engines for the Florida.337  This establishment, dating from 1758, was an 
early leader in marine engineering and cannon manufactory.  Fawcett & Preston 
built the first iron steamship on the Mersey in 1829 and were acknowledged for 
their capacity to construct guns of various calibers and their ability to construct 
limbers of wrought-iron, as a substitute for the shortage of suitable wood. 338   
     Bulloch compromised on another gun type for his ironclads.  Two 70-pounder 
Whitworth RMLs were to have been carried aboard as secondary armament with 
one to be placed forward and another aft to provide end-on fire.339  The 
secondary armament was more complicated and expensive than the venerable 
32-pounder smoothbore, and the system of rifling the barrel was debated 
between naval officers as to which (Blakely or Whitworth) was more effective 
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against armoured ships.  Another Confederate naval officer in Britain remarked 
that the cost of the 70-pounder Whitworth RML was £700 per gun, £5 per shell 
and exclaimed the sum ‗almost takes away one‘s breath‘.340    
     These cannon were manufactured by Joseph Whitworth from his Sackville 
Street factory in Manchester.341  Whitworth had trained at Maudslay‘s works in 
London and had opened his own machine tool factory in Manchester in 1835.342  
His machines and tools were created with precision and were of such robust 
design, that comparatively unskilled workmen could craft quality products from 
his mechanisms which were ‗almost self-acting‘.343  By 1851, Whitworth turned 
his expertise to ordnance manufacture, and his skill contributed to the body of 
knowledge that enabled the building of rifled guns with reduced ‗windage‘ in the 
bore, while also building guns able to withstand the higher pressures from larger 
powder charges.344  On 25 September 1862, during tests at Shoeburyness, a 
Whitworth gun pierced a target designed to replicate the armour of the Warrior.  
Subsequent trials proved that the flathead Whitworth shells could puncture 
armour plate with a neat hole, but guns such as the larger Armstrong RMLs 
would fire a shell, while not piercing, could smash against a larger area thus 
buckling the plates upon impact.345 
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     Although costly, the Whitworth guns were prized for their strength, but they 
were also considered complicated cannon to work.  The field artillery pieces were 
more problematic as they were not gunner proof and suffered damage in the 
stress of battle.  In 1861, one Richmond newspaper relayed a report claiming 
with some justification, that the Whitworth field pieces were ‗too excellently 
fashioned‘ for the average artilleryman.346  The English traveler-war tourist, 
Captain Edward FitzGerald Ross, had observed Confederate forces in Virginia 
and North Carolina in the summer of 1863, and remarked on the Whitworth 
artillery in service.  Ross observed a Confederate artillery park and commented 
‗There are a few Whitworth guns, which are very accurate and of great range, but 
require much care.  The breech has been blown off or disabled through 
carelessness in loading.  This is especially the case with breech-loading guns.  I 
understand that the Whitworth guns which are now sent out are muzzle-loading 
guns‘.347     
     Despite the skills required to load both the breech and muzzleloaders from 
this manufacturer, in the hands of well-trained and patient artillerymen, the 
Whitworth cannon were exceptional.  In North Carolina, a young artillery officer 
gained ‗much reputation for accuracy and rapidity‘ with his select gun and 
crew.348  At the port of Wilmington, a Whitworth gun set a record ‗for 
extraordinarily accurate practice‘ when a shell hit the blockader U.S.S. 
Connecticut at the then extraordinary range of five miles.349                               
     Bulloch stated that the type of gun he wanted (as the main armament) for his 
Birkenhead ironclads was the one ‗which will throw the largest shot with the 
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greatest initial velocity‘.  The secondary armament was not chosen for shell size, 
but for its capability within the limited spaces available fore and aft.  The 
Whitworth rifles were to have had a limited arch from either the forward or aft 
positions.  This arch would have been restrictive as the guns would have been 
placed behind their own iron-plated shields or bulwarks, in the forecastle and 
poop as these crew spaces were not armoured.350  The forecastle and poop 
structures were added after the hull was half complete, and were not built directly 
into the main hull frames but fitted to provide accommodation room for the men 
forward and the officers aft.  They were of ‗light structure, sufficiently strong to 
resist any force of the sea‘ but built to be removed in a dockyard or shot away in 
battle to give the ships all around fire (from the turret guns) if needed.351 
     Another addition, though not considered unusual on wooden and iron 
broadside warships, were racks to stow hammocks near the gun positions.  On 
the Laird rams, these racks would permit the stowage of hammocks three deep 
around the upper edge of the turret roofs.  The protection provided by the rolled 
hammocks were for marine riflemen to lie down on each turret roof and fire at the 
crew of any nearby enemy vessel, or down to clear their own decks of a hostile 
boarding force.352  This was not an ideal position as the concussion from the 
main armament would have been disorienting to the riflemen, and the presence 
of the marines on the roof of the turret would have also interfered with the 
gunlaying if done from the roof top hatches.       
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The Search for the Ideal Ironclad Warship 
  
     The building of the French La Gloire and the immediate British response in 
the form of the Warrior, set off an ironclad race between the two great rivals that 
redefined the measures of what constituted a first tier naval power.  The 
venerated three decked ship-of-the-line, already forced to adapt to the screw 
propeller, had been outclassed by the large, rifled muzzleloading gun and early 
breechloader equipped steam frigates disliked by naval purists for their single 
deck ‗streets of guns‘.353  Britain embarked on a massive building/conversion 
program to construct ironclads in order to not only keep pace with the French but 
to take the lead in the number of armoured ships afloat.  Between 1859 and 
1861, ten new ironclads were laid down in British yards and another seven two-
deckers still on the stocks, were converted into single deck armourclads.354   
     In the Commons the First Secretary to the Admiralty, Lord Clarence Paget, 
stated in July of 1861, ‗It is no use denying that the whole world is commencing 
the construction of these (ironclads) ships. Every maritime nation has completely 
given up the thought of building wooden line-of-battle ships‘ and added he did not 
want ‗to excite alarm throughout the country, but rather to engender a proper 
confidence, that we are determined to maintain our maritime position in its 
integrity‘.355  The newly-built ironclad frigates and the cut down sisters (each 
originally intended for 91-guns) of the H.M.S. Bulwark class, would give Britain 
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an edge over the French, as the wooden walls were eclipsed by the unwieldy 
iron-plated sides of major warships on both sides of the Channel.356 
     The Bulwarks were still in the frame when the order to remake them into 
ironclads was given and when launched, their converted hulls had a less refined 
appearance than the rakish Warrior.  These cut-downs had a rounded stern, a 
bow with only a slight angle to the waterline and no ram.  The squat appearance 
of these converted ironclads led to their being referred to as ‗double enders‘ by 
the seamen who shipped aboard them.357                                                
     One British periodical of the day reflected on the sudden shift to ironclad 
warships in a poem titled ‗Iron-clad Jack‘ published in April 1862.  This fabricated 
sea song blustered: 
„In armour case fo‟ard, amidships, abaft 
In our sides neither crevice nor crack, 
All safely we steam in our blacksmith-built craft: 
Naught to fear now has Ironclad Jack‟ 
„Nor of splinter or shot feel a dread; 
Pound away as he will, boys, we‟ll never say die! 
For we‟re proof „gainst steel, iron and lead. 
We‟ve no woodwork to riddle, alow or aloft, 
No canvas to shift or to tack; 
Not an inch in the ship that is shaky or soft, 
Shot and Shell proof is Iron-clad Jack‟!358 
 
     The poem mentioned Jack safely steaming along in his ironclad, but the 
armoured vessels of this era were cumbersome ships.  An 1863 edition of 
Scientific American denounced the ‗lumbering old iron-clads of England and 
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the…unwieldy carcasses of France‘ as ‗good examples of old fogyism‘.359  The 
editorial went on to criticize the deep draught British ironclads, with their ‗uncouth 
bows and sterns‘ as being unable to approach the shoreline of North America 
unless with great care, as their weight of armour caused them to ‗heave 
prodigiously upon the troubled sea‘.360  The argument was partially refuted by 
another American periodical printed earlier that year.  Although European 
ironclads were ‗ponderous…with their lofty sides and many vulnerable points‘, 
Union ironclads were barely seaworthy and those few which could undertake a 
sea voyage without undue fear, were not impervious to enemy guns.361    
     European ironclads were too deeply laden to reach all ports in North America, 
but several major ports in the Union could be entered and chief among them was 
New York.  One editorial in January 1863 noted the limitations of coastal 
fortifications and remarked ‗when the attack is made by iron-clad steamers, the 
peril to a city is fearfully increased.  We think we are fully justified in the opinion 
that the Passaic or the (New) Ironsides, the Warrior or the La Gloire could enter 
the harbor [sic] of New York unharmed in spite of all the fortifications which 
defend it‘.362   
     Stopping a force of enemy ironclads within gun range of a great metropolis, 
was a troubling prospect for any nation dependent on oceanic trade.  The 
Confederacy and the Union followed the customary path of other established, or 
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aspiring naval powers, and sought British expertise in the ways of armoured 
naval warfare.  British-built fast cargo ships transported weapons and material 
which kept the Confederate forces supplied with enough arms and equipment to 
stave off a war-winning Union victory on the battlefields of the South for most of 
the conflict, but only armoured men-of-war could lift the blockade of the seceding 
states.  
     The New York Times noted that the Laird rams had the ability to elevate their 
turret guns to bombard distant towns and forts ‗while ships of the Warrior class 
would be perfectly useless for such service‘.363  Bringing guns to bear was a 
concern, not only in terms of elevation but also for aligning the armament on to a 
target at the optimum time.  A crewmember of the Federal monitor Nahant wrote 
that the turret did not stop when required, and on occasion, had to be reversed 
several feet or put through a complete rotation in order to bring the target into 
alignment with the guns.  The Laird rams rotated their turrets manually; the 
mechanical defects on the steam rotated turrets of the Federal monitors would 
have impaired their efficiency in a fight with other turret armed ironclads.364  The 
Laird rams presented a threat in the form of ocean-going armoured vessels able 
to both, withstand fire from most Union warships, and deliver well-aimed shot and 
shell at range with a marginally higher rate of fire.365     
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     The Bulloch contract with Lairds to build the sister armourclads represented a 
technological forward leap in naval warfare as the industrial capacity and 
manufacturing skills of Britain were utilized to produce a pair of warships to offer 
an effective challenge to the evolving might of the Union Navy.  These sister 
ships were an amalgam of design features incorporated into armoured hulls built 
at the very edge of marine engineering practices at that time.  They were created 
not only as a response to the Federal monitors, the Laird rams were built as 
evolutionary models of the next phase in the development of the armoured man-
of-war. The ironclads under construction on the Mersey were understood by all 
observers to be something unique and powerful, so powerful as to contest the 
Union command of the sea around the beleaguered Confederacy.  These two 
ships with their armour plate, heavy ordnance, and moderate endurance on a 
light draught, were power projection weapons the South desperately hoped to 
have at sea under their flag.  With each frame and plate fitted at Lairds shipyard, 
the Federals viewed progress on the ironclad rams with increasing alarm.  These 
two new turret ships, under construction in Birkenhead, were viewed as direct 
threats to the Federal Navy and the coasts of the Union itself.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
            Reluctant Actions: Seizure and Acquisition of the Laird Ironclads 
                                                       1863-1864 
 
     The two armoured warships building at the Birkenhead Iron Works during the 
early 1860s, had become something of a legend for the belligerents during the 
Civil War.  For the Confederates, they were the best chance for raising the 
blockade of their coasts.  Union officials saw them as a threat they could not 
assuredly counter despite their latest ordnance and larger monitor-type ironclads.  
The U.S. envoy in London, Charles Adams, complained to the British Foreign 
Secretary that the lead ship was ‗a steam-vessel of war, of the most formidable 
kind now known‘.366  
     Historians have approached the Laird rams during the vital stage of their 
construction (1863) with too much of a retrospective view.  The crisis in Anglo-
American relations is seen as ‗largely resolved before it began. As a casus belli, 
the Laird rams crisis of later 1863 has been much overrated‘.367  However, a 
more detailed review of events is needed in order to determine aspects of what 
was a slow brewing diplomatic dilemma that later came to a near crisis.  This 
chapter will describe how this predicament was not as clear as is commonly 
supposed.  A secondary objective of this chapter will be an examination of the 
potential impact that the Laird ironclads had on naval plans and operations for 
both the Confederacy and the Union.  
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     The Civil War was not as distinct to many as it is in retrospect.  War news 
certainly had an impact on British investors and politicians, as it did on the 
American opponents, and the results of the dual Confederate disasters at 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg in early July 1863, ‗did not always have symmetric 
effects on North and South‘ nor did those two events have an irreversible effect 
on British opinion as many historians previously stated.368  By the summer of 
1863, the war was far from over and the Laird rams contributed to the 
apprehension felt in the North, as the conflict continued in the aftermath of Union 
victories, some smaller setbacks, and the ill effects of the New York draft riots.369    
     Attitudes in Britain were ‗more complex than once supposed‘, and although 
many favoured the end of slavery, many also identified with the Confederacy‘s 
fight for independence.370  Palmerston had decided in October 1862 that the 
British government should ‗continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall 
have taken a more decided turn‘.371  In a speech given in the Commons on 23 
July 1863, he identified the key issue surrounding the Laird rams as one of 
ownership.   After debating the nature of ships converted for use as commerce 
raiders, the Prime Minister turned to warships under construction for foreign 
customers saying ‗There is a further difficulty. I will suppose a ship built of such a 
character that we might safely say it was built for warlike purposes. Then you 
must prove whom she is intended for‘.372  The situation had not changed enough 
for London to intervene with the Laird rams then under different stages of 
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construction in Birkenhead during the summer of 1863.  The crisis would have to 
run its course.  
     Adams did not overstate the threat these warships posed to the United States 
when he wrote ‗all the appliances of British skill to the arts of destruction appear 
to have been resorted to‘ in their creation.373  They represented the cutting edge 
of design and construction of the ironclad warship, and it was believed they could 
have a major, even a critical impact on the outcome of the war.  The construction 
of these two ships would redefine the rules of diplomatic protocol, clandestine 
intelligence collection, and ultimately influence a reinterpretation of international 
law and the definitions of neutrality. 
     Work on the two Laird rams progressed rapidly in the early stages, and 
Bulloch was able to report to Secretary Mallory by 11 August 1862, ‗The armour-
clad ships are getting on finely…‘ and on 24 September, Bulloch again wrote to 
Mallory: ‗I have nothing to add except that the ships are progressing as rapidly as 
could be expected, and that I am more pleased with them every day‘.374  Bulloch, 
like many ship owners, extended the construction timeline by requesting 
additions and modifications as the ships were building.  In a report to Richmond 
he stated, ‗the ships being of entirely new design, I see reasons to modify the 
plans from time to time but only in immaterial points not involving important 
alterations‘.375   
     By the autumn, the weather effected the Birkenhead Works, and new 
measures were taken to regain lost time caused by rain and cold.  In a November 
dispatch to Mallory, Bulloch reported on the slow progress on the two 
                                            
373
 TNA, FO 412/11 ‗Correspondence Respecting the Two-Ironclad Vessels Building at Messrs. 
Laird‘s Yard, Birkenhead‘,  dated 11 July 1863 
374
 Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, I (2012), 389,391.   
375
 Ibid, 391.   
 107 
armourclads, ‗An unusual amount of bad weather has somewhat interfered with a 
certain portion of the work upon the ships of this description; but the builders are 
as anxious as I am to have them ready in the stipulated time, and have covered 
them with comfortable sheds, and have even introduced gas, so as to insure 
additional hours for work during the short foggy days of this climate‘.376  
     Beginning in the spring of 1863, the issue of how or whether to stop the Laird 
rams leaving British waters was discussed in Parliament on several occasions.  
The issue would grow in importance and in intensity as the ships progressed in 
their stages of construction.  In response to the difficult questions of how to stop 
an ironclad ostensibly building by a neutral party for a belligerent power, the 
broader issue of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 was also debated.  Rising to 
defend his name and the involvement of the Birkenhead Iron Works in the 
building of the Alabama, John Laird systematically countered the claims of his 
critics in the Commons, that he had violated the law and outfitted a warship for 
the Confederate States and was in the process on building ironclads for them.  
The member from Birkenhead referred to the verbal wrangling over what 
constituted a violation of neutrality, as ‗childish fuss‘.  Calling the opposition to 
task for providing arms to the Northern States, he questioned why Manchester 
arms manufacturers shipped thousands of rifled muskets, swords and percussion 
caps from Liverpool to ports in the United States with cargo deceptively labeled 
‗hardware‘.377  Laird then dropped a bombshell when he read aloud to the 
Commons, the 1861 letters from Union representatives asking his sons to build 
ironclads for the North, ‗On the 14th of August, I received another letter from the 
same gentleman, from which the following is an extract: — I have this morning a 
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note from the Assistant Secretary of the navy, in which he says, 'I hope your 
friends will tender for the two iron plated steamers‘.378  Laird continued by 
claiming ‗to talk of freedom in a land like the Northern States of America is an 
absurdity‘.  Not content to rest there, Laird went on to declare that his friend (he 
was likely referring to Bulloch) was followed by detectives, and that spies were 
employed in his sons‘ shipyard in Birkenhead and in other factories in the United 
Kingdom.  In his closing remarks, Laird addressed his response against his critic, 
(John Bright) by stating ‗I would rather be handed down to posterity as the builder 
of a dozen Alabamas than as the man who applies himself deliberately to set 
class against class, and cry up the institutions of another country which, when 
they come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce the very 
name of liberty to an utter absurdity.‘379 
     Laird‘s words stirred not only in Parliament but also resonated across the 
Atlantic.  In the Confederacy, excerpts of the fiery speech were relayed via 
telegraph and courier as far away as northern Louisiana.  The 4 May 1863, 
edition of the Shreveport Weekly News reported that the shipbuilder-turned M.P. 
had forcefully argued that the weapons shipped to the Federals were as 
dangerous as the unarmed ironclads building in Birkenhead.380  
     The U.S. Secretary of the Navy was upset by Laird‘s allegation, and denied 
that the Federal Navy had contacted the shipbuilder to request the building of 
ironclads for the North.  Wells wrote in his diary on 2 May 1863: ‗It is wholly 
untrue, a sheer fabrication.  The truth is, our own shipbuilders, in consequence of 
the suspension of work in private yards early in the war, were clamorous for 
contracts, and the competition was such that we would have had terrible 
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indignation upon us had we gone abroad for vessels, which I never thought of 
doing‘.381  The Navy Secretary was intensely bitter over Laird‘s claim, and after 
penning a denial to U.S. Senator Charles Sumner, Welles wrote in his diary on 
19 May, ‗He (Laird) is in my opinion, a mercenary hypocrite without principle or 
honesty, as his words and work both show‘.382  The denial was released to the 
Northern press and on 10 August, the New York Daily Tribune opined that Laird‘s 
allegation was false and that he had ‗been the dupe of some adventurer‘.383   
     On 13 August, Welles became despondent when he received a telegram 
reporting that a letter from Fox may have entangled the Navy Department with 
Lairds.  Washington intriguers crept out of the background, and the Navy 
Department‘s Chief Clerk W. H. Faxon, reported to Welles his opinion that the 
Assistant Secretary ‗has been forward, and too ready with his letters substituted 
for those for the Secretary or chiefs of bureaus‘.384  Faxon suggested that Fox 
had taken it upon himself to contact Mr. Howard, the Brooklyn, New York based 
interlocutor between the U.S. Navy Department and Lairds in 1861.  Faxon also 
thought that Fox may have corresponded with one of the Lairds before Welles 
squashed the proposal early in the war.385  The Navy Secretary, feeling battered 
by the Northern press, gave credence to Faxon‘s allegations by writing in his 
diary on 13 August 1863: ‗There may be something in these surmises‘. Welles 
wrote that he did not feel that the Assistant Secretary was purposely going 
                                                                                                                                  
380
 ‗Telegraphic‘, Shreveport Weekly News, 4 May 1863,1. 
381
 The Diary of Gideon Wells, I, 1861-30 March 1864, (1911), 291. 
382
 Ibid, 307. 
383
 ‗Secretary Welles and Mr. Laird‘, New York Daily Tribune, 10 August 1863, 4. 
384
 The Diary of Gideon Wells, I, (1911), 401, ‗The Federal Government and Mr. Laird‘, Dundee, 
Perth and Cupar Advertiser, 25 August 1863, 8. 
385
 The Diary of Gideon Wells, I, (1911), 401 
 110 
against his instructions, but that Fox was ‗perhaps anxious to do something to 
give himself notoriety‘.386   
     Welles had reason to be cautious around his assistant, as Fox was the son-in-
law of the influential Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, who sometimes had 
the ear of Lincoln.387  Welles did not have this degree of access, and resented 
the standing of both Secretary of State William Seward, and the Secretary of War 
Edwin Stanton.  Regarding Stanton, Welles noted: ‗not unfrequently [sic] he has 
a private conference with the President in the corner of a room, or with Seward in 
the library‘.  Blair would later confide to Welles, ‗Strange, strange, that the 
President who has sterling ability should give himself over so completely to 
Stanton and Steward‘.388  Welles was of a different temperament than Seward 
and Stanton.  According to biographer John Nevin, he was more introverted, 
more of a background worker: ‗Welles was a wire-puller for thirty-five years, a 
politician‘s politician…‘.389  In light of the Navy Secretary‘s isolation from Lincoln‘s 
inner circle, he both admired and distrusted those with a bold, direct air, including 
his Assistant Secretary.  Welles came closer to the truth regarding the drive and 
political skill of his deputy when he wrote in his diary (also on 13 August), ‗Fox is 
shrewd‘.390  
     Fox was also a connected ‗wire-puller‘ in his own right, but not a directly 
political one.  A former officer in the U.S. Navy, his pre-war career mirrored that 
of Bulloch as Fox rose to the rank of Lieutenant while in the Navy, and 
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commanded a mail steamer in civilian life.391  Fox would use his naval 
connections to cut through red tape and bureaucratic indifference.  It was this 
willingness to act boldly that put him occasionally at cross purposes with the 
careful and cautious Welles.  This difference in experiences, both in sea service 
and politics, contributed to the Navy Department‘s embarrassment in light of 
Laird‘s speech in Parliament which connected the Birkenhead Iron Works with a 
proposal for ironclad warships, however tenuous, from Washington in the 
summer of 1861. 
     Perhaps from caution, perhaps from embarrassment, the Assistant Secretary 
made no mention of the Laird revelation in his correspondence.  One of only a 
few references to Laird and his ships in Fox‘s letters was ever made.  On 13 
August 1862, Rear Admiral S. F. DuPont, on blockade duty off South Carolina, 
wrote to Fox: ‗To ease my mind and yours about the Charleston division-the 
Powhatan should be the base there; she can run down those within, if they 
venture out, as well as crush the ―Laird‖ boat and other ironclads from 
England‘.392   
     The Union Navy was confused about the size and dimensions of the Laird 
ironclads.  These ships were not the low-hulled armoured turret ships originally 
envisioned in 1861.  Perhaps the Union Naval authorities thought the 
Birkenhead–built ironclads were based on the earlier designs and more like the 
monitors with their shallow draught and low freeboard.  This could explain the 
belief that a paddle frigate like the U.S.S. Powhatan could run down the Laird 
armourclads in a manner similar to what the U.S.S. Mississippi (another paddle 
frigate) had attempted against the damaged Confederate steam ram Manassas 
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during the Battle of New Orleans on the night of 24 April 1862.393  The Powhatan, 
despite her vulnerable paddle wheels, was one of the largest ships in the Union 
fleet.  She had been recently overhauled and fitted with ten 8-inch and one 11-
inch Dahlgren smoothbores.394  A well-armed, handy ship with dependable 
engines, she could maintain 10 knots in most weather but she still was no match 
for the improved Laird turret ships.395   
     One reason for this early confidence on the part of DuPont and Fox 
concerning the Laird rams likely originated from inaccurate information reported 
through the British press.  The 10 February 1863, edition of the London Evening 
Standard claimed the Lairds ‗cupola corvettes‘ would not be armoured.396  
Rather, these two ships were reported as having ‗a mere skin of iron‘ with no 
heavy armour or thick teak timbers for protection.  The article opined if ships 
such as the Laird corvettes, ‗costing no more than ordinary iron transports‘ were 
built instead of the more expensive Warrior and Agincourt, they could ‗choose 
their own fighting distance, and by that means in the end overcome an iron-
cased adversary‘.397  This same article favoured a warship design which would 
emerge over forty years later as the powerful, but dangerously flawed 
battlecruiser. The reporter likely toured Lairds yard before the armour plates were 
put on and thus drew the wrong conclusions about the ‗corvettes‘.   
     On 3 February 1863, Bulloch reported to Richmond via a cipher dispatch, that 
the work on the ironclads at Birkenhead had been delayed due to 
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‗insurmountable difficulties‘.398  The weather contributed to the delay, but the 
work to bend the plates was slowed by the machinery limitations of the yard.  
Lairds had only ‗two or three very light hammers for small forgings‘ and the fitting 
of the plates was undoubtedly slowed by these restrictions.  Furthermore, the 
slow progress on the much larger Agincourt, was described in February 1863 as 
‗not in a very forward state‘.399   The armour plates required an almost 
painstaking degree of exactness to fit on to the hulls of the rams.  Bulloch wrote 
‗No armoured ships for the Admiralty have ever been completed in time and the 
most important part of the work, the riveting, is far more tedious than 
anticipated‘.400  Lairds was an experienced iron ship builder, but it was new to the 
work on armoured men-of-war. 
     Lairds were also protective of their reputation.  Bulloch was impatient with the 
delays encountered building the Alabama, but the shipbuilders would not be 
rushed.401  The launching of the wooden-hulled cruiser was delayed in part by 
the exacting builders rejecting defective stern posts until the right one was found 
and properly fitted.402  This same attention to detail and exactness of construction 
was another reason for delay on the iron corvettes.  The armour plates were 
dove-tailed to interlock when attached to the hulls of the turret ships, and the 
work was done ‗so accurately, that the joints are scarcely perceptible‘.403  
Another observer noted the plates were ‗beautifully planed and fitted, that it is 
almost impossible to tell whether the vessels are plated or not‘.404      
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     Bulloch was a careful man and he knew his moves were being watched.  He 
had written to Mallory on 7 November 1862 that his plan for evading British 
neutrality laws had to be revised after the departure of the raiders Alabama and 
Florida.  He wrote of the need for careful preparations, as the departure of the 
first armoured ship had ‗to be conducted with such caution and secrecy that I fear 
to mention the plan even in this way‘ (via a ciphered dispatch) to Richmond.405  
Bulloch had to devise a unique plan of subterfuge for each ship and he kept 
those plans to himself until the pressure by Union agents required a different 
tactic that went beyond the direct dealings with Lairds.406  Rumours about the two 
ironclads had swirled around the docklands and out to the British press.  One 
story held that the armourclads were destined for the Imperial Chinese Navy, but 
the claim was not believed due to the presence of Bulloch at Lairds ‗who is daily 
in attendance superintending their progress‘.407 
     The Eastern connection was a confusion of facts related to ships building for 
the Imperial Chinese Navy at the time.  A flotilla of, approximately, eight smaller 
men-of-war were under construction in Britain for the emperor, then battling 
against the Taiping Rebellion.408  This squadron, usually referred to as the Lay-
Osborn Flotilla, was named after the British Inspector-General of Customs in 
China, Horatio Nelson Lay, and the man selected to command the ships on their 
passage to the East, Captain Sherard Osborn.409  The unarmoured Chinese 
flotilla and the Laird rams were intertwined both in the British press and the 
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Federal spy network as two of the ships intended for China were built at 
Lairds.410          
     Rumours over the Laird rams were also fueled, in part, by newspaper reports 
from the Confederacy which filtered back to Britain.  Bulloch warned Mallory that 
‗indiscreet persons who should have known better have written to private 
persons at [sic] the South on such matters, and I am not surprised at the 
result‘.411  The 22 November 1862, edition of the Richmond Daily Dispatch 
relayed from a New York newspaper, a report of ‗three immense iron steam 
rams, the most powerful ever constructed‘ with one building on the Clyde and the 
latter two on the Mersey built by ‗John Laird, M. P. who built the pirate Alabama, 
and is pushing them rapidly to completion‘.412  Discretion was not exercised by 
the Richmond newspaper and on 24 November of that same year, the Daily 
Dispatch relayed the disingenuous claim that after the Alabama sailed from 
Birkenhead, ‗no further contracts have been undertaken‘.413  This statement 
backfired and instead of confusing the Federals, added to further speculation 
about the mysterious iron ships building under the covered sheds (known as the 
‗annexe‘) at the Lairds yard.414  Information continued to leak that ‗two of the 
most formidable specimens of naval architecture that Liverpool ever has 
produced‘ were taking shape at Lairds.415  Arguably, the knowledge that men 
were working on the two ships night and day contributed to information about the 
two armourclads having ‗oozed out that they are intended for the 
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Confederacy‘.416  The builders were pushing their men to complete the turret 
ships for a foreign power in urgent need of these ironclads and the Confederate 
States was the only client hard-pressed enough to require such an extended 
work schedule.  
     From his flagship, Rear Admiral S. P. Lee, U.S.N, wrote to Fox to convey his 
views on the increasing danger presented by the ironclads building in Britain.  In 
his letter dated 29 March 1863, Lee wrote: ‗the use the rebels have made of the 
extensive English workshops to provide a formidable seagoing ironclad ram 
navy, is the worst feature of the war‘.417  This fear was justified as the Laird 
armourclads had developed a reputation for quality workmanship even before 
they were completed.  Almost a year later, Scientific American would claim ‗no 
better specimens of war ships [sic] have ever been constructed than the two 
rams built by Messrs. Laird at Birkenhead‘.418  
 
British Neutrality and the first stage of the Civil War  
 
     Britain declared her neutral stance when the Civil War had been underway 
only a month.  On 13 May 1861, Queen Victoria signed a declaration whereby 
the British Empire would ‗maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest‘ 
between the ‗Government of the United States of America and certain States 
styling themselves as the Confederate States of America‘.419  This declaration 
announced that a law enacted in 1819, forbade direct involvement in a conflict by 
British citizens, and the Queen prohibited her subjects from participating in the 
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American war ‗as they will answer to the contrary at their peril‘.  The proclamation 
continued at some length and also warned against entering into military service 
for a foreign power and made specific reference to sea service prohibiting the 
enlistment of: 
„Any natural-born subject…shall, without such leave or license…  
serve in and on board any ship or vessel of war, or in and on board  
any ship or vessel used or fitted out, or equipped, or intended to be  
used for any war-like purpose, in the service of or for or under or in aid  
of any foreign power...‘420 
 
The law as echoed by the proclamation forbade Britons from building warships 
for a foreign belligerent while the United Kingdom remained neutral as they were 
not to: 
„Equip, furnish, fit out, or arm, or attempt or endeavour to equip,  
furnish, fit out, or arm, or procure to be equipped, furnished, fitted  
out or armed, or shall knowingly aid, assist, or be concerned in the  
equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel, with  
intent…to cruise or commit hostilities.‘421   
 
Further, those who violated the law and were indicted, could face fines or 
imprisonment or both and warned that ships fitted out with:    
„The tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all the materials,  
arms, ammunition, and stores, which may belong to or be on board of  
any such ship or vessel, shall be forfeited; and it shall be lawful for any  
officer of his Majesty's customs or excise, or any officer of his  
Majesty's navy…to make seizures under the laws of customs and  
excise, or under the laws of trade and navigation‟422 
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     The Queen‘s declaration commanded her subjects to ‗abstain from violating or 
contravening‘ the law regarding neutrality, and gave the strongest warning that 
those who deliberately violated the law ‗will in no wise obtain any protection from 
us‘.423  The mention of those who sought to contravene the law was a point of 
focus for Confederate agents, Union diplomats and their solicitors.  If a direct 
violation could not be proven, the subsequent legal move was to show a violator 
as purposely taking steps to avoid the conditions of the law by staying outside its 
ill-defined legal edges.  The strict adherence to the not-so-well-defined text of the 
law, allowed shipbuilders and arms manufacturers to carry on their trade with 
both the Confederacy and Union to such an extent that rendered the law, known 
as the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, almost unenforceable.   
     The differentiations between what was legal and what was not expressly 
excluded by the neutrality laws and the proclamation would prove to be a source 
of continual friction between Britain and the United States throughout the war.  
The building of the Laird rams strained the relations between London and 
Washington to near the breaking-point.  Tensions had risen several times during 
the conflict but the events of 8 November 1861, almost resulted in war when the 
Federal steam sloop U.S.S. San Jacinto stopped the British mail steamer Trent in 
the Bahamas and took off two Confederate commissioners.424   
     During the winter of 1861, as the Royal Navy was preparing its ships for a war 
with the United States, Britain‘s ironclads were seen as an eventual factor should 
a conflict ensue.  One British newspaper remarked ‗We have not mentioned the 
Warrior nor the floating batteries, as we do not suppose there would be any 
intention during the winter months of sending across the Atlantic any iron-plated 
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ships‘.  The British press had apparently forgotten that an ironclad was on station 
at Bermuda and in service.425  The ironclad floating battery Terror, one of the first 
generation steam armourclads intended for service during the Crimean War, was 
in commission at Bermuda under the command of Captain F. Hutton, R.N, the 
first Captain-in-Charge of the naval base at the island fortress.426  Armed with 
sixteen 68-pounders, this ship provided the heavy broadsides needed to defend 
the island base or attack an American fort at close range.427  
     The Terror was the third of the Erebus class of floating batteries, laid down a 
year after Britain‘s first ironclads of the Aetna class were begun as part of an 
Anglo-French plan to build armoured gun platforms with which the allies could 
bombard Russian coastal fortifications at close range.  The Terror and her sisters 
were almost identical to the Aetnas, but they carried two extra 68-pounders, their 
hulls were built of iron instead of wood, and their greater horsepower permitted a 
slightly increased speed.  These batteries were designed to steam up to an 
enemy fort under their own power but to get to the foreign shore, they had to be 
towed by larger vessels.428   
     The paddle sloop H.M.S. Devastation had charge of the Terror during her 
voyage, (mainly under tow) to Bermuda in the autumn of 1857.429  Useful for 
intended close combat but unwieldy in service, this ironclad was the mobile 
armoured defender of a crucial naval base near a hostile shore.  Terror became 
Britain‘s first ironclad to be stationed overseas, and the first armoured ship to 
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cross from the eastern to the western hemisphere.  During the Trent crisis, the 
Terror was provided with a crew, and several ships were available at Bermuda to 
tow her if required.430   
     A difficulty arose regarding manning of British ships, suddenly called into 
commission in anticipation of combat with the United States.  The 7 December 
1861, edition of the Huddersfield Chronicle warned: ‗our only anxiety is the want 
of ‗trained seaman‘.431  The men of the Royal Navy reserve were eager for the 
call up and in a spontaneous display of patriotic zeal, men paraded through the 
streets of several cities with Union flags and marching bands.  In one procession, 
some Jack Tars carried a flag with the motto ‗Ready, aye ready‘.432  
     In Bermuda, the crew of the Terror was assigned from other warships in the 
squadron.  By November 1862, the Terror was manned by a crew detailed from 
the steam frigate H.M.S. Ariadne.433  The ironclad floating battery was 
considered to be ‗so heavy and clumsy to be almost immovable‘, but she 
provided vital protection to the naval base and stood ready to meet a foreign 
challenger, especially as the United States Navy grew in strength from 1861.434   
To man the warships in times of crisis, the admiral on station would decide to 
move men from various crews to man the reserve component.  This was 
especially true for guardships like the Terror.  Ready when needed, but most of 
her crew had to be detailed for temporary duty on the unwieldy armourclad.                    
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     Here was a pattern that would reoccur throughout the mid-nineteenth century.  
The Royal Navy could husband ships and resources during times of peace and 
mobilize during times of international tensions, but manning was always a 
concern.  With Britannia challenged on the seas, patriotism would send 
previously reluctant trained men marching in the streets and Britain‘s wealth of 
seamen would come to the colours.  Yet this was a surge capacity of manpower, 
for the pull of commerce, and the needs of industry drew the reserve sailors and 
trained men back to merchant ships and factories as foreign crises abated.   
     The Trent affair was the lightning rod event in the autumn and early winter of 
1861.  By Boxing Day, Seward had convinced a recalcitrant cabinet and a 
hesitant Lincoln to acquiesce to London‘s demands and turned the Confederate 
commissioners over to ‗British Protection‘ and thus, let the crisis subside.435  In 
Washington, Ambassador Lord Lyons, had upheld British honour through tact 
and determination in his discussions with Seward, and both men helped to avert 
war through their diplomatic maneuvres. 436  The Trent crisis ended when the 
United States freed the Confederate commissioners and their two secretaries in 
early January 1862.437 
     The senior Royal Navy officer in North American waters, Vice-Admiral Sir 
Alexander Milne, had taken steps to prevent inadvertent acts by his commanders 
from aggravating the already tense peace.  From his flagship H.M.S. Nile at 
Halifax, he had ordered in September 1861, that warships of his squadron were 
‗positively enjoined‘ not to enter a Confederate port or salute the Confederate 
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flag.  If a Southern warship or fort fired a salute, the British captain could return it 
‗though you are to be most guarded not to encourage or invite in any manner 
such proceedings‘.438  Vessels of either belligerent carrying war material were not 
to be interfered with in a British port nor were they allowed to be interfered with 
by a warship flying the opposing flag.439  Milne also advised his commanders that 
the previous practice of cruising with U.S. warships for the purpose of 
suppressing the slave trade was discontinued, ‗as it might lead to an infringement 
of the strict neutrality‘.440  The admiral usually did not range too far afield as he 
had to maintain contact with the Admiralty and especially Lord Lyons in 
Washington.  Halifax was directly linked to the Union capital city via telegraph 
lines, and to keep his fleet war ready, the admiral was instructed to watch for a 
coded message.  If relations with the United States were to be severed, a 
telegram sent from Lyons reading, ‗Could you forward a letter for me to Antigua?‘ 
would be the order to commence hostilities.441                                                                                                                           
 
Liverpool and the Laird Rams 
 
     The British Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell, undoubtedly read reports 
with a mixture of resignation and bewilderment regarding the symbiotic 
relationship between the commercial interests of Liverpool merchants and the 
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Southern States.  Russell noted that the merchant class of Liverpool was of a 
‗port specially addicted to Southern proclivities, foreign slave trade, and domestic 
bribery‘. 442  Liverpool had strong commercial links with the South for decades.  
Those links only strengthened when imports of cotton dwindled, but arms and 
war material made up for the dislocation in trade.  One Merseyside sea captain 
noted blockade running had relit ‗a spirit the like of which has not been known 
since the palmy days of the slave trade‘.443  Liverpool had the advantage of 
location as it was near the cotton mills of Lancashire and linked via railway and 
canal to the iron works and armament manufactories of Britain.  Connected by 
established business relationships to the belligerents, ‗the great American trade 
is mostly within the grasp of Liverpool‘.444   
     The deprivation inflicted by the cotton famine was largely recovered in other 
industries.  Merchants in the wool trade ‗reaped a [sic] unexpected harvest of 
gold‘, and the munitions makers ‗waxed fat and greasy‘.445  The war offered a 
tradeoff for British industry with one observer noting: ‗In the kingdom as a whole 
the number of person on relief did not rise materially during the war, for as heavy 
as was the unemployment in textile areas, other industries enjoyed a 
compensating boom‘.446  The war encouraged merchants to avoid the neutrality 
laws and develop clear ways to bypass trade restrictions.   
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     The U.S. Consul in Liverpool was the determined lawyer, Thomas H. Dudley.  
With his offices on the waterfront, he and his agents were well positioned to 
survey the Mersey for ships arriving and departing.447  The office of U.S. Consul 
at the great port city was a plum position, considered ‗one of the most lucrative of 
the foreign appointments in the Presidential gift‘.448  The post required an active 
occupant due to the pressing commercial requirements of oceanic trade between 
Liverpool and America.  The outbreak of the Civil War increased those duties and 
obligations multifold, but Dudley was to prove equal to the task.  However 
vigilant, he was frustrated by his failure to prevent ships from sailing for the 
Confederacy laden with arms and munitions.  In May 1862, he sent a dispatch to 
Seward complaining of Liverpool‘s loyalties: ‗The people of this place if not the 
entire kingdom seem to be becoming every day more and more enlisted‘ in 
service of the Confederate war effort.449  
     At Birkenhead, Bulloch took advantage of the cooperative relationship with 
Lairds and their suppliers, to propose changes to his ships in order to adjust to 
new concepts of naval warfare.  In a letter to Mallory, Bulloch reported that the 
ironclads would have bowsprits ‗fitted with a hinge so as to be turned inboard 
when the ship is to be used as a ram‘.450  He did not mention how the bowsprit 
would be brought back, but the ship‘s plans indicated the bowsprit was hinged to 
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the forecastle.451  When readied for close combat, the giant boom would be 
unshipped and hauled directly aft, lifting the bow sprit on end and clear of the 
forepeak, allowing the ram to crash into an enemy hull with minimal threat of 
fouling the rigging.  This was not a new concept.  A similar approach to a non-
fixed bowsprit had been tried out in the La Gloire.  The French warship had a 
bowsprit that was ‗a short, straight, stumpy affair, and can evidently be removed 
at pleasure‘.452  In early 1862, the Admiralty considered fitting the steam frigate 
Resistance with a movable bowsprit ‗to draw in and out like a telescope‘, but 
decided to fit a more traditional fixed bowsprit instead.453  Britain was not to lag 
behind for long, as the ‗beautiful yacht-like frigate‘ Northumberland was equipped 
with a bowsprit capable of being folded backwards in order to clear the ‗knife-like 
bow projecting at the water-line‘.454 
     The funnel for each Laird ironclad was altered during the later stages of 
construction.  The two known builder‘s models, one a profile of the first of the 
class, and the other a full model of the second, show a slightly ranked funnel 
resting on a base roughly three feet in height.455  At some point during the 
building process, the funnel was fitted, not slightly raked as originally designed, 
but straight and capable of telescoping.456  The original funnel (still slightly raked) 
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as fitted on the first of the Laird rams was capable of being ‗lowered at pleasure 
by an exceedingly ingenious arrangement‘ likely involving an internal winch.457  
The one clear change made after the first ship was launched, was the fitting of a 
circular armoured casemate, around the funnel and projecting well above the 
turrets tops.  Early photographs of the second Laird ram show a straight funnel 
elevated approximately eight feet above an armoured sleeve which stood some 
ten feet above the deck.  Illustrations of the first Laird ram reveal the funnel was 
altered and the armoured casemate was added after the ship was launched.458   
     Funnels aboard warships during the middle Victorian years were raised and 
lowered to accommodate sail or steam.  An advantage of the armoured sleeve 
was to protect the funnel from enemy shot and shell, but one experiment gave a 
false conclusion regarding the draught a damaged funnel could produce.  On 3 
June 1846, the steam tug H.M.S. Echo was the subject of experiments 
conducted by the Royal Navy at Spithead.459  The funnel of the tug was cut with 
a series of holes to simulate damage from 24-pound shot, with one hole near the 
top of the funnel, one midway down, and the other at the ‗jacket‘ or base of the 
funnel at the deck.460  An ingenious damage repair kit consisted of ready-made 
curved iron sheets, two feet square, fitted with a small handle which turned two 
iron clasps.461  These ‗stoppers‘ would be fitted over the shot hole and clamped 
in place to cover the damaged area like ‗the clasp of a door or cupboard‘.  The 
results of the tests wrongly concluded that when the temporary repair plates were 
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removed, the smoke continued up the funnel and no effect was observed in the 
speed of the Echo or in the performance of her machinery, although it was noted 
that a strong wind would have probably had an effect.462  The tests were ‗most 
satisfactory‘ and led to the mistaken belief ‗that very little danger will occur from 
shot striking a steamer‘s funnel‘.463 
      This error derived from observations made of a series of holes carefully cut 
into the funnel instead of the impact of a ball or shell breaking and bending iron 
as it passed through the smokepipe.  A decade before, ‗impact‘ and ‗initial 
velocity‘ were dubbed ‗scientific bosh‘ by some senior officers of the Royal Navy 
more familiar with Nelson‘s quarterdecks than the increased firepower of the 
guns produced during the early industrial age.464  Admiral Sir Percy Scott would 
later remark of this time: ‗Gunnery officers were laughed at as mere pendants 
and coiners of long words.‘465  Gunnery emerged during these decades to 
become more a mixture of science and sight than muscle and frequency of 
broadsides.  Written in the aftermath of the Crimean War, and the Indian Mutiny 
of 1857, the 4 June 1859, edition of Scientific American observed the change in 
warfare: ‗a sure aim will effect more than the shower of bullets hitherto thrown 
way‘.466  Although that journal was referring to land combat, the inference was 
the same for war at sea.  Accuracy mattered more than weight of fire alone.  In 
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1857, the newly commissioned steam corvette H.M.S. Pelorus was one of the 
first ships in the Royal Navy to receive a gun sight.467 
     Almost immediately after the successful introduction of a steam-driven 
armoured warship in combat, was the funnel proven to be a vulnerable point.   
During the first day of the Battle of Hampton Roads, the Virginia had her funnel 
damaged by the nearly point blank fire from the 9 and 10-inch smoothbore guns 
(and single 70-pounder rifle) of the sinking Cumberland, causing the unwieldy 
ironclad to slow, and her casemate to fill with smoke.468   The Virginia suffered a 
loss of steam pressure and a subsequent loss in her already marginal 
maneuvreability prior to the epic battle with the Monitor the following day.  On the 
morning of 15 July 1862, the ironclad C.S.S. Arkansas, was barely able to reach 
the Mississippi River port of Vicksburg after an enemy shell tore the funnel seal 
at the top of her casemate.  The impact dislocated the breechings to the boilers, 
and resulted in a drop of steam pressure.469  This damage caused the Arkansas 
to slow and prevented her from using her ram with any hope of success.470   
     A lower silhouette precluded some damage to a warship‘s funnel for enemy 
shot was not cast upwards, as would be found with a slope-sided casemate 
ironclad.  During the second Schleswig War of 1864 between Denmark and 
Prussia, the Danish twin turret ironclad Rolf Krake was in action with Prussian 
shore batteries on three occasions and although she was struck one hundred 
and fifty times, sixteen rounds piercing the funnel with no appreciable loss in 
                                            
467
 Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, (1919), 26, Lyon & Winfield, The Sail & Steam Navy List. 
(2004), 209.   
468
 Luraghi,  A History of the Confederate Navy, (1996), 141, Scharf, The Confederate States 
Navy, (1996), 159, Gibbons, Warships and Naval Battles of the Civil War, (1989), 161. 
469
 Chester Hearn, Naval Battles of the Civil War, (San Diego, 2000), 124, 127, Scharf, The 
Confederate States Navy, (1996), 316.  
470
 Scharf, The Confederate States Navy, (1996), 314. 
 129 
combat performance.  Had the Prussians used heavier guns (some were 12-
pounder field guns), the results of the funnel damage would have had a 
detrimental effect on steam pressure.  The superior quality armour plate held up 
to the shot and shell, and a low hull made her a hard target for the Prussian 
gunners, but she received her only causalities when enemy rounds penetrated 
the thin deck plates, a weak point of many ironclads built during the 1860s.  On 
19 July 1864, during a debate in the Commons on the characteristics of 
armoured warships, the Rolf Krake was praised: ‗the manner in which her guns 
had been used, her speed, and the way in which she had manœuvred, were 
admirable‘.471  
     Repairs and modifications were made to the ironclad after the actions, her 
funnel had been ‗shot through and through‘, and the turret tops were altered to 
prevent harassing fire from small arms entering through the ventilation gratings 
as had occurred during one engagement.  The turrets withstood the Prussian 
cannon fire with only slight indentations detectable, but the movable bulwarks 
were ‗shot to pieces‘ and the deck armour (¾ inch of iron covered with wood) 
proved to be inadequate protection from plunging fire, with one enemy shell 
piecing the deck and exploding near the engine room door.472  Deck armour also 
deflected one Prussian shell into the side of the forward turret.  Though this 
round did no damage to the turret, the steel shell penetrated the deck near the 
turret base, as this plating provided only limited protection against shot and shell 
fired on a flat trajectory.473  Battle experience in America and Denmark 
undoubtedly contributed to the appreciation for more protection for the funnel of a 
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warship from hostile fire. The telescoping funnels for the Laird rams were not 
fitted to only facilitate voyages under sail, they were protective measures proven 
from combat at close range with enemy guns.               
 
Union Reactions to the Laird Rams 
 
     In December 1862, the Federal Government received a plan that involved a 
scheme to buy the Laird rams, and similar potential men-of-war out from under 
the Confederates.  The Boston merchant John Murray Forbes suggested in a 
letter to Fox, that men ‗untrammelled by naval contractors, and such nuisances‘ 
would travel to Britain and posing as representatives of ‗Siam, or China, buy the 
best of the war steamers now under construction for the rebels‘.474  After months 
of delay, Forbes business associate, financier and shipowner William H. 
Aspinwall of New York, joined in the scheme now backed with U.S. Government 
bonds.  The bonds were to be sold via the Federal Government‘s banker in 
London, Baring Brothers, in order to raise £1,000,000 for the purchase fund.   
     Forbes arrived in Britain (29 March 1863) before Aspinwall, and took 
immediate steps to aid Union efforts in the United Kingdom.  After meeting with 
Consul Dudley in Liverpool, he made money available to aid intelligence 
collection efforts against the Confederates as the U.S. Consul was found to be ‗in 
sad need of moral & effective aid‘.475  Despite efforts to conceal their real 
objective, the undertaking to purchase the ships was found out and reported in 
the British press.  Aspinwall was too high in profile to avoid attention as he was 
an, ‗ancient commercial oak‘ able to ‗give the Rothchilds a few ideas how to 
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make money‘.476  The attempt to purchase warships under construction for the 
Confederacy was unveiled before it could begin, as the British press reported 
that Aspinwall and Forbes were not representatives of neutral powers but 
working for the Government of the United States.477 
     Although the mission to obtain the ships failed, several ancillary gains were 
made by the two merchants.  One was the sudden inflow of desperately needed 
cash into the coffers of U.S. Consul Freeman H. Morse in London, and especially 
Dudley in Liverpool.  With these much needed funds, the Union intelligence 
network in Britain retained expert detectives and expanded its supply of paid 
informants.  Another related benefit of this tranche of funds for intelligence 
collection, was to effect a division of labour between the two consuls.  With their 
hands on the purse, Forbes and Aspinwall persuaded Morse and Dudley to avoid 
overlap.   
     Dudley was responsible for all intelligence collection in Britain north of the 
53rd parallel, and Morse would manage collection in England and Wales south of 
the line.  In addition to funding British newspapers which reported favourable 
articles about the United States not wanting a war with Britain, the duo were able 
to convince Washington to take key steps to remove impediments to better 
relations.  They persuaded the Federal Government not to issue ‗Letters of 
Marque‘ with which the struggling U.S. Merchant Marine could be remade into 
privateers, ready in the event the Union went to war with the British Empire.  
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Forbes made ‗careful use of the press‘ to highlight the efforts taken by the United 
States to avoid an increase in tensions with Britain.478 
     The most direct suggestion to change policy was an insistence that the Navy 
Department remove Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes (who had commanded the San 
Jacinto when she stopped the Trent in 1861) from front line service.  Forbes 
noted that the Federals must make active efforts ‗setting their teeth‘ to avoid 
aggravating British political leaders, and not just respond to events.  Wilkes was 
a provocation and his squadron achieved a fresh incident each time it dropped 
anchor in the West Indies.  Forbes regarded Wilkes abrasiveness as hitting ‗twice 
as hard in irritating John Bull as the same thing done by anybody else.‘479  His 
reputation for belligerency and Anglophobia was a growing concern for the North 
and this was reported in the Southern Newspapers.  In Texas, an edition of the 
Dallas Herald commented that Admiral Wilkes was ‗causing increased irritation in 
England‘.480  As if Forbes‘ warnings over Wilkes were not enough, the financier 
Aspinwall wrote to Fox with his view that ‗Every Englishman thinks that his 
appointment was a taunt to them intentionally made-& whatever he does, good or 
bad, is viewed with suspicion‘.481  Welles would note in his diary regarding the 
inability of this admiral to follow orders: ‗Wilkes often recklessly disregards and 
breaks them‘.482  On 22 May 1863, within a month of receiving the letters from 
Forbes and Aspinwall, Wilkes was relieved of command of the U.S. West Indian 
squadron.  The British press reported that his removal was the result of 
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‗representations‘ made by Lord Lyons, in Washington with the result that the 
‗Federal Government desires to maintain at this time the most amicable relations 
with that of Great Britain‘.483   
     With Wilkes out of the way, more attention could be focused on the aspects of 
British neutrality and Confederate efforts to build ironclads and cruisers in British 
ports, instead of defending or explaining the legal interpretations of a rogue flag 
officer of the Federal Navy.  The Forbes/Aspinwall mission almost succeeded 
due to the frailty of Confederate credit.  Bulloch had pulled in funds from George 
Trenholm‘s financial and shipping interests in Liverpool, but since the start of the 
war the South lacked capital, and payments were late.  Bulloch would write ‗there 
was always much perplexity and embarrassment from lack of ready money‘.484   
     The Confederate Government had been able to fund the war through bonds 
backed by cotton, but this method had only limited effects by mid-1863.485  
Bulloch had asked Mallory to forward his suggestion that bonds or ‗Cotton Script‘ 
could be sold in Britain, but the sell had to be through the established agents 
(Fraser, Trenholm & Co.) and not left to a private individual.  Bulloch warned that 
negotiations had to be along established business practices as, ‗The English like 
to do business in a formal matter-of-fact way, and are always suspicious of 
adventurers and undertakings that require to be puffed‘.486 
     By March 1863, the Union was also vying for funds from European lenders.  
Former U.S Treasury Secretary Robert J. Walker was in London as the unofficial 
representative of the Union and was urged to avoid any actions which would 
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cause embarrassment to the Federal Government.487  Walker did not heed the 
advice, but drove down Piccadilly in a carriage pulled by eight white horses from 
his fashionable residence there, and dropped pamphlets denouncing Jefferson 
Davis, from a balloon as it floated over the English countryside.  These antics did 
not produce any appreciable effect against Confederate fund raising efforts, but 
Walker‘s subsequent dissemination of statistical reports detailing Federal 
monetary policy and trade volumes, had a positive impact on leading banking 
houses in London and on the Continent. 488      
     Nevertheless, pro-Southern agents did employ a ‗puffed‘ sell with mixed 
success in Europe.  A more advanced speculative venture proposed by a retired 
French civil servant came along at the right moment to shore up funding for the 
South and also served as a mechanism to shield against Federal attempts to 
outbid them in the European arms markets.  As Forbes and Aspinwall were being 
armed with bonds from the Federal Treasury, the French banking house of Emile 
Erlanger & Company of Paris floated a loan for the Confederate States.489   
     Foreign governments had been seen as uncertain investments after several 
newly independent South American countries defaulted on their loans in the 
1820s.  By 1862 this had changed, and ‗a distinct turn‘ in favour of loans to 
foreign governments was again circulated in the exchanges of Europe.  On 19 
March 1863, the Confederate loan was floated in Amsterdam, Paris, Hamburg, 
London, and Liverpool.490  Erlanger used his business contacts to raise funds for 
the Confederacy instead of Richmond pushing its own bonds as the main source 
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of income.  This signaled hope to the Confederate Government, as the loan and 
secret shipbuilding projects were interpreted as harbingers of more aid and 
perhaps, direct intervention by Britain and France.  This view was unrealistic for 
both acts were isolated and not part of a general policy shift in either London or 
Paris in favour of the Confederacy.  Erlanger had originally issued the loan at a 
higher share price to help Richmond make a good political impression in 
Europe.491   
     The Liverpool agents for the loan were the trusted shippers/financiers Fraser, 
Trenholm & Company, who received a commission from the sale of each bond 
and allowed Bulloch to borrow from them at will.492  The Erlanger loan was made 
more attractive due to a linkage with the price of cotton at only a quarter of its 
then value in Liverpool.493  The Confederate States were offering discounted 
cotton futures in exchange for this war loan of £3,000,000 at 7% interest; it 
appealed to ‗the gambling element‘ in financial circles and gave access (via 
blockade running) to much needed cotton.494 
     Cotton was a problematic commodity.  The Confederates had imposed a 
virtual embargo on its export early in the war in a misguided effort to attract more 
European support.  Although a decline in shipments succeeded in drawing down 
reserve stockpiles, especially in the cotton mills of Manchester, the move injured 
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efforts to create a convertible resource for credit in Europe.495  By late 1862, 
another product from the South was far more profitable.  Turpentine had risen by 
one hundred percent on its pre-war value, vastly out-performing cotton, which 
had only risen by twenty per cent during the first year of the war.  By 1863 the 
price of cotton was rising with limited supply available through the blockade, but 
the Confederate Government failed to generate more than a trifling revenue 
through either taxes or export duties.496  As a result of miscarried domestic 
revenue generation efforts, foreign bond sales became crucial for the 
maintenance of the Confederate war effort.                       
     Most financial houses in Britain were aligned with the North, especially 
according to Forbes and Aspinwall, ‗our steady-going friends the Barings‘, but 
Erlanger was able to persuade the London firm of J. Henry Schroder & Co. to 
take up the Confederate loan issue in Britain.497  This was more than a financial 
godsend for the Southern States.  It was also a useful propaganda tool as 
Schroders was a firm of ‗high standing and influence‘.498  The Southern 
propagandist Edwin DeLeon, then operating from Paris, did not like the 
conditions of the loan but conceded it ‗seemed a great success, financially and 
politically‘.499  The success of the loan would, according to DeLeon, encounter 
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‗occasional fluctuations as the Confederate cause brightened or darkened‘ with 
each battlefield victory or defeat.500   
     The Erlanger loan did not produce steady income throughout the war, yet it 
provided needed revenue at a crucial time for Bulloch.  On 9 March 1863, he 
wrote to Mallory informing him that ‗he (Bulloch) could not induce builders to 
commence more ironclads without cash‘.501  The funds were delayed in 
disbursement, but some money did reach Fraser, Trenholm & Company and 
from them, payment was made Bulloch‘s and other accounts on Confederate 
naval and military contracts.502  Although not enough to meet the growing needs 
of the Southern States, the Erlanger loan provided receipts ‗in specie, and far 
larger in proportion than it (the Confederate Government) realized on any but the 
earliest of its domestic loans‘.503  
 
Ownership of the Rams 
 
     Bulloch had taken essential steps to obscure the intended ownership of the 
ironclads and to achieve this objective, obtained legal counsel to guide him 
through the intricacies of British law, especially the Foreign Enlistment Act of 
1819.  Bulloch employed F.S. Hull, a leading Liverpool solicitor, to serve as his 
legal advisor throughout the duration of his mission in Britain.504   A key 
restriction in the Foreign Enlistment Act, a ‗bewildering…precept‘ according to 
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Bulloch, was the restriction against arming, equipping or furnishing a man-of-war 
for use by a belligerent against a neutral power.505  The expert advice of Hull, 
helped Bulloch avoid one sticking point in the ‗precept‘, regarding what was 
meant by ‗equipment‘.  More specifically, the armour on a ship‘s sides was not 
considered ‗equipment‘, as the iron plates were not grouped as armaments and 
ordnance stores.  Armour by itself did not pass the definition of Article 7 of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act as being, ‗for war-like purposes‘.506 
     By April of 1863, the hulls of both ironclads were completed and the 294 had 
‗a great number of iron armour-plates fixed‘.507  At the end of June, Bulloch 
reported to Mallory that the engines of both ships had been ready ‗for several 
months‘ and the 294 would have been launched six weeks earlier, but she was 
held back for political considerations.508  He also reported to his superior that 
spies working for the U.S. Consul in Liverpool were ‗daily watching their 
progress‘.509  The Russians were also watching, and indicated they were 
interested in buying the two vessels.  Bulloch would not wait until the ships were 
launched and ready for sea.  He transferred ownership to thwart both the Union 
and Russian interlopers.510  
      Bulloch was occupied with ‗a good deal of management‘ to transfer the 
ownership of the rams from his name to a French firm.  Bulloch had arranged to 
build two ironclads rams and two ‗clipper corvettes‘ with the French shipbuilder, 
Jean-Lucien Arman of Bordeaux, and acting on orders from Richmond dated 27 
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March 1863, transferred the ownership of his Birkenhead ironclads to a French 
company in order to remove them from Britain, and fit them out in France.511  
Arman was a well-connected choice to serve as facilitator.   He was a politician of 
national standing, served in the Corps Legislatif, and had occasional access to 
Emperor Napoleon III. 
     In late March 1863, Bulloch travelled to Paris and met with the Confederate 
emissary John Slidell, to arrange the transfer of his turret ironclads then building 
at Lairds.512  Bulloch and Slidell met with Arman who then arranged a meeting in 
Paris between the two Confederate officials and a suitable firm.513  A subsequent 
meeting with the Messrs. Bravay proved fruitful and a ‗satisfactory arrangement‘ 
was made, whereby Bulloch would no longer serve as the owner of the two Laird 
rams.514   The Messrs. Bravay had acquired the ironclads for a ‗nominal sum‘, but 
their ownership was a blind.515  They were holders of the contract but, once the 
ships were finished, the former owner would reacquire title (for another fee) and 
the ships would steam for America under the Confederate ensign.  Bravay & 
Company of No. 6 Rue de Londres, Paris, was under the directorship of Adrien 
Bravay, with his older brother François, providing the funds to launch the firm. 516    
     François was the stuff of legend.  The son of a French tradesman in ‗narrow 
circumstances‘, the young Bravay was apprenticed to a shoemaker, a trade that 
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would produce his entrée to fate.517  Taking up trade in Egypt, he was favoured 
by chance when he repaired the shoe of Viceroy, Sa‘ad Pasha.  After a 
subsequent meeting with the Viceroy, the ‗Lucky Shoemaker‘ received a contract 
to supply shoes for a portion of the Egyptian Army.  Bravay would continue in this 
service of the Pasha until the death of the ruler in 1862.  Following this, the 
wealthy François (who allegedly added to his purse through trade with Algeria) 
returned to France with a fortune estimated at 15,000,000 Francs (£1,200,000) 
and stood for office.518  After months of legal contests, he won his seat in the 
Chamber of Deputies.519  The election trials and legal battles of François was a 
likely reason Adrien was the public face of Bravay & Company.  It was through 
the elder brother‘s shoe contract, that the Messrs. Bravay got their proverbial foot 
in the door, both in Egypt and in France.  Bravay was an accomplished hand at 
maneuvreing around the intriguers in the official circles of Cairo and even after 
the death of Sa‘ad, he regained his influence to such a degree with the new 
Viceroy, Ismail Pasha, that he was regarded as ‗potential as any foreigner in 
Egypt‘.520  This linkage was the bedrock on which Bullock‘s plausible storyline 
was built.   
     The Laird rams ostensibly would be sold to Egypt to build their fleet, and the 
transfer of the ships from Bulloch to the Bravay brothers was ‗a mere business 
transaction‘.521  Lairds facilitated the transfer of ownership ‗in the ordinary course 
of business‘ and obtained a 2½ percent commission from Bulloch, who readily 
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agreed to the fee, as he was ‗Hoping that in better times we may be able to 
renew our business associations, which have been as satisfactory to me as our 
social intercourse has been agreeable‘.522  The plan was believable, as the 
Messrs. Bravay had received an order for two ironclads intended for the Pasha.  
On 28 December 1862, François had written to his brother Adrien from 
Alexandria reporting that he had sought to disengage from contractual 
obligations with the viceroy.  Nevertheless, the Pasha ordered François to build 
‗two armoured frigates, after the best and most perfect designs‘. The ships were 
to come from France and the contract was not to be made public.  This was due 
to political considerations and was likely a subterfuge to hide the purchase from 
the Pasha‘s overlord, the Sultan in Constantinople.523           
     Mallory ordered on 29 October 1862, that the Laird rams be named for the 
states of North Carolina and Mississippi but he did not specify which would bear 
which name.524  That was left up to Bulloch. The first of the Laird rams, 294, was 
to have been commissioned as the C.S.S. North Carolina, yet she would receive 
the false Egyptian name, El Tousson.  Her sister, the Mississippi, was built as 
295 and received the cover name, El Monassir.525   
     Despite the sale to the French firm, Bulloch was still involved with the 
construction of the two ironclads, only now he was less visible.  The contract to 
build the four corvettes, and another pair of rams through Arman and his 
associates (two corvettes were built in Nantes by J. Voruz), was initially a good 
idea to diversify Confederate shipbuilding contracts, yet this would later prove to 
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be an ill-timed distraction.526  Bulloch had written to Mallory regarding the moves 
he might take to insure the Laird ships left British waters with only a vague 
concept ‗As I can only shape plans to suit possible changes of circumstances, it 
is quite impossible to go further into detail on this subject‘.527  Traveling to and 
from Bordeaux, Paris, and back to Liverpool consumed much of Bulloch‘s time 
when delicate hands-on management of the completion and departure of the 
Laird ships was required.  When nuance and careful steps where most needed in 
Liverpool, he was away in France.          
     Prior to transferring ownership, additional equipment was likely arranged for 
installation on the Laird ironclads.  On 20 May 1862, when the Confederates 
were scouting around for British shipyards to build their ocean going ironclads, 
Commander North wrote to Bulloch to report on the plan of his intended 61, the 
vessel later to be dubbed as the ‗Scottish Sea Monster‘.528  North mentioned that 
a spare screw propeller would be carried on his ironclad as replacement for the 
three bladed iron propeller, fixed to the single shaft.529  
     The workmanship required to construct propellers was considered a high art 
of the iron shipbuilders‘ craft, and those not up to the exacting demands were 
regarded as ‗a poor tool‘.530  These tasks were handled by specialized foreman, 
(propeller) molders, who produced the screws fabricated for ironclads built in 
New York and other shipbuilding centres.531  The Confederacy lacked skilled 
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machinists and was critically deficient in propeller molders.532  Bulloch likely 
considered adding such a replacement screw to each of his rams on their 
voyages to the Confederacy.  Transporting spare screws on deck was not 
unusual.  When H.M.S. Black Prince steamed south from Glasgow to complete 
her fitting out in Portsmouth in 1861, she carried a propeller blade on deck as a 
replacement in the event the main screw had been damaged.533   
     The two bladed screw North referred to in his letter to Bulloch was probably a 
‗Griffiths‘ type, capable of adjustable pitch, and praised during a trial run in 
October 1862, for ‗scarcely any perceptible vibration‘.534  The Royal Navy had 
adopted Robert Griffiths‘ pattern for all screw warships in the early 1860s, and 
this design offered benefit of uniform production and greater strength.  This 
strength was achieved by bolting the ‗fans‘ or blades of each screw propeller to 
the hub with flanges, instead of the earlier method which involved attaching them 
with a ‗key‘ and wooden wedges.  This new method permitted an increased rate 
of screw revolution and greater speed.535  The adoption of the Griffiths pattern 
required the Royal Dockyard at Woolwich to take on extra ‗wheelers and other 
artisans‘ to handle the increased workload of the understaffed propeller 
molders.536  
     The Laird rams were fitted with other modern pieces of equipment and likely 
included William Hornsey‘s patent engine room telegraph.537  This pedestal 
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mounted instrument, positioned near the wheel(s), resembled a garden sundial 
and carried the face turned upward.  The orders for changes in speed were 
relayed to the engine room counterpart by a lever resembling a sideways ‗L‘ 
which, when pivoted over the indicated position as displayed on the face, 
sounded a gong in the engine room and a brass pointer would swing to the 
desired position on the dial.538  An earlier version of the engine room telegraph 
had first been mentioned in service on the River Tay in 1821.539  Additionally, in 
July 1825, the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal mentioned an engine room 
telegraph, an invention of James and Charles Carmichael of Dundee, which had 
been fitted on the Dundee and Fife ferry, George IV, and ‗for some time used‘.540  
The workings of the Carmichael-built telegraph was described by a Royal Navy 
officer:  
      ‗By the simple motion of a small handle, or index placed on a table, upon    
      deck, in view and in hearing of the man at the helm and the master of the   
      vessel, every movement which the engine is capable of giving to the paddle-  
      wheel may be at once commanded.  The vessel may be moved forward, or  
      backwards...or entirely stopped, at any given moment, by merely turning the   
      handle to the places denoted by the graduations of a dial plate‟.541 
 
     The engine room telegraph was too much of a leap toward in automation for 
many officers in the navies and merchant fleets of that era, and the man-in-the-
loop remained a familiar function of relaying commands from the deck.  A series 
of hand signals was one method employed but when that failed, orders were 
relayed through voice by ‗bawling out the engineer below‘.542  Another method 
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used for relaying commands to the engineer was through a series of bell 
signals.543   These signals, used in the U.S. Navy in the early 1860s, were 
detailed as ‗Ahead slow, 1 bell; fast, 4; slow again, 1; slower, 1; stop, 2; back, 3‘.  
The U.S. Navy method differed from the bell sequence used in the American 
merchant marine although the Navy system was ‗more complex but less 
ambiguous'.544  Methods of communicating from the deck to the engine room 
were simplified when the Hornsey telegraph was adapted for standard use in the 
Royal Navy in 1858.545   
 
The Union Spy Network in Britain  
 
     Inspection of the work on the Laird rams was by mid-1863, done not by 
Bulloch but by others assigned by him.  Lieutenant R. R. Carter of the 
Confederate Navy was sent through the blockade to serve in one of the ironclads 
(likely the 294) but was reassigned for the duty of ‗inspection of work actually in 
progress‘.546  Carter, praised for his ‗cheerful and intelligent assistance‘ by 
Bulloch, was appointed liaison with Lairds and those firms contracted to build 
Blakely pattern ordnance.  Carter‘s duties allowed for work to continue, and 
Bulloch to ‗keep entirely out of sight in the matter‘ of securing the guns for the 
Laird armourclads.547  
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     Bulloch had visited Lairds frequently during the earlier stages of construction, 
including supervising and assisting with the laying of the keels of the two rams.548  
Bulloch met with the yard foreman in charge of building his ironclads, and was 
seen in the company of one of the Laird brothers at the shipyard.549  Bulloch 
became more cautious as Union informants had ready access to the docks along 
the Mersey.  He was to remark on his need to maintain a low profile as 
‗experience has taught me that it is far safer to keep our business as little 
extended as possible, as otherwise the chance of our transactions being ferreted 
out by the Federal spies, who abound even in this country, is greatly 
increased‘.550   
     Dudley‘s intelligence network had evolved since the outbreak of the war, and 
money from the Forbes/Aspinwall mission aided efforts to collect information 
through outside sources.  The Consul would be acknowledged for his intelligence 
gathering against Confederate plans to purchase weapons and especially, 
acquire warships.  His tenacity paid dividends and he was later praised for his 
determined efforts ‗in hunting for secret information appears to have been 
indefatigable‘.551      
     Dudley‘s attempts to obtain reports on the construction status of the rams 
were initially frustrated by watchmen at the Lairds yard.  The Consul wrote to 
Seward ‗They are using great precautions to keep us ignorant of their doings.  No 
stranger is admitted into their yard‘.552  Dudley had to go beyond Merseyside to 
obtain a trusted agent to get to the men at the Birkenhead Iron Works.  One 
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leading supplier of information was London detective Matthew Maguire.553  
Maguire had obtained very detailed information about the Alabama while she 
was still building at Lairds in 1862, and his success marked him as a very 
effective agent for Dudley.554  In a sworn deposition dated 21 July and related to 
the Confederate cruiser, Maguire was by that time living in Liverpool and kept in 
employment around Britain by Dudley.555     
     Men like Maguire had to be handpicked, and efforts to obtain a sub-strata of 
paid informants able to provide reliable and legally verifiable information took 
time.  Although initially thwarted at the entrance to Lairds, the Union diplomat did 
obtain information regarding the armour plate being rolled for the Laird rams at 
the Mersey Steel & Iron Company.556  Dudley warned Seward that the plates 
were much improved over what the Union fleet had to contend with from 
homespun Confederate ironclads.  The Consul observed the plate making 
process, and noted: ‗the metal is heated in pieces not more than a hundred 
pounds in weight and then rolled together…they say the new mode is much more 
tenacious and its power of resistance much greater than the old‘.557  In 1863, one 
British newspaper described the art of armour plate production as an act that 
required ‗more than mere heating, and has to be cooked and watched in its 
cooking with as much care as if it was an omelette.‘558  British rolling mills were 
world leaders in the production of iron cladding, and few places could match the 
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skill and capacity of Yorkshire iron works, as iron plate took on the sobriquet, 
‗Sheffield carpet.‘559         
     Particulars, such as the one detailing the plate produced at Mersey Steel & 
Iron, were lacking from subsequent reports sent by Dudley.  The Consul‘s 
workload prevented detailed analysis on all information with the result that 
intelligence was sometimes confused by the sheer volume of reporting.  Lines 
crossed with other Federal agents and Dudley served as a facilitator and relay for 
intelligence obtained.  He did not have the resources for always accurate 
reporting.  His apparatus lacked a filter. 
     The Consul passed on information and rumour concerning the Confederate 
efforts in Liverpool, to the commanders of Federal warships during their regular 
calls to British ports.  On 20 July 1863, Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, relayed a report 
to Welles regarding the disarmed steamer Gibraltar, formerly the Confederate 
cruiser Sumter, which had loaded at Liverpool and was waiting to clear customs 
on 3 July.560  Her cargo reportedly included a number of heavy guns in wooden 
cases including two Blakely RMLs intended for transfer to one of the Birkenhead 
rams when the ironclad left British waters.561  The report claimed the guns 
weighted 22 tons each.  In the holds of the Gibraltar were shot, shell, ‗other 
munitions of war‘, and the machinery likely intended to work the guns in one of 
the turrets of a Laird ram.562  The blockade runner did carry two 13-inch RMLs, 
but these were destined for Charleston, not the rams.  These guns (each 
weighing 22 tons) were too large for normal stowage and had to be positioned 
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vertically, giving the Gibraltar the appearance of a ship with three funnels.563   
Although Lee‘s report was inaccurate in all its details, Bulloch did obtain 
ordnance for his ironclads from a Liverpool source.  Fawcett & Preston would 
build several 9-inch guns (including those numbered 221, 222, and 223) as part 
of a five gun order dated 8 September 1863, with four of those guns intended for 
the Laird rams.564            
     The presence of the Union informants in Britain was so evident by mid-1863 
that ‗The port of Liverpool has been delivered over to a systematic espionage 
such as probably would be looked for in vain in despotic Russia, and could 
scarcely find a parallel in free America‘.565  In May 1863, the London Evening 
Standard printed a letter to the editor from a British subject recently returned to 
London from the continent.566  Mistaking him for a Confederate official, the man 
was followed.  Describing the interests in his communications, the beset Briton 
reported: ‗If the postman knocked at my door to deliver a letter an attempt was 
made to handle it and ascertain where it had been posted…If I dispatched a 
telegram a ―private detective‖ was at my heels, and as soon as I left the 
telegraph office a bribe was offered to the young female who had received my 
message for the communication of its contents‘.567   
     Liverpool was ‗bristling with alarm‘ over the rumours of secret agents, and 
‗every strange looking person in the streets is at once taken for a hired spy or 
private detective‘.568  The Liverpool police, on orders from the Treasury, 
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investigated activities related to another vessel Bulloch hoped to acquire as a 
cruiser, the Alexandra.  Maquire‘s men and the other for-hire private detectives 
were functioning in an unofficial capacity, and were subject to ‗all kinds of 
censure and suspicion‘.569  These and other demonstrations of how the usually 
murky business of espionage had suddenly emerged into the public conscience 
were reflected in a comedy called ‗Finesse‘; or ―Spy and Counter Spy‖.570  The 
comedy starred a well-known favourite of the English stage, Alfred Wigan, with 
his wife and others in supporting roles.  The farce was termed a great success 
with one reviewer commenting that the ‗applause was hearty…the laughter 
incessant‘.571  Bulloch was dogged by the clandestine agents of the United 
States and complained that their actions were increasingly invasive.  The 
Confederate officer was to remark: 
     ‗The spies of the United States are numerous, active and unscrupulous. They   
     invade the privacy of families, tamper with the confidential clerks of   
     merchants, and have succeeded in converting a portion of the police of this   
     country into secret agents of the United States, who have practiced a prying    
     watchfulness over the movements and business of individuals intolerably  
     vexatious, which has excited the disgust and openly expressed indignation of  
     many prominent Englishmen, and the frequent criticism of that portion of the  
     British press which is really neutral‟. 572    
 
     The U.S. intelligence system in Britain began operations in the summer of 
1861, having been established by The U.S. Consul to Belgium, Henry Shelton 
Sanford.573  The Consul was eager to serve the Union, and roamed between 
Brussels, Paris, and London in his personal quest to obtain any information 
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regarding Confederate activities in Europe.574  During one of his visits to Britain, 
Sanford was given the name of a London detective by Consul Morse, when the 
diplomat was stopping over in the British capital.  Morse informed Sanford that 
police detective Ignatius Pollaky was ‗just the man‘, but required £100 to start 
work with his team of private investigators.575    
     Pollaky worked for C. F. Field, former ‗Chief of the Detective Police of the 
Metropolis‘ who employed Pollaky in the role of superintendent of his Foreign 
Department.576  Detective Pollaky had gotten married on the 5th of June and was 
undoubtedly motivated to his new line of work in the interests of generating cash 
for his new household.577  Apparently Morse had read of Pollaky in the 
newspapers as he was a well-known witness for Crown prosecutors.578  By 12 
July 1861, Morse had employed the investigator, and soon thereafter Pollaky and 
his agents were beginning their work of setting out ‗Posts‘ to be manned, and 
persons of interest to be followed.579  Bulloch was a primary target on their lists 
and the Confederates in Liverpool were reported on as ‗B. & Co.,‘580  Pollaky was 
one detective mentioned in the British press, as associated with the ‗Spy System 
considered so hateful to Englishmen‘.  He had been previously utilized by those 
who sought information for pending divorce cases, forgery claims, and now, 
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continuous surveillance work needed to track Confederate agents.581  Morse 
soon found Pollaky and his men to be too heavy-handed as their techniques 
lacked finesse and created unwanted observation by the general public. Sanford 
also lacked the requisite careful touch and in November 1861, proposed planting 
an agent on board the steamer Gladiator then loading with supplies for the 
Confederacy, and running her onto a mud bank in the Thames.582  
     The system established and paid for in part by Sanford, ran afoul of Adams, 
who disliked Sanford‘s meddling where Consul Morse held the portfolio.  
Sanford‘s ad hoc network also suffered from bureaucratic redundancy as both 
consuls were paying for information from the same source, Pollaky.  Adams 
disdainfully noted that the U.S. Consul to Belgium spent most of his time in Paris 
and travelled to London for the purposes of ‗poaching‘.583  The overlapping, dual 
reporting channels could not continue especially as the close surveillance 
methods of Pollaky‘s informants had generated unwanted press in Britain.  
Adams wrote to Seward, who then informed Sanford via letter, that his activities 
had unintentionally created ‗some inconveniences‘ for the U.S. diplomats 
assigned to Britain, and he was to stay out of intelligence collection operations 
there.584 
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     Dudley achieved a notable success in the spring of 1863, when he delayed a 
ship intended as a gift for the Confederate Navy from leaving Liverpool.585  The 
Alexandra was a wooden-hulled screw steamer, configured for rapid adaption 
into a commerce raider.  She was launched by the shipbuilder William Miller & 
Sons and fitted out through Fawcett, Preston & Company, the same yard, and 
engineering firm which had built the C.S.S. Florida.586  Dudley saw this ship as 
the opportunity for a test case concerning the Foreign Enlistment Act, and sought 
the assistance of A. F. Squarely, a Liverpool solicitor who had helped him during 
the earlier attempt to stop the Alabama.587  The evidence gathered by Dudley 
and his solicitor was routed through Adams who relayed it to the Foreign 
Secretary.588   
     The Union efforts were rewarded when officers from H.M. Customs seized the 
Alexandra on 5 April 1863.  The Crown prosecutors lost their case as the ship 
was not armed, but the government tried again.  The result was another failure 
and the Alexandra was released in April 1864.  She would eventually sail for the 
Confederacy later that year as a blockade runner, (she had been renamed Mary), 
not as a warship.589  Although not a decisive victory as Union diplomats had 
hoped, the Alexandra case set a precedent.  Dudley had found a way to impede 
the efforts of the Confederate agents and their associated shipbuilders in Britain 
through legal (albeit temporary) intervention.  The courts did not uphold the 
seizure, but delay became an effective tactic used by Dudley to aid the Federal 
war effort.                    
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    Union surveillance operations which had continued in Britain throughout most 
of the Civil War, now rose to new levels of activity.  The efforts centred not only 
on stopping arms and supplies from reaching the Confederates, but also on 
obtaining clear evidence for Adams to present to Russell.  Dudley‘s background 
as a lawyer provided a skilled discernment regarding which testimony would 
carry weight at an official inquiry.  More than mere information, he now moved to 
obtain sworn depositions from eyewitnesses.  Detectives had become tainted.  
The Union needed a fresh approach to block the Mersey ironclads from putting to 
sea.  They obtained men on the inside, paid informants who were skilled 
shipfitters in Lairds shipyard.590    
     Especially valuable were those men who worked on or near the rams.  Austin 
Joseph Hand was one paid informant working as a caulker in Lairds yard.  He 
would swear that he saw Bulloch at the Birkenhead Iron Works when the keels 
for the two turret ships were laid down.591  One informant relayed a discussion he 
had with ‗Mr. Moore‘ one of the head workmen at Lairds‘, who stated with a 
sense of pride in the two ships: ‗Wait for the 294 and 295, get out and alongside 
the ―Alabama‖ and then you will soon see the Southern ports opened‘.592  
     Paid informants are of doubtful reliability and soon after paying for information 
obtained from within the Birkenhead Iron Works, rumours swirled out that men 
were watching the construction of the rams and receiving coin for tale-bearing.  
Dudley had informed Seward that the workers he had to rely on for inside 
information were ‗not as a general thing very esteemable men, but are the only 
persons we can get to engage in this business, which I am sure you will agree 
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with me is not a very pleasant one‘.593  Men from shipyards suspected of building 
warships intended for the Confederates, were reportedly offered £50, or passage 
to the United States and the offer of a position or ‗excellent situation‘ if they 
provided information to Union agents.594    
     As mentioned previously, Laird had stated in the House of Commons as early 
as March of 1863, Union spies were interfering with work around the Kingdom: 
‗Almost every detective that can be got hold of in this country is employed, and 
they have spies everywhere.  I believe there are spies in my son‘s [sic] works in 
Birkenhead, and in all the great establishments in the country‘.595  By August 
1863, spies reportedly delayed progress on the rams and security was tightened 
at Lairds yard as a result. 596  Some informants were suspected, their positions 
were in jeopardy, and they were likely sacked if found out.  One of Dudley‘s 
informants wrote of the social and economic costs of his involvement in the 
Union intelligence network: ‗[I would] never undertake a job like this as I have lost 
all my self-respect and done myself a great deal of damage.  I hope you will write 
by return as I am getting bankrupt.  Let me know to be or not to be‘.597   
     Austin Hand was a curious case.  He had traveled with his wife to Liverpool to 
visit his brother-in-law, then employed at Lairds.  His relation helped him obtain a 
position at the shipyard where he returned to his trade as a ship-caulker.598  
Hand, an American citizen, supplied information to Dudley ‗from time to time‘ but 
when his deposition  detailing Bulloch‘s visits to Lairds to inspect the rams was 
sent to Russell by Adams in London on 17 July 1863, both Hand and his brother-
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in-law were subsequently sacked.599  Labeled as a spy, the unfortunate Hand 
had been unable to obtain work in and around Liverpool since his discharge from 
Lairds in August 1863, and he was compelled to return to the United States.600   
     Hand arrived in New York on 28 July 1864, in a destitute state, but hoped for 
work at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.  Unable to procure a position, Hand had 
reached circumstances of ‗great distress‘.601  The story of Hand and others who 
assisted the American consul in Liverpool undoubtedly sent a chill through 
Merseyside.  No one who had jeopardized the reputation and wellbeing of the 
area shipyards and the means to procure work for over 3000 men working at 
Lairds, could continue undamaged.  Swearing out depositions to give to Dudley 
would end any semblance of a steady working life in Birkenhead and Liverpool.  
Once labeled as an informer for the Union, these men had to go away, some as 
far as America, in order to rebuild their lives.  Taking the £50 from the Federal 
spymaster had proven to be more costly than anticipated for certain informers. 
 
Launching the Rams 
 
      Although the public had been largely barred from the major shipyards in 
Britain, some newspaper reporters were permitted access, and one wrote of his 
visit to Lairds in September 1863.602  That unnamed correspondent, having 
traveled to Liverpool and then on to Birkenhead to ostensibly visit an agricultural 
show, wrote: ‗to not have paid a visit to Messrs Laird‘s great industrial 
establishment, would have been something equivalent to being in Rome and yet 
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visiting neither the Pope nor St. Peter‘s‘.  After walking among the building ways, 
the correspondent found the two copula ships which he described as 
‗unmistakable ships of war…evidently sea-going, very strong, yet fine in the lines, 
with workmen clustered upon them everywhere like bees‘.  The atmosphere at 
Lairds had undoubtedly changed with a new emphasis on security, as the writer 
observed that ‗in the whole establishment there was not a single loiter…each 
man seemed occupied, and even more intent than his neighbor, in close 
attention to his special duty‘.603   
     The pace of work on the two rams had suddenly picked up in the early 
summer of 1863.  The Alexandra case had cast doubt over Confederate 
shipbuilding efforts, but the work was renewed with purpose after Lairds and 
Bulloch felt reasonably confident that the sale to Bravay & Company would 
prevent the U.S. diplomats from gaining ground with the Foreign Office.  On 16 
June, payment terms between Lairds and the new French owners were agreed 
whereby one fourth of the costs of the ships would be paid to the builders when 
the first ironclad was launched, and another quarter was to be paid when the first 
ship was completed.604  The remaining funds would be paid under identical 
conditions for the second ship.605   
     The drafts of money were facilitated by a French banker, a Monsieur Langier, 
who had also helped facilitate the Erlanger loan.606  Langier had reportedly 
signed as a guarantor for the rams, and served as the financial link between the 
Lairds and Bravay.  On 28 June 1863, Bulloch had officially relinquished legal 
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claim to the Birkenhead rams (which had officially begun under contract on 1 July 
1862), and did ‗for ever [sic] quit claim‘ his interest in the ships.607  Work could go 
ahead with renewed emphasis despite the prying of Federal informants, as the 
Confederate agent was out of the picture, at least as far as Lairds were 
concerned.  Bulloch had temporarily relocated to France to supervise the building 
of his armourclads at Arman‘s yard in Bordeaux, and only came to Liverpool for a 
day or two in the late summer to review letters and post his dispatches to 
Richmond via the Bermuda mail.608                                      
     The two ironclads building at Bordeaux were lesser men-of-war compared 
with their Laird predecessors.  Shorter and of less displacement than the 
Birkenhead vessels, these French variants carried a 9-inch Armstrong RML in 
the forecastle and two 70-pounder RMLs in a fixed turret aft.609  Like the Laird 
ships, both Arman ironclads were designed to operate in shallow waters 
(although their draught was almost as much as that of the 294 and 295) and built 
with rams, but the iron beaks projected much further forward than on the 
Birkenhead ships.610  One French armourclad was given the cover name Cheops 
and her sister the Sphinx in an attempt to give the ships another Egyptian air.611  
Unlike Lairds turret rams, the Arman ironclads were wooden-hulled and coppered 
in preparation for use in the warmer waters of the American South.612   
     The ram on these French-built ironclads was unusual.  Shaped like an 
elongated duck bill, it was described as ‗a huge round backed point, sharpened 
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and curved as it descends under the waterline‘, and extended approximately 20 
feet from the prow.613  Four times as long as the five foot tapered ram on the 
Laird ironclads, this feature negated the maneuvre advantage of the twin screws, 
and twin rudders on the Cheops and Sphinx.614  The ram of the two Laird turret 
ships (when compared to other British-designed steam rams of the era) was 
likely submerged three feet below the surface, but on the Arman vessels, more of 
the ram was above the water at the prow unless the ships were loaded 
forward.615   
     Unlike the Laird ships where the ram was a secondary weapon, the Bordeaux 
armourclads were built with an emphasis on the ram as a first strike option.  The 
larger surface area of the ram on Arman ships undoubtedly cast up spray and 
confronted the rudders with more submerged mass to overcome when helm was 
needed.  Steering was also hampered by the pronounced forward sweep of the 
‗tumblinghome deficiency of the ram bow‘ as observed by Patrick Barry during 
his visit to the Arman yard while the French rams were under construction.616  
When the Sphinx belatedly entered Confederate service in 1865 as the C.S. S. 
Stonewall, her commanding officer Captain Thomas J. Page, C.S.N, described 
her ram as an ‗elephantine proboscis‘ and faulted the structure as contributing to 
her poor seakeeping abilities.617  Page noted the ironclad plowed into the waves 
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‗diving and coming up, after the fashion of the porpoise‘.618  The ram was simply 
too large for a ship of 194 feet in length overall.619                          
      In Richmond, Mallory was increasingly anxious to get the Laird rams away 
from Birkenhead.  On 21 April 1863, he had written to Bulloch with his views on 
the two turret ships announcing ‘These vessels would be of incalculable value to 
us at this Time‘.  Undoubtedly anxious for the Confederate Navy to have the 
wherewithal of scoring a blow against the Union forces, Mallory ventured a bold 
but highly impractical concept of operations when he wrote in the same letter 
about the possibility of restoring New Orleans to Confederate control.  The 
secretary was desperate for information to allay his fears that the Confederate 
ironclads might not get out in time, and he concluded the introduction of his letter 
with an inquiry: ‘What prospect have we of getting them out, and when?  These 
are all questions that intrude themselves constantly upon me‘.620 
     Earlier, Bulloch had written to Mallory requesting the command of one of the 
Laird armourclads.  The Confederate Navy Secretary replied peevishly on 3 
March 1863, ‗if you adhere to this desire, give the earliest notice practicable, that 
I may send an officer to take-not supply your place‘.621  Faced with the 
ungracious opposition from his superior, Bulloch withdrew his request for 
command.  When his success getting the Florida and Alabama into 
commissioned service for the South should have been rewarded, his plan 
changed to one of waiting for official gratitude to come later.  On 30 August 1863, 
Mallory wrote to the Confederate officer selected to command the Laird rams, 
Captain Samuel S. Barron, C.S.N, instructing him to travel to Britain and assume 
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the command of the first Birkenhead ram after Bulloch brought her out to France.  
Barron was under orders not to interfere with Bulloch‘s ‗special duties…the 
department desiring to leave his judgment and action the larger scope‘.622 
     Mallory had tried to assuage Bulloch‘s disappointment at not receiving a 
command when he wrote in April 1863 ‗I know of no gentleman in our service 
whom I would, from my point of view, with more pleasure see in such command 
than yourself, while at the same time there is not one to whom I could look to 
supply your place for us in England‘.  This was a shortsighted move by Mallory, a 
move which dampened the ardour of a man deserving of a chance to command a 
warship on a combat mission.  Mallory suspected he overstepped, and wrote to 
Bulloch to explain ‗I may have too far lost sight of your professional esprit‘.623    
     Mallory was too far removed from the action to appreciate what his man in 
Liverpool had accomplished.  A short assignment at sea would have given the 
chance of glory to an accomplished officer instead of overburdening him with 
more desk work.  Mallory unwittingly removed the inspirational spark that hope 
provided to his most effective officer.  With command a fading prospect, Bulloch 
pursued his tasks with a determination driven by duty, rather than one also 
motivated by anticipation and the hope of adventure.  Bulloch switched 
operations to France to avoid the increased attention from Federal agents in 
Britain, but the Laird rams were progressing again and he was needed most in 
Liverpool at this time.   
     Bulloch was probably hoping that one of those French-built ships would be 
finally awarded to him as his command.  Mallory‘s oversight had thwarted his 
best officer, and in so doing probably injured the Confederacy‘s best chance of 
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getting one of the Laird rams away from European waters at a crucial time in the 
war.  Bulloch was undoubtedly disappointed at not receiving command of one of 
the Laird ironclads.  He knew his position in Europe was crucial for the 
Confederate war effort but he could not completely contain his bitterness and 
later wrote: 
     „Active service at the front wins the “Bauble reputation”.  The men who work in   
     the rear are not despised or even undervalued, but they must have the nerve    
     to stifle their ambition. They may expect fair and just commendation, but then   
     they must not aspire to stand side by side with those who wear the “Myrtle   
     Crown”.624     
 
     On 4 July 1863, the El Tousson, the first of the Laird rams, was launched on 
the Mersey.625  She was launched without her masts or turrets, and her wide 
beam gave her an appearance of looking ‗more circular than conical‘ when 
afloat.626  As she slid down the ways, she carried the British flag astern and a 
French Tricolor fluttered from a temporary mast amidships in an acknowledgment 
of her new owners.627  Towed to her fitting out dock at Lairds, men were detailed 
to work in 24-hour shifts in a renewed effort to get her ready for sea.628  One 
Liverpool newspaper remarked of 294 at her launching, ‗She will give a good 
account of herself, and sustain the high reputation of her now celebrated 
builders‘.629 
     The launching was a tribute to Bulloch‘s perseverance, however that same 
day; the Confederates had suffered two catastrophic blows that would place 
them on the defensive for the remainder of the war.  The Confederate fortress of 
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Vicksburg, Mississippi, the last link to the trans-Mississippi river region of the 
South, surrendered to Union General U.S. Grant on 4 July.630  A day earlier, 
General Robert E. Lee‘s regiments, the crème of the Confederate Army, were 
defeated in the epochal encounter at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and began a 
struggle to get back to the relative safety of Virginia.631  In one 24-hour span, the 
Southern States lost the initiative and became frantic for the means to divert 
Union forces from their now compressed front lines.        
     Although the Laird ironclads were incomplete at this stage, they impacted 
naval plans and operations for both the Confederacy and the Union.  The rams 
offered the Confederates the means to inflict telling damage on the Union far 
from the battle lines.  Though he could not command his armoured ships, Bulloch 
still held influence regarding their utilization.  Five days after the first Laird ram 
was launched, he wrote to Mallory from Paris to express his reasons why 
attacking New Orleans and pressing further up the Mississippi River was not a 
valid option.  The ironclads would need escorts to pass over the bar from the Gulf 
of Mexico.  The shifting sands and mudflats at the entrance to the great river 
would require towboats to help pull the ironclads over the bar into the river 
channel.  If they did not go aground, the ironclads would likely be restricted by 
the confines of the river ‗very much in the condition of a boxer with one arm tied 
behind his back‘.632             
     Bulloch proposed something much bolder, but also less hazardous than a 
mission along the Mississippi.  He favoured an attack against the New England 
coast, a bombardment of the naval facilities at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  The 
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former U.S. naval officer was familiar with that port: ‗opposite the town is an 
important national dock and building yard.  The whole lies invitingly open to 
attack and destruction‘.633  As a reprisal for the burning of Southern towns, and 
as a scheme to help pay for the warships, Bulloch opined that a flag of truce 
could be sent to the mayor of Portsmouth to demand $5 million in gold, otherwise 
$50 million in ‗Greenback‘ paper notes, or the Confederate ironclads would 
bombard the town.  Enamoured with the visions of his plan, he wrote with an 
adventurer‘s flair: ‗Suppose our two ironclads should steam unannounced into 
that harbor [sic] on some fine October morning‘.   
     Bulloch knew they needed the best men to crew these ships as they were not 
cruisers able to attract men in search of prize money, but the ironclads were 
ships with a ‗grim aspect and formidable equipment clearly show they are solely 
intended for the real danger and shock of battle‘.  Bulloch was confident that he 
could obtain engineers and firemen from Britain and perhaps enough men to 
man one gun on each ship, but he needed Southern men skilled in the arts of 
heavy artillery.  If such men were pre-assigned to forts around Wilmington, North 
Carolina, the rams could steam through the Union blockading squadron and take 
the gunners on board to fill out their crews.  From Wilmington, the resupplied and 
fully manned ironclads could take on the Federal Navy and lift the blockade on 
their way north.634 
     Confederate authorities knew a seaborne attack was difficult to resist.  Early 
in the war, the Union naval attack on Port Royal, South Carolina, impressed 
General Lee who wrote to Richmond: ‗Wherever his fleet can be brought no 
opposition to his landing can be made except within range of our fixed batteries‘.  
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Lee was careful to place defensive works around Savannah and Charleston in 
areas which could provide interlocking fire while also positioned where Union 
warships could not offer direct support to attacking Federal troops.635 
     A key target for the Laird rams would have been the Union Naval base at 
Beaufort, North Carolina.  This port, captured by a Union amphibious operation in 
April 1862, provided coal, ammunition, provisions and repair faculties for the 
Union warships blockading Wilmington, North Carolina, 100 miles to the 
southwest.636  Beaufort was a busy port and the coal stocks varied in size as 
warships came in to refuel, generally during the full moon, as blockade runners 
only attempted to run into Wilmington during dark nights.637  The base was also 
an anchorage for ordnance supply vessels and storeships.  By June 1864, 
Beaufort had more provisions on hand than the combined stocks of the Baltimore 
and Washington Navy Yards combined.   
     The harbour was difficult to enter due to the shifting channels and prevailing 
winds, but the port brimmed with flammable materials including coal, barrels of 
tar, and highly combustible turpentine, enough to present a fire hazard to the 
civilian colliers, Federal men-of-war, and supply ships that usually crowded the 
bay.  Confederate soldiers had burned bridges in the area and their scouts were 
familiar with the pace of activities at the port.638  The Laird rams (or one of them) 
would have been unable to avoid bombarding Beaufort, as the benefits of 
shelling that port far outweighed the risks.  An attack on the key base would have 
disrupted Union resupply operations, and would have greatly hampered the 
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Federal blockade.  With a Laird ironclad operating from Wilmington, the Union 
Navy would have been compelled to reassign monitors from operations near 
Charleston to protect their base at Beaufort should Wilmington continue under 
blockade.  As a method of disrupting Federal operations, the base was too 
inviting a target to bypass if the Birkenhead ironclads were in commission under 
the Confederate flag and steaming near the Carolina coasts.   
     Union authorities had mixed views of the Laird rams, but most were growing 
concerned at their prospects of getting to sea.  Adams was increasingly gloomy 
regarding the outlook of stopping the departure of the vessels later referred to as 
‗these floating engines of destruction‘.  One early Union casualty of the two 
ironclads would have been the exchange rate, as gold was sure to have risen 
against the Greenback upon news of their sailing from British shores.639  The 
official exchange rate in 1863 was $4.85 (U.S. dollars) to £1.  Greenbacks 
depreciated from that level and averaged 70.5 percent of their face value against 
gold during the mid-war years.  A rise in the gold value would have damaged 
Union revenue from bond sales in Europe as these were purchased in 
Greenbacks.640                                                                                                                            
     Welles wrote in his diary on 17 August 1863, that he sent a response to 
Dahlgren ‗Who has serious apprehensions about Laird‘s ironclad steamers, 
which trouble Du Pont‘, and relayed a report from the State Department 
confirming Washington was making entreaties to Britain to prevent the Laird 
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ironclads from sailing.641  In his dispatch to Dahlgren, the Navy Secretary 
detailed a report from Seward which relayed that Adams ‗had informed the British 
Government that if the Rebel ironclads are permitted to come out it will be casus 
belli‟.642   
     Fox sent a copy of plans for one of the Laird rams to John Ericsson, who 
scoffed at their armament (and construction) when compared with the larger 
guns of the new Union monitors, ‗such a gingerbread affair must not come near 
our XV inch bulldogs in their impregnable kennels‘.643   Bulloch took a different 
view writing: ‗if one of the rams had gone into smooth water, and had suffered a 
‗Monitor‘ to make deliberate practice at her with 15-inch shot at short range...no 
doubt in time her plates would have been loosened and the backing splintered; 
but their power and speed was such that in open water, with room to maneuver 
[sic], I think they would have had no difficulty in running down any ‗Monitor‘ then 
afloat…‘ 644   
     Endeavouring to avoid alternative history, a brief discussion of ordnance 
available to the Union Navy and that designed for the Laird rams sheds some 
light on the results of a possible encounter.  The wooden warships of the Federal 
blockading squadrons lacked sufficient firepower to resist one Laird ram ‗long 
enough for a second broadside‘, therefore the armament of the larger monitors in 
service during the Civil War provides the comparison point.645   
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     The Union Navy had proven the capabilities of the 15-inch Dahlgren 
smoothbores, the largest naval guns in operational service in the war.  Two 
Confederate ironclads, the Atlanta, and Tennessee, had their armoured 
casemates penetrated by shot from these guns, but lighter ordnance was 
ineffective against the unwieldy Confederate-built armoured vessels.646  The 15-
inch Dahlgren had an effective range of 2120 yards at 7 degrees of elevation.647  
The four Blakely 9-inch RMLs on each Laird ram would have been able to out-
range the 15-inch Dahlgrens, but the two 70-pounder Whitworth guns intended 
for each ram had the distinct lead in range by better than two-to-one over a 
Federal monitor.648  Although the 70-Pounder (5-inch bore) Whitworth, was 
considered by some in the British press to be too light when used against the 
heavier armour plate entering service (1864), it was considered a superior piece 
of ordnance in terms of range and accuracy.649 
     As the 294 and 295 were armoured with rolled plates of single thickness, and 
the Union monitors were shielded with laminated iron, a battle could be decided 
by those warships armed with heavy guns capable of piercing the latest 
armour.650  A confidential Admiralty paper on ordnance indicated several qualities 
required of heavy guns in the late 1860s including: accuracy, range, penetrating 
power, simplicity of use, and strength to withstand heavy powder charges.  The 
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Admiralty was clear as to which quality was most desired: ‗The penetrating power 
(italics in original) at ranges under 1,200 yards is certainly the most important 
under the existing circumstances of naval warfare.  It is the most difficult to 
obtain, and without it all other qualities are useless‘.651  The initial velocity of a 
shell as it left the muzzle of a naval gun was an indicator of penetrating power.  
The Admiralty compared several leading guns of the 1860s, and the 9-inch RML, 
fired with a heavy charge of 43 pounds of powder, developed a muzzle velocity 
of 1340 feet per second.  This compared favourably to the largest American 15-
inch guns, which developed an initial velocity of 1220 feet per second when fired 
with a 60 pound powder charge.652   
     For the Union monitors, a maximum powder charge firing a shell from a 15-
inch gun could have decisive effects at close range.  One 15-inch shell had 
penetrated the layered armour of the Confederate ironclad Tennessee at the 
Battle of Mobile Bay in 1864, a blow which contributed to the surrender of the 
vessel.  Nevertheless, a charge of 60 pounds of powder in a 15-inch gun was 
considered ‗daring‘ and threatened to burst the barrel if not handled with great 
care in loading.653   
     Both Confederate and most Union ironclads were built in America with 
wooden hulls, mostly from green timbers and suffered structural stresses due to 
the rapid deterioration of the unseasoned wooden supports and planking.  The 
monitors also lacked enough watertight integrity to insure they could withstand 
being holed below the waterline, however the Laird rams were adequately 
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compartmented below decks and were designed with a double bottom to 
withstand contact with a torpedo.654  
     Another mitigating factor was the quality of shell.  Ammunition manufactured 
in the South suffered from mediocre quality and the Confederate Navy‘s chief 
ordnance officer, now Commander John Brooke, warned these inferior shells put 
their warships at a marked disadvantage against the better equipped Union men-
of-war.655  This was a partially the result of a lack of adequate materials, but the 
main reason was the lack of skilled labourers, a dilemma referred to in a report to 
the Confederate Congress by Mallory as a ‗serious evil‘.656  The Laird rams 
would have overcome this problem due to the superior quality of rifled guns and 
armour piercing shell available for the Blakely and Whitworth ordnance. 
     Had the Laird rams gone to sea with their intended RMLs, they would have 
had the edge in terms of range and accuracy in a gun duel with the most modern 
Union ironclads.  These monitors had the advantage, in terms of weight of shell 
during a close range encounter, but the Laird rams also had suitable speed to 
maneuvre out of reach if damaged.  A likely outcome would have been an 
inconclusive battle with the Laird ram(s) giving and receiving damage, but Union 
naval operations along the coasts of North America would have been 
endangered by the arrival of the Birkenhead ironclads.  David G. Surdam wrote: 
‗although Northern naval superiority alone probably was not sufficient to have 
defeated the Confederacy, it appears to have been a necessary condition for the 
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Northern victory‘.657  The Laird rams threatened to disrupt the Federal Navy‘s 
support to the overall Union war effort.     
     On 8 September 1863, Fox wrote to Lincoln warning that the Laird rams 
represented a clear threat to the Federal Navy and the coasts of the Union:  ‗In a 
naval point of view the departure of these vessels, or even one of them, requires, 
on the part of this Government, the gravest deliberation‘.658  The Union Navy had 
taken steps to offer some protection to Boston and the New England fishing fleet 
in the event a Laird ironclad steamed near Cape Cod.  One newspaper in Ohio 
reported the steam frigate Niagara had been refitted with a heavy battery of guns 
but the prospect of her action against one of the Laird rams was a source of 
‗apprehension‘ for the Union.659  
     The Federal Navy was urged to take other actions to make ready for the new 
Confederate ocean-going ironclads.  Rear Admiral Dahlgren had proposed 
precautions in anticipation of the first Laird ironclad arriving off Charleston.  The 
Admiral asked that a new monitor, either the Dictator or the Puritan be ordered to 
Union-occupied Port Royal, South Carolina, to protect that essential supply 
base.660  Dahlgren also proposed that coal and provisions be moved nearer to 
the Union lines outside Charleston.  This would allow adequate supplies for 
shallow draught steamers supporting the Federal regiments outside that Rebel- 
held port, as the arrival of a Laird ram would drive off the larger warships 
maintaining the blockade.661 
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     Bulloch would state years later, ‗The Government of the United States did not 
exaggerate the importance of preventing the departure of the rams from 
Liverpool‘.662  The Governor of Massachusetts also did not underestimate the 
rams and had dispatched Colonel Harrison Ritchie as his agent to purchase the 
latest RMLs from Armstrong for the protection of Boston Harbour.  Ritchie wrote 
back to inform the governor that the purchase must be ‗managed with great 
secrecy and caution‘ to avoid public scrutiny.663     
     The guns from the Elswick Ordnance Works were a curious choice for the 
fortifications of a key base of the Union.664  The 10 May 1862, edition of Scientific 
American denounced the transition of Armstrong guns from breachloading 
ordnance to larger muzzleloaders, as a reflection of ‗the age of humbug‘.665  
Despite this seeming regression, the development of the Armstrong guns 
progressed through the early 1860s to become ‗very much more of a success 
than is generally supposed‘.666  One American journal compared the Armstrong 
heavy pieces with similar sized U.S. ordnance (15-inch Rodman guns and Parrott 
300-pounders), disdainfully noting examples of failed American guns as ‗cast-iron 
abortions‘.667 
     The Armstrong patterns offered readily obtainable heavy guns for the 
protection of Boston, bypassing Washington bureaucracy and industrial backlogs 
in the Northern States.  In London, Colonel Ritchie obtained the Elswick contract 
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through a third party, the noted shipbuilder, John Scott Russell.668  The guns 
were delayed by slow payments and deception.  Russell had made the first 
installment with money received from Ritchie, but diverted funds to pay for his 
debts and to finance his shipyard in Cardiff.669  By the time the guns were 
finished, the war in America was over and Russell‘s embezzlement had been 
found out.670   
     The quality of work in armour, ordnance, and overall construction, put the 
Birkenhead ironclads at the forefront of naval shipbuilding in the middle-1860s.  
Both Confederate and Union officials believed the Laird rams would have had a 
noteworthy impact on the naval war.  In 1903, a New York newspaper reported a 
former Confederate naval officer spoke of the Laird rams, and commented, had 
the ironclads departed Britain and arrived off the Confederate coasts, ‗the effect 
upon the war might have been very great‘.671       
 
Redefining Neutrality 
 
     The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 was by the 1860s, at variance with the 
demands of trade, industrial-scale production of armaments, and the speed of 
Trans-Atlantic travel.  One British periodical would accurately note: ‗In truth, the 
whole system of maritime warfare has been revolutionized by the introduction of 
steam…‘672  The neutrality law had become obsolete and so too the methods of 
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enforcing that act.673  Neutrality as it was understood in the mid-1860s, was ill-
defined, as it was implemented and changed at a deliberate pace more suited to 
sail and the horse.  New concepts of what comprised neutrality had to travel at 
the speed of the telegraph if officials responsible for enforcing government 
actions were to out race the locomotive and the marine steam engine.                            
     The key problem regarding enforcing neutrality was where to begin?  The 
belligerents had imported arms and equipment, and men from Britain had been 
enlisted in the services of the warring powers, in both military and industrial 
capacities.  The 1819 law warned that British subjects were not to ‗knowingly aid, 
assist, or be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any 
ship or vessel..‘674  Factories in both the North and the South were in dire need of 
skilled hands and the promise of high wages encouraged some to make the 
Atlantic crossing.  John Snowden returned to his English birthplace to recruit 
ironworkers for his factory in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.675  Snowden was the 
senior partner of the firm Snowden & Mason which built shallow draught Union 
monitors for service on the Western Rivers.676  The Confederates contracted for 
British foundrymen to travel to the Southern States and begin work casting heavy 
guns.  Bulloch took this mission in hand, arranging with Thomas Ludlam, the 
foreman of the Low Moor Iron Works in Yorkshire, to travel with a team of skilled 
men through the blockade in order to set up an armaments shop for the 
Confederate Navy.677  Ludlam and his men were skilled tool makers, experts at 
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the steam hammer, and one of their team was considered ‗a practical man of 
every trade, one who can…make a horseshoe or repair an engine‘.678   
     Attempts by Adams to stop the Laird rams from going to sea were hampered 
by actions undertaken in the United Kingdom by men working on behalf of the 
U.S. Government.  Federal agents had complicated matters for the North by 
recruiting men in Ireland for the Union Army and some for their navy.  One 
editorial called attention to the recruiting efforts in Ireland to man the Federal 
Army, but also questioned the legal dilemma regarding the use of weapons sent 
to the belligerents: ‗The Confederates may be shot down with English-made 
cannon, but the Federals must not have their cotton and tea seized by English-
built ships‘ flying the Confederate flag.679                               
     Recruitment was sometimes considered deceitful work undertaken by 
unscrupulous men.  The U.S. Navy was cautious calling at some ports due to the 
actions of the recruiting agents or ‗Sharks‘ as they were sometimes called.680  
Captain John Rodgers, U.S. N., had written to Fox to report that he had lost men 
who had overstayed their leave, and recruiters in New York were keen to acquire 
seamen, especially English speakers.681  Merchant ship captains, hoping to avoid 
Confederate cruisers, were reportedly paying $50 for men to sign on for a voyage 
to Liverpool, and the Federal Army was offering a $150 enlistment bonus.682  
When the steam frigate H.M.S. Ariadne visited New York in the winter of 1861-2, 
22 men deserted the ship to take up arms for the Union.  The desertions had 
occurred even though leave was not granted and the Ariadne had anchored not 
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near the city, but in the harbour off Staten Island.  One officer on the frigate noted 
‗nationally was of no consequence so long as the men were ready to fight‘.683   
     Rather than recruiting men in Ireland, the Confederates pressed able bodied 
men into service wherever they found them in the Southern States.684  The 
British Consuls were able to obtain release from the Confederate Army for some 
men, but Governor Thomas Moore of Louisiana warned that if British subjects 
volunteered, the local government would not intercede with the military 
authorities to obtain their release.  The use of the bounty seemed to be a key 
component to military service.  Whether sought out, taken under pressure, or 
after physical abuse, the money in hand meant to the local authorities the man 
was enlisted in voluntary service.685  Despite pressure and coercion, some 
enlisted due to local ties and personal obligations.  One Scottish machinist living 
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, enlisted in a state regiment out of a sense of loyalty 
to his neighbours, and for ‗the honour of old Scotland‘.686  
     Crown prosecutors would later try men for operating an enlisting service in 
Liverpool tasked with providing a crew for the Confederate cruiser Georgia in 
violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act.  One man, Frank Glassbrook, signed 
aboard under the assumed name Frank Rimmers, a name he used in the Royal 
Naval Reserve.687  Three men in U.S. naval uniform appeared before a judge in 
Cork, Ireland for having enlisted aboard the Federal man-of-war U.S.S. 
Kearsarge.  These three men, natives of Ireland, plead guilty but one of them 
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stated they did not think there was any harm in their actions.688  Both the Union 
and the Confederacy had enlisted British subjects in their service, in breach of 
British law, and these were actions which were considered in Britain to be ‗the 
grossest violation of all amicable relationships which ought to exist between 
friendly powers‘.689     
     In August of 1863, the Confederate warship Florida returned to European 
waters and contributed to the rising apprehension over the fate of the Laird rams.  
The Florida steamed into the French port of Brest in need of repairs to her 
engines and copper hull plates.  Her arrival compounded the concerns of 
Bulloch, and consumed much of the diplomatic good will he had retained through 
his discretion.  Some 35 men from the Florida were discharged and made their 
way to Cardiff in a ragged and worn state, and unintentionally aroused suspicions 
over the Mersey ironclads.  From Wales they traveled to Liverpool and attracted 
the attention of both Union intelligence operatives, and legal agents of the 
Crown.  
     A confidential letter from the Foreign Office to British legal authorities asked 
‗whether these seamen, in so far as they may be subjects of Her Majesty, are not 
liable to be proceeded against‘ for enlisting in the service of the Confederate 
Navy.  The law officers were less anxious to seize such a large body of men, as 
they appeared to no longer be in service of the Southerners and opined the 
arrest and trial of these men was not worth the effort.  However, the arrest of 
                                                                                                                                  
687
 LOC, ‗Report of Trials in England of Various Parties for Violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 
in Recruiting for the Rebel Vessels, Case of Jones and Highatt‘. United States Serial Set, Number 
1397, Appendix No. XIV, (Washington, 1869), 553, 554   
688
 LOC, ‗Proceedings Before the Crown Court at Cork in the Case of the Men received on Board 
the United States Steamer Kearsarge at Queenstown‘. United States Serial Set, Number 1397, 
Appendix No. XIII, (Washington, 1869), 547, 548. 
689
 Ibid, 548. 
 178 
those Florida men ‗anxious to be re-engaged in the service of the Confederate 
States‘ would serve as a suitable example to discourage further recruitment.690 
     By the late summer of 1863, the pace of work at Lairds had moved the 
construction of the ships forward to such a point that their service at sea was 
becoming a near certainty.  One observer to Lairds yard described this 
construction as being done with a speed which was ‗apparently by magic‘ and 
the ever present industrial sounds as: ‗knocking and hammering…such 
cyclopedian noise.‘691  The turrets were aboard neither the 294 nor 295 but they 
were being painstakingly fabricated in the yard, with the chief workmen making 
frequent references to the plans close by.  The turret foundations were largely in 
place in the lower hulls, their form resembling ‗neither more nor less than 
ordinary railway turn-tables.‘692  
     At 10:45 a.m. on 29 August 1863, the second ram, number 295, was 
launched in the presence of hundreds of spectators.693  The El Monassir, 
translated as ‗Victory‘, was not a merchantman which could be converted into a 
cruiser; she was a ‗war-ship of extraordinary power…of some other purpose than 
mere privateering‘.694  She flew the French Tricolour as a matter of form, but no 
one was deceived.695  The El Monassir and her sister were intended for the 
Confederates.  The race to prove complicity and the ruse of both actual and 
intended ownership was soon to come to the fore.   
                                            
690
 TNA, FO 881/2011 ‗Florida‘. No. 70, dated 23 September 1863, No. 71, dated 1 October 1863, 
No. 73, dated 22 September 1863, Printed November 1871.  
691
 ‗Visit to Messrs Laird‘s Shipbuilding Yard‘, Dundee Courier, 19 September 1863, 2.  
692
 Ibid, 2. 
693
‗Another ―Ram‖ for a ―French‖ House‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 31 August 1863, 5. 
694
 Ibid, 5. 
695
 ‗Launch of Iron Steam ―Rams‖ at Birkenhead‘, Sheffield Independent, 31 August 1863, 3. 
 179 
     The first Laird ram, the El Tousson, was rapidly coming together.  Her masts 
had been shifted, boilers and engines were in place, and the funnel was put 
on.696  Equally worrying to the Federals, four Confederate Naval Engineering 
officers had arrived in Liverpool on the Cunarder Asia from Halifax.  By the time 
her sister was launched, the forward turret was installed and painting was soon 
to begin on the first ram.697  Several coats of thin red lead paint had been applied 
to the 294 to protect the ironwork from oxidizing prior to the final painting of the 
hull and upper works in black, white and buff.  The three coats of red lead paint 
applied to the exterior gave the ironclad a dull hue, but the colour was an 
unmistakable signal to all her saw her.698  The first Laird ram was nearing 
completion and only the installation of her aft turret, final fittings, and finishing 
paint work was needed to prepare her for sea.699           
     Anticipation, fears, plans of action, and intelligence reports circulated between 
Britain and Washington, yet the ships were not ready for combat.  The guns were 
not aboard the Laird ironclads, but the ships had one piece of ‗equipment‘ which 
could not be explained away.700  The ram projecting forward from the bows of 
each ship was described as ‗a most effective weapon of war‘ thus proving that 
Lairds were building warships for a foreign power.  One British newspaper 
touched on the key point of the Confederate shipbuilding efforts when it 
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proclaimed that ‗there must be some fault somewhere, when we see the spirit of 
the law evaded‟ (italics in original).701                     
     The United States had pressed Britain to close the legal loop holes which 
permitted a ship to leave a British port and later be transformed into a man-of-
war flying the Star & Bars.  One British newspaper, quoted in a New York 
magazine stated: ‗There is no amendment of the law required.  The Government 
has ample powers, and if it really wanted to put a stop to the fitting out of vessels 
in our ports for the Confederates, Mr. Davis would be unable to get a fishing 
smack out of the Mersey‘.702  This position was supported in another British 
newspaper when it compared the Laird rams to the attempted procurement of 
Hale‘s Rockets for Hungarian revolutionaries in 1853.  As with the rockets, ships 
could be seized in Britain, for ‗Laws, we know, can be stretched or tightened at 
the will of those who are appointed to execute them‘.703 
     The main problem with enforcing the Foreign Enlistment Act as it applied to 
the Laird armourclads, was the point of ownership.  They belonged to a French 
firm and what happened to them after the owners received them was not a point 
that directly involved the British Government.  Interpretations of when an activity 
permitted by a neutral power ceased to be neutral, and actions by a belligerent 
involved other nations in a conflict where they had beforehand remained apart, 
now (late summer to autumn 1863) became the dominate issues of Trans-
Atlantic relations.  In late October 1863, one British newspaper highlighted the 
legal dilemmas of neutral trade with belligerents when it stated: ‗Of all the 
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different classes of the law, the Law of Nations is the most intricate, and 
consequently to this hour the most unsettled‘.704 
     The Laird brothers brought the dilemma to a head in early September 1863 
when they informed S. Edward Price, the Collector of Customs at Liverpool, of 
their intention to take the El Tousson out for a short cruise on the Mersey.  They 
intended the voyage to be a short trial run to begin on 14 September, in order to 
test her machinery, after which the ironclad would return to the shipyard for her 
final stages of fitting out.705  This proposed run was thwarted when the Treasury 
ordered the Liverpool Customs office to prevent the ironclad from leaving the 
Mersey until government inquiries into the destination of the ship were 
concluded.706  The first Laird ram was expected to be completed in early October 
and the second ship by early November if the work schedule was maintained.707  
The delivery of the two ironclads was an issue which could not be ignored, and 
the British Government would soon have to choose sides in America‘s Civil War 
regarding these warships.  
     On 11 September the Foreign Secretary wrote to Adams in response to his 
entreaties against the Laird rams stating:  
     „With regard to the general duties of a neutral, according to international law,  
     the true doctrine has been laid down repeatedly by Presidents and Judges of   
     eminence of the United States, and that doctrine is, that a neutral may sell to  
     either or both of two belligerent parties any implements or munitions of war…  
     and it is difficult to find a reason why a ship that is to be used for warlike  
     purposes is more an instrument or implement of war than cannon, muskets,  
     swords, bayonets gunpowder, and projectiles to be fired from cannon and  
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     muskets‟...In fact, the ship can never be expected to decide a war or a  
     campaign…708 
 
     Russell was using America‘s recent history against Adams to prove 
that neutrality was open to a wide disparity of interpretation.  During the 
Crimean War, American businesses had supplied arms, and had built 
ships for the Russians.709  One U.S. built steamer, the America, was built 
for Russia and sailed to Petropavlovsk during the Crimean War, under the 
command of American officers.710  William H. Hudson, the Captain of the 
America, had allegedly carried arms for the Czar‘s Pacific garrison buried 
in the bunkers under the ship‘s coal.711  Hudson would claim he only 
carried a few small arms, a barrel of powder and ‗Robin shot‘.712  Colt 
revolvers and other arms were reportedly sent on U.S. flagged and other 
neutral vessels to the then Prussian port of Memel on the Baltic for 
overland shipment to eastern Russia.713  American mechanics from 
Baltimore, Maryland had reportedly travelled to Russia in 1855 to take the 
place of British railway workers who had left due to the outbreak of war 
                                            
708
 ‗Correspondence between England and America about British Neutrality‘, Daily Dispatch, 1 
February 1864, 1. 
709
  ‗Miscellaneous‘, NYT, 28 June 1855, 1. 
710
 Hansard, 27 March 1863, 170, cc 69, 70. 
711
 ‗Mr. J. Laird, M. P., and the United States Government‘, Cheshire Observer, 29 August 1863, 
7. 
712
 Ibid, 7. See: TNA, ADM 231/5, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 43, 
‗Eastern Siberian Ports and Anchorages‘ dated January 1885, 61. The America, built by New 
York shipbuilder William H. Webb and completed in 1856, was 166 feet long, had a 28.4 feet 
beam, and a draft of ten feet aft, eight feet forward. Her engines produced 140 Nominal 
Horsepower and she displaced 554.67 tons.  This steamer remained on service with the local 
defence force known as the ‗Siberian Flotilla‘ at Vladivostok until summer 1884 when she was 
reportedly sold at auction.  
713
 Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe.  I. (2012), 83 
 183 
the previous year.714  Trade with the allies was more important for the 
United States both in terms of ready income and relations with the big 
powers.  American clipper ships were chartered to carry troops, munitions, 
supplies and horses for the British and French forces besieging 
Sevastopol.715  Neutrality was still a confused concept in the mid-
nineteenth century, but the application of national interest was a key factor 
and another was profits.  During the Civil War, one British journal was to 
remark: 
          „Ingenious lawyers and crotchety politicians may contend that there   
           is no distinction between exporting guns and exporting men-of-war.    
           But the results prove the contrary.  The Americans have practically   
           lost half their mercantile marine. The Confederate Government are  
           the parties who have directly or indirectly caused these ships to be  
           built in this country, and in so doing they entered upon a deliberate  
           course of violating and evading the laws of England‟.716  
 
     In Washington, Lincoln was considering a declaration of war, and on 
the back of his calling card, wrote his instructions to Seward for him to 
pass to Adams.  The note read: ‗Tell Adams to say to Palmerston that 
another ‗Alabama‘ means war‘!717  Meanwhile, the British Government 
was taking steps to determine the fate of the Laird rams.   
     On 22 September 1863, the British Naval Attaché to France, Captain 
E. Hore, R.N., met with Adrian Bravay to find out the true owners of the 
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pair of ironclads.718  Bravay produced the papers from Laird proving that 
he was the legitimate owner and reported that the former owner, Bulloch, 
was involved with the ironclads then under construction at Bordeaux.719  
The meeting also provided Captain Hore with more than supposition 
regarding the intended end user of the rams, as Bravay punctuated his 
comments with a series of winks and nods to indicate Bulloch was to be 
the recipient of the finished ironclads.720   
     The Prime Minister had also been involved in the search for a way out 
of the dilemma.  He had written to the First Lord of the Admiralty with what 
was apparently a sales pitch to buy the Laird armoured ships:  ‗We are 
short of Iron Clads, [sic] and it takes Time to build them, we want a good 
many more to put us on our proper level with France; here are Two nearly 
finished, no doubt well built, fast sailors, and fitted as Rams…‘721  One 
Liverpool newspaper chided the seemingly indecisive Foreign Office, 
announcing that if the impasse over the Laird ships was to continue, the 
power would rest not in Westminster but with ‗any shipowner in England 
to plunge the nation into war‘.722  That newspaper concluded with the call 
‗Just now we want a Cromwell, not a Russell‘.723   
     On 28 September, the newly appointed Chief Constructor of the Royal 
Navy, Edward James Reed, reported to the Admiralty, the results of the 
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interviews he had with the Lairds.724  Reed had met with William Laird and 
his father John Laird, M.P. on the 21st, 25th and 26th of that month to 
inquire if the two turret rams would be available for purchase by the British 
Government.725  The Constructor found the suspicious Lairds ‗very 
reserved‘ at first but they soon let down their guard and indicated that the 
issue of French ownership of the two rams was ‗apparently mere 
policy‘.726  Work had again slowed on the ironclads due to the increased 
official interest in the ships, and Reed‘s inquires revealed that the Lairds 
(and the Messrs. Bravay) would be interested in selling the armourclads to 
the Admiralty.  This changed again by the time of his last meeting with 
John Laird and his son William on the 26th, as the shipbuilders apparently 
grew wary of Reed‘s insistent questionings.727  These meetings were 
likely the beginning of a rivalry and distrust between Reed and the Lairds 
that would come to the fore several years later, and would follow the two 
rams throughout most of their service lives.    
     Reed had been censured before the Commons on 27 February 1863, 
for his perceived insults written in a letter to a Member of Parliament.728  A 
controversy had occurred around his appointment as Chief Constructor, 
due in part to his reported inexperience in constructing warships.729  Laird 
had asked the Commons on 26 February, the day before the Constructor 
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was brought before the bar in the House, to question why accounts in the 
Royal Dockyards had not been properly kept and had asked that Deptford 
be sold due to a lack of shipbuilding activity there.730  Several days earlier, 
Laird asked that work on Reed‘s broadside ironclad H.M.S. Enterprise, 
and on the Royal Sovereign, then fitting out with Coles revolving turrets, 
be pushed to early completion in order to test the benefits of each 
design.731  Laird was not involved in his censure, but Reed was 
understandably wary of running afoul of an M.P. so deeply engaged in 
warship design and the affairs of the naval dockyards.  Suspicion was the 
natural outgrowth of Reed‘s controversial start.  
     Following his September visits to Merseyside, the Chief Constructor 
reported to the Admiralty his views that the Birkenhead Iron Works had 
not made sufficient progress on the ironclad frigate Agincourt then 
building for the Royal Navy, due to the apparent work priority given to the 
two turret ships.732  Reed would also criticize the Sheffield iron maker, 
John Brown & Company, for delaying work on Royal Navy warships, in 
order to export armour plate to the United States.  To the Lairds, Reed 
likely seemed something more dangerous than a spy or a uniformed 
emissary from the Admiralty.  He had the power to influence future 
contracts with the government or he could perhaps steer away new orders 
from would be foreign clients.  With so much of their money undoubtedly 
tied in with the turret rams (the Constructor had told the Admiralty the 294 
and 295 might have been undertaken as ‗mere speculation‘ by the 
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shipbuilders), the Lairds could not afford to confer too openly with the 
inquisitorial Reed.733 
     The Constructor highlighted the pros and cons of acquiring these ships 
for the Royal Navy in a confidential report to the Duke of Somerset, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty.  In his report, Reed stated the iron cladding on 
the rams was less at the bow and stern than the armour fitted on British 
warships then building or in service, and the iron ribs were ‗inferior in size 
and strength‘ compared to British armourclads.734  Although low in the 
water, the raised forecastle and poop would undoubtedly improve the 
seaworthiness of each vessel.735  Reed wrote the ships were ‗formed 
sufficiently strong to render them sound, safe, and durable‘, and 
recommended the First Sea Lord consider the ‗immediate‘ purchase of the 
two rams in order to add more ironclads to the British Fleet.736       
                                            
Seizing the Ships 
 
     In early September, The Prime Minister wrote to Russell expressing his 
satisfaction with the move to detain the Laird rams and the ironclad 
building on the Clyde.737  Palmerston would later write (on 21 September) 
to his Foreign Minister, ‗politically I appreciate it would be best that the 
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South should have them‘ but he understood this would not occur.738  
Palmerston knew the ‗ships cased in iron were intended for warlike 
purposes‘ and he was waiting for the final excuse to seize them while 
avoiding a change to the Foreign Enlistment Act which would run afoul of 
Parliament.739  The Prime Minister suggested to Russell that the ironclads 
could best serve ‗our own interests‘ in a harbour defence role in British 
ports.740   
     The excuse came in the form of story likely spun by Union informants 
regarding the discharged crewmen from the Florida preparing a plan to 
hijack the El Tousson on her trial run.741  The renewed desire by the 
builders to send their nearly completed 294 on a short run just beyond the 
entrance to the Mersey presented a hazard which could not be ignored.  
On 8 October 1863, the Admiralty sent a coded telegram to Captain 
Edward A. Inglefield commanding the ship-of-the-line H.M.S. Majestic, 
anchored in the river, with instructions to support the Customs officers 
after they had received orders to seize the two ironclads.742  The following 
day, George A. Hamilton of H.M. Treasury, informed Lairds that threat of 
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‗forceable abduction‘ of one or both of the rams could not be overlooked; 
therefore, the ships were seized by Customs officials.743   
     Inglefield ordered a gunboat moved up to the ‗Great Float‘, the 
entrance gate from the fitting out basin to the Mersey, a well-armed guard 
boat patrolled the area at night, and a detail of twelve Marines under the 
command of an officer, was placed on board the El Tousson.744  The 
workmen were sent ashore with their tools and no one was permitted 
aboard other than the Marine guard.745  The El Monssair was not the 
focus of attention as she did not have masts, sails, funnel or rudder 
fitted.746   One American magazine quoted a poem from Punch entitled 
‗The Ram of Liverpool‘, the conclusion of which proclaimed: 
                         ‗They said he was going to Egypt,                                                                                       
                              At least so his owners states,   
                          But suppose he mistook the turning,  
                              And made for Davis‟s straits. 
                          I think that an honest drover 
                             Might prove where he‟d made a sale,  
                         And not come smoothing us over  
                             With a cock and bullish tale. 
                        And I think that Policeman Russell,                                                        
                           Who to keep the peace is bound,  
                       Has used a wise discretion 
                          In clapping the Ram in the Pound‟.747  
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     The Laird rams, and ironclads in general had acquired a reputation for 
near invincibility, with the Scientific American wryly commenting, ‗The 
majesty of the law must be the real safeguard: setting a wooden ship to 
―guard‖ a ram is like putting a sheep to protect a bulldog‘.748  The 
Admiralty felt the precautions were not enough and ordered the recently 
commissioned ironclad H.M.S. Prince Consort to the Mersey to watch 
over the Laird rams.749  The lumbering broadside ironclad, converted from 
a 91-gun ship-of-the-line while still on the builder‘s ways, was the only 
British ironclad available for immediate duty and was dispatched from 
Plymouth with a newly assigned crew on 28 October.750  The men were 
temporarily detailed to the ironclad from other ships in dockyard; only the 
Chief Engineer and the Warrant Officers had been on the ship longer than 
three days, and no one aboard had experience on the Prince Consort in a 
variety of weather conditions.751     
     En route to the Mersey, the armoured frigate encountered a severe 
gale in the Channel and Irish Sea.  The new ironclad struggled against the 
waves as she began to take water down both her hatchways and the 
bases of the funnel casings when seas washed over her upper deck.  As 
the huge waves broke over the bows of the ironclad, her main (steam) 
pump failed, and the ship was in danger of foundering.  Her captain knew 
he could not reach the safety of Liverpool in the face of that storm, and 
turned instead for Ireland as the ship‘s company worked the manual 
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pumps.  The crew kept to their stations and the stokers were barely able 
to keep the pressure up in the boilers as the water rose to their knees.  It 
was a close run escape, and when the people of Britain learned their 
overdue ironclad had not sunk as was feared, Queen Victoria sent a 
congratulatory telegram to the officers and men of the Prince Consort.752  
Afloat, but still the worse for wear, the ironclad was not to proceed to the 
Mersey but, on 5 November, departed Ireland for immediate repairs at the 
Devonport dockyard.753   
     Legal maneuvres continued between the government and the 
shipbuilders, with Lairds anxious to finish the ships and the other 
determined to prolong a resolution.  Lairds wrote to the Treasury on 
several occasions to protest the ‗arbitrary‘ seizure of their vessels and 
pressed for permission to take the El Tousson on a trial run.754  On 27 
October, the Treasury responded to the builders stating they could not 
take their ironclad out that week ‗or within any other suitable time‘.755  Two 
days later Lairds answered with an attempted explanation of their secrecy 
concerning the rams: 
„It is a rule well recognized in all Trading Establishments, that an 
Order whilst under Execution is the property of the person giving it, 
and that a builder has no right to make public the orders or 
instructions of his employers.  This is a rule of business which must 
be well known to H.M. Government.  We are satisfied that Her 
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Majesty‟s Government have lent too credulous an ear to the 
inventions of designing persons‟756   
 
Not content to let the matter lie with their opinion of rumours about their 
turret ships, Lairds warned: ‗We need hardly say that we hold the 
government responsible to us for the large pecuniary loss we shall sustain 
by these arbitrary proceedings‘.757 
     Squabbling over the fate and condition of the rams continued for 
months.  Worsening weather damaged the two unfinished ironclads, now 
anchored in the Mersey.758  On 7 December, Lairds wrote to inform the 
Treasury that an insurance policy covering fire aboard the El Tousson had 
expired and the shipbuilders asked for advice regarding the payment of 
insurance protection for the vessels while in government custody.759  On 
the 18th, the Treasury replied saying that the insurance on the two 
vessels would be paid by the government with the provision that after the 
fate of the ships was adjudicated, the costs of the insurance would be 
reimbursed to the public purse.760   
     The case of the Laird rams was finally resolved on 20 May 1864, when 
Bravay & Company accepted the offer of H.M. Government to purchase 
the two ships for service in the Royal Navy.761  The price for the 
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incomplete ironclads, having spent months floating on the Mersey, was 
£195,000 with another £25,000 to be paid to Lairds to complete the ships 
to planned specifications existing prior to the seizure.762   
     The purchase provided a two-fold benefit by diffusing a growing 
American crisis, and prevented France from obtaining a numerical 
advantage in armoured warships.  The Laird ironclads were not 
purchased for the ‗wrong reasons‘, but were acquired to resolve two 
pressing strategic issues simultaneously.763  Thus, the ships were 
acquired ‗for prudent reasons‘, and Britain would fit out two modern men-
of-war during a time of rapid industrial change, while also preventing 
disruption to a key shipbuilding facility.764  Although Reed had suggested 
the ‗immediate‘ purchase of the two rams, their belated acquisition by the 
British treasury added two powerful but untested armourclads to the Royal 
Navy.765  Britain had avoided a breach with the United States over the 
feared Confederate procurement of these ships, and the Royal Navy 
acquired two hybrid turret ironclad rams.  Although initially, the British fleet 
had ‗no really useful role‘ for the two Laird armourclads, the Admiralty 
would spend decades trying to find a suitable role for them.766  That quest 
would help advance the role of the turret ship in the Royal Navy, while 
through trial and error, they would eventually fit into a crucial defensive 
niche.          
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     CHAPTER THREE 
 
       Technological Advances and Failings: The Laird Rams in Service   
                                                1865-1880 
 
     The completion and commissioning of the Laird ironclads in the autumn of 
1865, provided the Royal Navy with two distinctive, but untested armoured men-
of-war, built during a time of rapid and almost contradictory change.  They were 
warships that attempted to establish a mixture of defensive and offensive 
capabilities that would define the ideal warship of the mid-nineteenth century.  It 
was a time when technological inventions were perfected and adapted ‗rather 
suddenly‘ to introduce ‗new dimensions to the conduct of naval warfare‘.767  
Steam propulsion, iron construction, and ever increasing ordnance power 
marked this time of ‗revolutionary‘ changes in naval might, so much so, that the 
warship became, as William Ashworth states, ‗virtually a new commodity‘.768   
     The purchase and completion of the Laird turret ships allowed Britain a further 
numerical advantage over her European rivals during the transition from wooden 
ships-of-the-line to armoured warships.  The need to strengthen the fleet against 
a French ironclad building program was pressing, as the armoured frigates of the 
Royal Navy were not entering active service in enough numbers to give Britain 
the decisive superiority it needed.  Some in London feared that a contest of 
ironclads in the Channel would be ‗an unequal one for the English Fleet‘.769  The 
Laird turret ships gave Britain a slight edge over their French rivals and against a 
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revitalizing naval threat from Russia.  Palmerston considered the rams could 
prove useful in any fight against the Czar as they could ‗run down and sink the 
Russian ships in the Black Sea if need were‘.770    
     Reed remarked in the late 1860s that the Laird rams were considered 
perhaps the poorest examples of British armoured vessels.  This view was 
framed by the Constructor‘s earlier comments in a letter to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty in which he stated that he would not ‗propose the building of exactly 
such ships as these.‘771  Constructed for a power deprived of the wherewithal of 
building seagoing ironclads, the Laird rams did not fit into a tailor-made niche for 
the Royal Navy.  As stated, they were valuable additions to the armoured 
squadrons of the Royal Navy, but were poorly adapted to a blue water role.772  
Britain established a precedent in acquiring these armoured warships designed 
and intended for a foreign buyer.  London would seize other armoured men-of-
war in times of crisis from British shipbuilders before they steamed off under a 
foreign flag, from the example set by the acquisition of the two Confederate-
intended rams built on the Mersey.  The seizure, purchase, and completion of the 
Laird rams also provided Britain with the first purpose-built turret ships to be 
commissioned in the Royal Navy.773   
     Historians credit the H.M.S. Prince Albert as the first true, keel-up British turret 
ship, but this is misleading.  The Prince Albert was the first purpose-built turret 
ship ordered by the Royal Navy; however, she was not commissioned until 1866. 
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Therefore the distinction must go to the first of the Laird rams, H.M.S. 
Scorpion.774  Overshadowed by the Warrior, Alabama and the tragic Captain, the 
Laird rams were innovative designs on a compact hull.  Built to the specifications 
of a foreign customer and intended for a contest against a numerically superior 
enemy, they never saw combat but they deserve more attention than they have 
received after 1865. 
     This chapter will survey the details of the first years of the Laird rams while in 
service with a Royal Navy adapting to the new and unfamiliar features associated 
with ironclad warships.  A secondary aspect of this chapter will focus on the 
challenges imposed by the technological and operational changes associated 
with finding a suitable role for these armourclads.               
 
Ships Trials 
 
     Both Laird-built ironclads were  placed in service with the Royal Navy in the 
autumn of 1865, with the H.M.S. Scorpion commissioned first and the second 
ram placed in commission as H.M. S. Wivern in October of that year.775  The 
Scorpion had her initial run on 30 August 1864, with the British press reporting 
that ‗her machinery worked with great smoothness‘ and she lacked the vibration 
usually associated with screw-driven ships.776  The results were measured from 
her initial test runs from Birkenhead and the reports were optimistic as they 
recorded her performance at her highest speed before she had been fitted with 
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her guns, stores or a full load of coal.  It was also stated that the ironclad would 
draw about another foot of water when fully loaded (13 feet forward, 14 feet 9 
inches aft during trials) and although the screw would be more deeply immersed, 
it was felt this would not affect the speed noticeably.  This proved to be untrue as 
her best speed dropped from 12.34 knots to 10.5 when commissioned.777 
     The Wivern had her trial run from Birkenhead on 8 June 1865, and reached a 
speed of slightly more than 10½ knots.  It was estimated that she would reach a 
top speed of 11½ when the engines were put in order at the builders‘ yard.778  It 
was not to be, as she too lost speed when fitted out and she only reached slightly 
more than 10 knots when commissioned.779   Fitted with three masts, sails would 
assist (in theory) the steam engines on long voyages as the ships carried an area 
of sail that was considered ample or in the case of the second of the class, 
‗unusually large‘ for ships of this small size.780  The Scorpion was praised for her 
‗handiness‘ but when the engines were stopped and sail utilized as the only 
motive power, the ships were hard to control as they steered ‗anywhere‘.781        
     Helm control was a factor when at 3: 40 a.m. on 23 March 1865, the Scorpion 
collided with the merchant ship Theresa Titiens while the ironclad was steaming 
south of Holyhead, en route for her first stop at Plymouth.782  The wooden 
merchant vessel reported damage to her port side when a steamer brushed into 
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her, staving in a portion of her hull.  The Scorpion stopped engines, furled sails, 
hung out lights and waited for any sounds from a sinking ship, but none were 
reported in the dark night.  Although aboard the Titiens, planking was torn and 
some of the rigging carried away, the armoured vessel did not escape unscathed 
in the encounter.  The merchantman luckily did not contact the dangerous ram 
extending from the bow of the Scorpion, yet the turret ship was ‗bruised‘ with six 
feet of her forecastle stove in.  Unable to locate the other damaged ship, both 
vessels continued their voyages and arrived in their respective ports, dented, 
scratched and torn but without the loss of any crewmen.783 
     The ram sailed south in an incomplete condition due to a separate mishap 
involving a government supply vessel, and the Scorpion was to be completed 
when she arrived at Portsmouth.  Although the slides for her guns where carried 
in her two turrets, no armament was shipped.  In late February of 1865, the 
ordnance steamer Balaclava (mistakenly identified in the British press as the 
Lord Panmure) transporting the four, 12-ton guns intended for the ironclad, went 
ashore on the eastern coast of Ireland.784  As the Scorpion steamed south 
(manned by a temporary crew from the screw ship-of-the-line, H.M.S. Donegal) 
without her guns, a recovery gang from Prince Consort, the one-time intended 
guard ship of the rams, was dispatched from Plymouth to haul up the 
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ordnance.785 The guns were recovered but had to be forwarded to Woolwich 
Arsenal to be examined and refurbished. 786 
     The gun carriages were a point of contention between those who favoured 
turret ships and those who supported the broadsides of the central battery 
ironclads.  The Royal Sovereign received wooden carriages for her guns while 
Reed‘s small ironclad H.M.S. Research, received more durable iron models.787  
Other ships preparing to enter service (including Reed‘s corvette H.M.S. Pallas) 
were given priority for iron carriages.788  The Scorpion received obsolete wooden 
carriages of ‗very defective‘ manufacture and the Wivern‟s turrets were 
unbalanced and their revolutions impaired when iron was loaded in her turrets to 
simulate the guns and carriages she would eventually receive.789  
     The second Laird ram was delayed joining the fleet due to a lack of suitable 
gun carriages.  Woolwich Arsenal experienced delays due to the recent adoption 
of the ‗novel invention‘ of iron carriages, and struggled to manufacture the new 
gun mounts ‗as rapidly as the strength of that establishment admits‘.790  The 
delay frustrated the attempts by the Admiralty to outfit the Laird turret ships, with 
chains and blocks required for the Scorpion‘s guns, and the armament and 
fixtures for the Wivern.791  Admiralty and War Office officials exchanged letters 
during the summer and autumn of 1865 regarding the armament for the second 
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Laird ram with the timbre changing from ‗as soon as convenient‘ to one that 
‗demanded‘ the gun carriages be supplied.792  The completion of the armament 
for Wivern was delayed as she did not have her guns, carriages, shot, and shell 
from Woolwich aboard until early 1866.793  Finally, on 29 December 1865, the 
ordnance steamer Lord Panmure departed her wharf at the arsenal, loaded with 
four wrought iron gun carriages and a supply of shot and shell for the four, steel-
lined RMLs to be installed on the Wivern.794   
     In the mid-1860s, the Royal Navy struggled with the War Office to supply the 
armament to all ships entering commissioned service.  Guns were available, but 
the necessary accoutrement were sometimes lacking.  The supply of adequate 
gun carriages continued to hamper Navy readiness as the  Liverpool Daily Post 
commented: ‗We are not deficient in the pieces themselves as far as the fleet is 
concerned, but we want a sufficiency of iron carriages or, indeed, of any 
carriages, to support the shock of firing from very heavy ordnance‘.795  Rifled 
heavy guns, stout carriages, shot and shell were part of the myriad issues 
effecting the ever-changing shape and makeup of ships of the Royal Navy during 
the transitional years away from sail to the armoured all-steam warship.                                  
     The Wivern had the distinction of being the first ship in the navy to receive 
tripod masts which were to improve the arch of fire for the guns by substituting 
the hollow iron legs in place of the numerous stays and shrouds which would 
have further restricted the training of the guns.796  The masts offered a means to 
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work the topsails and halyards without having to send men aloft as lines passed 
down through the masts to positions below decks.797  The iron masts also offered 
a reported advantage. They were hollow iron tubes and served as a type of 
ventilator for the lower decks.  Later ships used lower iron masts as ventilators 
but those masts were seen as a fire hazard as they created an updraught which 
would have unintentionally fueled a major fire if one broke out below decks.798   
     On the rams, the iron masts would also sink when shot away and not float 
with rigging trailing behind to risk fouling the single screw during a fight.799  
Although the Scorpion was not fitted with tripod fore and main masts, both ships 
suffered the limiting factor of turrets on a fully-rigged ship.  The Scorpion would 
have to shoot away much of her lower rigging when the guns were brought into 
action during combat, in order to train the weapons against a moving target.  The 
Wivern did not have the same burden of rigging, but the iron legs of the masts 
still inhibited the guns so much that her captain opined they would have to be 
shot away to provide an adequate arc of fire during action.800  The British press 
even acknowledged this inevitability: ‗should it ever be found necessary in time of 
war to clear the decks and give both ships their true monitor form, a few powder 
discharges from the turret guns would speedily effect the desired 
metamorphosis‘.801   
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     Sighting the two guns in each turret could be archived through three small 
open hatches for the gunner to ‗pop his head through‘ on the turret roof.802  The 
sides and rear of these sighting ports were protected from small arms fire by ‗iron 
bonnets‘ fitted over the openings.  The turret arrangement was proven during the 
trials and ‗the facility with which it was worked was admirable, even with an 
untrained crew‘.  The rams offered an advantage as their low silhouettes, only 
four feet, six inches above the waterline (amidships) when the bulwarks were 
lowered, presented targets that would be difficult to hit.803  Furthermore, one 
writer ventured to speculate they would become very difficult to see if painted 
slate grey like the earlier blockade runners that steamed into the Confederate 
ports during the Civil War.804  Some French harbour defence vessels were also 
painted this colour in order to complicate enemy gunnery at longer ranges. 805 
     The ironclads of the Royal Navy where painted black with white upper works, 
black or buff funnels, and the masts and yards were usually painted either a bone 
or a red brick colour.  Illustrations and photographs of the Laird rams in the 
middle to late 1860s  show them is this prescribed blend of pigment, complete 
with a thin white stripe or ‗Boot-top‘ running fore to aft midway along the hull.806  
The ironclads of the Royal Navy were not camouflaged or obscured; they were 
painted to be seen.  One historian noted the uniformity of the livery schemes 
gave their black hulls ‗a fearsome and sinister‘ look.807 
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     Appearance was not the only consideration, for in iron ships, rapid 
deterioration would result from exposure to salt water and air.  Paints had to be 
durable and elastic enough to withstand the elements, and the movement of the 
hulls, upper works, masts, etc. especially while underway.  Paints adopted from 
those mixed for houses or wooden ships were not suitable throughout an iron 
ship, as lead based paints were electrically conductive around the positions 
where copper and iron were near each other, particularly near the lower hull 
plates, for these properties contributed to a rapid decay of the iron at those 
points.808  Ship painting remained an inexact science for decades as different 
potions were mixed to provide properties suitable for iron and later steel vessels.  
Men assigned to coat a ship were exposed to inhalation risks from the noxious 
mixtures and many succumbed to ‗painter‘s colic‘.809  Fast drying paints were 
needed to get a ship out of dockyard as quickly as possible, and when used in 
poorly ventilated interior spaces, like coal bunkers, the workmen were known to 
suffer ‗bleeding from the nose and ears and temporary dementia‘.810                                           
     When preparing to fire the guns, the moveable bulwarks on the Laird rams 
would pivot from a hinge positioned on the lower edge of the iron shield and 
attached to the deck.811  Other turret ships were similarly fitted with the iron 
bulwarks resembling a reverse capital letter ‗L‘.812  The bulwarks were supported 
by two stanchions on a base plate and were inclined inboard at a slight angle of 
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approximately 10 degrees.813  With one edge fixed to the two-inch thick bulwark, 
the other was secured to a base plate which was in turn, either secured by ‗pins‘ 
or  when removed, freed from the deck.  When clearing away, a few men could 
rotate the movable iron walls over the ship‘s side where they would hang slightly 
above the waterline.814  
     Other design features provided advantages but also highlighted unintended 
and sometimes related shortcomings.  The three bladed 14-foot propeller 
enabled the Scorpion to answer her helm with a quickness which was regarded 
as ‗remarkable‘.815  The official reports on the Laird rams revealed different 
performance results than those listed in the press.  Under sail, the Scorpion 
performed ‗as well as can expected for her small sail power‘.  The three bladed 
screw was a clear detriment when not steaming, as the small rudder also 
contributed to the ship steering ‗wildly‘ when under sail alone or at low speed.  
She had to have 3 to 4 knots from the screw to enable the ship to answer the 
helm.816  The direction the ship was to turn was likely also an issue, as the 
rotation speed of the screw determined the amount of water washed against the 
rudder.  Some ships of this era turned better when the rudder was at port, as a 
right-handed screw with an ample pitch would churn more water over the ported 
rudder than to starboard.817  This factor undoubtedly influenced the performance 
of the Laird rams at low speed with a screw designed to rotate to the right.818                   
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     The Scorpion (and likely her sister) had a rudder of slightly under 17 feet 5 
inches, and experience was to prove that armoured warships needed larger 
rudders to offset the rotations of the screw(s) and hull weight.819  This was not a 
new phenomenon, as some of the post-Crimean War wooden-hulled steam 
battleships were built with longer hulls for larger machinery spaces.  These 
vessels gave the Royal Navy ships-of-the-line higher speeds, but at the expense 
of rudder control caused in part by the drag from the screw propeller.820  The 
steam line-of-battle ships were fitted with a ‗banjo‘ frame whereby the screw 
could be uncoupled from the shaft and hoisted inboard during sailing.  Despite 
this ability to disconnect and pull in the screw, those steam battleships with finer 
hull lines did not perform as well under canvas as their earlier companions in the 
fleet.  Some of the ships-of-the-line converted to steam also suffered in 
performance as they had a tendency to roll after being retrofitted with engines.821   
     In light of these facts, the performance of the Laird rams should be examined 
with the performance not only of other ironclads, but with other steam warships.  
For most advantages gained regarding iron construction, heavier guns, steaming 
qualities, etc., other qualities were sacrificed.  This typically meant that steering 
(especially under sail alone) suffered, and other unforeseen drawbacks were 
manifested in seakeeping and fuel consumption. Reed had remarked in 1863, 
that her rig was ‗very satisfactory‘, but this preliminary assessment of the masts 
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and sails of the Scorpion did not hold up to performance at sea.822  A ship which 
might be a good cruiser usually had to sacrifice some aspects of performance to 
achieve a different set of compromises required of a sea going warship needed 
at different stations of the globe. This world ranging capability generally came at 
the cost of a deep draft, a lack of armour, and a larger crew.         
     When steaming, the Scorpion performed well ‗for her horsepower‘.823  The 
main drawback of the first Laird ram was identified while underway, as she ‗rolls 
very deeply when there is any sea on the beam, which causes her to ship large 
quantities of water‘.824  Flat-bottomed and without a deep keel, the Laird rams 
had the ability to approach closer to a hostile shore while presenting a low hull 
profile, but this came at the cost of seaworthiness while underway off the coasts 
of Britain.  Steaming showed the best qualities of the Scorpion under ideal 
conditions.  She spent the last three months of 1865 on Home Station where her 
captain observed ‗she behaves very well at sea and her engines are very 
effective and good, driving the ship in a head sea remarkably well. A heavy head 
sea and strong head wind do not seem to affect her much‘.825  A design feature 
which restricted the field of fire fore and aft, the forecastle and a poop, improved 
the rams‘ performance while underway.  Her first captain noted that the 
forecastle kept the ship relatively dry and ‗the ship rises easily and buoyantly at 
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sea‘.  She could shrug off a head sea, but waves amidships deluged the vessel 
between the turrets.  The Scorpion‘s commanding officer noted that it was 
‗dangerous‘ for the men to work the ship under these conditions as the water 
washed across the deck.826  
    The Wivern had the most problems of the two sister armourclads, as her trials 
revealed a tendency for the main shaft bearing to heat ‗considerably‘ when she 
was at full speed, but she performed satisfactorily when slowed to 50 revolutions 
per minute.  This defect was not corrected until a new main shaft was put in 
during her first visit to Portsmouth dockyard.827  Her turrets also did not operate 
as planned.  The rollers did not distribute the weight of 180 tons of iron ballast 
substituted for the yet to be mounted armament (1865) and as a result, the turret 
could only be worked ‗with difficulty and great labour‘.828  Also the turret sills were 
only five inches above the deck and this lack of height exposed the ships to the 
risk of flooding the turret room and magazines unless corrected.829  Here the 
advantage offered by a low gun platform, with the base of the turret below deck, 
was also a drawback.  Unlike the American monitors, with their turret bases 
above deck, the Laird rams also had to contend with the disadvantages of a low 
turret on a low hull.     
     Like her sister, the Wivern‘s deck was only four feet seven inches above the 
water at the gangway when her armoured bulwarks were down.  The low hull 
exposed the ship to flooding not only at the turret sills, but also the hatchways 
whose lack of height above the deck was termed ‗a very serious defect‘ on a later 
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cruise.830  A heavy sea on the beam caused a great deal of water to be shipped 
aboard the rolling rams and undoubtedly held aboard longer than the scuppers 
could clear away while the bulwarks or ‗flaps‘ were up.831  In essence, the 
moveable bulwarks kept some water out and held some water in depending on 
the sea and the position of the ship.  The Scorpion and Wivern proved to be 
uncomfortable and flawed ships, but they were the seagoing turret ships by 
which other armoured vessels of their type would be measured.  The 8 
November 1865, edition of the Exeter Flying Post asked if it was ‗possible to 
build an armed vessel upon the model of these rams fit for regular sea 
service‘?832  The answer would be found through trial and error, frequent refits 
and design modifications.  As originally built, the Laird rams were not suitable 
models for the cruising armoured man-of-war but they showed how to remake 
the turret ship into a suitable naval weapons platform which would eventually 
overshadow and then supersede the broadside.      
 
Port Visits and Foreign Dignitaries 
 
     On 29 August 1865, the French Channel Fleet from Cherbourg visited  
Portsmouth.  Among the French dignitaries were Minister of Marine, M. de 
Chasseloup-Laubat, Chief Constructor of the Navy and architect of the La Glorie, 
Dupuy de Lome, and a collection of admirals.833  Lord Somerset, led the visitors 
on a tour of several new ironclads at Portsmouth.834  Aside from the large iron 
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frigate Minotaur, the Lords of the Admiralty escorted the French delegation to 
view the new turret ships still fitting out, the Scorpion and Wivern.835  The French 
visitors also toured the foundries and armour plate workshops at the dockyard, 
but the ironclad men-of-war were the chief points of interest.836   
     The Wivern still carried the iron weights in place of her guns when she 
underwent sea trials from Portsmouth that autumn.837  The ironclad would have 
to wait to have her deck modified with the more traditional teak planks after the 
Lairds innovations to deck armour were removed.  Lairds had built both ships 
with a lightly armoured iron deck to provide limited protection from plunging fire, 
and placed cement over sections of the deck for added defence, and 
waterproofing.838  The cement also had another role in that it protected the rivet 
heads on the deck and in the bilges.  The continual wash of water in the bilges of 
iron ships had been found to scour the iron so that the heads of the rivets were 
worn away, but the application of cement delayed this.839  The Scorpion had 
served as a test of the utility of applying cement to the iron decking for an 
armoured warship, but the results proved to be an almost instant failure.  Small 
channels were cut in diamond patterns, crisscrossed over the iron deck plates, 
and filled in with cement to provide a better footing for her crew, but the cement 
cracked and quickly worked out of the seams.  This early experiment of what 
would later become an anti-slip feature more recognizable to warships of the 
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twenty-first century, was removed and not repeated as the traditional teak 
decking was applied over the iron.840      
     The British press lamented they were not the best vessels in the Royal Navy.  
The ‗masterpiece of ironclads‘ the Warrior, was in the hands of the dockyard 
‗gutted‘ in the process of an extensive refit, and concerns were raised over the 
costs of the overhaul .841  The Times remarked that the Wivern would not have 
added much to the British squadrons sent from the Channel Fleet on the earlier 
1865 visit to Cherbourg, as she was very low in the water for an ocean going 
cruiser and her tripod masts gave her ‗a most experimental appearance, anything 
but reassuring to a sailor‘.842   The editorial was perhaps true for those more 
accustomed to the more traditional displays of naval might in an era of transition 
but the Laird rams were a demonstration of British innovation and readiness to 
adapt to meet a variety of threats from would-be hostile powers.  The Admiralty 
was moving at a measured pace to incorporate new adaptations in iron warship 
construction in order to make units of variable capabilities, for the possibility of 
meeting rivals with varying combat potential.   
     The tripod mast configuration was suspect almost from the day they were 
fitted.  During her trials, the Wivern was thought to roll more than the Scorpion 
due in part, to the lack of armament aboard the second armourclad.  As stated 
earlier, weights were placed in the turrets to replicate her yet to be completed 
guns during her voyage south from Birkenhead and these contributed to her 
rolling.843  The tripod fore and main masts of the Wivern proved to be of great 
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strength on her first voyage as ‗there was not the sign of a crack or the starting of 
the paint‘ on these stout structures.844  Captain Hugh Burgoyne did not like tripod 
masts from his first experiences in the Wivern.  He preferred masts strong 
enough to stand up in action, but fitted with shrouds during other times.845  
Although they reduced the amount of standing rigging required, the tripod masts 
would prove to be unsuitable for any ship carrying sail.  One British admiral was 
later to remark that the stout construction of the experimental masts was a 
detriment as the rigid legs ‗reacts to a push as well as a pull‘.846  The tripod legs 
held the masts firmly in place but virtually eliminated the flex of a more 
traditionally rigged ship of war.  Without the slight movement and sway accepted 
in masts aboard other ships, the tripods pushed that motion into the ship‘s hull 
and also contributed to the roll.847   
     Although adequately armoured, and provided with sufficient internal 
compartments for watertight integrity, the Laird rams were poorly ventilated ships 
when originally constructed.848  On her trials in May and August 1865, the 
temperature throughout the Scorpion varied noticeably.  The engine room was 
apparently well ventilated, but the stoke holds were not, and the temperatures in 
certain sections were sweltering.  Heat ranges from deck to engine room varied 
markedly, but temperatures in the middle stokehold were significantly hotter than 
the engine room.  At one point the mercury registered 122 degrees Fahrenheit 
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(50 degrees Celsius) which influenced the Chief Engineer to remark to the 
inspectors that ventilation was ‗much required‘.849  The layout was also found to 
be defective aboard her sister. 
     During the trials of the Wivern in October 1865, the ventilation of the 
stokehold was found to be ‗very faulty‘.  This was not by accident, but was a 
reflection of her design influenced by the requirements of her original intended 
customer, in preparation of a fight against a numerically superior enemy, likely at 
close quarters.850  The smaller area of hatchways and ‗other openings on her 
upper deck‘ were designed to restrict access to the spaces below if boarders 
where able to attack the ship and gain access to the main deck.  This was a 
practical measure as navies still practiced with cutlass in hand.  The Royal Navy 
would conduct drills at boarding stations with edged weapons and small arms 
until 1905.851                        
     Liverpool followed the news of the French visit to Portsmouth, and was proud 
of the efforts of the Merseyside shipbuilders and their role in providing the Royal 
Navy some of their latest armourclads.  The Cheshire Observer wanted the 
French delegation to visit the Mersey to see a source of Britain‘s strength: ‗They 
will find here no yards of the splendid proportions of Cherbourg, but they will find 
private enterprise teeming everywhere, and performing wonders which even 
Imperial resources cannot equal‘.852  With several thousand workers labouring in 
their compact yard, Laird‘s was preparing the five-masted steam frigate Agincourt 
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for commissioning to meet any seagoing threat Napoleon III dared send forth.853  
A distinction between the hurried activities of British yards as compared with the 
slower pace of French building slips, was not lost on British observers proud of 
the changes reflected in the growing armoured strength of the Royal Navy.   
     The fleet exchange visit was a clear message to Paris that Britain was ready 
to meet any French naval expansion with new iron ships fitted for action with 
broadsides or a few heavy guns behind armour plated revolving turrets.  France 
would have to meet this dual challenge of the large new iron frigates and the low-
hulled copula ships or fall behind her rival.  The British press would later criticize 
the Scorpion and Wivern as being neither very powerful nor steady as they were 
hurriedly built.  That was the point made by Laird when he built the ships.  They 
were built rapidly, their flat bottoms and lighter draught were well suited for a role 
in coastal waters, and they were armed with four of the largest guns Britain 
manufactured at the time behind adequate armour.  The rams gave the Admiralty 
options for defence and attack, and the foreign powers noticed.  France and 
Russia added turret ships and rams to improve their coastal defence forces by 
purchasing surplus American monitors, and building shallow draught ironclads.854 
     The Scorpion and the Wivern steamed together from Portsmouth to test their 
capabilities in the autumn of 1865.855  Despite their failings, the rams were 
important acquisitions for a Royal Navy in an era of continual experiment both at 
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home and from her would-be challengers for maritime supremacy.  The British 
press declared:  ‗it is satisfactory to know that the English navy alone possessed 
such a class of vessel as this-fit of either harbour work or ocean cruising, and 
having such a rate of speed at a comparatively small expenditure of power.  The 
famous American monitors are not so fast by several knots, and they are only 
coast vessels‘.856  The Laird rams were capable of both harbour and coastal 
defence roles, whereas the Prince Albert was designed for harbour defence as 
‗no provision has been made in her calculations and arrangements for carrying 
masts and sails, or stores for sea-going purposes.‘ 857   
     Despite their disappointing speed, the Scorpion and Wivern could, under 
moderate weather conditions, reach closer to enemy home waters without having 
to stand off shore like the larger iron frigates.  While cruising in late October, the 
rams struggled back into Spithead in heavy seas, disproving a rumour that the 
Wivern had foundered.858  An observer from the shore noticed one of the vessels 
was seen to roll in a manner that was ‗very perceptible‘, a motion which 
highlighted the problems with the low freeboard, flat bottom, weight of the heavy 
masts and lower spars, all combining to impair the capabilities of these 
ironclads.859   
     Seakeeping qualities were their main limitations and ocean cruising was not a 
task these ships were to undertake except for limited durations.  They were 
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failures as seaboats, but the definition of what consisted a failure was highly 
subjective as many early armoured vessels were prone to quick and deep rolling 
while at sea.  Storms provided a valuable reference point for the performance of 
ships in commission at the time, as the turret ship Monarch, delayed her 
December 1869 transatlantic crossing due to heavy weather, even though she 
was considered to be the crack ship of the Royal Navy.860   
     Ship handling changed with the advent of the armoured warship.  This was 
especially true for short-hulled ironclads, and the low-hulled turret ships served 
as a new test bed for how best to maneuvre an iron-coated man-of-war.  
Experience with these ships demonstrated to the commanders, officers, and men 
of these ironclads, they had to change routines to successfully run their ships 
while at sea.  During the short career of the Confederate ironclad C.S.S. 
Stonewall, the new warship demonstrated her propensity to plow into the green 
seas and so alarmed the engineers and the crew of the armoured vessel, they 
appealed to their captain to return to port.  A Confederate naval officer aboard 
persuaded the Danish captain, contracted to return the ship to her French 
builders, to press ahead as ‗the only danger lay in stopping engines; that in a 
word, the safety of the vessel, and all on board depended entirely on the 
continuous movement of the engine, and the watchful care of it by the 
engineers‘.861  
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     In December 1867, Captain M. H. Jansen, the commander of the Dutch turret 
ship Prins Hendrik Der Netherlanden, steamed off Brest to test her seakeeping 
abilities.862  Jansen later reported that, although his ironclad rolled noticeably in 
the trough of the winter waves, she did come up slowly but steadily.  When put 
into the wind, the performance improved somewhat.  Although the funnel was 
caked with salt from the waves and spray, the Prins Hendrik was able to weather 
the gales.863  Experience in the mid-1860s revealed that these ships could not be 
steered and worked in a manner similar to their predecessors.  The turret 
ironclads had to be driven, and handled like the new and touchy beasts they 
were.    
     The Laird rams were slow to obtain proper refits in the Portsmouth dockyard, 
as ships required for service on foreign stations received priority over those 
assigned closer to home.  This was especially true for the rams; their schedule of 
alterations to modify them into more efficient seaboats was suspended or 
delayed as cruisers and heavier draught ironclads came in for refits.  The 
Scorpion and Wivern suffered from the effects of bureaucratic delay as they did 
not meet the exact requirements for any fleet.  Too unstable to use on long 
cruises, too untested to warrant a suitable refit when purchased, they were 
unready during their early years under the White Ensign.864         
     Captain Coles utilized the Laird built rams in his press battle for the turret ship 
by responding to a report in the Times which claimed turrets employed on Royal 
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Navy ironclads were not viewed as ‗very favourable‘.865  In reply to this claim, 
Coles struck a vital point when he defiantly called: ‗I challenge any one to 
produce a broadside square-box ship that will carry the same broadside of 300-
pounders as the Scorpion and Wivern, designed by Messrs. Laird Brothers, with 
as much speed, the same tonnage, the same protection and equal buoyancy at 
sea‘.  Coles went on to say that his rival, Reed, had no vessel in commission at 
that time (1866) with as heavy guns as the two rams, and touched on another 
key point when he stated that heavy guns would be carried on Reed‘s ships, then 
under construction, but those ships were of ‗enormous tonnage‘.866   
     As stated earlier, the heavy broadside warship could cruise the oceans but 
they could not get inshore. The rams were compromises of design and reflected 
both those advantages and limitations in their construction and employment.  
They also did not need large crews.  The number of crewmen reportedly varied 
from a high of 170 yet most reports refer to a complement of some 150 per ship 
to man the turrets, work the guns, steam, and fitfully sail.  Britain‘s ironclads of 
the 1860s were usually crewed by hundreds of men.  The Achilles and Minotaur 
each had 705 men aboard.  Indeed only the Reed ironclads Research and 
Enterprise required less men than the Laird rams, but only fifteen fewer hands 
were aboard those experimental warships.867   
     Manning requirements proved to be a benefit for the Laird rams as the 
number of active duty Royal Marines and seamen in the Royal Navy available for 
shipboard duty had declined since the early 1860s, and ships on foreign station 
were reduced to ‗the minimum amount necessary for the maintenance of the 
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honour of the country...‘868  Further cuts in manpower were pushed by Disraeli‘s 
government in an effort to keep to a fixed budget.  The Prime Minister reported to 
the Queen on 15 February 1868, ‗without any material increase of expenditure, 
your Majesty will now have a real & we hope, rapidly increasing naval reserve‘.869  
Other manpower changes were enacted during the late 1860s by reducing the 
number of boys in the training establishments, reducing the number of stokers in 
the reserves, (and paying seamen extra to perform that duty), and placing more 
officers on the retired lists.  Limited budgets also meant that some candidates 
failed to obtain commissions although they passed their entrance examinations, 
with the result that some appointments were not filled.870  During these years, a 
few more ironclads were constructed to keep up with foreign rivals, but they 
came at the cost of fewer men and fewer ships ready for sea in the event of an 
emergency.871   
 
Performance at Sea 
 
     The ocean-going performance of the rams was mixed.  The Wivern steamed 
with the Channel Fleet to the west coast of Ireland for exercises in September 
1866 to test her capabilities with an armoured squadron.  The fleet was battered 
by a western gale, with the Research and Pallas having the worst of the tempest 
although the Wivern responded ‗remarkably well‘.872  While underway for Ireland, 
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the admiral commanding signaled to ask if the ships could work their guns in the 
heavy seas.  Most could not, as the ships rolled about 25 degrees in the swell.  
Wivern responded that she was able to work her guns, as did the Reed-built 
ironclad frigate Bellerophon, but they did not fire while in transit to Ireland.873  
      In the Victorian era, the dimension of  the degree of a roll was calculated from 
the entire motion, instead of a one way measurement from an even keel as is 
done in the modern day, but the deep roll was still uncomfortable for the crew of 
many ironclads.874  A printed illustration from her 1866 voyage revealed the 
Wivern rolling to port, and shipping waters up to the base of her tripod masts as 
waves surged over the low sides.  Nevertheless, with bulwarks down, the turret 
ship could still ‗satisfactorily work‘ her guns as they were further from the sea 
than on a broadside warship.875  The print showed the Wivern struggling in a 
heavy sea, with all sails furled, men on her forecastle and flying bridge inclined 
backwards against the pitch of the ship which seemed to prove the naysayers 
claim that ‗she cannot do much in the way of sailing, and she is as a steamer 
very expensive‘.876  The storm showed the limitations of several ships during that 
voyage as the ironclads were contending with increased weights of armour, 
guns, and engines which had conversely come with a loss of seakeeping agility 
and crew comfort at sea.  The illustration of the Wivern struggling in the waves 
also showed the funnel raised to its full height as the ironclad turret ship fought to 
make headway.877  
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     Many ships of the Royal Navy of the 1860s had telescopic funnels which were 
usually lowered in port and raised when getting underway.878  In the early 1870s, 
one commanding officer adopted a unique solution to raising the funnel.  Captain 
John Hopkins, while in command of the armoured frigate Agincourt, had 
determined to improve drill aboard ship and ordered a series of bugle calls for 
specific shipboard evolutions.879  When the accepted military bugle calls were 
assigned to more traditional practices, an adoption of a popular tune was utilized.  
The captain selected the new call, briefed his bugler, and the stokers were 
mustered to inform them of the change in routine.  When the bugler sounded the 
nursery rhyme ‗Polly put the kettle on‟, the stokers raced to their winches and the 
funnel went up in quick order.880  The Royal Navy was adapting to mechanical 
changes brought about by the evolving ironclad warship, and through innovation 
and drill modification, the routines of shipboard life were changing with them. 
     During the September 1866 exercises, the fleet was ordered to practice an 
evolution under sail alone and the new Bellerophon failed to perform to 
satisfaction.881  While underway, another concern arose due to unexpectedly 
high fuel consumption rates. The Wivern was the first to drop out of the exercise 
as she was running short of fuel and was ordered to take on more coal at 
Cork.882  The Wivern was singled out for additional criticism as Admiral Hastings 
R. Yelverton later relayed a report from her then commander, Captain Burgoyne, 
that she was almost always battened down when at sea as the water threatened 
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to pour in through her gunports.883  It was also claimed that fires in two of her four 
boilers were doused by a rush of water from the deck while she was steaming 
down the Channel.884 
     On 26 September, the ships engaged in gunnery practice south of Bantry 
Bay, off the west coast of Ireland despite a heavy swell which caused some of 
the ironclads to roll up to 30 degrees.885  Each ship was to fire fifteen rounds but 
some ships could not reach that rate due to the continuing swell. Despite the 
seas washing over her deck, the Wivern was among those able to fire at the 
floating targets when the other broadside ships could not open their gunports.886  
The gunnery was uneven as only the Achilles performed well, for when firing her 
broadsides, she was reportedly ‗steady as a church‘ despite the loss of her main 
and mizzen topgallant masts in the storm.887  The fleet gunnery practice was 
hazardous as the heavy guns threatened to get away from their crews struggling 
on the pitching decks.  The men had to contend with some guns that had their 
muzzles dunked and their powder ruined in the heavy seas while wrestling to 
keep the guns from sliding back when their ships rolled and lurched in the waves.  
Some ships reported their gunports were completely submerged at times. 888  
The ironclad warship, in all its forms, was rarely a comfortable and efficient man-
of-war during this age of rapid change.  
     These training cruises allowed commanders to determine the characteristics 
of not only each ironclad, but the performance of an armoured squadron as a 
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unit.  These exercises produced new considerations regarding the various 
applications of ship handling needed for the ‗formations for attack and defence; 
all the possible evolutions which ships, divisions or squadrons may be called 
upon to perform while acting together.‘  During this era, the concept of seapower 
transformed into two distinct expressions.  Tactics were evolving into concepts of 
localized operations separate from the broader context of naval warfare, a 
different outlook defined as global or strategic in its scope.889 This reevaluation of 
naval thought occurred with the advent of steam propulsion and the armoured 
warship, and grew apace as the ironclad evolved in its different forms.                          
 
The Admiralty and the Laird turret rams 
 
     The Laird rams were never popular with the Admiralty.  When debating naval 
budgets in the Commons, the Secretary to the Admiralty, Lord Clarence Paget, 
called the Scorpion and Wivern unfit vessels, remarking that the crew spaces 
were faulty and the men could not be kept clean.890  The inference that the ships 
were dirty was disingenuous.  Sub-Lieutenant Swinton Holland kept a log of his 
time aboard Wivern when he was assigned to the ship from September through 
the end of December 1865.891  He made 22 references to cleaning the ship, from 
the holds to the turrets.  Holland also mentioned the crew was issued soap and 
tobacco as rations. 892  The log of the Scorpion made references to ‗cleaning 
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ship‘ during this time, which indicates this was a normal part of ship‘s routine and 
not excessive duty aboard the rams.893  The telescoping funnel aboard each 
ironclad was a probable contributor to coal dust aboard the rams, especially if the 
funnel was lowered, but coaling procedures where notorious for all steam 
powered ships.   
     The coal used was likely the real reason the ships had to be cleaned 
continually.  The Royal Navy used a mixture of North Country coal and Welsh 
anthracite during the middle Victorian years as a cost savings measure.894  The 
result was a thick cloud of smoke produced by the cheaper North Country 
variety.895  Another reason for this supply concern was due to the well-
established collier trade from Newcastle to London, especially by the time of the 
Crimean War of 1854-56.  The supply of Welsh coals was relieved somewhat by 
the end of that war, but the need for economy meant that the dual coal supply 
remained in effect.896  The Royal Navy would continue to use the dirtier 
bituminous coals until 1887 when the cleaner burning Welsh coal was utilized 
exclusively except when supplies were not available.897 
     In 1866 the Laird rams came in for abuse on the floor of the Commons due to 
their poor performance in the fleet. On 15 March, Paget had mentioned that 
discipline suffered as a result of the unsatisfactory conditions aboard the Laird 
rams saying neither vessel was ‗fit to put British sailors into‘.898  His comments 
were at variance with other remarks he made in the Commons that day.  Paget 
stated, when referring to the Agincourt, that he would prefer the command of 
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smaller ships, as the larger ironclads were not as handy in turning.  His remarks 
are also curious as he stated that he would prefer the command of smaller ships 
‗even at some sacrifice‘ to the performance and firepower of a larger ocean 
cruising ironclad.899  The remarks were a part of a verbal joust with John Laird, 
who had proclaimed that the rams were not failures, as they were not intended 
for duty as ocean going cruisers, but they had proved to be ‗thoroughly 
seaworthy‘ during trials and exercises.900  Laird also pointed out that if the rams 
were troublesome in a seaway, it was because they were not fully modified to 
meet requirements before joining the Channel Fleet.901 
     Laird made a clear distinction as to the real benefit of the two ironclads when 
he observed they had advanced the evolution of the turret ship as test beds for 
Coles armoured cupolas.902  In the mid-1860s, the Admiralty had mixed views of 
the proper utility of a turret ship, as Paget mentioned the ironclad U.S.S. 
Monadnock, a powerful double turret monitor then en route around Cape Horn, 
for harbour defence duty at San Francisco.903  Paget compared the American 
monitor to a rock at half tide, deck awash in a breeze, and a hard vessel on her 
crew, but he also called her ‗one of the most formidable engines of war in 
existence‘.904  Paget had said earlier that month (March 1866) that the Laird 
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rams, though not effective as cruisers, would be ‗very effective‘ under certain 
circumstances.905  Laird claimed that the Royal Navy did not know what to do 
with either the Scorpion or the Wivern or how to use them properly, and as such, 
they remained in home waters until they found a suitable role.  It would be years 
before the forlorn ironclads would be adequately modified for the role more 
suitable to their design.906   
     The Scorpion was the first to go out of commission when she was docked for 
alterations to make her ‗one of the most efficient of our armoured vessels‘ as 
Laird had hoped, except money was not appropriated in a timely fashion and only 
five or six men were working on her in July of 1866.907  The previous month, the 
double turreted monitor U.S.S. Miantonomoh anchored in Cork, having crossed 
the Atlantic in the company of two U.S paddle-driven warships.  One British 
newspaper described the armoured visitor as ‗destitute of spars and rigging‘, 
noting her low hull was barely visible above the water.908  Her sparse 
arrangement of upper works attracted a curious description with the, ‗broad flat 
base and her confused superstructure…she might very well pass for a novel 
description of dredging machine‘.909  The low silhouette of the American monitor 
was a feature not immediately recognized for seaworthiness yet her arrival in the 
United Kingdom caused a sensation due to the subsequent impressions of the 
vessel and the demonstrations of her 15-inch Dahlgren guns.910  Before the 
voyage, the addition of a wooden 3½ foot tall wooden breakwater forward aided 
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the Miantonomoh‟s headway, although waves surged inboard, rolling ‗halfway up 
the forward turret‘ during the crossing.911  
     A fixture that facilitated her Trans-Atlantic crossing as much as her 
breakwater, waterproofed hatches, steam-driven fans and pumps, was the 
‗Hurricane Deck‘.912  This structure, positioned between the two turrets, was 
described as ‗a latticed platform…supported upon pillars, on which when the ship 
is at sea all the nautical duties are performed‘.913  The fitting of hurricane decks 
improved conditions aboard iron warships of the time, and after the Reed 
armourclad Research received hers, she was ‗rendered at least safe and 
comfortable-and she kept her place fairly with the fleet‘.914  By August 1867, the 
Scorpion was fitted with her walkway which extended over her turrets and 
permitted safer passage from the forecastle aft to the poop in heavy weather.915  
The Admiralty had taken a step to render the Laird rams and other ironclads 
more serviceable in British waters; although the bold steps needed to reduce 
weight aloft and thus lessening some of the rolling, would have to wait for a later 
overhaul.  The Scorpion had her masts removed during the ‗extensive‘ refit, but 
they were placed back aboard ship near the end of her time in dockyard, and an 
opportunity was lost to convert her into an all-steam ironclad.916  
     Weight savings had been achieved in the mid-nineteenth century with the 
adaption of rope made from steel wire.  Although wire rope was first made in 
Britain in 1832 for collieries, mine owners were slow to switch from the trusted 
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hemp and only added wire rope when the manufacturing process evolved.917  By 
1859, the Admiralty had fitted three steam frigates with steel rope manufactured 
by such firms as Webster & Horsfall of Birmingham.918   The new steel rope was 
also almost a third of the diameter of hemp, held up well to experimental stress 
tests, and by the late 1860s, both iron and steel rope was less expensive than 
hemp.919  When introduced to the United States, the steel substitute was termed 
‗an invention of great importance‘.920  Traditional hemp rope continued in service 
as wire rope of steel and especially iron lacked sufficient elasticity until steel 
manufacturing processes were advanced in the 1860s.  Wire rope was made 
from individual strands, each comprised of six wires of equal diameter.  The 
manufacturer varied the number of strands depending on the size of rope 
required.  Iron rope was preferred for standing rigging as it was cheaper than 
steel rope and like hemp, was sometimes tarred for waterproofing.  Steel rope 
proved more suitable than iron for work in the various blocks carried on ships, 
and the use of galvanized wire ropes for both iron and steel resolved the 
problems of corrosion, and allowed for increased flexibility over the more rigid 
tarred stays.921 
     Despite these advances, the weight savings did not compensate for the 
increased weight of the engines and boilers on warships.  In November 1867, the 
wooden-hulled twin-screw gunboat H.M.S. Plover was found to be too heavy aloft 
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as she rolled as much as 20 degrees even in fine weather due to her heavy 
masts and rigging.  She was subsequently reduced in both to render her more 
stable. 922   
       
Special Duty, Gun Failure and Drill Changes  
      
     In July 1867, Wivern was present at the Spithead Naval review held in honour 
of the Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Aziz.923  Nevertheless, the refurbished Warrior, the 
Black Prince and Minotaur were the more traditional representations of British 
naval might.  Several turret ships were at anchor during the review although the 
Wivern was the smallest.924  The ship was still at Portsmouth in August when the 
officers placed an advertisement in a local newspaper announcing that the 
wardroom would not be responsible for the debts incurred by their steward.  
Curiously the newspapers still referred to her by the earlier misspelling of her 
name ‗Wyvern‟.925 
     Duty at Portsmouth had been dull for the crew of the Wivern, as notices 
appeared in local papers concerning issues regarding discipline aboard ship.  In 
January 1866, two boys, Charles Peacock, and Joseph Windsor, were tried 
before the local justice of the peace and charged with desertion.  After admitting 
their crime, the boys were returned to the ironclad.926  Another boy, Harry Cole, 
had deserted the ship on 5 October 1865, was apprehended and court martialed 
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years later (January 1870).  He was imprisoned at Winchester and sentenced to 
18 months hard labour before being discharged from the navy.927   
     Peacetime discipline was not a new concern for commanders during this era.  
Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby faced a similar problem in the Mediterranean Fleet a 
decade later and responded by removing an ineffective captain, further court 
martial proceedings, and keeping his ships at sea more often.   Additional time at 
sea and the rigours of practiced shipboard drill improved crew efficiency and 
removed the distractions of the shore from the men.  Another issue that 
contributed to a drop in performance and morale was the rapid turnover of 
trained crewmen, as many went into the reserves.928  Nevertheless, a ship ably 
led, refurbished, and manned with a trained and stable crew, was a formula for 
improved efficiency.  Retention of a well-trained complement was essential, as 
the ships entering service in the 1860s were fitted with more unfamiliar weapons, 
as well as intricate and interdependent machinery.  This bewildering array of 
technical changes required a special breed of men able to absorb the continual 
fluctuations to shipboard routine while also performing at levels of efficiency 
necessary for ships more dependent on steam.  The changes aboard ships of the 
Royal Navy perplexed even the best officers, as Hornby later described his 
Mediterranean flagship, the Alexandra, as ‗too complicated‘.929  This was not the 
case with the Laird rams.  They possessed the same calibre guns and could 
focus on efficiency with only one type of heavy ordnance to train upon as 
compared with a variety of mixed guns aboard the larger ironclads.    
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     In late September 1867, information concerning a possible Fenian attack in 
Ireland led to several warships being sent from the Channel Fleet with only a few 
hours‘ notice.930  The Wivern had been held in a state of partial readiness as she 
was listed as ‗unappropriated‘ in one British newspaper prior to sailing with 
elements of the fleet.931   The Wivern was ordered to Holyhead to serve as the 
guardship at that harbour in response to rumours of an impending raid.932  The 
ironclad left without her full complement, as her captain was recalled from leave 
to join his ship after she arrived at the Welsh port.933  Emergency orders and a 
new station changed the routine of shipboard drill aboard the ram, and the added 
impetuses of possible action undoubtedly lifted morale and helped to improve 
discipline aboard the turret ship.            
     The Wivern had her first taste of ‗action‘ in September 1867 while at Holyhead 
when she sent a boat crew to search for members of a Fenian plot who had 
sailed from Liverpool aboard a ship bound for Cardiff.934  The boat searched a 
nearby merchant ship for the two Fenian escapees from Manchester Gaol, 
former Union Army Colonel Thomas Kelly and Captain Timothy Deasey.  Kelly 
and Deasey had been arrested on charges of plotting an uprising in 
Manchester.935  On 18 September 1867, while being transferred to prison, a 
Fenian gang attacked the prison van and killed police Sergeant Charles Brett, 
permitting Kelly and Deasey to flee and reportedly seek passage to America.  
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The attackers were soon captured and William Allen, Philip Larken, and Michael 
O‘Brien were sentenced to hang for their role in the murder of police Sergeant 
Brett with the execution carried out on 21 November.936  The men would go into 
Irish folklore as the ‗Manchester Martyrs‘.937   
     The boarding party from the Wivern did not find any fugitives, but the ironclad 
was ready to assist with men and firepower if the threatened Fenian plot erupted 
into a series of full scale riots around the country.938  On 14 November 1867, the 
ship was involved in another anti-Fenian mission.939  Shortly after midnight, a 
telegram from Manchester warned that a unit of armed men planned to land at 
Holyhead and rescue an Irish prisoner scheduled to arrive there.  The 
Coastguard notified the commander of the Wivern, Captain George A. C. Booker 
R.N, who responded by leading a force of marines ashore to search for the 
armed band.  Later that morning, the turret ship fired a shot across the bow of the 
London & Northwestern Railway steamer (likely fired with a reduced charge) and 
sent a boat over to search the vessel.  Although no suspicious persons were 
found aboard, Coastguard Chief Officer Rowe and Captain Booker were later 
praised for the ‗greatest activity and vigilance‘ in the sweep for the reported 
armed men.940      
     The Wivern had remained on duty despite a near tragedy that occurred 
aboard ship during a routine training event.  In early November 1867, a gun in 
the forward turret (incorrectly identified as the after cupola) blew up during target 
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practice after firing a shell with a 30 pound powder charge.941  The ‗left hand gun‘ 
burst while the gunners were firing at a target some 1500 yards distant, and the 
explosion caused the breech of the gun to be ‗blown clean away‘.   Aside from 
the gun captain whose legs were grazed when the breech, weighing about a ton, 
flew backward to strike the turret side and then fell to the deck, no one was 
injured.  This despite a crew of about 15 being in and below the turret at the time 
of the explosion, as the blast from the failed gun cast up above the heads of the 
men and the breech blew back and away from all but the gun captain.942  The 
Wivern was armed with four 300-pdr RML, two guns per turret, as was her sister 
ship, indicating that three men were assigned to each gun in the turret and an 
additional three below for each gun to pass up powder and shell and two other 
men to bring more ammunition from the forward magazine when needed. With 
the gun captain in the cupola, this would account for a 15 man crew assigned to 
each armoured turret above and below decks.943  As a result of the mishap, the 
Wivern was mentioned in the Irish press as having ‗A Novel Armament‘ and with 
some black humour, was referred to as having ‗three guns and a half‘.944  The 
failed gun, produced at the Woolwich Arsenal, reportedly had some casting flaws 
in the iron which contributed to the mishap.945  The flawed gun was reported to 
be a 10½-inch, 12½ ton Armstrong RML made before an improved reinforced 
breech was adopted in 1863.946   
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     The Scorpion was initially reported to carry smoothbore cannon, but these 
and the original armament of the Wivern, were earlier RMLs.947  An officer in the 
18th Hussars, William Palliser, had patented the method to refurbish 
smoothbores into rifled guns, by inserting a rifled iron and later steel inner core 
into the old guns.  When the breech of the muzzleloader was covered with iron 
bands to provide additional strength for the increased powder charges, the 
Woolwich Arsenal (which used the Palliser patent) was able to provide 
inexpensive rifled guns reconditioned from old smoothbore cannon.948   
Coincidentally, the change from smoothbores to heavy rifled muzzleloading guns 
had occurred as the ordnance terminology was changing.  By March 1864, the 
War Department designated the heavy Armstrong guns (and subsequent 
ordnance) by the size of the bore, not by the weight of the shot or shell as had 
been the previous practice.949  Palliser would later identify the screw threading of 
the breech plug as the weak point in these early 300-pdr RMLs.  The cascable 
was screwed into place to seal the breech after the rifled tube had been inserted 
into the rear of the gun during manufacture.  The screw threads had been cut 
from the breech wall instead of the later method of inserting a raised threaded 
surface for strength.  With each firing of the older guns, the force of the blast 
worked from the inside of the breech down the screw lining to the outer threading 
of the cascable.  Fortunately, few of these guns were made before the stronger 
breech closing method was adopted.950                          
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     As a result of the incident aboard the Wivern, the Admiralty ordered the older 
pattern guns replaced with the improved 9-inch RML.951  The failed guns were 
the early Mark I versions with steel rifled tubes built up at the breech with 
overlapping sleeves of iron ‗hooked together‘ for supposed strength, but the 
breech (and the cascable screw threads) was not strong enough to contain the 
heavy charges.952  The improved 9-inch guns had shed the earlier method of 
overlying reinforced iron at the breech, for thicker single-layered iron covering 
from the breech to the trunnions for greater longitudinal support.953  With each 
modification, the gun changed with the inner steel tube becoming more tapered 
and less rounded at the innermost part near the vent and with more separation 
from the cast breech plug.954  After changes to the gun, the carriages had to 
again be modified, as the 9-inch RMLs were termed ‗inconveniently heavy‘ for 
use aboard most warships of the time.955  Naval armament had become more of 
a weapons system and bore less resemblance to the wooden gun trucks and iron 
smoothbores of the sailing navy.  Industrialization was reaching the very heart of 
the warship and transforming the perceptions of firepower.  Man and machine 
had to work in precise unison to load, direct, and fire the heavy ordnance used to 
arm the ironclads of the middle-nineteenth century.             
     Large naval ordnance in a turret represented a challenge to gun drill in the 
1860s.  The heavy guns of British ironclads during this time were described as 
‗short dumpy things like soda-water bottles‘.956  The muzzles of these guns 
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barely stuck out from the gunports of the turrets, and the short barrel length 
hampered firing due to safety concerns.  In 1865 several lieutenants and some of 
the crew of the Scorpion were detailed to the Royal Sovereign, to learn the 
intricacies of working turret guns.957   
     The Royal Sovereign was the touchstone of the turret warship for the Royal 
Navy, and the practical experience gained by the gunners who trained aboard 
her was invaluable.  Originally armed with 10.5 inch smoothbore muzzleloaders, 
the standardized armament for all turrets aboard allowed for a uniformity of 
storage and handling of ammunition as well as practice at gun loading and 
training.958  During gun drills in the forward double turret, Royal Marines refused 
to stand at the muzzle of one gun, ready to load as the other was being fired.  
The reason was fear of the fire from the muzzle blast of the other gun coming 
into the gunport while they were handling the powder charge of their yet to be 
loaded smoothbore.959  Two members of the Royal Marine Artillery prefaced their 
appeal to a lieutenant in the turret by warning ‗we are experienced gunners, we 
have had as much experience as you have‘.  The solution was to fire the guns 
almost simultaneously to prevent the blast from one gun inadvertently touching 
off the powder of the other.960  An emphatic warning given by practiced experts 
overcame faulty procedures to produce a gun drill adapted for the larger 
ordnance entering service on the ironclads, especially for those guns housed 
within the close confines of the armoured turrets.   
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     During her first commission, Scorpion carried 25 Marines as part of her then 
(1 October 1865) overall crew complement.961  Divided between the crew for a 
turret provided from the Royal Marine Artillery (R.M.A.), the remaining ten 
marines would have served as riflemen positioned around the ironclad to shoot 
down men on an enemy quarterdeck, gunners near an open port, or at their 
opposites up in a fighting top.  The Royal Marines were flanked by the Admiralty 
and War Office establishments, and were separated from their naval brethren 
and each other by different uniforms and traditions.  The R.M.A, that ‗splendid 
body of men‘, was considered well trained and superior to their army 
counterparts although they wore blue uniforms patterned after the tunics of the 
Royal Artillery.962  The scarlet-coated riflemen of the Royal Marine Light Infantry 
(R.M.L.I.) ranked after the 49th Regiment and before the 50th Regiment of the 
British Army when serving ashore, and earned the distinction of being referred to 
as the venerable ‗Forty-Ninth and a Half‘.963  Marine artillerymen and the R.M.L.I. 
were trained to double as foot soldiers when needed for an expedition ashore, 
and their services afloat added a espirt de corps wrought from having a dual 
mission which made them ‗particularly useful‘ for the myriad of duties required by 
the Empire.964  
     Experience aboard the Royal Sovereign in May 1865, proved that Marine 
riflemen could not stand or knell on the turret roofs as originally envisioned when 
Bulloch ordered the two Laird rams for the Confederates, as the double-gun 
turret produced a ‗very serious concussion‘ to anyone positioned immediately 
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above the guns when fired. 965  The turret was changing drill aboard the ironclads 
of the Royal Navy, although the Marine riflemen not assigned to a turret were 
undoubtedly deployed to their traditional positions aloft in the tops of the foremast 
or mainmast of the Laird ironclads as these were the surviving fighting positions 
from the sailing navy still carried in these turret ships.966                  
     The 9-inch Armstrong was the largest rifled gun afloat on Royal Navy 
warships of the mid-1860s.  Bigger smoothbore guns were afloat under the White 
Ensign, but the Armstrong was the main RML in service until larger bore heavier 
rifled guns could be perfected.967  Although this 12-ton gun was the premier piece 
of naval ordnance aboard British men-of-war at that time, the Admiralty 
experienced problems with those 9-inch RMLs produced by Woolwich Arsenal, 
guns considered to be ‗the pride of the War Department‘.968  Tests at 
Shoeburyness had proven the advance of armour had been momentary halted, 
but as mentioned previously, the gun explosion aboard the Wivern, revealed a 
design flaw in the earlier breech plug.  Complaints in British newspapers also 
called attention to the bore of the Armstrong 300-pdrs as they worn out rapidly 
when firing the heavy shells and larger powder charges.  The guns usually lasted 
only one hundred rounds before needing repair or at least detailed inspection as 
the steel rifled central tube and iron coils wrapped around the breech were 
unable to endure the blasts from repeated firings.  Another problem was that the 
grooves cut into the bore reportedly contributed to the fire not being carried away 
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from the muzzle immediately after discharge.969  Improvements to the muzzle 
loading naval rifles continued although the projectiles proved to be 
disappointments.  One senior naval officer observed that studded shells broke up 
in the barrels or tumbled in flight and ‗went in any direction except the right one, 
but the guns made plenty of smoke‘.970           
    
In Search of a Role 
     
     The British press exhibited a casual dislike of the Laird rams during their early 
years in service, with one newspaper exclaiming they were hurriedly built and 
unsteady at sea.971  By early August 1868, Wivern went into the Portsmouth 
dockyard for a refit and to receive new guns.972  She was to be modified along 
the lines of her sister ship, as the Scorpion had been ‗improved greatly‘ with new 
fittings and alterations.973           
     Despite the alterations, these two turret ships were not significant 
improvements over their previous configurations.  Slightly over five years after 
being commissioned, the Laird turret rams were already outclassed and ill-suited 
for work in home waters.  Reed remarked (1869) that the Scorpion and Wivern 
were ‗the weakest of our armour-clads‘.974  In a rebuttal to the claim, one writer 
questioned Reed‘s mention of the armament of the two Laird rams as being light 
and retorted saying ‗we might admire the grandeur of thought which could 
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contemplate a 300-pounder with such a degree of depreciation‘ as the guns 
carried in these turret ships were among the principal afloat in the Royal Navy 
and only three British men-of-war carried larger guns at that time.975   
     Performance issues impacted the reputation of Laird rams during their first 
years in commission.  The Scorpion was able to slightly outpace her sister as she 
reached 10½ knots on at least one occasion.976  Although they archived what 
was then considered a moderate speed, the Laird rams were susceptible to roll 
as they took seas amidships.  During her 1866 cruise with the Channel Fleet the 
Wivern rolled up to 27 degrees in a heavy sea, but this must also be read in 
context of the Coles-Reed battles in the press.977 Coles had remarked earlier that 
two Reed built ironclads the Enterprise and Research, were both ‗dreadfully slow‘ 
and did not perform well at sea, going on to proclaim that the Research was an 
unsafe ship ‗the Admiralty have never trusted her 100 miles from our coast since 
launched‘.978 
     The battle between Coles and Reed had been going on beyond design issues 
regarding the broadside versus the turret ironclad, and also delved into the 
fittings on the ships.  As previously mentioned, the Scorpion was originally 
equipped with wooden carriages instead of newer iron carriages for the 
Armstrong RMLs.979  The British press opined: ‗while the captains of Mr. Reed‘s 
ship get everything which they require done without a day‘s delay, the captains of 
the turret ships find all their requests treated with utter neglect, and are forced to 
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do as they best can with what their own crews can manage to do‘.980  The 
Scorpion needed adjustments to her gun carriages to render her armament more 
serviceable and these modifications were undertaken by her crew.981  The port 
side gun carriage in the aft turret was altered as several bolts were too long and 
had to be cut down to prevent injury to the gunners in the confined space 
between the muzzleloaders.982    
     Turret ships of the Royal Navy lacked the room associated with an 
unobstructed gun deck of those broadside armed ironclads favoured in the early 
ironclad years.  The larger armoured vessels carried rope netting or ‗mantlets‘ 
suspended from the deck above the guns in broadside in order to prevent shell 
fragments, broken bolts, or nuts from flying unimpeded around the gun deck 
during action.983  When in place, these rope barriers (some weighing as much as 
820 lbs each) would separate each gun crew in a cage-like isolation.984  During 
gunnery tests ashore, the rope mantlets did stop larger fragments and served to 
deaden the sounds when the guns fired, but they also presented a fire hazard.985  
When treated with a fire retardant (chloride of calcium), the rope mantlets could 
be made safer, as they were also considered a barricade to prevent burning 
powder from entering an adjacent gunport when heavy ordnance was fired from 
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a warship during high winds.986  The rope mantlets were a valuable method to 
improve safety aboard the broadside warships but they were not suitable for the 
turret ships, as overhead beams were needed to secure the rope screens and 
would have impeded the loading and sighting of the guns.987       
     The refitted Scorpion participated in a mock combined arms demonstration off 
Dover Castle on 30 March 1869, with the Royal Sovereign serving as flagship of 
the squadron.988  The ‗sham fight‘ involved the two ironclads reducing the shore 
batteries manned by the army volunteer regiments as part of their annual review, 
while gunboats were to provide close-in fire for the invading force.  A gale 
delayed the exercise until the rains abated; a drummer aboard the Royal 
Sovereign beat to quarters as a signal was hoisted ordering the Scorpion to clear 
for action.989  High waves prevented the smaller gunboats from putting to sea 
from Dover as the brig H.M.S. Ferret broke loose from her moorings in harbour 
and was bashed to pieces against a quay.990 
      The gale tossed the mail steamers about ‗as if made of cork‘, and the two 
ironclads held their positions only through the application of full steam power.991  
The storm tested the abilities of the men and turret ships as both vessels 
wallowed in the heavy sea and the Scorpion, with her flat bottom, rolled in excess 
of 30 degrees.992  Eventually the storm abated and the two turret ships prepared 
for action after lowering their iron bulwarks, an act the well-trained men of the 
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Royal Sovereign completed ‗in a few seconds‘.993  Some of these men were a 
picked crew from the gunnery training ship H.M.S. Excellent, and the commander 
of the squadron also commanded both the gunnery establishment and the Royal 
Naval College.994  The flagship opened fire at 4: 30 p.m. as the crew served their 
9-inch guns (she had been rearmed in 1867 when her original 10.5 inch 
smoothbore guns were removed) with a drill that was described as ‗smart and 
exceedingly well regulated‘ and the rotation of the turrets ‗worked smoothly and 
without a hitch‘.995  The Scorpion joined in, and both ships did ‗good service‘ in 
providing the invading force with covering fire to reduce the batteries ashore.996   
     An 1869 print from the Illustrated London News shows both ships firing, the 
Scorpion employing the guns in her forward turret, the Royal Sovereign firing all 
but the gun from her central-most turret.997  The ironclads have hurricane decks, 
permitting officers and men on the ships better forward and aft as waves are 
washing over the lowered bulwarks on each ship.  The Scorpion reveals another 
aspect of her refit as her armoured casemate surrounding her funnel was no 
longer visible indicating that the somewhat slender telescoping funnel and 
armoured sleeve had been removed to make way for the hurricane deck and 
larger fixed funnel.998  Although her topside weight had been reduced with the 
change to her funnel, the iron masts and yards contributed to her rolling and 
lesser performance at sea.                                    
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     Nevertheless, the ships put on a good show.  The artillery ashore fired back 
with 68-pounders, but their response was consider insignificant when compared 
with the boom of the naval guns as their reports reverberated off the cliffs.  Both 
ships were to fire a round from each gun every three minutes but the Scorpion 
was much slower than the flagship in her rate of fire.  At the conclusion of the 
simulated bombardment, the bulwarks were raised, the guns run in, and the 
ships anchored.999   
     The sham fight did illustrate a valuable tactical lesson.  An Invading force, 
when supported by heavy guns of armourclads within range of a vital stretch of 
coastline, would greatly complicate the defence.  The defending force would 
have to have the ability to imperil the attacking warships, withstand the 
bombardment, and hold off the invading ground force or be overwhelmed.  The 
assault force was assessed to have gained the outer works of the defenders after 
the fire from their guns had become ‗ominously slacker, for the heavy artillery of 
the fleet had succeeded in overpowering and silencing many of the guns of the 
south-east bastions‘.1000  Although the bombardment was only a demonstration, 
the Scorpion would have been effective in a coastal assault role, as her slighter 
draft would have permitted a closer approach to an enemy shore in wartime.  
With a crew trained to handle the heavy guns in a seaway, she (and her sister) 
would have given a good account against a hostile coastal position.1001       
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      In April 1869 the Scorpion was at Portsmouth to receive new ‗pointers‘ for her 
guns.  Artisans formerly employed by the gunwharf establishment at Portsmouth 
had been let go in a cost saving plan and as a result, skilled workmen had to 
travel from Woolwich Arsenal to carry out the fittings at almost double the 
cost.1002  The government responded to the claim by stating that the work was 
intricate and would have cost the same for the materials and the skilled labour 
regardless whether the men came from Woolwich or Portsmouth.  During a 
debate in the Commons over this expenditure, the real issue came to the fore.  
Skilled workmen (113 of them) had been discharged from the gunwharf as the 
navy was forced into cost cutting measures.1003  Some men took the offer for free 
emigration to Canada as a resettlement severance from government employment 
and Sir James Elpinstone remarked it was ‗a thousand pities‘ for Britain to lose 
their hard-earned skills.1004 
     Fiscal restraint was the demand from Westminster as the Royal Navy‘s 
funding had contracted by over 40 per cent from the end of the Crimean War to 
the early 1880s.1005 Despite the occasional funding spikes brought on by the Civil 
War, Franco-Prussian War, and the 1878 crisis with Russia, British domestic 
political gravity kept budgets under constraint.1006  Parliamentary pressure for low 
defence expenditure was answered at the cost of efficiency.  The requirements 
for those ships not in the dockyard to keep to sea, exacerbated the problem of 
defending a global empire with a navy restricted in size by budget and wear.  
Ironclads not considered a success by the contradicting requirements of a 
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service with worldwide commitments, nevertheless meant they had to be retained 
in degrees of readiness.1007  Britain had to keep ships like the Scorpion and 
Wivern in the fleet to maintain enough armourclads available for service while 
others were in overhaul.  Although smaller and slower than the large armoured 
frigates, and in need of alteration, they were still required.  To maintain Britain‘s 
maritime security, every ironclad was needed regardless of seakeeping qualities.  
It was a numbers game.   
     The Scorpion participated in another ‗sham fight‘ off Southsea Castle near 
Portsmouth on 26 April 1869, when she led a force of six ‗enemy‘ gunboats in a 
mock attack against the castle, supported by an attacking land force comprised 
of volunteers and regulars.  During the simulated invasion, the castle fell after a 
landward attack supported by the Scorpion and her flotilla, with the ironclad 
shielding the smaller vessels until they closed the range.1008  The turret ship did 
not fire her guns (although they were run out and the bulwarks lowered) as it was 
feared that the blast from her 9-inch battery would shatter the glass of the houses 
near the shore.1009  A nearby lighthouse had the lenses removed as a precaution 
against damage from the guns of the flotilla as ‗economy-even in glass‘ was the 
order of the day.1010   
     After that stage of the exercise, the invading force moved up with skirmishers 
and field artillery, towards the main objective, the fortress of Portsmouth.1011  A 
naval landing party led by an officer from the warships marched with the field 
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artillery as the gunboats protected their flank.  The flotilla steamed into 
Portsmouth (in a simulated bombardment) and was reportedly overwhelmed by 
the fire of the forts, whereupon the invasion collapsed under the weight of 
counterattacks.1012   
     The event was conducted under a festival atmosphere as the gunboats slowly 
moved into position, and the volunteers led by regulars, followed a set schedule 
with no adjustments for the probable response of a real enemy.  The spectators 
enjoyed a good show and a team of inventors from London brought a pedal-
driven sightseeing craft or ‗velocipede yacht‘ to the beach to the delight of the 
crowds.  Although termed ‗perhaps the prettiest spectacle yet presented in 
connection with the volunteer movement‘, the exercise was dubbed a naval 
‗absurdity‘ and the field maneuvres ashore ‗highly indifferent as a military 
lesson‘.1013   
     Two days later, after being refueled and reprovisioned, the Scorpion was at 
sea again headed for her new assignment in Ireland, arriving at Queenstown 
anchorage on 1 May.1014  With her sister on duty as a guardship, by mid-May 
1869 the Wivern was back in Portsmouth in the hands of the dockyard for 
alterations to adapt her for her more suitable role as a coastal defence 
ironclad.1015  Experience gained aboard one turret ship was relayed into refits 
and modifications with the other turret ironclads as new technology, methods of 
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drill, and changes to ship handling, remade these vessels.  The turret ship was 
evolving.                  
  
The Guardships 
 
     In Early May 1869, Scorpion took up her duties as guardship at Cork from 
where she would occasionally put to sea to exercise the crews at the guns.1016  
On 26 July, she steamed out on what was to have been a week long cruise along 
the Irish coast.1017  The vessel encountered a tremendous storm which caused 
the ship to ‗behave very badly‘ in the mountainous seas to the terror of her 
crew.1018  The waves washed down on the turrets, the powder stores were 
damaged when water poured in from the turrets down into the magazines, and 
the men were drenched as their berths were ‗in anything but a comfortable 
condition‘.1019  The ship was quick to roll and was taking water on one side of her 
deck as she was emptying it from the other side.    
     One day during the cruise, all sail was applied but the results were not 
satisfactory.  Despite this shortcoming, her captain would later claim when steam 
was used, ‗I thought the Scorpion as safe as any ship could be‘.1020  She 
answered the helm when under steam but when under sail only, her steering was 
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described as ‗wild‘.1021  Another factor which impaired her performance in a storm 
was her hurricane deck was too narrow for her crew to safely work her with 
efficiency.1022  With her complement exhausted from the ordeal, the storm 
battered Scorpion returned to anchor at Cork a day earlier than anticipated on 31 
July.1023  This voyage and the experiences with the Royal Sovereign, likely 
contributed to design changes needed for other turret ships as Reed‘s H.M.S. 
Glatton was fitted with a hurricane deck 11 feet wide to permit suitable room for 
her crew to move about while the harbour defence ironclad was underway.1024  
The structure (also referred to as the spar deck) on the turret ship H.M.S. 
Captain, was widened to 24 feet to provide room to work all the ropes for the 
sails, conduct navigation, and provide storage for the ship‘s boats.1025    
     In August 1869, rumours circulated that the Scorpion had her masts removed 
in Cork after her crew protested that she was unseaworthy due to their 
experiences endured during the July storm.  This was not entirely true, but the 
men were wary of again going out in her.1026  Despite the claim made in the Cork 
Herald (and repeated in the British press), that the performance of the ship 
‗occasioned such panic to her crew‘, the report was exaggerated. However, her 
captain acknowledged that the Scorpion was very uncomfortable in a heavy sea, 
and the amount of water on the deck during those conditions made it unsafe for 
the crew to move about except on the hurricane deck, and impossible to work the 
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guns.1027  The low freeboard was a concern for the crew, and although ‗not 
heavily sparred for her size‘, the heavy iron masts and yards contributed to her 
top heavy condition.1028  The double topsails in several Royal Navy ironclads of 
the 1860s provided little in the way of extra speed, but the weight aloft was 
excessive.  On the larger iron frigates, as much as six tons were added, but the 
sails and rigging also added to the wind resistance in steam armourclads.1029   
     The Laird rams were rarely know as being good sea boats and a month after 
her arrival in Cork, the Scorpion was referred to in one Irish newspaper as a 
‗tipsy Sinbad the Sailor‘.1030  Ironically, the whimsical story published in the 18 
June 1869, edition of the Cork Examiner described the Scorpion as a seaman on 
liberty, weighted with back pay or ‗having much metal about his hull‘.  The tale 
continued with the tar, (Scorpion) becoming wrecked after having been ‗sorely 
buffeted by that Old Man of the Sea‘.1031  This intended light-hearted musing 
undoubtedly played on the superstitions of some members of the crew and 
contributed to their fear during the great storm several weeks later.  The Laird 
rams were regarded as ‗equally disreputable‘ seagoing vessels and some 
members of the crew stated they would not go to sea in the Scorpion again after 
her July voyage.1032    
     The issue of the ship‘s seaworthiness was revived when on 16 September 
orders were read to the crew instructing them to steam to Bermuda to assume 
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the duty as guardship there.1033  The men came aft and ‗respectfully 
remonstrated‘ against having to put to sea on a long voyage at that time of year 
‗in a ship like the Scorpion‘.1034  The effect of the crew going aft was a change in 
the order, and the voyage into the central Atlantic was postponed in the interest 
of safety.  After the weather cleared, the ship was reportedly ordered to proceed 
to Portsmouth for a refit prior to her circuitous voyage to Bermuda.1035  The 
armourclad did not steam to Portsmouth, but the Admiralty took the unusual step 
of coming to her in Queenstown.  When the Agincourt, flagship of the Channel 
Squadron, anchored in the roadstead later that month, the inspecting party 
proceeded to the turret ship to ascertain for themselves the conditions aboard 
and to determine her fate.  The party consisted of the First Sea Lord, Vice-
Admiral Sir Henry Dacres, Commodore G. O. Willes, and the former 
commanding officer of the Wivern, Captain Burgoyne.  The report found nothing 
which prohibited the ram from its mission, and the Scorpion was ordered to 
proceed to Bermuda when her escort ship arrived from Devonport.1036   
     Why the hurry to send the Scorpion to Bermuda?  She was needed at the 
naval base to reinforce the station with a modern turret warship to defend the key 
installations, especially the new floating dry dock.  The dry dock was essential for 
a modern fleet.  It facilitated command of the local seas, for well-maintained 
British warships, especially armoured ones had an advantage against an enemy 
force far from their own home waters.  The dry dock was ‗the pivot around which 
British Imperial strategy was transformed between 1860 and 1890‘.1037  Bermuda 
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was the ideal location, within easy steaming distance to Canada, the West 
Indies, and the American eastern coasts, it was a protected base that provided 
Britain with a likely launch platform for raids against American harbours and 
shipping if war occurred.  Admiral Milne referred to the island base as the ‗key‘ to 
the United States, and American observers agreed.1038  One Washington D.C. 
newspaper commented as late as 1896 that Bermuda was ‗menacing our coast‘ 
and hailed the strategic location near the centre of the Gulf Stream, as the 
‗Watch Station of Great Britain‘.1039  Significantly, the newspaper featured an 
etching not of a fleet at sea or great gun, but of the cradled Bellerophon, her bow 
sprit extending forward over the men posed along the upper and lower gangways 
of the floating dock, as an illustration of British Imperial might.1040  The colonial 
dry docks, gave the Royal Navy an edge over most rivals, as they kept the ships 
of the Royal Navy not only in repair but also battle ready, for their ‗everyday role 
was to maintain speed and endurance‘.1041       
     In the summer of 1869, the Royal Navy undertook one of the most intricate 
feats of seamanship since the laying of the Trans-Atlantic cable three years 
before.  The floating dry dock Bermuda was towed from Britain to the Azores 
then on to her namesake home in two relays.  Described as ‗intrinsically ugly‘, 
the 381 foot long dock was also acknowledged as a specimen of skilled 
workmanship that would provide the Atlantic colony with the modern means to 
overcome the shortcomings of poor soil and coral which prohibited the building of 
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a more traditional dry dock.1042  Escorted by ironclads the entire way, this tow 
was an example of British maritime power executing a seemingly routine transfer 
to a colonial station with breathtaking skill.  It was also a display of naval 
supremacy as four of Britain‘s ironclad frigates, including the Warrior and her 
sister the Black Prince, escorted the dock from Madeira to Bermuda after the 
Agincourt and Northumberland towed the Bermuda to the Azores from Britain.1043     
     Weighing 8,350 tons, it was dubbed ‗the monster floating machine‘, the 
largest floating dry dock in the world.1044  Although able to ride on the waves ‗like 
a well corked bottle‘, she needed a ship to pull her back when she yawed while 
under tow. That function was served by the venerable paddle frigate Terrible 
after the gunboat H.M.S. Lapwing went ahead to inform the naval authorities of 
the convoy‘s progress.  The dock arrived at Bermuda on 29 July 1869, and came 
to anchor at her new home at the naval base on the western edge of the 
archipelago.  The Royal Navy now had the means to repair ships on the North 
Atlantic Station.  The tow of the Bermuda to her namesake home over 4000 
miles of open ocean was an achievement justly commended by the Admiralty to 
the men of the ships involved in the undertaking, as ‗an operation without 
precedence in the British of any other navy‘.1045  
     In the late 1860s, Britain had naval yards around the Atlantic at Halifax, 
Jamaica, Antigua, Gibraltar, and the Cape of Good Hope, yet these lacked dry 
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docks.1046  Aside from the floating dock at the island fortress, one other graving 
dock existed at Quebec for the use of the North American Squadron.  However, 
due to icing up, this facility would not be available during winter.1047  Only the 
Bermuda gave the Royal Navy the year around strategic option of keeping a 
warship on the coasts of North America and available for service in the South 
Atlantic without returning to Britain. 
     On Tuesday, 12 October, the Scorpion left harbour with her consort, the 
paddle frigate Terrible recently returned from Bermuda, in close proximity.1048  
The British press mistakenly reported that that paddle frigate had been ordered 
back to Bermuda in order to tow out a dredging machine for use clearing 
channels around the reef-bound base.1049  Details of Scorpion‟s brief refit were 
only hinted at in the British press, but these likely included the removal of her 
double top gallants for lighter single yard variants to render her a safer vessel.1050 
     Captain Booker (former commander of the Wivern) had identified several 
deficiencies in the ship during the July voyage and pointed to the flanges around 
the turrets and the hatches as the main avenues of flooding.  By adding screw 
‗buttons‘ to tightly hold the flanges to the iron plate which circled the base of each 
turret, the water would be prevented from entering the ship through the spacing 
between the deck and the turret wall.1051  Raising the height of several 
hatchways was also required to insure the ship remained dry.  These minor 
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alterations were likely carried out before the Admiralty delegation arrived as 
further fittings were recommended by the inspectors.  These included the 
installation of deadlights to the hatchways to provide more light from above and 
the fashioning of angle iron to fill in the space between the funnel and pilot house 
in order to ‗carry off the sea‘.1052  Captain Booker had made other suggested 
changes which included widening the hurricane deck and replacing the three-
bladed screw for a more suitable two-bladed Griffiths version, but these were not 
implemented while in Ireland.1053  The ship had to carry out her mission and 
steam for Bermuda.  Prior to her departure, the main armament was transferred 
to the Terrible to further reduce the weight of the turret ship.1054     
     The Laird rams were not the only armoured warships to have been unpopular 
with officers and men of the Royal Navy during the first decades of the ironclad 
age.  Reed ships also received reproofs from the Admiralty.  The Reed designed 
Vixen and Waterwitch were experimental ships termed failures by the Navy.  
These small casemate ironclads had a feature referred to as ‗plough bow‘ which 
restricted the speed of each vessel and held the bow down in the waves.1055  
Men aboard both ships were said to have come aft to protest going to sea in 
them.1056  One admiral referred to them as ‗coffins‘ and the naval experts refuted 
the subsequent claim by their designer that they were intended for river use.1057    
     The Reed designed Viper, performed better than her unpopular sister the 
Vixen, yet these three vessels were armoured corvettes and carried a few heavy 
guns on a lighter draught.  They suffered from the design disadvantage of a 
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compromise on a small experimental hull form.  Observers would comment some 
twenty years later that the ironclad warship was a compilation of concepts put 
forth by the gunner, the seaman, the engineer, naval architect, and other nautical 
experts.  The Times correctly referred to the rapidly evolving armourclads of the 
middle nineteenth century as ‗a marvel of theory, compromise, and 
complication‘.1058 
     The Scorpion steamed to Bermuda via the Azores in the late autumn of 
1869.1059  Towed by the Terrible during some stages of the voyage, the crew of 
the turret ironclad apparently did not suffer any mentionable ill effects from 
weather as the ship rolled far less than in the Irish Sea, and was only under sail 
for several days between Madeira and Bermuda.  While in tow of the paddle 
frigate, coal was conserved as usually only two boilers were lit on the turret ship 
when not steaming.1060   
     On 18 November, the Scorpion and the Terrible anchored at Bermuda ‗all 
well‘.1061  Britain had successfully dispatched a turret ship to an overseas base 
and soon others followed.  A turret ship stationed at a distant naval station had a 
distinct advantage over a broadside equipped ironclad, as a ship fitted with twin 
turrets could ‗direct all her guns on the same object on more bearings than by 
any other known plan‘, and when the broadside armourclad was navigating an 
intricate harbour channel, the turret ship would have guns brought to bear while 
the broadside warship was end on at times and vulnerable.1062   
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     In December 1869, Britain dispatched the new double turret ironclad H.M.S. 
Monarch to the United States on a good will mission.  George Peabody, an 
American philanthropist known for his work as ‗the great benefactor of the 
industrious poor of London‘, had died in Britain and his remains were returned to 
Portland, Maine aboard the Monarch escorted by the American steam corvette 
U.S.S. Plymouth.1063  Unlike all other turret vessels, the Reed-designed Monarch 
departed from the contemporary belief in a low freeboard, and with her hull 
higher above the waves like a broadside armourclad, she became Britain‘s first 
‗blue water turret ship‘.1064  Comparing the Monarch with American monitors, one 
New York newspaper called her ‗a vessel of commanding appearance‘ and 
remarked it was impossible ‗to deny the fact that our war-worn turret vessels are 
nearly useless by reason of decay‘.1065  The British turret ship also had the 
advantage of her high freeboard, large coal capacity, four 12-inch guns in two 
turrets, and the then high speed of 14-knots; these factors made her the most 
powerful man-of- war afloat, and combined with her good seagoing abilities, ‗a 
cruiser in the literal sense‘.1066   
     A telegram sent by Andrew Carnegie in America was the impetus for her 
transatlantic voyage when he suggested the ‗first and best service possible for 
Monarch‘ was to bring the remains of Mr. Peabody back to the United States.1067  
Her arrival at Portland was met with appreciation and awe.  When the turret ship 
steamed into that port on 29 January 1870, she was met by several U.S. 
warships including the ‗saucy‘ double-turreted monitor Miantonomoh and dozens 
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of dignitaries including Admiral David Farragut.1068  When Governor Joshua 
Chamberlain of Maine, (hero of the fight at Little Round Top during the Battle of 
Gettysburg) officially accepted Peabody‘s coffin from Captain Commerell and his 
escorting  party of seamen and Royal Marines, the governor thanked him adding 
that the Monarch had achieved, ‗a greater victory than her guns could ever 
win‘.1069     
     Harbour and coastal defence ironclads came into vogue in the 1860s with 
new designs created by Reed.  In 1867, the Australian Colony of Victoria 
required a coastal defence vessel to protect Melbourne, and Reed created a twin 
turret monitor of improved configuration to meet the requirements.  A brilliant 
solution to the problems of the low-hulled monitor design was to place the turrets 
above the hull on an elevated armoured platform.  This platform or ‗breastwork‘ 
positioned amidships would carry the superstructure and funnel, with one turret 
on the forward edge and one on the after edge of the elevated deck.1070  A bridge 
and simple pole mast for signals would complete the profile of the new ironclad 
(H.M.S. Cerberus) , heavily armed with two 10-inch MLRs in each turret crowded 
on to the breastwork, with the decks clear of all but a few iron pieces.  Two other 
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similar turret ironclads or ‗floating batteries‘ (H.M.S. Magdala and the Abyssinia) 
were ordered by the India Office for the defence of Bombay.1071    
     Although these ‗near sisters‘ were an improvement over the Laird rams in 
terms of the position of the turrets above the main deck, the hulls were lower 
than the Scorpion and Wivern as their above water height was only a few feet 
above the waterline forward and aft of the ‗armoured redoubt‘ which stood a 
further six feet above the decks.1072  The result was a much poorer performance 
at sea as the low bows speared into the waves, whereas the Laird rams with their 
higher forecastles and poops, road over the waves coming ahead or astern.  The 
breastwork monitors solved the problem of all around fire, but they were a 
setback in terms of seakeeping.  With their decks awash even in a moderate sea, 
their ‗low swimming‘ hulls virtually dove into the waves and the Cerberus rolled 
40 degrees, when she was beset by storms while en route to Gibraltar on her 
voyage to Australia.1073    
     Discipline broke down aboard ship and the captain had to find replacements 
for three mutineers when the Cerberus docked in Malta.1074  Despite her 
dangerous performance at sea, the turret armourclad reached Melbourne on 10 
April 1871, rendering the colony ‗quite invulnerable‘ to attack.1075  The Magdala 
arrived at Bombay two months ahead of her Australian counterpart, having 
benefitted from a good passage out from Britain.1076  Both the Cerberus and 
Magdala were ‗hampered with the absurdity of sails and masts‘ but the smaller 
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Abyssinia left British shores with only pole masts for signal flags.1077  The lighter 
turret ship proved that her rig (or lack thereof) was the right fit for an armoured 
vessel of her dimensions, for she arrived at Bombay on 23 January 1871 without 
incident.1078  The voyages of the British turret ships to colonial stations influenced 
the Royal Netherlands Navy to dispatch their turret ironclad, Prins Hendrik Der 
Netherlanden, to the Dutch East Indies in 1876 where she arrived on 24 May.  
Outclassed in European waters, the smaller turret ships were available for 
‗general service‘ in the colonies where they were not expected to meet a larger 
rival.1079  
     The voyages of these turret ships were eclipsed by the disaster of another.  
On 6 September 1870, the new Lairds-built turret ship H.M.S. Captain 
encountered a severe gale in the Bay of Biscay while steaming with a squadron 
of the Channel Fleet.1080  Under the command of the experienced Captain 
Burgoyne, the low-hulled armoured vessel rolled in almost any weather, but in 
the face of the high winds and threatening waves, the Captain rolled to a 
dangerous degree.1081  At midnight on 7 September, the winds rose and the 
turret ship was in grave peril.  Burgoyne was on deck giving orders to cut away 
the few sails that remained as the ship heeled over 18 degrees, but it was too 
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late.1082  Other ships in the squadron suffered sails ripped apart or canvass 
blown overboard, but not the Captain.  Her sails held in the rising winds and with 
them in place, the ship was doomed as she rolled beyond the point of stability 
and capsized.  She sank in several minutes taking down 472 of her crew 
including Coles, the inventor of her turrets and masts.  Only 18 men survived.1083   
     Sails and heavy iron masts were rarely a successful blend in ironclads and 
were dangerous in most turret ships.  They proved lethal in the case of the 
Captain.  One British admiral was to remark of her sinking: ‗as the topsail yards 
were nearly fore and aft and nobody wise enough to let go a lee topsail sheet in 
time, it is no wonder that she capsized‘.1084  Admiral H. J. Rous‘s comments were 
exceedingly direct, but the Captain did not have time or freeboard enough to 
matter.  During the Court of Inquiry, Gunner James May mentioned the sails, but 
identified the structure built to aid the crew moving fore and aft was also a 
contributing factor.  Functioning as an unintended barricade or airfoil, the ‗wind 
might have had great force on the under part of the hurricane deck‘ and when the 
sea struck, the combined force of wind and wave pushed the ship over as she 
rolled in the trough of a swell.1085          
     When the ironclad frigate Achilles was completed in 1864, she was the largest 
warship in the Royal Navy, and with 44,000 square feet of canvas, the most sail 
ever carried in a warship.1086  Although a ‗splendid seaboat and steady gun 
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platform‘, the Achilles was not a safe ship for her crew.1087  In a rough sea, the 
helm was manned by eight men instead of the normal six.  One midshipman was 
to note that when aloft, the foretopman ‗developed the activity of a cat and the 
grip of a gorilla‘ to furl the canvas while holding on to whatever provided a secure 
support, as she had a reputation as a dangerous ship for those men who worked 
high above the decks.1088  Rous acknowledged that steam propulsion had cost 
the modern tar the ‗feel‘ of wind, sea, and the ship, proclaiming: ‗The fact is, the 
boiler has emasculated seamanship.  No man can serve two masters; he will 
hold to the tea kettle and despise the canvas.  You can no more rear a seaman 
in a steamer than on the Bridgewater Canal.  In ten years time the British 
seaman will be a rare bird among the sailors in the Royal Navy‘. 1089  
 
Maintenance and Reserve Duty  
          
     As the Scorpion was settling into her new role in Bermuda, modifications to 
the armament of the Wivern were made during her refit in the autumn of 1869.  
Her guns had been removed, and subsequently experimental changes made to 
her reconditioned armament and equipment.1090  Another modification made to 
the Wivern during that refit was the installation of a hurricane deck to connect her 
poop and forecastle ‗similar to those carried out on board the Scorpion‘.1091  Both 
Laird rams had received much needed modifications, but these changes were 
made incrementally.  The masts were retained and the armourclads were not 
                                            
1087
 Ibid, 43. 
1088
 Humble, Before the Dreadnought. (1976), 125. 
1089
 Ibid, 117. 
1090
 No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 1 January 1870, 8, ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, 
London Evening Standard, 12 October, 1869, 6.  
1091
 No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 1 May 1869, 8. 
 262 
allowed a suitable refit to test their true abilities for their role as coastal defence 
warships.  The Royal Navy was reluctant to cast off the large masts and heavy 
yardarms for armoured ships propelled only by steam.  
     The Laird rams were needed as other ships were decommissioned, and   
Wivern was ordered to Hull after completing her refit in Portsmouth, to relieve the 
wooden steam frigate H.M.S. Dauntless as guardship at that port.  The men from 
the frigate were to be transferred to the Wivern when she was paid off on 31 
December 1869, to give the turret ship a complement of 130 officers and men.  
The gunboat Rainbow (a Crimean War vessel built by Lairds) was to serve as a 
tender for the Wivern at her new home.1092  The arrival of the Wivern in Hull 
marked the end of the assignment aboard the turret ship for some of her crew, as 
this was a temporary arrangement.  The remaining complement of the ironclad 
was comprised largely of coastguardsmen as most of the active service seamen 
were transferred back to Portsmouth for duty on other ships.1093   
     On the evening of 3 May 1870, the routine of the ironclad guardship was 
disrupted when a fire broke out at a saw mill in Hull.  The fire quickly spread 
towards the Victoria dock, spraying showers of sparks onto the air and 
silhouetting the ships stranded at the quay.1094  Wivern was fortunate as she had 
been moored at the Albert Dock for six months since her arrival in port, and had 
cast off and steamed out into the roadstead only that morning.1095  One or two 
merchantmen had caught fire, but the flames aboard were extinguished as those 
ships were pulled away from the quays to anchor out with the ironclad and other 
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ships in the safe anchorage way from the spreading blaze.1096  Assisting the 
firefighting efforts, were fifty men from the Wivern who chopped away some 
wooden sheds near the docks and carted away timbers to slow the spread of the 
‗fearfully grand‘ conflagration.1097  Rowed out from the ironclad in boats, the men 
were cheered when they marched up from the dock under the direction of the 
commanding officer of the guardship, Captain Charles W. Hope, R.N.1098    
     The Wivern men immediate began work when the bugle was sounded, and 
continued for four hours without let up until the bugle called them to withdraw 
after the danger to the docks had passed.  A report circulated that the ironclad‘s 
firefighting detail was withdrawn after a dispute occurred with the local police, but 
the claim was quickly proven to have been erroneous and Hope‘s men were 
subsequently praised for their good service.  Although the flames continued to 
spread to a nearby timberyard, the intervention of the Wivern men did prevent 
several ships and stacks of lumber from being consumed in the inferno, and thus 
helped slow and contain the path of destruction.1099   The discipline of the men of 
the Wivern under the direction of Hope, revealed the positive impact of training 
and teamwork for a well-drilled crew proud of their role as the home defence 
ship.   
     The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war again disrupted the peacetime 
routine of the guardship, as the Wivern received orders to rejoin the Channel 
Fleet.1100  The ironclad was valued at Hull as an armoured defender of the 
Humber, and the town council protested her removal in a memorial to the 
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government noting that in the event of Britain‘s involvement in a wider war, only 
two small forts defended the coast in that vicinity and those garrisons had only 
obsolete artillery.1101  Despite the protests from Hull, the Wivern was soon on her 
way to the Channel where she would form part of ‗a small but very formidable 
ironclad squadron‘ assembled at the Nore.1102     
     Steam and armour had not only changed concepts of warship design, but had 
also redefined the concept of positioning for a naval battle. The tactical 
employment of an ironclad squadron had changed from the time tested line-of-
battle, to groups of bow-on formations.  By the 1870s, armoured ships were 
expected to clash with an enemy in a manner similar to a cavalry charge and 
although the line-of-battle was used, another formation, a grouping of three ships 
or ‗pelotons‘ was briefly in vogue.  This arrangement was intended for mutual 
support, but even this smaller bunching was difficult to maintain with ironclad 
warships of different seakeeping abilities.1103 
     While firing at the rocks of Bantry Bay during gunnery practice later that 
summer, a dangerous defect was discovered.  A log entry from the Wivern dated 
13 August 1870, indicated that the compressor screws did not hold the guns in 
place after they were loaded and run out.1104  With the ship rolling 15 degrees, 
the guns were moving back and forth on their slides and presented a danger 
from an accidental discharge or the crushing weight of an out of control heavy 
piece of ordnance.  The new guns installed after the 1867 explosion in the aft 
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turret, had not resolved the problems of operating heavy ordnance at sea.  The 
guns proved to be too heavy for their carriages, and the compressors attached to 
the slides, were unable to hold the combined weight of guns and iron carriages in 
place. The Wivern had to be turned head on to the swell to steady the ship and 
regain control of the 9-inch RMLs in the turrets.  Wivern‟s commander remarked 
that her guns could not be ‗fought except under extreme risk‘.1105  
     Control of the guns while at sea was an ongoing concern, as one officer on 
the ironclad frigate Bellerophon described her (in 1885) as ‗quite out of date as a 
fighting ship‘.1106  The captain felt the compressors would not hold the guns in 
place as the frigate crossed the Atlantic to Bermuda, and braced the guns up 
with timbers to hold them securely near their gunports.  In October 1896, the 
crew of the battleship U.S.S. Indiana had to secure the forward turret and the 
secondary guns with hawsers to the superstructure, after those guns had broken 
their clamps in a severe gale and were smashing against the upper works of the 
then-new warship.1107              
     The 1870 fleet exercise highlighted more faults in the Laird rams as the 
Wivern would need modifications to make her suitable for operations in British 
waters.  Admiral C. W. Elliot the inspecting officer returned a scathing appraisal: 
‗I cannot look upon the Wivern as being ‗efficescent [sic] as a cruizer‘ [sic].1108  
With an extensive refit she could be reshaped into an efficient coastal or harbour 
defence ship for duty near home.  Her guns were the immediate priority as she 
was in need of modern slides to render her capable of using her armament at 
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sea.  Despite her obvious drawbacks, the ironclad also was ‗quick and handy in 
turning‘ and had the advantage of a light draught.  With a list of alterations 
completed in dockyard, this armoured man-of-war would be made into a warship 
more in line with her potential.1109  Her low hull was a concern as the sea 
constantly washed over the deck between the turrets rendering it ‗difficult and 
hazardous‘ for the crew to pass fore and aft while underway except via the 
hurricane deck.  
     The Wivern was recommended for further alteration by removing her heavy 
iron tripod masts and fitting with light poles to carry fore and aft sails only.1110  
Accepting that the sails would never move the ship, the light rig would help 
stabilize the ironclad in a rough sea.  Seamen in the merchant navy prized the 
steadying effect a fore and aft sail could have on an iron ship by referring to the 
stabilizing stretch of canvas as a ‗flopper stopper‘.1111  With her tripod masts 
removed, Wivern would cut down a considerable amount of topside weight, the 
loss of which would contribute to an increase in stability.  To correct the defect in 
communications between vital compartments on ship, voice tubes were to be 
added between the pilot house and the engine room and a speaking tube from 
the pilot house and the aft turret was also proposed.1112    
     The Wivern was placed in the 4th Division reserve that autumn to await her 
turn in the dockyard.1113  She arrived at Devonport on 27 September 1870, and 
her captain, with the officers and some crew, were transferred to one of Reed‘s 
new central battery ironclads H.M.S. Invincible, as the Wivern was 
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decommissioned.1114  The ironclad ram was also recommended to receive two 
64-pounder muzzleloading smoothbores to give the ship greater arches of fire 
and supplement the restricted turret guns, but the new guns were never 
installed.1115  Her refit was again incremental as she was docked in Devonport in 
October 1873 to have her hull scrapped and painted with two coats of ‗Hay‘s 
Protective Varnish‘.1116    
     Ironclads were frequently in the hands of the dockyards for hull maintenance 
and refit as the reoccurring problem of marine growth was one shared by all iron- 
hulled vessels.  Although iron provided strength to longer hulls, and solved the 
escalating costs associated with timber shortages, the iron hull was fouled by 
marine growth at a much faster rate than copper sheathed wooden-hulled ships.  
If not scrapped and painted regularly, the iron bottom of any warship would 
resemble a ‗lawyer‘s wig‘ of shell and sea grass in short order.1117  In 1871, the 
Scorpion was in the hands of the dockyard in Bermuda to examine the condition 
of her hull.1118  One section amidships on the starboard side, was found to have 
been ‗honeycombed‘, with the corrosion reaching a depth of 1/16 of an inch into 
the plates and some of the rivet heads partially eaten away.1119  The remainder 
of the hull was found to have been in good condition which was a likely indication 
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of the different qualities of iron used in her construction, and a justification for 
using Hay‘s Protective Varnish to impede fouling and corrosion.1120   
     Hay‘s compound was in general use for the iron warships of the Royal Navy, 
and was advertised has having ‗met with the approval of the Lords of the 
Admiralty‘.1121  Hay, who worked as the chief chemist at the Royal Dockyard at 
Portsmouth, also produced a ‗prepared putty‘ and other protective substances 
that bore his name.1122  Early anti-fouling substances contained mixtures of 
copper, mercury, and arsenic, and ‗probably killed many painters as well as 
barnacles‘.1123  These toxic blends were necessary, as after six months in home 
waters without docking, an iron ship would accumulate enough marine growth as 
to decrease performance while underway by 25 per cent.  Most anti-fouling 
substances would last about a year before a ship would need to be sent back to 
dry dock, but more frequent attention was needed if in warmer waters.  Despite 
the need for more regular hull maintenance, the anti-fouling paints saved the 
admiralty many hundreds of pounds per hull by avoiding more expensive and 
drag inducing solutions.1124  Warrior received coats of the stuff after a visit to dry 
dock in 1863, and Hay‘s concoction was termed ‗invaluable‘ in the preservation 
of the submerged sections of her hull.1125   
     Although his chemical compositions were a success, Hay‘s association with a 
commercial venture while employed with the dockyard was questioned in 
Parliament.  The Admiralty initially defended him as his twenty five years of 
service had been beneficial to the navy, and his substances coating the ironclads 
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were used with ‗considerable advantage‘.1126  He is not mentioned in the records 
of Parliament after 1867 and was last referred to in newspapers in 1886 when his 
substances were used to coat below the waterline of the Achilles.1127  Other 
concoctions, such as ‗International‘ and ‗Moravia‘ (many later nineteenth and 
early twentieth century anti-fouling paints were produced by German firms) came 
into use in 1879 and replaced the earlier mixtures.1128  Success proved costly as 
Hay and countless other men in the dry docks likely succumbed to the 
undiagnosed effects of mercury and arsenic poisoning inflicted by the unintended 
application of the lethal mixtures through their own hands and in Hay‘s case, of 
his own making.                  
     One solution to the fouling problem favoured by marine architects was to 
revert to an earlier method, and provide wooden planking over the lower hull, and 
plate that section over with copper.  Copper could not be joined to the iron plates, 
as this connection would create an electric charge when the ship was in 
seawater, causing the iron to corrode at an accelerated pace.1129  The layering of 
copper and teak over the iron plates of the hull prevented both fouling and 
corrosion of the iron plates, but it came at the cost of increased drag.  
Nevertheless, this was considered a worthwhile sacrifice for ships deploying to 
tropical waters where marine growth occurred at a more rapid rate.   
     The Chilean broadside ironclad Blanco Encalada, returned to Britain in 1885 
for her first time in dry dock in over a decade, and the results of her second 
docking were astounding.1130  Before leaving for the Pacific on her original 
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commissioning, she had received a layer of teak planks on her lower hull, and 
over the planks were attached zinc sheets to prevent marine growth and wear of 
the iron hull.  The combination hull of iron, protected by teak, protected by zinc, 
was found to have been ‗even more successful than could have been hoped‘.1131  
None of the iron plates were eroded in any way, and the wear of the zinc was 
barely more than had been calculated when she originally sailed for Chile. The 
trade off was between more time in dry dock and a more expensive hull 
fitting.1132  
     Despite the praise, zinc was not the ideal solution, as it was hard to apply and 
even harder to adhere.  The results seemed to vary from one part of the world to 
another, for on the China Station the flagship H.M.S. Audacious was sheathed in 
zinc cladding below the waterline and fouled very rapidly.1133  Serviceability, 
speed, and expense, were factors in the daily maintenance of a man-of-war, and 
this was especially true for the ironclads.  It was simply too costly to retrofit all 
armoured vessels with a three-tier hull, so the Royal Navy opted to have more 
ships rotate in and out of the dry docks for a good scrapping and thorough 
brushing with the toxic anti-fouling compounds.   
     Another problem that vexed the merchantmen and men-of- war during the 
mid-Victorian years was the short live span of the boilers aboard all steam 
vessels.  This was particularly true for warships due in part, to the improved 
performance of engines and the subsequent decline in the sailing abilities of 
ships of war, most notably in the ironclads.  With the warships more dependent 
on their engines and thus on their boilers, the insidious circulation of ‗fresh‘ water 
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back into the boilers through the use of the Surface Condenser, aggravated the 
situation.1134  Although better performance was obtained after the invention of the 
condenser in 1855, the decay of boilers accelerated.1135  The condenser allowed 
for exhaust steam from the pistons to be recycled after cooling back to water and 
thus, to supply the boilers again.1136 
     The advantage of increased boiler pressure was also the culprit in the form of 
water from the condenser.  This problem plagued the Admiralty and the Merchant 
Marine, as the decay was spread through the circulatory systems of the boilers 
by the heated and reheated water which had become ‗excessively foul‘.1137  
Ironically, recycled water did not provide a benefit as had come in the earlier 
days when salt water had been used in the lower pressure boilers.1138  The 
recycled water did not allow for a ‗protective scale‘ to form on the iron surfaces of 
the boiler interiors.1139    
     Another problem was intermittent use.  In the middle Victorian years of 
constricted naval budgets, boilers were sometimes drained and refilled when a 
warship was needed back on patrol.  The results were counter to the intended, 
as the weakness in the boiler iron was discovered in the heating and cooling of 
the plates.1140  The box boiler favored in this era had grown to the limits of its 
capacity.  A Parliamentary committee established to investigate solutions, 
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received a dire report from the Admiralty which announced, ‗boilers in the Navy 
did not last more than five or six years‘.1141 
     The water tube boiler offered the promise of greater steam pressure but this 
was a premature lead.  Excessive scale built up in the small diameter water 
tubes impeding water circulation, and explosions resulted from the uneven water 
flow when the metal heated.1142  One observer warned that any overheated boiler 
would explode, as the metal with ‗any flaws will be stretched out, the flame will 
penetrate them, and promote their increase (in tensile strain) to the bursting 
point‘.1143  One expedient was to place zinc anodes in the boilers to prevent scale 
clogging the tubes.1144  Each boiler on the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet, 
H.M.S. Alexandra, carried 200 pounds of the metal and the results were highly 
effective, as the boilers lasted a phenomenal sixteen years before being 
replaced.1145  
     Another resource tried by the Admiralty was tubes made from brass.  These 
tubes were installed in the boilers of the sea going ironclads like the Warrior and 
later Alexandra, as brass corroded less than iron.1146  The Scorpion also had 
brass boiler tubes, likely a detail foreseen by Lairds in the original 
construction.1147  During a Bermuda dockyard overhaul in 1873, iron tubes were 
fitted to replace the brass tubes on the turret ship which had become foul from 
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the effects of burning bad coal.1148  Despite advantages, brass boiler tubes were 
expensive and as such, were phased out aboard most Royal Navy warships 
around 1882.1149  Iron was the cheaper product, but only with the advent of steel 
in the construction of the components of the water tube boiler, could the 
necessary high steam pressures be obtained with safety and efficiency.1150  Iron 
was at its limit.    
     In 1873, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Goshen, informed Parliament, 
that six ironclads had to go to the dockyards to deal with their worn out 
boilers.1151  The need for more frequent maintenance forced more men-of-war 
into the dockyards where they were pulled to pieces to get at the offending parts 
of a ship‘s boilers and machinery.  This bottleneck led not only to delays and 
increased expense, but to an increased need for those warships already in 
commission due to a ‗presence of a certain number of absolutely unusable ships 
at all times in Her Majesty‘s Dockyards‘.1152   
     As observed with the refit of the Warrior in 1865, costs associated with the 
ironclad warship were escalating.  By 1874 the Admiralty acknowledged that the 
expense of refits to the armoured ships of the Royal Navy was ‗far greater than 
had been anticipated‘.1153  Mounting costs complicated refurbishments and refits, 
for during this post-Palmerston era, the Royal Navy had a smaller budget than 
had the British Army.  Although Britain had a small army of 115,000-136,000 men 
during the years 1866-1885, the navy averaged only 60,000-65,000 
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personnel.1154   A skilled labour force of an additional 11,000 men toiled in the 
dockyards, but the manpower levels of the naval establishment, even with an 
additional 2,500 ‗hired labourers‘ at the above strength limit, was not sufficient to 
prevent an overcrowding of out of service warships at anchor in British 
waters.1155  To keep the naval establishment from expanding, skilled workmen in 
the Royal Dockyards were let go in the occasional short-sighted drive for 
economy when times of crisis had passed.1156   
     Engines were yet another reason for ever rising costs.  The engines on a 
warship were more prone to wear out than those on merchant steamers due to 
the accepted practice of placing engines below the waterline to prevent damage 
from enemy broadsides.1157  Merchant ships during this era were shifting to 
compound engines which were more complicated, but also had the much more 
efficient arrangement of vertical cylinders where steam and gravity could work as 
partners.1158  For the navy, the horizontal cylinder arrangement was still required 
in its ships, especially in the ironclads.  A warship with a low hull could not have a 
taller vertical engine extending above the deck or armour belt.1159  Higher fuel 
consumption and increased engine wear were accepted costs for most warships, 
as only those of the deepest draught were fitted with the new engines.  The 
Admiralty was not rigid in its approach to new engines, it was justifiably cautious.    
     The merchant fleet had experienced mechanical problems with the newer 
style compound engines and had to work through the teething problems 
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associated with this new development in marine propulsion.1160  Trials took place 
aboard a Royal Navy warship in the mid-1860s with mixed results.1161  The 
engines, when in good working order, performed more efficiently and coal 
consumption dropped, but suffered breakdowns more often as ‗they are of 
course more complex than single cylinder engines, & they perhaps have been 
more often defective than Engines of simpler construction have been in 
performing the same amount of work‘.1162  The Admiralty did not abandon the 
idea, it waited for the merchant marine to work through the mechanical 
drawbacks to achieve greater fuel efficiency and improve engine 
performance.1163   
 
Refit and a Foreign Station  
 
     In March 1878, the British press reported that the Wivern was to enter 
dockyard at her birthplace to undergo a six month refit.1164  The turret ship was 
long overdue for more than a short term patching over as she was towed by the 
paddle frigate H.M.S. Valorous, and assisted by the paddle tug H.M.S. Scotia to 
Birkenhead.1165  Valorous, the last wooden-hulled paddle frigate commissioned in 
the Royal Navy (1852), was well suited to the task as her paddle wheels 
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dampened most rolls of the waves while at sea.1166  Her hull length and 
freeboard also contributed to her being recognized as an ‗easy‘ ship due to her 
superb handling under sail and steam.  The ability to use the paddles 
independently allowed her to remain in position or to maneuvre with only slight 
turns of the helm.1167  Although one Irish newspaper referred to the frigate 
Terrible in 1867 as being as ‗ancient as a trireme‘, these obsolete paddle 
warships were useful, even preferable, to other vessels for the more routine 
tasks of ocean surveys, coastal patrols and the underappreciated but vital 
assignments of towing ungainly armoured men-of-war.1168 
     After the ironclad frigate H.M.S. Iron Duke had completed her refit at Lairds 
shipyard, the Wivern was turned over to her builders, not for a refit and the 
installation of new components, but for a long needed remaking.1169  The 
Scorpion was also slated for an extensive alteration, and on 24 June 1878, the 
Admiralty approved Lairds offer (for £1340) to construct a new funnel, uptakes, 
and boiler mountings for refitting the ironclad at the Bermuda dockyard.1170  By 
Christmas, the Wivern and the ram H.M.S. Hotspur were still at Lairds in 
overhaul.  Merseyside was experiencing a slowdown in ship orders at the time, 
and work on the navy rams was most welcome during a period of ‗considerable 
decline‘ compared with the previous year.  The Wivern received new boilers, her 
engines were reconstructed, and she received attention to her hull as part of the 
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extensive alterations undertaken to make her more suitable for steaming to an 
overseas outpost.1171 
     In February 1880, the Admiralty announced that the Wivern would be 
dispatched to Hong Kong to provide a naval defence for the colony.1172  The 
decision to send the Wivern to Asian waters was ridiculed in the British press as 
the turret ironclad and her sister were called ‗the weakest of our armour-clad 
fleet‘.1173  She was slow, and rolled in heavy weather, but she was available for 
service in the Far East.  The Wivern was the right fit for a defensive role on the 
China coast.  Modifications were made to her again after her stay at the 
Merseyside shipyard.  New fixtures were to have been added at Portsmouth but 
she had to steam to Devonport without the new machinery aboard.  This back 
and forth steaming was due in part, to issues of heavy loading of support 
equipment on an already deeply laden hull.1174  Reed criticized the decision to 
send her to the Orient, and referring to her new role proclaimed: ‗for general 
service in China waters she is, in my opinion, dangerously unfit‘.1175 
     The Admiralty did not share Reeds view as the old turret ship had undergone 
‗considerable improvements‘ which had made her ‗a safe and efficient vessel for 
the services for which she is intended‘.1176  To prevent overloading the hull, the 
ironclad would pick up some components at Malta, dispatched prior to her 
departure from the Channel.1177  Other new weapons would be sent out on 
                                            
1171
 ‗Shipbuilding on the Mersey during 1878‘, Aberdeen Journal, 25 December, 1878, 7.  
1172
 ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 12 January 1880, 3. 
1173
 ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Times, 14 February 1880, 8. 
1174
 Ibid, 8. 
1175
 ‗H.M.S. Wivern‘, Times, 20 February 1880, 12. 
1176
 Hansard, 23 February 1880, 250, cc 1196.   
1177
 ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Times, 14 February 1880, 8. 
 278 
separate ships, especially two 2nd Class Torpedo boats (TBs) originally intended 
to be carried on davits amidships on the Wivern.1178 
     The boats first intended for the Wivern were damaged in a mishap on the 
night of 5 February during a mock attack on their carrier ship H.M.S. Hecla at 
Spithead.  One TB was painted black to render her nearly invisible to the 
lookouts on the mother ship.  Although she was observed while closing on the 
Hecla, the other attacking torpedo boat did not see her.  The second boat painted 
grey to obscure the outline of her features, collided with the hard to see black 
boat and both were damaged in the mishap.1179  Although the thin steel-hulled 
boats were both pierced and torn, the watertight compartments held, and none of 
the personnel aboard were injured.  With repairs ordered for the camouflaged 
torpedo boats, two more 2nd Class TBs were substituted for eventual 
assignment to the Wivern.1180                 
     Almost two decades after they were accepted by a reluctant Royal Navy, the 
Scorpion and the Wivern were still mentioned in Parliament as unsuccessful 
ships.  The Scorpion and her lightly armoured harbour defence cohorts at the 
Atlantic island fortress came in for abuse when Lord Henry Lennox proclaimed 
that he hoped that Bermuda would never find itself confronted by a serious 
opponent.  Lennox asserted that if the Scorpion, Viper, and Vixen, were all the 
colony had for naval defence, then their best course of action was not to engage, 
but withdraw.1181  The Scorpion and the other gunboats on that station would, 
from ‗within the ring of Bermuda reefs‘, cooperate with the shore batteries and 
protect the minelaying crews, to defend the channels and harbours (especially 
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the naval station and dockyard) at the island base.1182  The Wivern was also 
criticized in the Commons as she was among a handful of small ironclads singled 
out as being no more efficient as seagoing ships than Noah‘s Ark.1183  This 
curious reference was an unintended compliment, for like the ungainly ship from 
the Bible, the Wivern was serving her true purpose and was soon to depart for a 
new station. 
     Both the Laird rams were to find their optimum roles as coastal defence ships 
and the Admiralty spokesman, Sir Thomas Brassey, corrected the opposition for 
speaking ‗very lightly‘ of these (and other small ironclads), emphasizing that they 
were quite useful in a defensive role, and they enjoyed the added benefit of being 
in very good repair.1184  Although slow and not worthy of the van of a battle line, 
these ironclads had a role to defend far off stations while other warships patrolled 
the oceans to show the flag and intimidate Britain‘s enemies.   
     The low-hulled Laird rams would never again make the voyage home. 
Nevertheless, these old armoured guardships had more years of service life in 
them, keeping the White Ensign flying at distant and vital bases while modern 
corvettes and ironclad frigates were busy on other ‗needful duties‘.1185  The Royal 
Navy needed more modern ships to meet the growing combined threats from the 
French and Russian navies.  The old turret ships, and the other forlorn ironclads, 
remained in harness until newer ships could be built, their crews properly trained, 
modifications made and tested, and then the more modern warships would be 
sent out to defend the seaways.  The Scorpion and Wivern helped give the 
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Admiralty the breathing space it needed to build up the fleet as European rivals 
launched their own versions of improved armoured vessels.  The Laird turret 
ships brought Britain time.     
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1. Birkenhead Iron Works (1857)          
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     2. Dry Dock No. 4, Cammell Laird (summer, 2015)     
    The Laird rams were built to the left of the dry dock                                    
      (Photo by Author) 
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     3. Armour Plate Rolling Mill, Mersey Ironworks, Liverpool 1863             
                                                                   Image# 10464453,                                                                                                                      
              (Courtesy National Media Museum/Science & Society Picture Library, London)  
 283 
  
4. Marine Trunk Steam Engine likely at Lairds (circa 1865)                     
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6. The ‘294’ (foreground) and ‘295’ after being seized in the Mersey                           
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 7. H.M.S. SCORPION at Sea  
 Illustrated London Almanack for 1869  
(Author’s Collection)  
    
                                       
 8. H.M.S. WIVERN at Plymouth, 1865    
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9. H.M.S. WIVERN off Plymouth, 1865  
 (Image# NH 71211, Photo courtesy of Naval History & Heritage Command)  
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10. H.M.S. WIVERN in the Channel,  
ILN, 27 October 1866 
(Author’s Collection)  
                                           
11. Coles Turret with MLR 
ILN, 2 December 1871 
(Author’s Collection)  
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12. Combined arms demonstration: ‘Sham Fight’ at Dover with covering fire for 
an invasion force provided by H.M.S. ROYAL SOVEREIGN (on the left) and         
H.M.S. SCORPION, ILN 10 April 1869 
(Author’s Collection) 
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13. Nordenfelt gun for defence against torpedo boats,    
     circa 1880 (Author’s Collection)  
 
                                           
14.  A refitted H.M.S. WIVERN at Portsmouth, 1880    
(Image# NH 65901, Photo courtesy of Naval History & Heritage Command)  
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15. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill  
repaint Britannia, 1885 
 (Author’s Collection)   
 
 
16. A refitted H.M.S. SCORPION at Bermuda, Circa 1900   
(Author’s Collection) 
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17. The hulk of the WIVERN departs Hong Kong for the breakers                             
                                              13 March 1923  
Richard Cox Collection, courtesy of Miguel Sehested Zambras , 7seasvessels.com  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
  Naval Weapons and Power Projection:  The Laird Rams on Foreign Station     
                                                       1874-1883 
    
     Following the death of Palmerston in 1865, the Royal Navy endured two 
decades of limited budgets imposed by both Conservative and Liberal 
governments determined to restrict the costs of Empire following the economic 
downturns of the 1870s and 1880s.  During these years, which Oscar Parkes 
described as the ‗Dark Ages of the Victorian Navy‘, warship design and 
construction slowed due to budget limitations, and confusion wrought by rapid 
changes in heavy guns, armour, and machinery.1186  Despite the incremental 
approach to new construction, the Royal Navy was fully engaged in the role of 
deterrence.  The defensive aspects of this deterrent mission applied not only to 
the more routine stations of the Royal Navy, but also to the more remote but 
strategically important bases far from European waters.  Notwithstanding the 
limited budgets and distance from repair facilities in Britain, the British squadrons 
beyond the Suez and the Channel remained abreast of the latest changes in new 
weapons and the evolution of tactics.   
     In the face of evolving threats, commanders of these foreign stations adapted 
existing ships for the defence of Britain‘s outermost strategic positions.  The 
Admiralty made do with the warships available, and experimented constantly with 
modifications to those ships with an eye on improving capabilities.  This time of 
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innovation and resourcefulness led to the adaptations of existing weapons and 
platforms in order to maintain a forward presence.  Armaments technology during 
the 1870s and 1880s was punctuated with lags, as new weapons such as the 
self-propelled torpedo, the improved breechloader, rockets, and the machine gun 
promised a redefinition of naval warfare.  Armaments had to undergo 
modifications to incorporate micro innovations which would later become the 
fulfilled promise of the new technologies.   
     In the 1870s and 1880s, first-generation ironclads were fitted with a mixed lot 
of old and new, creating a bewildering array of inventions which transformed 
some of these warships into floating testbeds of new technology.  Ironclads no 
longer suitable for front line service in home waters or the Mediterranean, were 
remade into armoured guardians to deter would-be aggressors further afield at 
the outposts of the Empire.  Small turret ships, such as the Scorpion and Wivern, 
not only relieved other ‗sea-going‘ warships for more urgent tasks, they remained 
on hand for defensive operations and were ready to attack an enemy coast in the 
event of war.1187   
     Assignment of the Laird rams to Bermuda and Hong Kong placed two 
valuable ironclads at key installations and near the thresholds of two separate 
continents.  Coal yards, stores warehouses, magazines, and repair facilities were 
vital for the maintenance of a modern navy.  Armoured warships provided a 
degree of security at modest cost.  Their arrival on colonial stations marked a 
development in the layered defence of Britain‘s military springboards. 
     By 1880, the dry docks and the turret ironclads merged into a symbiotic 
relationship which permitted the Royal Navy to retain superiority beyond 
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European waters.  These installations, and their assigned forces, would help 
determine the ability to project British naval and military power at key points in 
Asia and North America in the event of hostilities.  This deterrence at the edge of 
Empire was possible because Bermuda and Hong Kong had the right mix of 
assets.   
     This chapter examines the expansion of colonial dockyard infrastructure, the 
reemergence of the Russian threat, the development of naval intelligence, and 
the advantages and limitations of the Laird rams during their middle years in 
service.  A secondary feature of the chapter focuses upon the roles these 
warships played in the Royal Navy‘s response to the technological challenges 
and tactical shortcomings of the 1870s and 1880s.   
 
Scorpion and the Bermuda Dockyard 
 
     In the early 1870s, the three ironclads of the ‗Inshore Defence Squadron‘, the 
Scorpion, and the smaller Viper and Vixen, were periodically exercised at sea.  
These exercises occurred rarely as the ships suffered problems with manning 
and mechanical malfunctions.1188  During a drill in April 1873, the Scorpion 
experienced defective boiler safety valves and was stopped almost immediately 
after weighing anchor.1189  The ironclad also suffered the effects of corrosion on 
internal and topside iron surfaces and a repair was deemed necessary.  To both 
improve her performance and avoid a total refit, her heavy masts and spars were 
removed and boilers were overhauled.  The store rooms and cabins aft had to be 
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cleared away to repair and paint the rusting iron hull frames below the water line.    
As a cost-saving measure, the store rooms and the cabins were not reinstalled 
as the ship was assigned to harbour and coastal defence duties and would likely 
not cruise far afield.1190  Refit of the Scorpion created a more streamlined 
defender capable of employing her turret guns with greater effect after the clutter 
associated with a sailing cruiser had been removed.  Local naval authorities took 
necessary steps to maintain a degree of readiness without exhausting limited 
budgets.  This was a sensible move as the iron ships at Bermuda appeared to 
have suffered advanced corrosion in the warm wet climate.   
     The problem of suitable coal stocks continued to influence naval operations at 
Bermuda.  The British press had stated that the supply of coal from Nova Scotia 
‗gives us an overwhelming advantage over any European combatant who might 
endeavour to cripple our Atlantic trade‘, but that advantage was only a short term 
benefit.  Poor quality coal had damaged the Scorpion‟s boilers and sentenced 
her to frequent care of the dockyard.1191  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the use of inferior coals continued until 1887, when cleaner burning Welsh coal 
was ordered for Her Majesty‘s warships except when supplies were not 
available.1192  The need for economy and the requirement to maintain fuel stocks 
meant that supplies of cleaner burning Welsh anthracite could not always be 
maintained.     
     Weather was an additional factor and the Bermuda dockyard was particularly 
susceptible to tidal surges.  On 28 August 1878, an Atlantic gale damaged the 
crucial floating dock when the Bermuda was lifted by the storm surge and 
rammed into the breakwater. The dock had been careened for repairs but with 
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the pending arrival of the storm, it was temporarily ‗flooded down‘ by filling her 
with water in an effort to limit damage.  For generations of Bermudians, the sight 
of the dock sinking without a ship awaiting repair, was the sign a hurricane was 
imminent.  The Bermuda was pumped out and salvaged by crews detailed from 
the warships on station, and the dockyard workers reassigned to repair the 
floating dry dock.1193  In late August 1880, the island base was struck by another 
severe hurricane, but the floating dock ‗remained immovable‘ as the Scorpion 
was inside, keeping the great structure in place at her berth.1194        
     Suitable labour at Bermuda was difficult to acquire.  Convicts had been 
utilized to build the naval base at Ireland Island beginning in 1823, yet the last of 
the criminal labourers had departed by 1863.1195  Royal Marines were 
occasionally used on work details at the dockyard but it became ‗evidently 
impossible‘ to rely on Marine contingents.  Their tasks were dependent on the 
needs of the service, and one duty was to help man the ships of the reserve 
squadron when those ships were required.  Workers were requested from the 
Halifax dockyard to help fill the vacancies left by the Marines, but during 
emergencies replacements could not be had from Nova Scotia.  Available Halifax 
workers had occasionally been brought to Bermuda on warships and carried out 
required work during the Canadian winters. When the Marines were needed to 
argument the crews of British warships during times of crisis, Halifax also had 
need of their dockyard men.  As the Royal Navy readied for conflict, the labour 
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shortage on Bermuda became more pressing.1196  Marines were to assist with 
manning the Scorpion, Viper and Vixen, with approximately 300 officers and men 
(including some seamen from the guard ship, Terror) required to round out the 
complements of these three seagoing ironclads.1197  At other times, health issues 
prevented the shuttling of skilled civilian manpower between the dockyards of the 
North American station.  On one occasion in 1880, a detail signed on at Halifax 
to work on the floating dock at Bermuda but after labouring a short time, many 
became ill and had to be invalided home.1198 
     Bermuda was the key link in the chain of British dockyards and military bases 
in the New World.  Halifax, Bermuda, and the Bahamas were referred to as the 
‗guardians‘ of the Gulf Stream, ‗freighted…with the exports of half a 
continent‘.1199  Bermuda was at the centre of that ring of bases, and the dry dock 
was the crucial component.  That structure, the then largest floating dock in the 
world, had another advantage.  The chambers built into the Bermuda could be 
individually filled or pumped out, giving the floating dock ‗a self-careening 
capability‘.1200  An adjacent addition near the floating dry dock, was the massive 
sheerlegs built by James Taylor & Company of Birkenhead.  Shipped and 
installed at the naval base in 1875, this 195 ton structure augmented the heavy 
repair capabilities of that mid-Atlantic station.1201  A photograph, circa 1878, 
provided a rare glimpse of a Bermuda ironclad, likely the Scorpion, moored under 
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the sheers for an extensive alteration:  masts removed, new funnel fitted, and 
canvas awning rigged where the aft turret once stood.  The armourclad had 
probably received her new boilers and this stern view revealed her riding high 
without her earlier fittings, turrets, and guns.1202        
     Despite the dockyard improvements, Admiral J. E. Commerell, a former 
commander of the Scorpion, did not favour Bermuda and termed it ‗one of the 
most tempestuous spots in the world‘.  Commerell warned that an ironclad that 
suffered a flooded compartment in the winter months would have a ‗lively time of 
it‘ waiting offshore for the right conditions of wind and tide to get over the bar and 
into the dry dock.  He also pointed out the necessity of bringing labourers from 
Britain to repair the dock and to conduct the necessary upkeep of chipping and 
painting the ‗enormously expensive‘ structure.  The Admiral feared the health of 
the workmen shipped from Britain would ‗surely break down‘ adding to the costs 
of maintaining the dry dock.  Despite these misgivings, Bermuda would remain 
the key facility for the Royal Navy in the Western Hemisphere until a large dry 
dock was built at Halifax in the late 1880s.1203        
     Condemned in the British press in 1876 for being ‗failures as seagoing 
vessels‘, the three ironclads ‗stowed away‘ at Bermuda were overhauled in 
anticipation of service in local waters.1204  To refer to these ships as ‗failures‘ 
discounts another factor that influenced their construction.  When launched in the 
mid-1860s, these ships had armour as thick as that of the Warrior, although they 
were armed with few heavy guns.  Despite being poor sea boats, they had 
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another advantage.  The Scorpion, and the smaller experimental ironclad rams, 
Viper, and Vixen, were also capable of steaming up the St. Lawrence as far as 
Montreal to provide heavy naval firepower should the United States threaten 
open hostilities.  The Viper and Vixen had the additional advantage of shorter 
length, beam, and draught to permit the transverse of the locks at Montreal if 
required, into Lake Ontario should tensions with Washington reoccur.1205   
     The shoals, difficult currents, and slender channels of Bermuda made the 
Atlantic fortress the ideal base for the rams.1206  An American geographer 
observed that the main shipping channel (St. George‘s) was so narrow ‗that one 
could easily toss a biscuit to either shore‘.1207  In Bermuda, the speed of the more 
modern man-of-war was not a necessity.  Here, a warship‘s position and 
accuracy of fire were the determining factors in a conflict with any enemy willing 
to hazard an attack.  A ram would have an ample opportunity to fire on, and 
crash into, an enemy vessel threading its way between the shoals.  Bermuda 
was, according to Richard Gould, ‗one of the few places in Britain‘s overseas 
empire where geography, in the form of surrounding reefs and limited, narrow 
channels, favoured the use of steam-powered rams‘.1208            
     The geographical advantages, both in terms of steaming distance to the 
eastern United States and Canada, as well as the suitability for defence, were 
reasons for the improvements made to the Bermuda naval dockyard in the late 
1860s.  Although the 1866 Fenian raids into Canada from the United States had 
sparked another crisis in relations with America, the raids failed to provoke a 
                                            
1205
 Hansard, 6 April 1865, 178, cc 846. 
1206
 Our Power by Sea‘, Liverpool Mercury, 4 February 1876, 7. 
1207
 Charles L. Bristol, ‗Notes on the Bermudas‘, Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 33 
(1901), 243. 
1208
 Richard A. Gould. ‗The Archaeology of HMS Vixen, an early ironclad ram in Bermuda‘. The 
International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 20 (1991), 153. 
 300 
wider conflict.  Washington was more absorbed with Reconstruction and 
westward expansion than with supporting grievances the Irish immigrants held 
against the British Empire.  With the South subdued, Washington dismantled 
most of its navy and scaled back its army for missions more suited for a home 
guard. By 1867, Prime Minister Disraeli wrote: ‗The Americans have no navy & 
not an ironclad except for coast defence‘.1209   
     The Washington Treaty, signed on 8 May 1871, and the subsequent Geneva 
arbitrations, resolved the Alabama claims and removed one of the last remaining 
points of contention between Britain and the United States from the Civil War.1210  
Britain again turned towards Europe as tensions between old rivals resumed.  
The French defeat at the hands of the German Confederation in the war of 1870-
1871, removed France as a major international naval threat for almost a 
decade.1211  Britain was occupied with propping up the weakening Ottoman and 
Chinese Empires during the later nineteenth century, and this placed Russia as a 
rival to British interests in the Near East and Asia.1212  Russian expansionism in 
Central Asia was restrained somewhat by the British Army in India, and 
containing them in eastern Asia was ‗of the first importance in the Royal Navy‘s 
order of priorities on the China Station‘.1213  Russia was not the only concern for 
British naval stations.  Despite the decline of the United States as a rival, the 
Fenian threat did not completely subside and by the early 1880s, Bermuda was 
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under surveillance by Fenian agents planning an attack against key facilities at 
the base.1214   
 
Overseas dockyards and Imperial Defence 
        
       By the mid-nineteenth century, the Royal Navy was in high demand to 
protect British interests around the globe regardless of the fewer warships and 
men available.  Despite the expansion of trade, the Royal Navy continued to 
seek ways to maintain their missions under a restricted budget.  Merchants, 
missionaries, and adventurers invariably put pressure on colonial authorities who 
in turn, put pressure on the Foreign Office to provide protection, and the 
Admiralty struggled to meet demand.  One British admiral complained: ‗We are 
doing or endeavouring to do much more than our force is sufficient for.  It is 
fortunate that the world is not larger, for there is no other limit to the service of 
the fleets‘.1215  The pressure had been building for decades.  By 1861, the China 
and East Indies Station had become the largest station outside home waters.  
With 66 British warships steaming through those seas, another 15 cruised the 
distant waters of the Pacific, and nine more warships protected Australia.1216  By 
1880, Britain‘s share of merchant steamers had climbed above half of the world‘s 
total.  Despite this advance, by the end of the 1880s, sailing ships still carried 
about 25 per cent of global waterborne freight.1217  Steamers and clippers 
needed warships of differing capabilities to protect trade routes. 
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       The dry dock was a vital component for any major base and absolutely 
essential to keep an ironclad on a foreign station.  The naval dockyard could 
ready a fleet for operations and return damaged vessels to sea.  During the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the hulls of the few Prussian ironclads were 
badly fouled due to limited dry dock space, and a young Alfred Von Tirpitz was 
‗indignant‘ at the inability to engage the French fleet blockading the German 
coasts.1218  Britain made plans to defend her key bases, but an emphasis was 
placed on attacking those of her potential enemies.  Dry docks attracted 
particular interest as targets of enemy vulnerability.1219  Infrastructure was 
necessary for power projection and power sustainability as ‗only fleets with local 
bases for supply, repair and concentration could maintain command of key sea 
areas‘.1220   
     Skilled dockyard workers were almost always needed by the naval 
establishments and the manpower problem was a persistent one for Bermuda.  
Costs escalated for overseas work and in 1878, when skilled dockyard men were 
urgently needed on the North American station, men from the Royal Dockyard at 
Chatham refused to sign on to work on the dry dock in Bermuda for 5s 6d a day.  
It was only after the Admiralty offered 8s per day that a Portsmouth work force of 
twenty men, led by a foreman of shipwrights, sign on.  The promise of work at the 
nearby yards proved too strong for most skilled men to exchange the pull of 
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home for work in a distant and unfamiliar climate.1221  Yet, it was this work that 
made the island more than a stopover.  Bermudians knew the Royal Navy 
provided not only their protection but, also, their livelihood: ‗of course it is as a 
naval station that Bermuda exists…but for this the Imperial Government would 
have little use or regard for her‘.1222         
     During the middle Victorian years, Shanghai was the epicentre of Western 
economic efforts in China, but Hong Kong emerged as the ‗most important port-
of-call for intercontinental shipping lines and for all sorts of vessels employed in 
coastal shipping‘.1223  Unlike the fortress-base of Bermuda, Hong Kong was an 
international focal point for ships engaged in regional shipping and a centre of 
eastern trade ‗carried on for the benefit of the mother country and the British 
taxpayer‘.1224       
     The main dry docks at Hong Kong were a dual use naval and commercial 
facility, built with government backed loans issued in 1864 and 1866.  Completed 
in 1867, the Whampoa dry docks, located in Aberdeen Bay (also referred to as 
the Lamont and Hope dry docks), was the largest in the colony.  The only other 
dry dock was at Kowloon, built after the Whampoa facility, but this dock was too 
small to take in an ironclad for repair.  The Royal Navy made frequent use of the 
Whampoa dry docks, including the then flagship of the China Squadron, Iron 
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Duke, after she ran aground near Shanghai in May of 1879 and required 
extensive repair of her damaged hull plates.1225 
     The Hong Kong facilities were occasionally under scrutiny.  In the House of 
Commons, Mr. E. Jenkins, the M.P. from Dundee, criticized the Navy for the 
expense of maintaining the commodore of the naval yard, whose duties 
consisted of ‗walking about with a telescope under his arm and swearing at the 
men‘.1226  This perception was corrected, (by M.P. James Reed), as skilled 
carpenters from the fleet were regularly detailed ashore to assist with repair work 
in the dockyard.  The commodore was actively engaged in his duties as the 
senior officer of the port, and the reality was quite different from the blithe 
existence imagined by Jenkins.  Nevertheless, the inference was quite clear and 
British governments of the 1870s and 1880s were determined to cut the costs of 
naval facilities wherever they could.1227 
     On 20 January 1882, the Admiralty reacted quickly to a dispatch sent from the 
Colonial Office.  That office had previously received a copy of a dispatch (dated 
31 December 1881), from the British Consul in Philadelphia, which described a 
Fenian plot to blow up the floating dry dock in Bermuda.  The plot was at an 
advanced stage of preparation but the British response was slow.  Consul R. C. 
Clipperton had not sent warning to the Governor of Bermuda until he received a 
follow-on report that detailed the plot ‗being matured‘.1228  Despite Clipperton‘s 
adherence to procedural protocol, secret correspondence concerning the threat 
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to Bermuda moved through Whitehall with sufficient speed once in the hands of 
officials in London.  On 26 January, the Admiralty sent a priority letter to the 
Foreign Office urging them to send instructions for immediate action to the consul 
in Philadelphia.  The Admiralty requested that Clipperton not wait for routine 
mechanisms of official correspondence catch up to, and incrementally approve 
his actions, rather he was requested ‗to communicate at once with the Governor 
of Bermuda in regard to the alleged intentions‘ and to forward ‗copies of all such 
communications to the Governor direct‘.1229  The Foreign Office complied with the 
request and on 28 January, a cable was sent to Philadelphia instructing the 
consul to relay a warning to the Governor of Bermuda.  
     A coordinated response was implemented and threat information was 
communicated to the commander of the Bermuda dockyard, the Attorney 
General for the colony, customs officers, and colonial police.  To avoid detection 
on the frequently used mail steamers from New York, Fenian agents had booked 
passage to Bermuda on sailing vessels from ports in the southern United States.  
After the plot unraveled, the Fenians booked return passage on the New York 
bound steamships as the authorities closed in.  The Bermuda dragnet found no 
bombs, but several suspect local men were found to have possible links to the 
visitors.  These men had worked at the dockyard and suddenly quit to hurriedly 
book passage for New York.  In light of these occurrences, the Attorney General 
and Chief of Police sent a military detail aboard one passenger ship under the 
guise of searching for deserters.  The search did not discover any incendiaries, 
but it did reveal Fenian newspapers in the baggage of some suspects.  In 
response to the threat additional ammunition was issued, and guards at the forts 
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and dockyard were doubled.1230  The people of Bermuda had been forewarned 
and cautioned by newspaper reports that they ‗should be well on their guard‘ 
against the ‗cowardly‘ attempts to commit the bomb attacks.1231  The increased 
alertness was effective, as ‗no stranger can walk about the place without 
attracting as much attention as if in an English country village‘.1232  Word filtered 
back to the Fenian plot leaders in New York: they had been found out.  
     Had it carried, a bomb attack against the floating dock would have achieved 
very limited damage.  Archaeological surveys made of the remains at Spanish 
Point, Bermuda from the 1980s and 1990s, indicated that the dock would have 
been a tough target.  Despite attempts to scrap the structure when it was sold off 
after 37 years in service, the lower third of the floating dock remained where it 
went ashore in 1908 and continues today as a ‗testimonial to the robust nature of 
Victorian-era engineering and construction‘.1233       
 
The North American and West Indian Squadron and the Russian War Scare 
of 1877-1878 
 
     Anglo-Russian tensions over the possessions of the declining Ottoman 
Empire had been increasing steadily in the mid-1870s.  As had been the case in 
1863 during the Polish insurrection, in early 1877 Russian warships were at 
anchor in New York and San Francisco awaiting orders.  At San Francisco, the 
Russian squadron received coal and supplies.  Additionally, some ships were 
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dry-docked in anticipation of a long sea voyage away from a friendly port.  The 
Russian squadron at San Francisco was rumoured to have set the British North 
Pacific naval station at Esquimalt, on Canada‘s coast of British Columbia, as a 
prime target in order to seize valuable supplies of ammunition and coal.1234  
When the Russian man-of-war Kraysser unexpectedly steamed into Esquimalt a 
year later on 20 February 1878, the inhabitants of the naval base feared war had 
been declared between Britain and Russia, as the decks of the Kraysser seemed 
to have been cleared for action.  The appearance of the Russian warship was not 
a hostile act, but the result of storm damage received after she departed San 
Francisco, en route to the Russian Pacific coast.  After obtaining permission to 
effect repairs at the Canadian base, a Royal Navy corvette escorted the visitor to 
sea as both exchanged the requisite military salutes.1235 
     The purchase of several fast merchant steamers from U.S. shipbuilders for 
the Russian Imperial Navy in 1878 marked a return to the debates over neutrality 
and the threat of commerce raiding on the Atlantic by would-be auxiliaries.  
Funds to pay for the ships were raised from subscribers across Russia, and the 
ships were dubbed the ‗Volunteer Fleet‘.  A Philadelphia broker named Wharton 
Barker was the official owner of the steamers, but it was reported in the American 
press that he only served as a blind for the real owners, the Russian 
Government.  In a revisit of the fine points of neutrality concerning the 
Confederate warships built in Britain during the Civil War, the debate relating to 
intended use and intended ownership resurfaced.  The steamers were not armed 
in the United States, their main guns were made in the German city of Essen by 
Krupp, and intended to be fitted after the ships arrived in Russia.  This shuffle 
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made U.S. officials nervous as William Cramp & Sons, Philadelphia shipbuilder 
of three of the four ships, noted (likely by Charles H. Cramp) that American 
neutrality laws were so strict, they prevented shipbuilders from constructing ships 
for foreign governments in times of peace, ‗let alone in times of war‘.1236  The 
issues of contractual obligations and the enforcement of the envisioned neutrality 
came to the fore as it had during the building of the Laird rams, and the New 
York Herald warned Barker‘s purchase of the steamers, State of California, 
Columbus, and Saratoga, had brought the ‗Washington government face to face 
with the great question of international duty toward the two great nations‘, Britain 
and Russia. 1237              
     Barker was well positioned to facilitate the purchase of the American ships for 
Russia as he was a personal friend of Captain Leonid Pavlovich Semetschkin, 
the Czar‘s naval emissary chosen to arrange the purchases. 1238   
Although not armed, these ships were intended as auxiliary cruisers.  The 
American press opined that, if armed and sent to attack merchant ships or 
colonial property of another power, that country ‗could claim damages from the 
United States‘.1239  Barker arranged a contract with Cramp to build a fourth 
steamer for the Russian fleet, and was also responsible for purchasing guns, 
ammunition and supplies for the ships. Additionally, Barker was the American 
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representative of Baring Brothers, although that arrangement was later described 
by the London financiers as ‗not intimate‘. 1240     
     Some American shipbuilders remarked that the Russians were having 
engines built in Britain for several of their new warships under construction in the 
Baltic, but this argument fell flat.  The British press noted that Barker had 
obtained funds for his ships, via Baring Brothers in London, yet Britain could 
respond by suspending exports and payments with the announcement of 
hostilities.1241  Payments would have likely been stopped had Barings been 
aware of Barker‘s secret agreement to provide additional guns and ammunition 
for the volunteer cruisers to take on board after departing U.S. Waters.  One 
arming location later identified, was Santo Domingo.1242  The legal precedent of 
the Alabama claims was not lost on the American public, and the British press 
noted that U.S. Secretary of State William H. Evants had served as a U.S. legal 
advisor during the arbitration of the Alabama claims at Geneva.  He was likely to 
uphold a strict interpretation of American neutrality laws and not ‗suffer them to 
be neglected‘.1243 
     The activity had not gone unobserved.  The New York Times noted most of 
the Royal Navy‘s North American and West Indies Squadron had assembled at 
Bermuda by the first week in April 1878 where they ‗were constantly at ball 
practice‘.1244  Increased readiness at the island base was in response to Russian 
attempts to purchase the commerce raiders in America.  British authorities were 
confident in their preparations and acknowledged that although a Russian 
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steamer converted into a commerce raider might have initial success on the 
Atlantic, that success would be short lived: ‗We might have some trouble at first‘ 
yet the Russians were ‗more likely to fall victims to our cruisers than to inflict 
damage on our merchantmen‘.1245            
     At Bermuda the pace of activity increased as the ships in reserve were slated 
for immediate overhaul.  The Scorpion was to receive two new boilers from 
Britain, and the small ironclad rams Viper and Vixen were also in the hands of 
the dockyard, in preparation for active service. 1246  Armoured warships with 
heavy guns, when combined with torpedoes, provided a defence against any 
naval enemy.  Bermuda received a supply of torpedo stores in the summer of 
1876 and these weapons were held in readiness for defensive or offensive 
operations.  Additionally, Halifax had received a shipment of torpedo related 
supplies that year.1247  These weapons, when augmented by the refitted 
warships, allowed Britain a renewed capability against the handful of cruisers 
Russia could deploy into the Atlantic.   
     Britain had taken steps to provide key positions in the New World with 
sufficient manpower to shuttle to other locations, should need arise. This was 
especially true if the Royal Marines were needed aboard the warships.1248  
Bermuda was home to 2146 soldiers, Halifax had a garrison of 1831 stationed at 
that base, and the British Army had another 2000 soldiers available for duty in 
the West Indies.  Several years later, one American visitor to Bermuda remarked 
on the number of fortifications positioned at key points around the fortress colony 
and that ‗red-coats [sic] and marines should meet you on every street corner‘.  
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The essayist observed that Bermuda was the ‗rendezvous‘ of the British fleet in 
that area of the Atlantic, and the fleet was the reason the base held vast 
quantities of arms and ammunition.1249   
      While warships conducted gunnery practice and troopships shuttled 
replacements and reinforcements to Bermuda and other points of the Empire, the 
great Atlantic storehouse was supplied by the visiting schooner or hired steamer.  
As Whitehall prepared for a possible war with Russia, British merchantmen were 
contracted to supply naval bases and garrisons.  The steamer Lady Tredegar 
was chartered by the Admiralty to carry the two new boilers destined for the 
Scorpion, along with 80 tons of provisions, 50 tons of shot and shell, and another 
200 tons of ammunition for the army garrison and the naval forces at the 
archipelago.1250  These shipments augmented the stockpile sent out in March of 
that year (1878) aboard the British Queen.  That steamer had transported a 
cargo of shot and shell to the island station, along with a new 18-ton gun.1251   
    Americans were anxious over the Russian naval presence on their Eastern 
and Western coasts, and newspaper reporters clamoured for details.  Russian 
agents visited the main U.S. ports to obtain data on steamships available for 
service and likely intended for long cruises.  As Russian officers were followed by 
British spies and hounded by the American press, the Czar‘s officers complained 
that the determined reporters gave them the most annoyance.1252  The Russian 
need for secrecy was not helped by public pronouncements and overseas travel.  
One American representative of the Russian government was New England 
merchant ship captain, H. W. Hunt.  Visiting Dublin, Cork, and other places in 
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Ireland in the spring of 1878 prior to his return voyage to Boston from St. 
Petersburg, Hunt opined that Russia was ‗well prepared for the struggle‘.1253  The 
Russians had taken steps to forward deploy over 40 officers and 600 crewmen 
on the steamer Cimbia to the American coast of Maine.  Once there, they were 
under orders to standby for a short voyage to Philadelphia when the American-
built ships were ready to sail.1254   
     The sloop H.M.S. Sirius patrolled off the coast of Maine, ready in the event 
the new Russian auxiliaries steamed out from American harbours after a 
declaration of war.  Other Royal Navy warships in Halifax and Bermuda were 
also held ready to cruise off the eastern seaboard of the United States should 
tensions with Russia have escalated.1255  One British newspaper editor lamented 
that Britain had relied too much on large armoured warships ‗as with our 
ironclads we have in this branch of service put our eggs in too few and too large 
baskets‘.  The editor went on to advocate the chartering of Cunard and P & O 
steamers to serve as auxiliary cruisers in order to search for Russian commerce 
raiders, yet this concept was not widely accepted as Britain had, ‗vessels enough 
to guard her coasts and to scour the seas‘.1256             
     By November 1878, tensions had abated, and two companies of Royal 
Engineers at Bermuda were ordered to prepare for transport to Gibraltar and 
Malta.1257  By late July 1879, the refurbished steamers, State of California, 
Columbus, and Saratoga arrived in Russian waters.  Joining the American built 
Zabiaka, they were renamed as the Russian vessels, Yevropa, Aziya, and Afrika.  
                                            
1253
 ‗Russian Cruisers in America‘, Somerset County Gazette, 1 June 1878, 7. 
1254
 ‗The Russian Cruisers‘ NYT, 13 September 1878, 1. 
1255
 Strakhovsky, ‗Russia‘s Privateering Projects of 1878‘, Journal of Modern History, 7. (Mar., 
1935), 34, ‗Military and Naval‘, York Herald, 1 June 1878, 12.  
1256
  No Subject, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 10 June 1878, 2. 
1257
 ‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 9 November 1878, 2. 
 313 
On 31 July, Czar Alexander II and his official party visited the Yevropa, where 
Barker was awarded the Order of St. Stanislas.1258 
 
The China Station and the Russian War Scare of 1877-1878 
 
     In 1877-1878, London made political overtures to halt the Russo-Turkish 
conflict in Bulgaria but when those proved unsuccessful, Britain began to 
mobilize.  The Royal Navy purchased new vessels, including torpedo boats, and 
British press opined that a naval war with Russia would be ‗a torpedo fight‘.  Four 
new vessels under construction in British commercial shipyards were acquired by 
the Admiralty, including three broadside ironclads intended for Turkey, and one 
armoured turret ship intended for Brazil.  The precedent set by the seizure and 
acquisition of the Laird rams in 1863-1864, was utilized by the British government 
as a method of denying ironclads to a potential rival via a third party.  
Additionally, the seizures served as a means to expand the number of armoured 
warships available for the Royal Navy in a time of crisis.1259   
     The British Army was also preparing for deployment and the Times claimed 
that although Britain was ‗chiefly a maritime power, we should yet be able to 
strike a telling blow with our Army‘.1260  In Hong Kong the commander of the 
China Station, Vice Admiral Charles Hillyar, made ready for action in March of 
1878.  On 4 April, the flagship H.M.S. Audacious, with the gunboat Magpie in 
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tow, steamed north ‗under sealed orders‘.  One local newspaper speculated that 
they were bound for an anchorage just outside Vladivostok, but the British 
warships only traveled as far as Yokohama, undoubtedly keeping an eye on 
Russian activities there.1261 
     With most of the fleet away, Commodore G. W. Watson, the commander of 
the Hong Kong naval base, took steps to ready the colony for defence.  As a 
precaution, the mastless hulk Victor Emmanuel was towed from her moorings to 
a position closer to the naval base where she could provide ‗for the protection of 
that establishment‘.1262  The immediate danger passed quickly enough and one 
week later, Victor Emmanuel was returned to her usual anchorage in mid-
channel.  The armoured frigate, Shannon, arrived to refuel and reprovision as did 
the steam corvettes, Diamond and Ruby.  They were soon off to the north to 
reinforce other British warships in the area.  The corvette H.M.S. Charybdis was 
at the dry dock, but she was out and on her way after only two weeks at the 
facility.  Hong Kong demonstrated its value as a logistics hub and repair depot on 
the China coast:  far enough from the main Russian base at Vladivostok, but 
near enough to provide supply and maintenance facilities.        
     Hong Kong utilized her available resources to expand defences but these 
were not adequate for a colony of such importance.  A main issue of concern 
was manpower.  With the onset of the crisis, the guns of one battery were to be 
worked by veterans called back into service.  These men from the dockyard 
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police force were to help man some of the cannon.  They were ‗old artillery men 
and all know something of great guns‘.1263    
     The versatile steam launches provided the wherewithal to deploy mines, and 
had the requisite stealth for night torpedo attacks against enemy men-of-war.  
These were not merely courier vessels for the fleet, but first commands and ‗an 
important part in the education and training of several generations of naval 
officers‘.1264  The Victor Emmanuel fitted her steam launch as a spar-equipped 
torpedo boat, and gunboats usually assigned to patrol area waters, were also 
issued with spar torpedoes as, ‗all the Russian men-of-war are fitted with 
them‘.1265   
     A letter dated 19 July 1878, from Commodore Watson identified the dry docks 
and reservoir as key facilities requiring defence.  The naval base was protected 
by the Victor Emmanuel and her limited battery.  Four 68-pounders had been 
positioned at the gunports to augment her usual armament of two 68-pounder 
muzzleloading smoothbores.1266  Watson was clear in his definition of priorities 
and named the reservoir as a major interest of the colony, with the dry docks as 
a strategic concern of the Imperial Government.  To provide more security at the 
narrow bodies of water around the colony, some approaches were protected with 
booms and chains, in order to free up skilled gunners for the more crucial fortified 
positions.1267  The navy would defend the docks, naval base, and coal yard with 
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the limited ships, weapons, and personnel remaining on station, and assist the 
Royal Engineers and the garrison force in defending positions valued by the 
Colonial administration.   
 
The Wivern to the Far East 
 
       The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to a decline in Russian overland 
trade with China.  The primary route to Beijing from central Russia, wound down 
Siberian rivers, and across Lake Baikal to the edge of the Czar‘s empire.  From 
1879-1880, Russian expansionism in Asia contributed to a border dispute with 
China over control of Kuldja (also known as Kuldzha), a frontier town some 100 
miles southwest of Lake Balkhash.  Overland paths were key smuggling routes 
between the Great Celestial Empire and Imperial Russia, with one route snaking 
over the steppes and travelling through the desert to Kuldja, eventually linking to 
the port of Canton.1268   
     Russia‘s response to border tensions with China was marked with a steady 
buildup of military and naval forces to Asia.  Vladivostok was vulnerable to 
Chinese troops across the Amur River and the Russian Government responded 
to this threat by chartering ships to convey 1500 men to this strategic port.  
Russia also made arrangements with Japan to supply her ships with coal and 
provisions.  Six torpedo boats were dispatched to Vladivostok to defend that port, 
freeing the Czar‘s Pacific cruisers for offensive operations.  Russia prepared to 
blockade Chinese ports to counter their preponderance of ground forces during 
these tensions, and warships were rushed to the Far East to give Russia, as a 
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British newspaper noted, ‗a naval influence in the Pacific superior to any she has 
ever enjoyed in that quarter of the globe‘.1269 Coal stockpiles were increased at 
Vladivostok and plans for new floating docks at the naval base were put forward, 
‗in order not to be entirely dependent on Japanese courtesy‘.1270  The Russian 
build up was followed closely in the British press: ‗Russia, free from the 
entanglements of Constantinople and Merv, will be ready to carry fire and sword 
to the pagodas of Pekin‘ [sic].1271  China stepped up military preparations on the 
Pacific frontier and a Chinese spy was reportedly captured near Vladivostok with 
a map of the city.1272  
     The limited numbers of Russian merchant ships available for voyages to the 
Far East were loaded with government supplies bound for the Pacific as 
preparations for the defence of Vladivostok were increased.  Convicts (referred to 
as ‗The Unfortunates‘ by the local civilian population in Siberia) were also sent 
out to improve fortifications in the thinly-populated district described by one writer 
as, ‗a forbidden and mysterious land‘.1273  
     Russia dispatched modern vessels, including the ironclad frigate, General 
Admiral, to Vladivostok in order to augment forces already in those waters,  
which included the armoured frigate Minin.  The Minin was the first Russian 
ironclad to arrive in Asia, and her armament was considered superior to that of 
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the Iron Duke.1274  Russian ironclads and cruisers were fitted to carry torpedo 
launches ‗constructed after the most approved models‘, and the Minin was 
assigned three.1275  More men-of-war arrived in Vladivostok, and Russian 
capabilities on land were enhanced with the assignment of marines from these 
warships.  The marines stepped up drill regimen at the fortifications in 
anticipation of the arrival of their big guns from St. Petersburg and seamen 
aboard the Russian warships, ‗were drilled in every way as marines.‘1276  The 
British government was not content to remain idle, and the Wivern was ordered 
to Hong Kong in response to the Czar‘s naval build-up.  Despite this increase in 
Russian activity, the Admiralty was questioned in the British press over its 
decision to send the Wivern to Hong Kong as that port had, ‗little to fear for years 
to come‘ and reportedly, no enemy armoured vessels were stationed in the Far 
East.1277   
     The Wivern had undergone engine tests and minor modifications after she 
arrived at Plymouth on 14 February 1880.1278  The men removed ammunition into 
lighters, and the dockyard workers effected repairs as the ship neared her 
departure time.  The crew went about their duties ‗as requite‘ including cutlass 
drills, cleaning ship, and preparing boats for the voyage to the Far East.1279  A 
photo from this time reveals a ship transformed by extensive refits.  Gone were 
the heavy iron tripod masts and yardarms.  In their place were three light masts 
carrying only fore and aft sails to steady the ship while at sea; the pretence of an 
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actual sailing ability had been abandoned.  The image, taken from the ship‘s 
starboard side, revealed that the earlier telescoping funnel had been replaced by 
a larger, more standard oval-shaped stationary version.  The bulwarks were in 
the up position and the ship was painted white in preparation for her voyage to 
Asia.  A boat was alongside and hooked to a boom forward of the gangway, with 
two other cutters secured to davits on either side of the poop.  Four empty 
crutches were visible amidships, awaiting one of two torpedo boats she would 
obtain at her new homeport.  Positioned around a newly added superstructure 
amidships, forward of the funnel, were bell-mouthed iron ventilators.1280  These, 
combined with the two smaller versions forward on the forecastle, were a far cry 
from the canvass sacks suspended from mast or yardarm utilized in 1865 in an 
attempt to provide increased air flow to the engineering spaces below.1281  The 
raised forecastle and poop were cut back and angled inward towards the deck, 
permitting a greater radius for the turret guns.  Devoid of a jib boom, and fitted 
with only the most rudimentary rigging, the rebuilt Wivern had a less cluttered, 
more rakish look.1282      
     When the Wivern steamed to Hong Kong in 1880, she was to have sailed with 
two 2nd Class torpedo boats aboard.  Her plans indicated that torpedo boats 
were to have been hoisted aboard, one each side of the funnel, at the height of 
the hurricane deck, with ‗torpedo spars‘ stowed amidships for the use of the two 
intended torpedo boats.  These auxiliaries, TBs No. 51 and No. 53, were not 
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embarked as they would have added extra weight during her long voyage out.1283  
The ironclad was also to have sailed with a ‗water heating arrangement‘ which 
would allow the two torpedo boats to quickly get up steam and set off on a 
separate or supporting mission.  This apparatus was not ready when she 
departed Britain, and it was sent forward for loading at Malta.1284  Wivern was 
fitted with a ‗railway‘ on the forecastle, and related handling gear for her 
Whitehead torpedoes, but these weapons were not loaded in the ship on her 
outbound voyage.1285 
     The ironclad was to have been accompanied by the frigate H.M.S. Raleigh, 
but that vessel was required to transport replacement crews to Australia.  As a 
result, the corvette Curacoa was assigned the duty of escorting the turret ship to 
China.1286  However, that corvette was delayed by dockyard repairs at Devonport 
and the Wivern sailed alone on 13 March, bound for Gibraltar.1287  Her 
complement consisted of 13 officers, 34 petty officers, 85 seamen, 16 marines, 
and 4 boys for a total crew of 152 personnel.1288                      
     The Wivern‟s plans were retained at Devonport, and revealed a ship 
incorporating some of the latest weapons in anticipation of her service on the 
China Station.  Twelve Nordenfelt machine guns were carried aboard (only four 
were part of her permanent armament at this stage), with two forward (one on 
each side on the forecastle), two positioned aft of the funnel on the 
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superstructure, two stowed (not ready for immediate use and further aft on the 
superstructure), two stowed on the poop, and four positioned (two on either side 
of the poop) to provide complete coverage of the vessel.  She transported some 
of the stowed guns for other vessels on the China Station and with only 150 
Nordenfelts available for service in the Royal Navy by October 1880, the guns 
were in short supply.  On the poop, a Gatling gun and a rifled 7-pounder gun, 
both on field carriages, were lashed in place, intended for close-in fire support 
and later service ashore, when the Wivern arrived at Hong Kong.1289     
     The 7-pounder was a versatile light artillery piece, suitable for service ashore, 
when mounted on its field carriage, or placed on a small naval carriage and slide 
for boat operations.  Like the slightly larger 9-pounder, these dual-use RML boat 
guns were shipped aboard British men-of-war to provide a landing party with the 
ability to fire a shell over three kilometers when elevated to the maximum.  The 
guns were known to have been stamped with the numbers ‗1° 30‘ when 
manufactured by the Royal Gun factory at Woolwich.  This reminded the gunner 
that the barrel deflected to the right, as all British guns were rifled to be ‗right 
handed‘.  Designed for simple loading and sighting, these guns were recognized 
as ‗weapons of some versatility‘.  With their rugged and portable design, the 
small bore muzzleloaders were in service throughout the Empire as mobile light 
guns with the Royal Horse Artillery and the Royal Navy for over thirty years until 
the end of the century.1290                       
     The Nordenfelt gun was available in multiple variations, but these particular 
versions were four-barreled weapons, capable of shooting a four round volley as 
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rapidly as a crewman could move the charge handle forward to fire, and to the 
rear to reload.1291  This close-in weapon, with its 1-inch shell, was designed to 
counter torpedo boats and deemed of sufficient size to penetrate the light steel 
skin of an attacking craft.  Additionally, the gun was nimble enough to retrain to a 
rapidly shifting target.  The four barrels of each gun were necessary for an 
adequate amount of fire to insure a hit against a fast moving attacker.1292  The 
machine gun, either the Nordenfelt or rival Hotchkiss, was seen as the naval 
weapon of choice for an ironclad to sink a TB during the 1880s.  One Royal Navy 
officer stated: ‗Suffice it to say, that either of these machine guns, if properly 
handled, will render a torpedo-boat attack a service of extreme difficulty and 
danger‘.1293           
     Another feature on the modernized Wivern, was a single wheel, positioned 
immediately forward of the iron conning tower. Within a pace to the port side, 
was the engine room telegraph and speaking tube.  Although the Wivern 
retrained her wheel aft, it was now of only secondary, even tertiary, importance.  
Steering had reached an impasse with the development of the large iron 
steamship and in 1867, John McFarlane Gray invented a steam-powered 
mechanism for the unwieldy Great Eastern to overcome the limitations of manual 
steering.  Gray‘s machine was the first to employ a ‗feed-back‘ system, and 
permitted the large, double and triple wheels familiar to sailing ships to be 
replaced by smaller, single variants positioned forward.1294  With steering located 
at a vantage point forward of the funnel, the need to communicate to the 
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helmsmen aft, thorough shouted commands or by hand signals, was 
eliminated.1295  The steam steering gear was likely manufactured by Forrester & 
Company, (of the Vauxhall Foundry in Liverpool) to Grays patent, as more 
modern ships in the Royal Navy and mercantile service used this device which 
was hailed as, ‗one of the most important of modern inventions connected with 
navigation‘.1296  Although still open to the elements, the ‗bridge‘ of the Wivern 
was marked by an elevated wooden grating where a quartermaster and a detail 
of men could pilot the ship.  With binnacles on either side of this forward edge of 
the superstructure, the ironclad had made another evolutionary step away from 
sail.1297 
     After the Wivern arrived at Gibraltar on 18 March, the crew readied the ship 
for the next leg of her voyage.1298  The following day, as some members of the 
crew were engaged coaling ship and loading stores, the gunner armed one of the 
cutters and trained select men in firing details.  This detail fired dozens of shells, 
and some canister, from the light 7-pounder.  Another weapon, a launcher tube 
designed to fire 24-pound Hale rockets, discharged only two rounds.1299   
     Britain officially adopted the Hale rocket in 1867, replacing the earlier 
guidestick-stabilized Congreve rockets popularized in the American national 
anthem.1300  The Hale 24-pounder was slightly over two feet in length and 
painted red to protect the iron casing from rust.  The most distinctive feature was 
a raised triskelion at the rear of the casing with three vent holes to induce spin 
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when the rocket was fired from its tube.1301  The tube went through several 
iterations and one version employed for shipboard and boat operations, was 
designed by Lieutenant, later First Sea Lord, John Fisher.1302  The rocket, 
referred to as ‗the soul of artillery without the body‘, was an erratic weapon that 
offered the advantage of blast and incendiary capability, but was susceptible to 
damage as the casing was prone to expand or contract when used in climatic 
zones of extreme temperature variations.1303  When utilized on colonial 
campaigns, Hale rockets offered the benefit of range (approximately 1200 yards), 
were light weight, were effective at dispersing enemy formations (especially 
cavalry), and were frequently employed to burn down grass hut villages. Their 
main drawback was their erratic, slow flight path, which occasionally resulted in 
the rocket ricocheting against trees and turning back towards its launching 
point.1304  The Hale Rocket, propelled by gunpowder, suffered from a short shelf 
life and the Admiralty required them to be returned to arsenal for examination 
every five years.  The rocket was useful for brush wars as it, ‗spread danger over 
a wide area‘, but was also considered, ‗almost as dangerous to the firers as to 
the enemy‘.1305 
     The Wivern departed Gibraltar on 23 March 1880, bound for her next refueling 
stop at Malta.1306  While at sea in the central Mediterranean, the crew exercised 
firing the main 9-inch guns, the Nordenfelts, and discharged a few volleys from 
their Martini-Henry small arms rifles.  During the gunnery exercise, the left 9-inch 
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RML of the aft turret was disabled after the slide split from the effects of the recoil 
of the gun and carriage.  The ironclad also developed a leak and when she 
arrived at Malta on the 28th, she was placed in dockyard to make good her 
defects, which included examination of her screw by a diver.1307  
     The armourclad departed Malta for Port Said, on the north coast of Egypt, on 
4 April, and the crew was employed in the usual shipboard routines of muster, 
drill, and painting.  On 6 April, rough weather prevented some training as seas 
washed over the deck, but boat crews were later instructed in rockets and 
lights.1308  As the Wivern steamed westward, the British press noted that Edward 
Reed described her, and other older ironclads, as being outdated, with ‗armour 
which is no longer worthy to be called armour‘.  Nevertheless, Reed 
acknowledged the ‗ironclads of the old type...have been rightly and widely 
repaired and refitted‘.1309 
     The Wivern began her voyage through the Suez Canal shortly after dawn on 
the 11th.  While under the control of the pilot, the ironclad exhibited her 
propensity to yaw at slow speeds, and although engines were reversed, the 
ironclad‘s port side touched the bank of the waterway and the ship grounded. 
After a short ten minutes aground, the Wivern was off and underway.  By the 
14th, the man-of-war was steaming south through the Red Sea, bound for Aden.  
The ship‘s log revealed that her captain, Commander T.G. Jones, kept the men 
busy painting ship, conducting routine repairs, and hoisting sail to compensate 
for the ship traveling at half speed.  The Wivern was slowed to conserve fuel, yet 
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waves washed over her main deck, indicating that higher speeds were preferable 
to maintain suitable headway in storm prone waters.  Jones kept to routine as 
much as possible in the rough seas, ordering firefighting practice, boats swung 
out, and a cutter‘s men provided with life jackets or ‗cork dresses‘ for lifesaving 
drills.1310   
     By 21 April, the Wivern was at Aden where she was refueled, reprovisioned, 
and her crew conducted target practice with the Nordenfelts, the Gatling, and the 
7-pounder.  When underway on the 24th, a log entry indicated that coal stored on 
the upper deck was used for fuel.1311  This reference revealed that refits had 
increased the stability of the ironclad and permitted her to ship extra coal on her 
deck.  Coaling stations had become a new part of naval strategy as sail was a 
diminishing consideration for mobility.1312 It was not uncommon for warships to 
carry a temporary coal supply on their decks to extend range.  During the 1869 
voyage to tow the massive floating dock to Bermuda, the ironclads Warrior and 
Black Prince each carried extra coal on their main decks to ensure adequate and 
available fuel.  This was recognized as an unsafe practice, as warships that 
carried loads of coal on deck were ‗unfit to meet an enemy and doubtfully fit to 
meet extremes of wind and sea‘.1313  This fear was justified when the new sloop, 
H.M.S. Condor, disappeared in a storm off Vancouver in December 1901.  The 
load of 48 tons of extra coal carried on her deck was assessed to have been a 
contributing factor in her loss.1314 
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     After her arrival at Singapore on 21 May 1880, Wivern conducted her usual 
routine of recoaling, reprovisioning, and repainting.  She also took on another 
seaman but this man was excluded from duty as he was a supernumerary and 
bound for the military hospital at Hong Kong, another facility which differentiated 
that naval base from a commercial port or coaling stop.1315   
     On 2 June, Wivern steamed into Hong Kong harbour and made ready for her 
new mission as reserve guardship.  Awnings were spread for protection from the 
sun, and the ship was guided to her anchorage at No. 4 buoy.  Four men were 
discharged to hospital, and the crew began the task of offloading stores for 
shipment ashore and cleaning ship.  Three days later, the log of the Wivern 
noted the arrival of one of the American-built Volunteer cruisers, the Aziya, as 
she steamed into Hong Kong harbour flying the flag of a Russian rear admiral.  
With the Wivern‟s crew parceled out in predetermined assignments to other 
British warships in the Far East, on 14 June, the turret ship was paid off and her 
pennant lowered for the end of her first commission on the China Station.1316    
     The Wivern was ideal for this role.  She was selected to protect the harbour of 
Hong Kong, and the smaller adjacent islands viewed as potential positions where 
a hostile warship could bombard the shore while safely shielded from fire by land 
batteries.  Forts were, in this scenario, ‗useless‘ against an enemy sheltered 
within the islets, and the turret ship was available to chase off all but the largest 
armoured man-of-war.  Additionally, her two torpedo boats posed a fast moving 
threat and would further complicate the actions of a hostile force.1317   
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     With British coastal defences in Asia and Australia improved after the arrival 
of armoured turret ships at key bases, the Royal Navy had the ‗strategic 
flexibility‘ to attack enemy harbours and hunt down hostile cruisers.1318  One key 
British foreign policy goal in the second half of the nineteenth century was to 
maintain China‘s stability.  The Wivern was available for defensive duty in the 
event renewed Russian tensions with China escalated into war and the Royal 
Navy became involved.1319  The Wivern gave the Royal Navy freedom of action 
in Asian waters as more British warships were available for operations without 
leaving Hong Kong exposed.     
     A permanently based armoured warship in Hong Kong was a welcome sight 
for colonial officials at that vital possession.  One newspaper in the colony 
summed up the new addition as ‗the best fighting ship of her size‘ on station.1320  
The Colonial Governor, Sir John Pope-Hennessy, said in his speech on 10 
October 1880, ‗We have in the harbour at this moment a most efficient turret-
ship, the Wivern.  That ship is here for local purposes.  The Admiralty will not 
carry her away from us…‘1321  
 
Duty on the China Station 
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     The Wivern gave Britain an edge over the other Pacific powers.  She 
remained in local waters while the larger ships of the squadron went out to show 
the flag or, in the event of conflict, hunt the enemy.  Following the Wivern‟s arrival 
at the Asian colony, officers not remaining on board were divided between the 
Victor Emmanuel, the flagship Iron Duke, and gunboat Kestrel to round out 
wardroom billets.  Crewmen were also reassigned as needed.  As a caretaker 
ironclad, the Wivern was available for service but she was not fully manned.1322  
Nevertheless she was ready for immediate service, and the Hong Kong press 
noted that her presence ‗can hardly mean that she will lie in this harbour all her 
commission.‘1323  Indeed, she did not remain idle as she was regularly utilized for 
training voyages.     
     The turret ship was a subject of particular interest for Governor Hennessy.  
The governor was invited to travel aboard the ironclad for a trial trip on 6 January 
1881, and was impressed with the performance of the ship and her gunnery 
practice during the journey.  In a report to his superior Colonial Secretary, The 
Earl of Kimberley, Hennessy judged the ram to be ‗a most efficient ship‘ for the 
purpose of harbour defence.  The governor also included ‗colonial defence‘ in his 
description of the Wivern‘s role in Hong Kong.  The ironclad was, in Hennessy‘s 
estimation, ‗of more value than a regiment of soldiers‘, and he asked for 
Kimberley‘s support requesting that the Admiralty man the Wivern with a full 
complement and place her on active service.  During the trial trip, the crew had 
been borrowed from the Iron Duke.  With the turret ship fully manned, wrote 
Hennessy, a battalion (he referred to it as a ‗wing‘) of the British regiment then 
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stationed in Hong Kong, could be available for deployment elsewhere or returned 
to Britain, thereby reducing costs on the Imperial establishment.   
     The Admiralty declined the request, as the expense of taking the ironclad out 
of reserve and providing her with a full complement of officers and crew would 
have been ‗considerable‘.  Cost savings was the focus of all branches of the 
imperial machine, and the priorities of one service prevented a unity of effort in 
the colony.  The Admiralty was not prepared to take on the additional costs of 
keeping another ironclad in service without an increase in funds.  The Wivern 
was placed in reserve to augment the China Squadron in the event of hostilities, 
yet her role was not envisioned as that of a static guardship.  The ironclad gave 
the Admiralty options, and they specifically mentioned her light draught and 
heavy armament as useful, not only in defence of Hong Kong, but on rivers 
where her big guns were likely to be more powerful than those an enemy was 
expected to bring to bear. 1324     
     The Admiralty forwarded Governor Hennessy‘s proposal to Vice Admiral G. O. 
Willes, but it was clear that if the ram went back into service, the crew would 
come from ships already on station.  Willes had suggested that the Admiralty 
post to Hong Kong, twenty five Royal Marine Artillerymen (all assigned to the 
books of the Victor Emmanuel) in order to man the guns of the Wivern.  The 
Marines would serve as a nucleus around which more men could be assigned to 
build a temporary crew in order to provide the turret ironclad with a full 
complement during times of crisis.  Willes‘ suggestion was overruled by the 
Admiralty as they did not consider it necessary for ‗so large a number‘ of Marine 
gunners to be utilized for a standby mission on the Wivern.  Nevertheless, they 
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promised to send out ten Marine gunners when ‗an opportunity offers‘, for the 
use of Willes as he saw fit.  Around these men, a partial crew could assemble to 
man the Wivern‘s guns and when augmented with several additional hands from 
the squadron, could prepare the ship for commissioned service.1325   
     The demands of working the larger guns meant that trained gunners were at a 
premium and the Royal Navy did not have enough to go around, especially for 
ships not needed for immediate service.  The smaller, ubiquitous gunboats were 
of more utility than a turret ram on the Chinese coasts in peacetime.  Showing 
the flag on coastal waters and Chinese rivers, the gunboats occasionally had to 
fire a shot over the heads of ‗menacing natives‘ and conduct anti-piracy 
patrols.1326   
     Crews were generally assigned for as long as the commission of the gunboat 
or ship lasted, usually three to four years.  This was viewed as the longest time 
men could be assigned to the China Station and away from their families, before 
morale began to break down.  Beginning in 1865, gunboats and some larger 
warships were recommissioned as required, with relief crews sent to Hong Kong 
in the troopships from Britain.  Other British stations and foreign navies adopted 
this relay system, allowing for ships at a given base to be adequately manned 
while other ships remained on location, but without full crews.  Troopships such 
as the H.M.S. Tamar had to take care to provide ventilation to prevent sickness 
from ‗jail fever‘.  These troopships were to arrive in Hong Kong before June and 
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July, typically the hottest months at the colony, to allow time for men to recover 
from the ‗debilitating journey‘ from Britain.1327 
     Manpower limitations were a constraint on operations at Hong Kong in 
different ways.  One British Admiral opined that only three ships could be in the 
dockyard at any one time to prepare for recommissioning.  Therefore routine and 
preventative maintenance was a necessity to keep ships ready for use and avoid 
a surge of warships at the overworked dockyard.  Additionally, the clerical staff at 
the Hong Kong naval dockyard was too small for this important station.1328                 
     As stated, the turret ram was not relegated to remain at Hong Kong on a 
continuous basis.  In December 1881, she steamed to Canton to show the flag 
and train her delegated crew, assigned from the sloop H.M.S. Pegasus, in the 
ways of their temporary charge.1329  In some instances, showing the flag was 
likely more related to the occasional intelligence collection mission than a mere 
excursion and training voyage.  In 1878, the Quartermaster General Department 
of the British Army of India organized a group of officers charged with reporting 
on events in East Asia.  Officers selected to ‗Section E‘, were responsible for 
intelligence reporting on Nepal, Tibet, Japan, Korea, and French Indochina.  
China though, was the main emphasis.1330  These officers, well versed in culture 
and language studies, provided detailed reports on Chinese military issues 
including arms imports, training methods, fortifications (especially coastal 
defences), and public sentiment around the country.1331  These reports 
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influenced British policy makers in the region and the cruise of a warship was 
likely part of, and in response to, intelligence operations in China.1332 
     In January 1882, the Wivern visited the nearby Portuguese colony of Macao 
and steamed towards Canton.1333  In early February 1883, Wivern was again at 
sea with a crew borrowed from the sloop H.M.S. Albatross, after that vessel was 
dry-docked for repairs.  On 5 February, while steaming down river to Hong Kong 
from Canton, the ironclad ran aground on a bank in the river while in charge of 
the pilot.  Attempts to tow her off were unsuccessful, and the torpedo boats and 
ammunition were offloaded to lighten ship.  On 9 February, with assistance from 
a civilian paddle steamer, and the gunboat H.M.S. Swift, the ironclad was pulled 
free.1334  After reloading the turret ship, the Wivern steamed down river in 
company with the Swift, and both vessels returned to Hong Kong on 11 
February.  The following day, target practice was conducted with the main battery 
as the ironclad steamed off Hong Kong.  After firing four rounds from each 9-inch 
RML, boats were lowered for torpedo practice.  The log entry notes the Wivern 
increased to full speed, ‗as requisite for firing torpedoes‘, indicating at least two of 
these weapons were launched, not from the TBs, but from the ironclad.  On the 
17th, the crew was ashore assisting with undocking procedures for the Albatross 
and after days spent returning equipment to that vessel, their mission was 
completed.  The Wivern hauled down her pennant at sunset on 23 February 
1883.1335     
                                            
1332
 Ibid, 181. 
1333
 TNA, ADM 50/299, Vice-Admiral George O. Willes, C. B., Commander-in-Chief on the China 
Station, 1 January 1882-31 March 1882 
1334
 TNA, ADM 53/11744, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Albatross, 11 August 1882-23 February 1883 
1335
 Ibid. 
 334 
     Some naval traditions of protocol were under assault from the British press in 
the name of fiscal prudence and safety.  The practice of firing salutes from 
warships was challenged as, ‗surely a most barbarous one; and firing guns is but 
a degree removed from the clanging and hammering that savages resort to on 
similar occasions‘.1336  The fitting of massive shell guns to the ironclads meant 
that smaller guns had to also be carried aboard to offset the cost of powder fired 
in salute from the larger guns.  Dubbing the use of ‗pop-guns‘ a product of, ‗a 
juvenile age‘, a disdainful British newspaper editor proclaimed that firing salutes 
was dangerous, and on occasion resulted in the loss of fingers, arms, and 
probably ‗even lives from time to time‘.1337 
     This claim was not without merit and had occurred on the Victor Emmanuel, 
on 14 October 1883, when firing a salute.  While reloading to fire another blank 
charge, a Chinese crewman lost his hands as gunpowder exploded prematurely 
in the gun barrel.  Additionally, this mishap provided a rare glimpse of a local 
solution regarding manning at Hong Kong.  Due to, ‗the very small number of 
European servicemen in the ship being continually employed as working parties 
out of the ship‘, more of the routine shipboard duties fell to Chinese crewmen 
recruited locally to fill out the minimum manning requirements for the station.1338               
     A separate gun problem occurred aboard the new flagship in December of 
that year.  On 21 December, the Audacious was at target practice off Hong Kong 
when a gun captain, Leading Seaman William Haynes, was injured as Number 
33 gun, a 4-inch rifled breechloader (RBL) was discharged.  During the shoot, a 
vent sealing tube flew backwards and into the chest of Seaman Haynes as the 
gun fired.  The new breechloader had been fitted aboard only on the 12th of that 
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month, and this firing was likely one of its first aboard ship.  Firing from the new 
breechloaders was halted until the problem with the tube, and the failure of the 
breech ‗shutter‘ to hold the tube in place, was corrected.1339  The British press 
noted the problems with the China Station, especially concerning the age of 
some of the warships, and their ‗rubbishing guns‘.  Of the few vessels noted as 
being ‗worth a rap‘ in those waters, the Wivern was listed among them.1340                          
     Although in reserve, Wivern was the armourclad naval defence for the colony, 
and the ironclad frigate Audacious, was the offensive power for the fleet.  In 
1883, Britain held mastery on the China Station with 24 warships, two being 
ironclads, the flagship and the Wivern.1341  Russia was second with thirteen men-
of-war, but the large casemated frigate Gerzog Edinburgski, was their only 
ironclad in Asia.  France came in a distant third with five warships assigned to the 
China Seas.  The U.S. Navy also had five warships in those waters but none 
were ironclads.  The British press was satisfied that the Royal Navy had, ‗an 
ample naval force to look after our proper interests in the far [sic] East‘.  This was 
an improvement over the situation in 1880 prior to the arrival of the Wivern, and 
the partial improvement of Hong Kong‘s defences helped to mitigate the threat 
from foreign cruisers.  The preponderance of firepower did not remain static for 
long.  Due to Franco-Chinese tensions over Indo-China, by December 1883, a 
revived France had sent four more warships to the China coast, three of which 
were armoured.1342   
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     The log of the Audacious made note of this change in an entry dated 17 
January 1883.  Upon her return from Singapore, details of foreign warships were 
noted.  Besides the names of three ships was written: ‗French‘!  After the names 
of four other men-of-war was noted: ‗Russian‘!  The only British warships at 
anchor were a few gunboats (one of which was in the dockyard), the hulk Victor 
Emmanuel, and the ironclad Wivern.  The British were concerned that while their 
larger ships were away on other duties, rival powers would anchor in the harbour, 
reminding them that the Royal Navy could not be present everywhere in sufficient 
numbers.  The situation was reversed that September, when the Audacious, in 
company with several warships of the squadron, paid a visit to Vladivostok.  The 
Royal Navy had an ironclad in the key Russian harbour in the Pacific while their 
main warships were away.  The marines aboard Audacious were drilled at the 
heavy guns to make an impression on the host.  Shortly thereafter, the Russian 
casemate ironclad Gerzog Edinburgski, anchored at Vladivostok to rebalance the 
force disposition.1343     
     Despite frequent exercises and continual maintenance, Admiral Sir Richard V. 
Hamilton remarked that British warships on the China Station were beginning to 
look obsolete.  He noted that French ships, ‗beat us in speed, and in many cases 
armament‘, and the American ships, ‗even small corvettes‘, had electric lights.  
Acknowledging the slow retreat from sail, the admiral lamented that he was 
‗ashamed‘ of the heavy-looking British ships compared to the lighter topside rig of 
the French and Americans.  This was all the more regrettable as the admiral 
noted the more modern ships went to the Channel Fleet or to the Mediterranean, 
although Hong Kong was the next station in line of importance.  Despite its 
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valuable position, the China Station would rarely receive new ships from Britain; 
few modern British warships made it beyond Suez as they were needed for 
duties with a more important fleet based in Malta.1344 
   
Naval Intelligence and the Telegraph     
 
     In response to rapid technological changes and their collective impact on 
strategic planning, naval intelligence became a separate function of the Admiralty 
by the late 1880s.  The pace of growth for British naval intelligence and its effect 
on naval planners was uneven during its early years, but the organization was 
well placed for expansion.  Naval intelligence came into being as a result of the 
cable networks which expanded into global systems of near instant messaging in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century.  The decision to employ ships to a 
station, in response to tensions or in preparation for changes to defence policy, 
was influenced by the cable system and the intelligence organization responsible 
for interpreting foreign threats.  Intelligence was a tool for deterrence before it 
helped win battles in 1914.       
     During the 1878 war scare, steps were taken to relay information on the 
movements of foreign warships, not by routine dispatches, but via special letters 
or telegrams.  Vice Admiral Sir Ashley Cooper Key, the Commander of the North 
American and West Indies Station, was instructed to insure that his captains 
relayed the information directly to the Admiralty, ‗by Telegraph or otherwise‘.  
Special care was to be taken that reports were timely and possessed with more 
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than rudimentary details: ‗In every case in which a Foreign Ship of War is 
mentioned, the name of the Ship is reported‘.1345  
     Britain‘s global position and commitments were both a source of strength and 
a defence concern.  The distant, unprotected, coaling and telegraph stations 
were a worry, and one British newspaper reported they were the ‗most fatal flaw 
in England‘s armour‘.1346  British cable layers linked not only London with the 
colonies, but also Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish overseas 
processions with their home governments through global-wide system.1347   
     By 1870, the Foreign and Colonial offices were linked with their own lines to 
this growing global network.  A decade later, almost 100,000 miles of submarine 
cable laced continents together and trailed out to remote stations and 
harbours.1348  The British government had honed the art of assistance to cable 
operations, from direct funding, to modified aid provided by diplomatic officers, 
and utilizing the Royal Navy in a supportive role.  In 1858, the first attempt to link 
India, via a submarine cable through the Red Sea was a complete failure, and a 
costly one for the British Treasury.  The contractors had not properly surveyed 
the floor of the sea along the route which was strewn with jagged rocks.  
Additionally, they had not provided for sufficient slack in the cable and the line 
was broken before the first message could be sent.  Although the Royal Navy 
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continued to provide surveying support for British cable companies, the British 
Government avoided direct investment in cable operations, again, until 1893.1349   
     Russia, handicapped by the long sea route to the Far East and the absence of 
their own coaling stations along the way, was not crippled by communications.  A 
telegraph line linked St. Petersburg with Siberia by 1865, although this line was a 
victim of heavy snowfall and frequently broke down in winter.1350  Russia 
undertook this staggering project almost immediately following the Crimean War, 
with the Ministry of Marine funding the line from the Eastern Maritime ports, into 
the Siberian interior.  This was a tenuous link, subject to cuts not only from 
storms and bandits, but also insurgents.  Following unrest in Poland, Polish 
exiles were deported to Siberia beginning in January 1863, and sentenced to 
penal colonies in the eastern wastelands.1351  In 1866, they revolted against their 
Russian guards and raided settlements for weapons.  The revolt was initially 
successful after the Poles cut the telegraph lines, but Russian troops were 
rushed in from other garrisons and the uprising was crushed.1352  By 1868, the 
telegraph line extended from Khabarovsk, on the upper reaches of the Amur 
River, to Vladivostok.  Commentators were awestruck by the global spans of 
electric wire almost girding the world, and asked:  ‗Could Aladdin‘s Lamp work 
any faster wonders‘? 1353  This crucial Trans-Imperial conduit gave Russia 
‗incalculable advantages‘ in communications with China and Japan.  It also made 
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possible the rapid exchange of orders and intelligence with St. Petersburg, 
impacting diplomatic and military dispositions in the Far East.1354     
     By 1872, a submarine cable connected Vladivostok to the international naval 
and commercial harbour of Nagasaki, Japan.  Though ostensibly Danish-owned, 
it was supported by the British-owned Telegraph Construction & Maintenance 
Company and funded by a group of British financiers led by John Pender, a 
former Manchester cotton merchant.   London‘s control of telegraphic 
communications was to such extent that the submarine cable was referred to as 
the ‗nervous system of Britain‘.1355   
     The telegraph had transformed global trade in what was then termed ‗a wired 
world‘, a surprisingly modern moniker more identified with the dawn of the 
internet age instead of the middle Victorian years.1356  British telegraph 
companies supported by businessmen and diplomats, and aided by the Royal 
Navy, gave the British Empire unparalleled access to global communications.  
Whitehall had the pulse of the world.  
     The rapid transmission of war-related information to naval and military 
decision makers was becoming increasing vital in the age of steam and the 
telegraph.  In the aftermath of the Crimean War, Russia sought administrative 
methods to acquire foreign industrial and military information to mitigate their 
shortcomings.  Modern intelligence was born.  Russian military attachés were 
assigned to London in 1856, almost immediately at the conclusion of the 
Crimean War, and in 1868 an attaché was posted to Washington to learn from 
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the experiences of the Civil War.  By 1863, Russia established a centralized 
processing chamber within the General Staff to analyze intelligence.  In an 
acknowledgement of the focus of the Russian intelligence collection priorities, 
this body was renamed the ‗Military-Scientific Committee‘ in 1867.1357  At the 
Russian General Staff Academy, the Civil War was viewed as a source of study, 
and strategic coastal attacks and defence were key subjects of interest.     
     American use of the telegraph, railways, and steamships were appreciated as 
essential tools for modern warfare by the instructors at the academy, and their 
use by the Union was incorporated into the lectures.1358  Strategic studies and 
centralized intelligence collection efforts benefitted both the Russian Army and 
the Czar‘s navy.  By the late nineteenth century, Russian Naval Intelligence was 
considered ‗the best in the world‘, and they reportedly knew ‗much or more about 
our navy than the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty‘.1359  Russian Naval Intelligence 
was ‗deeply‘ interested in gaining information on the actual speeds of British 
warships as opposed to nominal speed data, indicating plans for commercial 
warfare.1360     
     Britain responded to this Russian threat by forming its own intelligence cell in 
1882, stating: ‗We, who are ever ready to permit the eyes of deeply interested 
foreigners to pry into the innermost recesses of our dockyards and arsenals, will 
now have vigilant and systematic eyes bent also upon their proceedings, and 
presumably profit as well as pleasure will result‘.1361  The war scare of 1878 had 
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led to the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Committee (F.I.C.) in December of 
1882.  A naval officer assigned to the F.I.C. described his duties as a mixture of 
operational planning and intelligence, stating: ‗I had to know all about British 
defended harbours at home and abroad, with their defences and their resources 
that might be of value to the Navy; about communications (submarine cables) 
British and foreign; about all foreign guns (at sea and in coast defences), gun-
mountings, submarine mines, and experiments connected therewith;‘  Other 
duties included ‗British and Foreign Commerce, Defence and Attack‘.1362   
     The creation of the F.I.C. was facilitated by key leaders in the Admiralty, 
including: Admirals Hornsby, Cooper Key, and a leading proponent in the 
Commons, retired Royal Marine Captain, John Colomb, M.P.  The appointment 
of Captain William H. Hall, R.N., to the F.I.C. proved fortuitous, as this gunnery 
officer from the training ship, H.M.S. Excellent, possessed the precision of 
thought required to form the nascent intelligence cell into an organization which 
would influence defence policy.  Before the end of the decade (the 1880s), this 
information clearing house, ‗wielded great power by the way they presented the 
briefs to their Lordships, by the turn of phrases in the letters they drafted to the 
Fleet and to other Government Offices, [and] by the influence they could exert 
upon the tone of replies from other Departments…‘1363         
     Businesses had employed codes to relay detailed information with brevity, 
thus saving on the costs of each cable, and preventing details from leaking to a 
competitor.  On the sending end as well as the receiving, a code book, ‗like a 
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dictionary‘, enabled the short cables to be read with clarity.  By 1882, this 
compression of data into a few lines of seemingly incomprehensible print sent via 
submarine cables, gave British merchants another advantage as the codes were 
‗nearly perfect‘.1364  The ministries in Whitehall had utilized separate codes and, 
in March of that year, Lieutenant C. Campbell, R. N., was detailed from Agincourt 
to serve on a committee appointed to determine the practically of creating a 
universal code which could be used by the key ministries in London for 
telegraphic messages.  In addition to Campbell (sent as the committee member 
for the Admiralty), the Foreign and Colonial Offices each sent a representative, 
as did the War Office, which detailed an officer to serve as secretary.1365  This 
move represented an early step to a unified crisis planning capability and for 
operational awareness, not only for the military arms, but also for the other 
ministries involved with Imperial defence.    
     Another function of war planning was mapping, and the Department of 
Hydrography in the Admiralty served as a quasi-intelligence body until the F.I.C. 
was formed.1366  In late January 1883, the China Station flagship, Audacious, 
was at sea with the squadron mapping the harbours of the Russian Maritime, and 
‗exercising steam tactics‘.1367  All warships in the Pacific were frequently engaged 
in important duties which included showing the flag, but the Royal Navy 
conducted other efforts to gather intelligence relating to the enemy coasts.  The 
Audacious and ships of the squadron drafted detailed charts of not only the main 
Russian naval base at Vladivostok, but also key anchorages at Port Lazarec and 
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Posiette Bay to the south, and Olga Bay and Vladimir Bay further up the 
coast.1368  In the event of war, Britain would be ready to take key positions near 
Vladivostok in preparation for blockade duties, or to attack Russian coastal 
fortifications and harbours.    
     The mission of the Royal Navy was to engage in offensive operations at the 
outset of war.  As Hall noted, the strategic objective was, ‗blockading the ports of 
an enemy, of destroying his trade, attacking his possessions, dealing with his 
ships at sea, and we may add, of preventing an attack in great force against any 
special place.‘1369  The maritime aspect of intelligence was separated from the 
F.I.C. in February 1887, with Hall appointed as the first Director of Naval 
Intelligence.1370  When he departed the position to return to sea in January 1889, 
Hall left behind a small but vibrant office poised to support the Royal Navy‘s 
global role, as he had ‗established an intellectual tradition that would be 
sustained‘ through his successors.  By the late 1880s, the Naval Intelligence 
Department had quickly evolved into a laboratory of strategic thought concerning 
‗all information relating to maritime matters likely to be of use in war‘, and was 
responsible for mobilization and aspects of campaign planning.1371          
      
Colonial Defence and the Torpedo Boat 
 
     The Civil War had proven that the torpedo had changed naval warfare, at 
least in coastal waters.  British newspapers feared the new weapon as a force 
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equalizer, and one commented: ‗A little powder, an old and worthless boat frame, 
a simple apparatus for ignition, directed by one or two cool and resolute men, 
may in a minute send to the bottom all the labour, science, money and valour 
embarked on vessels such as the Warrior or Royal Sovereign‟.1372       
     The torpedo took on three forms during the 1860s-1880s:  spar, towed, and 
self-propelled.  A torpedo boat carried an explosive charge on a spar or 
‗outrigger‘, and if able to avoid a fatal shot, steamed the charge into an enemy 
warship.  The explosion was intended to sink or damage the enemy and, 
hopefully, allow the torpedo boat to steam away if not swamped by the 
detonation.  The spar was 42 feet in length with a diameter of six inches, tapering 
down to five inches at the forward end which held the torpedo. A three cell 
battery provided the electric charge which would, if all functioned properly, set off 
the explosive.  A frame with roller bar held the torpedo aloft until the launch 
closed within striking distance.  With the command ‗rig out‘, the spar was pushed 
forward until it dropped the forward end with the torpedo, some ten feet below the 
surface.  At a distance of 33 feet, the torpedo would be rammed home and set off 
by the battery.  The TBs carried several spars rigged with torpedoes in reserve 
for contingencies.1373  
     Robert Whitehead, a British engineer working in the then Austro-Hungarian 
port of Fiume, developed his first generation self-propelled torpedo in 1866, but 
this weapon was unreliable and slow.  Working through complex controls to 
regulate the depth of his weapon, by 1868 he extended its range from 200 yards 
to 700 yards, although the speed was still an inadequate 7 knots.1374     
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     Another version of the torpedo was towed behind a warship in the hopes of 
running it into an enemy.  The Harvey torpedo, named after its‘ inventor 
Commander James Harvey R.N., was the best known of this variety although, 
these proved to be all around failures and of far more danger to the user than 
any would be opponent.  The 242-pound Harvey torpedo consisted of an 
explosive charge in a copper casing, placed in a wooden keg encased in iron, 
and towed behind a warship about 30 degrees from the wake.  Fitted with a buoy 
to maintain the required depth, a pull of a lanyard released the float and allowed 
the towed charge to sink, should a friendly ship happen in the way.  Many large 
warships of the era carried this torpedo, yet it was impractical and required 
‗skillful handling and thorough seamanship‘ to place this charge under an enemy 
warship.1375  
     Necessity forced Russia to take the lead in the employment of the torpedo 
boat during the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78.  The shipment by rail of the 
torpedo boats (most of which had been built from the plans of English boat 
builder Alfred Yarrow), south from St. Petersburg to Sevastopol in 1878, was a 
significant logistical feat, and gave the Russians a weapon to challenge the 
Ottoman ironclads in the Black Sea.  Despite this, the performance of the 
Russian torpedo boats was lackluster at best.  During a Russian attack against 
the Turkish ships at Batoum (modern day Batumi in Georgia), the Russians 
reportedly neglected to remove the safety pins from the torpedoes and the attack 
failed to achieve the anticipated results.  Had the torpedoes been used with more 
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skill after more planning and training, the results could have been more 
decisive.1376  
     Before reinforcements arrived by rail, the Russians had only two torpedo 
boats in the Black Sea outfitted to fire the Whitehead torpedo.  One boat was 
equipped to fire the 9-inch weapon from a tube, and the other had the awkward 
arrangement of launching a Whitehead from a raft carried alongside.  With a 
reach of only 200 yards, these small diameter weapons lacked the range, 
reliability, and explosive capacity to alter the naval balance of power to Russia‘s 
advantage.  The small Turkish monitor, Seife had been sunk by the Czar‘s 
torpedo launches but this success in the Danube was scored by the more 
dependable spar torpedoes.  On the night of 25-26 January 1878, the Turkish 
wooden gunboat, Intikbah, was attacked by two Russian steam launches and 
became the first ship sunk in combat by a self-propelled torpedo.  The torpedo 
boat and the locomotive torpedo proved their potential in naval warfare, but they 
also demonstrated their limitations.  More development and training was required 
to bring the weapon and launch system to maturity.1377   
     The torpedo and the torpedo boat were not ready for large scale offensive 
action.  In the 1870s and 1880s, tactics were developing, and vessels were 
evolving with each innovation.  Technology had to catch up with the Whitehead 
variant while the other configurations for spar and towed torpedoes ran to their 
design dead ends.  The Whitehead torpedo was advancing, yet it suffered from 
defects including faulty steering.  The ‗frequent loss‘ of the weapon during 
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training voyages was a source of concern regarding its effectiveness, and by the 
late 1870s, the cost of £380 per copy made it an expensive and uncertain piece 
of armament.  The Whitehead locomotive torpedo and the various configurations 
of special boats to transport it, was still an imperfect weapons system at this 
stage.1378    
     Admiral John Locke Marx, R.N., looked back on his time as a junior officer 
aboard the torpedo training ship H.M.S. Vernon in the early 1880s, and noted the 
weapon was difficult to control.  In describing the torpedo, he wrote: ‗I do not 
think much of them‘.1379  One reason for the control problems of the Whitehead, 
was found in the process of launching.  A torpedo boat had to have headway to 
prevent the weapon from being knocked about by the waves before it got 
underway.  The TB or steam cutter that launched the Whitehead, over the side 
by means of a carrying frame hoisted by a specially fitted davit, had to maintain a 
steady helm, or the slow moving torpedo would be deflected off course by the 
forward edge of the frame.  Night operations were preferred for a torpedo attack, 
but there were no indicators in early torpedo tubes or launching frames to verify if 
the weapon had been fired, thus complicating an attack under hours of 
darkness.1380  
     On the night of 4 November 1880, a torpedo exercise was held at Bermuda 
with the anchored armoured frigate H.M.S. Northampton, protected by booms, 
and steam launches.  The attacking force consisted of two second-class torpedo 
boats, and four steam launches supported, by an ironclad.  The slow moving 
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armoured ram Viper was to sweep away the boom and drive home the attack 
while clearing a path for a torpedo boat.  Scorpion would have made a better 
escort, but she was likely still in the hands of the dockyard after the hurricane of 
late August.   
     The Northampton was able to ‗defeat‘ the attacking force by the combined 
employment of quick firing lighter caliber guns, and the two electric searchlights, 
aboard.  The hail of fire from the light guns (both mounted and on field carriages), 
were judged to have damaged and driven off the torpedo boats, launches, and 
the ram, before they could close the range.  The searchlights ‗had never 
previously proved so efficient‘ in detecting an attacking flotilla, and made the 
prospects for a successful night attack one of ‗very great uncertainty when an 
electric light is employed by the defence‘.  Although the attack was deemed a 
failure, the discovery of the Viper in the attacking force proved to be ‗an 
excellent, complete, and great surprise‘ to the defenders, and another ironclad 
attacker would have likely imperiled the Northampton and her escorts.1381          
     After she arrived at Hong Kong, the Wivern acquired a secondary but 
important role as a torpedo boat tender.  The flagship, Audacious, sent men to 
her for training, and one torpedo party rowed over to the turret ship on 16 
February 1883.1382  A photograph taken at the studio of a Mr. A. King in Hong 
Kong, reveals a small symbol of the weapons development in the Royal Navy.  
Circa 1885, the small carte de visité is of an unnamed Royal Navy 2nd Class 
Petty Officer in blue uniform.  On the right sleeve he displays two crossed 
weapons beneath a six-pointed star: one a breechloading naval gun, the other a 
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sharp-nosed early Whitehead torpedo under the gun.  Although it is not known to 
what ship he was assigned, the petty officer undoubtedly trained aboard the 
Wivern.  There he and the other gunners and torpedomen of the station, 
maintained and improved their skills on the rapidly evolving new generation of 
weapons, especially the rapid-fire light guns, and the Whiteheads.1383  
     By the early 1880s, the self-propelled torpedo evolved into a sophisticated 
projectile, and the mechanisms of which had to be guarded, in part, by non-
disclosure agreements signed by those who worked with these weapons.  On 17 
January 1882, the Admiralty dispatched a letter to the China Squadron 
commander, Vice Admiral Willes, requiring all torpedo personnel in his ships, to 
sign form S-321, to protect ‗the secret of the Whitehead Torpedo‘.1384  
Restrictions regarding the Whitehead were imposed with ‗painful exactness‘ as 
the training manual was to be left aboard the torpedo training ship, and junior 
officers were not allowed to remove it for their private study after duty.1385                    
     In 1883, the Admiralty approved the plan to have more torpedo boats 
stationed in the colony (but only with partial crews), and sent two 1st Class 
torpedo boats to Hong Kong.  One crew was to man one of the two new torpedo 
boats following their arrival from Britain.  A single 2nd Class torpedo boat would 
be placed in service by combining most of the crew from the two TBs assigned to 
the Wivern. This rotating plan of manning was a positive step forward in 
readiness for the embryonic torpedo boat section in the colony, but the Royal 
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Navy continued to be undermanned in those waters.  The makeshift situation on 
the China Station is illustrated by a letter written by Lieutenant Douglas Gamble, 
the torpedo officer assigned to the Victor Emmanuel.  Gamble requested a gig 
and crew be permanently assigned to him in order to perform his duties as the 
officer in charge of the torpedo boats.  Gamble was required to move from the 
warships at anchor, the dockyard, and his four direct charges, by borrowing a 
boat and crew from the Chief Engineer of the Wivern in order to make his rounds.  
Gamble had the duty of insuring that all machinery on his boats were ‗kept in a 
state of efficiency‘, for the little flotilla had to perform at least six runs per quarter 
with Whitehead torpedoes to maintain proficiency with those weapons.  This duty 
was complicated by the Wivern‟s Chief Engineer, as the boat was frequently 
needed by this more senior officer, who was also tasked with keeping the turret 
ship in a state of readiness, visiting the dockyard, and conducting his additional 
duties aboard the gunboats, Elk and Tweed.1386   
     In 1882, the Admiralty sent out 50 torpedo nets from Britain for the protection 
of naval assets in Hong Kong. The flagship had a complete set, thus the new 
nets were assigned to the Wivern.  The Admiralty also specified that the five 
corvettes on station were not to be supplied with nets, for in the 1880s, nets were 
generally provided to armoured ships.1387  These were likely the nets of steel wire 
rope which were ‗incredibly flexible‘, yet ‗wonderful for strength and evenness of 
texture‘.  Made by William M. Bullivant of London (based on his wire rope patent 
of June 1878), these nets were used by the Royal Navy and foreign powers 
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alike.1388  Each section of net (held out from a ship‘s side by spars), was 25 feet 
in length, 20 feet wide, and suspended to a depth of nine feet.1389  These nets 
gave an added degree of security to ships against torpedo attack, especially 
while at anchor, and were acknowledged later as, ‗an unglamorous but essential 
phase of naval warfare‘.1390  
 
The enemy cruiser and the Coaling Station 
 
     The French proponents of commerce raiding advocated the Jeune Ecole 
concept of naval warfare which centred, not on the battle fleet, but commerce 
raiders and coastal defence vessels.  Developed in the 1870s and 1880s, this 
French concept of commercial naval warfare was embraced by Admiral 
Theophile Aube.  When he became France‘s Minister of Marine in 1886, Aube 
cancelled the building of more costly armoured ships in favour of cruiser and 
torpedo boat construction as a means to challenge British superiority at sea.1391    
     The situation changed following the end of the Civil War.  The submarine 
telegraph cable brought distant areas of the globe into instant contact, and an 
enemy raider could no longer cruise for weeks without the knowledge of her 
opponent.  Hong Kong was linked to the growing cable network in 1870, but 
Bermuda had to wait another twenty years before it was tethered to the telegraph 
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station in Newfoundland.1392  Although Bermuda was a late addition to the 
imperial communications network, prior to this, a combination telegraph and flag 
signal system was in place around the archipelago, with nine telegraph stations 
throughout Bermuda run by the Royal Engineers, and a flag signal system able 
to relay, ‗the first appearance and subsequent movements of all vessels within 
sight‘.1393  This communications system permitted the timely flow of information 
throughout the fortress base, and (during times of clear weather) provided a 
means to direct the defences of the colony on shore and in local waters.  From 
the main cable landing stations around the Empire, another form of relay was 
established to provide timely messages.  Dispatch vessels were stationed at the 
ends of the telegraph cable systems to steam out and inform the fleet 
commander away at a distant anchorage, of the latest orders.  Control of a 
squadron was becoming less the sole prerogative of the local admiral and more 
at the direction of the Admiralty in London.1394         
     However, naval authorities continued to worry about the threat to merchant 
shipping from potential enemy commerce raiders.  Admiral Fisher had likened 
cruisers intent on attacking British merchant shipping as ‗Armadillos‘ eating up 
the ants they came across.1395  The Alabama was the success story of the 
commerce raider, yet the inability of the Confederates to get many of their 
foreign purchased would-be-raiders to sea was a fact not entirely overlooked.  
One such ship was the French-built corvette, Yeddo, which the Confederates 
intended to commission as the raider, C.S.S. Mississippi.  U.S. diplomatic 
pressure forced Emperor Napoleon III to intervene and prevent the 
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Southerners from acquiring the steamer and her sister ships.  The men-of-war 
were eventually commissioned after the Yeddo and her Bordeaux sister, the 
Osceola, were sold to Prussia as warships for that nation‘s fleet.1396 
     The Yeddo was commissioned as the S.M.S. Augusta, and several years 
later, she succeeded in capturing several enemy merchant ships during the 
Franco-Prussian War.  On a foray near her Gallic birthplace in early January 
1871, she fired on the steamer Max, laden with a cargo of war material slated for 
the hard-pressed French army.  That hapless merchantman was the only French 
vessel sunk at the hands of the small German fleet during the Franco-Prussian 
War.1397  The success was not repeated, as French cruisers quickly blockaded 
the Augusta in the Spanish port of Vigo until the end of the war.  Telegraphic 
communications and reinforced French patrols prevented a German commerce 
raider from having more than a very brief foray against what could have been a 
rich hunting ground further out to sea.  Vigorous pursuit and mobbing by a 
superior naval force prevented the cruise of the Augusta from becoming an 
Alabama-style cat and mouse embarrassment for France.  The Augusta failed in 
her mission to pull French resources away from home and drive up war costs.  
French cruisers were looking for only one corsair, not chasing after several 
commerce raiders at once as had the Union, with such Confederate ships as the 
Alabama, Florida, and their auxiliaries during the Civil War.  
     Nevertheless, the voyage of the Augusta served as warning over the potential 
impact of a single raider attacking merchant shipping near an opponent‘s home 
shore.  France enjoyed naval superiority over her German rivals yet that did not 
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prevent a single enemy cruiser from capturing the merchantmen, St. Marc (laden 
with flour and bread), and Pierre-Adolphe (carrying a cargo of wheat), at the 
mouth of the Gironde River in January 1871, some 50 miles downriver from the 
French provisional capital of Bordeaux.  With a show of daring, the German 
captain steamed out into the Bay of Biscay before anchoring Augusta near 
Rochefort, briefly occupying the deserted Fort Boyard, while a boat crew 
captured a French tug.  With these captures and a fourth French ship sunk (the 
Max), the Augusta steamed off to neutral Spain.1398   
     The siege of Paris and the great land battles sapped French strength and 
pulled the French fleets away from the Baltic and North Sea blockades.  French 
statesman and future premier, Georges Clemenceau remarked that if the 
German commander of the Augusta had continued the fight, and if more German 
warships had attacked French shipping, the cost of obtaining supplies from 
America would had increased tenfold.1399  These lessons were not lost on the 
French after the war, when they returned to their global competition with their 
greatest rival and envisioned their use of commerce raiders against British 
shipping: ‗the surest way of stopping English merchantmen is thus to prevent 
them from starting‘.1400  One London newspaper commented on the effect the 
lone German raider would have, referring to the commander of the Augusta as 
the, ‗forerunner of the men who will be the Nelsons of the Fatherland‘.  That 
newspaper also provided a warning, based on the exploits from that lone warship 
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for it had, ‗quickened the intense wish of the German people to gain such a fleet 
as can put down the navy of England herself.‘1401      
     Julian S. Corbett used the example of the Augusta in his work, Some 
Principles of Maritime Strategy, and stated that it was impossible to insure a 
commerce raider would be intercepted before she steamed out to threaten British 
trade: ‗Never in the days of our most complete domination upon the seas was our 
trade invulnerable, and it never can be‘.  Corbett made a geographic distinction 
between ‗fertile areas‘, which were the, ‗terminals of departure and destination 
where trade tends to be crowded‘, and the open ocean away from these 
terminals.1402  An enemy squadron or single raider ran a risk in attacking a 
defended port or coaling station.  This was especially true of ports defended by 
coastal turret ships such as the Wivern in Hong Kong, the Cerberus at 
Melbourne, the Magdala, and smaller Abyssinia at Bombay, and the Scorpion at 
Bermuda.  Admiral G. A. Ballard saw the true worth of the coastal defence ships 
as a deterrent against raiders.  Ballard noted that from the late 1860s until the 
mid-1880s, they were heavily armed and well-suited for their roles.  He compared 
them to be like, ‗full-armed knights riding on donkeys, easy to avoid but bad to 
close with‘.1403  The presence of these ironclads in local waters was a caution for 
an enemy, as a raider would be wary of approaching and would thus have to 
stand further out to sea to pick off the unwatchful and isolated steamer, or sailing 
ship.    
     In 1884, the Earl of Caernarvon spoke in Parliament for greater defensive 
preparedness of British naval bases overseas.  The bases needed better 
protection, and infrastructure in the form of fortifications, and defended coaling 
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stations.  Lord Caernarvon described the centres of gravity for Britain‘s lifeline in 
commercial, but especially in naval, and military terms.  He referred to these 
stations as ‗The Maritime quadrilateral of England‘—Gibraltar and Malta in the 
Mediterranean, and Bermuda and Halifax in the Atlantic.  These bases were of 
primary importance for British security, ‗a weighty responsibility‘, for the defence 
of the Empire. ‗Those four great stations have, for many years past, been the 
special care of Her Majesty's Government‘, but sufficient attention to their 
adequate defences was intermittent during the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
     In 1881, the Bermuda garrison was reduced in numbers and consequently, 
the coastal defence vessels stationed there assumed a greater importance.1404  
The realignment of forces was viewed as part of essential changes.  British Army 
manpower had become too dispersed after it was parceled out to garrisons 
dotted around the globe.  The ‗scattering of forces‘ had come to be seen as  
‗an…evil‘ which prevented the concentration of regular army units needed for 
campaigns ashore.  The coastal turret ironclads were a method of filling in the 
defence gaps when the garrisons were drawn down.1405   
     Caernarvon also highlighted the varying priorities of defending the other 
sixteen or seventeen coaling stations around the globe to prevent a section of the 
Empire from being cut off.  Not all of these stations were of equal importance, but 
the upgrade to the defences of Aden, Singapore, and Hong Kong were termed 
‗urgent‘.  These bases could not be defended by warships alone.  Artillery was 
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needed at points along the shorelines at these installations to free up coastal 
warships to operate in local waters.  Britain needed more guns to defend these 
key coaling stations but Caernarvon warned: ‗The real difficulty is that we have 
not got plant adequate to turn out the number of guns we need. We are 
dependent upon Sir Joseph Whitworth for the steel required for the heavier guns, 
and I believe the best gunpowder we now use is imported from Germany‘.1406  
The prioritization of which refueling stops would receive adequate protection, 
emerged in the early 1880s as a concept later referred to as, ‗a coaling station 
defence strategy‘.1407  
     David Snyder argued that ‗access to fuel sources had little impact on the 
strategic planning of the world‘s navies until the end of the late nineteenth 
century‘.  Although this interpretation is true in terms of the transition to oil from 
coal for the navies during WWI, it is not accurate regarding the strategic needs 
for coal, prior to the advent of the oil-fired boiler.1408  The Pacific was relatively 
‗coal-poor‘ compared with Europe and North America, and Britain dominated the 
carrying trade in that commodity.  British coaling stations were available to 
foreign warships and merchantmen, but this access was frequently denied in 
times of war and curtailed during times of international tensions.  Coal was a 
primary consideration for most men-of-war in the last half of the nineteenth 
century, especially one en route to a distant station, as ‗the necessity of fueling 
far-flung fleets varied among the navies of various states‘.1409 
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     The Imperial Russian Navy slowly increased its strength in ironclads, but the 
emphasis of the building program, begun in 1882, was on long range cruisers.1410  
Russia was also on the lookout for advantageous coaling stations.  In late 1878, 
the cruiser Vsadnik, commanded by Captain Andrei Novosil‘skiy, anchored at 
Penang where he secretly met with Malay representatives of the sultans of 
Sumatra.  The envoys sought a Russian protectorate over their island to prevent 
being acquired by the Dutch.  In July 1879, they petitioned Czar Alexander II to 
annex Sumatra, but the Russians declined as they were unwilling to anger the 
Netherlands.  St. Petersburg was also undoubtedly wary of placing a Russian 
installation so far from any of their stations, while being so near to key British 
bases.1411  Despite the failure to obtain a coaling station along a key sea line of 
communications, the Russian Navy expanded incrementally.  One British 
observer noted that the Russian Fleet in the Far East, ‗varies in strength 
according to political exigencies‘.1412  The operational requirements of a fleet 
expanding in both numbers and cruising areas, continued to influence strategic 
thinking in St. Petersburg.  By the early 1880s, the Russian Admiralty was, 
‗focused on the issue of obtaining reliable bases, which could be used both in 
case of conflict with China, and for commerce raiding operations against 
European powers, especially Britain‘.1413            
     Sandler noted that protection of merchant shipping and colonial defence, were 
‗considered subordinate‘ to the ‗great national purposes‘ of using the first class 
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ironclads of the Royal Navy in a fight in European waters to overwhelm a rival 
sea power closer to home.1414  The events of the 1870s changed that view 
somewhat.  Britain would keep most of her ironclads in the Channel or 
Mediterranean, but the Admiralty was alerted to the threat of commerce raiders 
avoiding British cruisers to attack merchantmen or an isolated outpost.  The 
press warned that, ‗on a sudden outbreak of war our great ports of trade would 
be perfectly at the mercy of any daring fellow, who with a good ship under him, a 
daredevil crew, and the prospect of ―loot‖, would dash into a unsuspecting 
colonial port, wreak havoc, and escape ‗before we can summon a force to resist 
him‘.  This fear was answered in part by the coastal defence ironclad, an asset 
termed, ‗a class of ship our navy can never be without.‘1415   
     The necessities of defending key British coaling, communications, repair and 
supply bases were understood in the mid-1870s as a core strategic concern: ‗a 
greater naval problem probably does not, and never did exist‘ wrote one Royal 
Artillery officer.1416  Yet, discussions of balanced solutions between the defence 
of main bases, and the naval forces dispatched on offensive operations, centred 
on economy:  
     In maintaining an efficient Navy, therefore, and to obtain the greatest results  
     with a given expenditure, the question must be kept in view how much of that    
     expenditure is to be devoted to the ships themselves, and how much to the     
     harbours, coaling stations, &c., which are absolutely necessary for the ships   
     in time of war‟.1417          
 
     As the Royal Navy evolved to meet new threats during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, the shallow draft turret armourclads remained useful units of 
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reserve squadrons at home, but especially on foreign stations.  Sandler referred 
to the Abyssinia, Cerberus, and Magdala as ships that gave ‗economical, 
uneventful service‘, and they did so in a time of limited defence budgets for the 
Admiralty, but also for the colonies they were to protect.1418  The burdens of 
costs continued to influence colonial defence planning in the 1870s and early 
1880s.  In a letter to Governor Hennessy in April 1880, former Colonial Secretary 
Sir Michael E. Hicks-Beach wrote to inform the governor, that Hong Kong could 
be safeguarded with smaller vessels, as they would be ‗most useful & certainly 
the least expensive form of defence of this kind‘.1419   
     Nevertheless, the turret ships and other, smaller ironclads, were considered in 
these years as ‗the most effective means of defending the larger ports‘ rather 
than coastal fortifications, as the armoured ships were able to offer protection for 
area sea lines of communications , and for harbour facilities, especially the 
crucial coaling stations and dockyards.1420  During debates in the Commons on 1 
August 1882, Sir John Hay, a former First Lord of the Admiralty, asked the 
pointed question about coastal defence ironclads: ‗how are we going to replace 
them‘?1421  These vessels were not replaced.  They were repaired, refitted, and 
remade, to meet the changing requirements of an Imperial establishment 
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increasingly aware of its vulnerabilities.  Like the dockyards, coal depots, and 
cable stations, they were an essential part of the infrastructure of Empire.     
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                   CHAPTER FIVE 
 
   Imperial Competition and Strategic Change: The Laird Rams 1883-1885                    
 
     In January 1885, a Washington D.C. newspaper observed, ‗the ironclad fleet 
of Great Britain cannot be intelligibly classified.  It embraces not less than twelve 
distinct types‘.1422  That article went on to claim the British ironclads, built over 
the preceding twenty years, ‗represent the transition period of naval 
architecture…and present a variety of type, class, and design that not only 
bewilders the non-professional mind but often confuses the expert.‘1423  Despite 
their differing types, the ironclads of the Royal Navy were acknowledged in one 
Salt Lake City newspaper from that year, as comprising the force that 
represented Britain‘s ‗floating peace-makers‘.1424  
     Nevertheless, Britain‘s naval superiority in armoured vessels was questioned 
in Parliament two years before, in May 1883, when a criterion was applied to 
what elements comprised a suitable ironclad.  Among those were armoured 
belts, performance at sea, fuel capacity, and steel breechloading heavy guns.1425  
France and Russia were building their fleets, and the threat of a combined force 
equipped with modern ironclads and torpedo boats, was a consideration Britain 
could not ignore.  On 7 May 1883, M.P., W. H. Smith, a former First Lord of the 
Admiralty, stated in the Commons his views regarding the necessity of 
maintaining ironclads on foreign stations, but he also warned:  
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    „At this moment, ironclads have to be employed in the China and Australian  
    Seas, in the Pacific, on the Coast of North America, and in the West Indies.  
    Our Fleet is scattered in a manner in which the Fleet of no other Power can be  
    scattered; and while it is discharging duties in three or four different seas, if,  
    unfortunately, we should be engaged in a war, Foreign Powers might be able  
    to concentrate their forces against our Navy.1426   
 
     This chapter examines the roles played by the Royal Navy in maintaining an 
armourclad balance of power on colonial stations, as Russian and French 
imperial expansion was viewed as a threat to British interests, especially in Asia.  
Naval weapons and strategies were developed to defend key colonial 
installations with limited resources, and intelligence inputs emerged as a factor 
influencing war planning, both offensively, and concurrently with defensive 
preparations.  A secondary feature of the chapter focuses upon the support roles 
of the Scorpion and Wivern as part of layered defences at key naval bases 
during the mid-1880s and the war scare of 1885.   
 
Russian Expansionism  
 
     On 4 January 1882, newly appointed Russian War Minister Petr Vannovskiie, 
opened a conference in St. Petersburg with several key officials from the Czar‘s 
ministries, to address the issues of British support to China, and Russian 
expansionism in Central Asia.  A circular from the Russian General Staff argued 
that British influence in China and Japan had been countered somewhat by 
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Russian territorial acquisitions in the Far East after the Crimean War.1427  Colonel 
Kakov Barabash had traveled through the northeast border region of China‘s Jilin 
province on an intelligence collection mission for the Russian General Staff and 
wrote in his report that Britain had obligations around the globe, but Russia could 
concentrate a naval force in the Pacific to effect.  Once the squadron was in 
those waters, it ‗might be able to inflict serious damage on Europe from the 
Amur‘.  The Pacific held the possibility of action to pull British resources away 
from Europe during a war, and Russian overland activity along the Afghanistan 
border could prevent Britain from withdrawing forces from India and redeploying 
them to the Mediterranean.1428    
     In the mid-1870s, Captain Fred Burnaby, a British cavalry officer in the Indian 
Army took leave from his unit stationed on the northwest frontier and traveled 
north through the Asian hinterlands.  While on his journey, he visited his 
counterparts in the Czar‘s army and Burnaby noted: ‗You cannot be with Russian 
officers in Central Asia for half an hour without remarking how they long for a 
war…we ought to be thoroughly prepared and ready for an emergency‘.1429     
      Russian officers allegedly acting without guidance from St. Petersburg, had 
been readily employed by the Czars ministers as a cover story for Russian 
expansionism.  If confronted by a superior rival they would be disavowed, if 
successful, more territory would be added to the Russian Empire and the 
process would be repeated.  As early as 1869, the Russian Government  claimed 
that ambitious military officers had acted without orders to advance into Central 
Asia and emphasized this was not an official policy of St Petersburg,  thus 
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‗creating the myth that insubordination was the principal cause of the Russian 
conquest of Central Asia‘.1430   
     Russia expanded into Asia in part due to imperial competition with Britain, 
and, as Peter Hopkirk stated, was driven by that part of the Russian character 
which has ‗an abiding fear of encirclement‘.  The ‗Great Game‘ generated its own 
momentum, and the ‗fears, suspicions and misunderstandings‘ were played out 
on a global scale.1431  In St. Petersburg, Major General Nikolai Igantiev wrote: 
‗The British statesmen should not indulge in pleasant illusions of their colonies 
being secured‘.  Part of his concept to challenge Britain‘s security, was to 
strengthen the Russian Pacific fleet.1432  In Hong Kong, one local newspaper 
noted the Czar‘s military pressure on Afghanistan and observed, ‗Russia can 
hardly repudiate a treaty, before the ink is dry‘.1433         
 
Deterrence and the Royal Navy in the Far East  
 
     Sir Julian Corbett referred to the amphibious options the Royal Navy gave to 
the Empire by emphasizing the strategic advantages of ocean borne mobility, or 
‗what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do‘.1434  Basil Liddell Hart 
termed this maritime centric approach to combat; naval actions, blockades, and 
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amphibious operations on the periphery of a continental enemy, as ‗The British 
way of warfare‘.1435   
     During the War Scare of 1877-78, Russia planned for commerce raiding 
against British shipping worldwide and considered attacking ports in the Empire.  
This was especially true for the Far East as Russian warships were issued charts 
depicting routes in the Pacific utilized by British merchantmen.  Historian John 
Beeler stated the threat from Russian commerce raiders during the mid-
nineteenth century was ‗more imagined than real‘, but the British press of that 
time worried ‗for the want of proper vessels, enough coal, or a few thousand 
pounds spent on defence of important points, we may lose more in a few weeks 
by risks and ―scares‖ than would be regained in the whole course of a successful 
war‘.1436  In 1878, Russian naval planners envisioned a sudden attack against 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia.  British intelligence agents intercepted the 
plans and these likely influenced efforts to reinforce Hong Kong.1437  The Wivern 
was regarded as being able to ‗do good service‘ defending the colony (especially 
when supported by one or two gunboats) against a foreign naval threat which 
was termed ‗very far from imaginary‘.1438            
     Britain had been wary of Russian designs on Turkey, Central Asia, China, and 
Korea as part of St. Petersburg‘s never ending quest for warm water ports.  
During the Victorian era, the British warships of the China Squadron had the task 
of containing the Russians in the Far East, a role which was similar to the Cold 
War missions of the mid-late twentieth century.1439  In August 1861, H.M.S. 
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Ringdove was dispatched from Nagasaki to Tsushima Island to investigate 
rumours the Russian frigate Possadnik had established a station there.1440  The 
discovery of the ‗very comfortable little naval settlement‘, led the British naval 
commander, Vice Admiral Sir James Hope, to steam to the Russian Pacific coast 
and meet with the commander of the Russian squadron.  After that meeting, 
Rear Admiral Likhachev recognized that the game was up and recalled his 
warship from Tsushima.  The Royal Navy had thwarted Russian attempts to 
‗effect a quiet and unobtrusive occupation‘ of the strategic island in the straits 
midway between Japan and Korea.  Russian expansion in northern Asia was, for 
the moment, blocked.  In 1885, Britain‘s China Station warships would again 
forestall a Russian attempt to ‗creep down the coast of Manchuria‘, this time, into 
Korea.1441  Russia presented a threat to British interests in northern Asia and the 
goal of the November 1883, Anglo-Korea treaty was to contain Russia ‗in her 
design of extending her influence from Vladivostok southwards‘.1442  
Nevertheless, Russian plans to move into Korea or gain access to her coasts, 
was not fully understood in London until after the 1885 crisis.1443     
     In the 1880s, St. Petersburg‘s ambitions in Afghanistan had run afoul of 
British concerns over India.  The British Army in India, resupplied and reinforced 
by the expanded Indian rail network, could rush forces to the frontline if Russian 
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troops advanced south from the Afghanistan frontier.  If the crisis developed into 
war, London would have to apply pressure elsewhere on the Russian Empire to 
compel her to pull reinforcements away from Central Asia.  Britain could conduct 
a naval war ‗all over the world‘ as she had done during the Crimean War, yet 
London needed allies to attack the armies of the Czar.1444  No other powers 
accepted the British offer, and London looked to areas in the Russian Empire for 
potential sites for military operations.  The Russian coastlines at her few outlets 
to the world offered the best options for a sudden British strike. 
 
Vladivostok 
 
     Vladivostok was a target, but some leaders in London saw this as a peripheral 
area only, with no impact on ‗a war either in Europe, or Central Asia‘.1445  
Nonetheless, Vladivostok was more than a naval base; it was Russia‘s 
springboard in northern Asia.  In the years since 1880, Vladivostok a former 
‗fishing and trading village‘, had grown into ‗a city …with dry docks of the largest 
capacity and fortifications which make it impregnable‘.1446   Nonetheless 
Vladivostok was ice-bound part of the year, and in a move to keep the fleet 
dispersed but ready for action, warships of the Russian Pacific Fleet usually 
wintered over in Japan, particularly at Nagasaki, where they could receive 
dockyard attention as needed.1447   
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     The Russian Pacific coast was ‗frustrated by the rigor [sic] of nature, as the 
Winter temperature along the western coast of the Pacific is much lower than in 
corresponding latitudes either in America or Europe.‘1448  Vladivostok had a fine 
harbour, three miles in length, permitting the ships of the Pacific Fleet to anchor 
close to shore.  The entrance to the bay was protected by shore batteries (and 
during times of crisis, submarine mines), but the headland that separated the bay 
from the sea was narrow.  During a conflict, hostile warships could elevate their 
guns to fire over the spit of land and into the anchorage or upon key shore 
facilities.  Although not free from ice, Golden Horn Bay was usually frozen over 
late in December but thawed in mid-February.  This was under ideal conditions, 
as ice could block the port sometimes until mid-April.1449  After the ice thawed, a 
surge in shipping would enter the anchorage and soon the bay would be ‗well 
filled up with vessels‘.1450  Not a perfect outlet to the Pacific, but it was the best 
available for the Russians to take belated advantage of a weakening Chinese 
Empire.1451        
     Vladivostok was initially ‗strategically insignificant‘, but that changed during 
the later nineteenth century.  Russia had undertaken incremental steps to 
improve its main outlet to the Pacific.1452  The port shared a similarity with 
Bermuda as the land was not suitable for the construction of a conventional dry 
dock.  Whereas the Atlantic island base stood on incompatible porous stone, the 
main Russian naval facility in the Far East was perched on a narrow strip of land, 
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bounded by seas and high hills, and locked most of the year in permafrost.  The 
solution was a floating dry dock built on the same lines as the dock at Bermuda.  
In July 1880, Russia ordered an iron floating dry dock from a British shipbuilder 
for its Pacific base.1453  This dock (301 feet in length), was built on the lines of a 
similar floating dock built by Clark, Stanfield and Company of London for the 
Russian Navy to hoist its circular ‗Popovka‘ ironclads.1454  The new dock was 
capable of lifting 7430 tons, and would provide the Siberian port with the ability to 
repair or clean the hull of any cruiser in the Russian Navy of the time.  
Vladivostok was making strides to earn its moniker ‗The Sebastopol of the 
Pacific‘, but this base remained an isolated port until the end of the century when 
it became the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway.  Steady improvements 
were made to the naval base, but it remained an alternative post for the Russian 
Pacific Squadron, in favour of the warmer waters of Japan and the large dry 
docks at Nagasaki and Yokohama.1455  In September 1883, Vladivostok received 
its floating dry dock from Britain, and Russian officers would ‗cherish the hope 
that their ships will now become independent of Japanese ports‘.1456   In the 
event of war, Vladivostok would be defended by mines and torpedo boats as the 
Russian Pacific Squadron, at least at the outset of the conflict, was expected to 
operate against British commerce.1457 
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     Sir Henry Brackenbury, the Director of British Military Intelligence felt that an 
attack on Vladivostok would not have any impact on affairs in Europe.1458  
Nevertheless, blockade and attack against Russia‘s only Pacific fortress would 
influence St. Petersburg at the other end of the long Russian telegraph line and 
would cut the Czar‘s Pacific cruisers off from a home base.  Vladivostok was one 
place where ‗England‘s power could make itself felt‘, but actions against the 
Russia coasts (aside from the certainty of blockading all Russian ports) in the 
Baltic and Black Sea would be heavily contested, and the deployment of a corps-
sized British Army Expeditionary force of 36,000 men would not have a 
guarantee of success in the Baltic unless, Russia was ‗in a very enfeebled 
condition‘.1459   Vladivostok was considered ‗the only vulnerable point of the 
Russian Empire in the event of war‘.1460  
 
Commerce Protection and Coal Supplies 
 
     Arthur J. Marder wrote in The Anatomy of British Sea Power that a Russian 
war against British commerce was never feared in Whitehall.  The reason was 
due to Russia‘s geographical position as it ‗was a poor one in a naval war; she 
had few cruisers and coaling stations‘.1461  This appears true only in retrospect 
when compared with the much larger and closer threat from Germany in the early 
years of the twentieth century.  
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     Of the 22,000 or so British merchant ships in service in 1875, slightly more 
than 3400 were steamers, whereas over 18,000 were sailing ships.  Of the 
steamers, only some 300 had a speed of 12 knots or over.1462  The tramp 
steamers were considered to be ‗an absolute necessity for the actual support of 
life‘ in Britain.  Most British steamers plodded along at a speed of advance closer 
to 8 knots.  The dependable and thus predicable tramp steamer was the 
commerce raiders‘ ‗inevitable prey‘.1463  The tramp steamer might have been the 
main quarry of an enemy commerce raider, but the forlorn sailing ship, gliding 
along with a partial cargo of coal en route to an a remote harbour, could provide 
fuel to a hostile warship if it was unlucky enough to be captured.1464   
     Sailing ships supplied coal to ports on distant oceans, especially in the 
Pacific, and the P & O line operated 170 sailing colliers to maintain the supply for 
their steamers traveling to India.1465  British coaling stations aided other powers 
such as the French and Russians, in shuttling reinforcements and replacements 
to and from their overseas colonies and remote bases.  As one contemporary 
observer put it: ‗In peace-time, the redistribution of naval force can be arranged 
without any difficulty by the aid of foreign ports, and the successive 
reinforcements and reliefs of the Russian squadron in the Far East have been 
facilitated by the British coaling stations of Aden, Colombo, Singapore, and 
Hong-Kong‘.1466   
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    Britain, held an ‗unrivalled chain of stations on the routes to the China Seas‘, 
and used these possessions to her advantage for the benefit of her navy and 
merchant marine, and on occasion, to restrict the movements of a rival during 
times of increased international tensions.1467  In 1885, the Russian Navy 
discovered the liability of having to depend on British coaling stations on the 
route to the Pacific via Suez.  During one encounter, a Russian cruiser was 
followed by the British ironclad Orion until the Russian warship was left astern as 
the Orion steamed ahead to the next coaling station.  When the Russian warship 
arrived at Aden, it discovered that the Royal Navy, acting on Admiralty orders, 
had bought up the entire coal supply at that port.  Only a small amount was made 
available for the Russians, and the same was true when the cruiser arrived at 
Colombo.  The lack of fuel restricted the Russian warship to half speed in order 
to conserve its already inadequate supply of coal.1468  The type of coal made 
available to them was likely not the best Welsh anthracite as those stocks were 
usually reserved for British warships.1469  Thus, during a time of increased 
tensions between the two empires, Russia could be hamstrung if not prepared to 
provide her own fuel sources on the route to their Pacific coast.   
     The coaling station at the northern Borneo port of Labuan, a necessary stop 
for warships travelling to Hong Kong during the monsoon season, had plans to 
move the coal inland during wartime where the fuel stockpile could be defended 
by a small redoubt.1470  On 11 April 1885, the senior British naval officer at 
Singapore relayed (via telegram) information concerning the arrival of a Russian 
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immigrant ship bound for Vladivostok.  In that report, he asked permission to 
purchase 2000 tons of Welsh coal stored in Borneo to prevent the Russians 
obtaining the supply.1471  In early May 1885, W. B. Dalley, acting Colonial 
Secretary for New South Wales, telegraphed a request to the other Australian 
colonies asking their financial support to all merchants who refused to supply 
coal to Russian cruisers in their waters.1472   
     Russia was aware of her fuel limitations, but petroleum offered a solution.  
Steamers on the Caspian and locomotives in southern Russia burned it with only 
a few adaptions to existing boilers, and it offered advantages in loading and costs 
over coal.  The adoption of oil as substitute for coal would give the main 
petroleum suppliers, America and Russia, an advantage over the trade in coal 
dominated by Britain.1473  During the crisis of 1885, the Royal Navy would need 
over 3500 stokers if full mobilization were implemented, but liquid fuel offered the 
hope of a manpower reduction for some smaller warships as stokers were not 
required for oil-fired boilers.  If tests proved the serviceability of the new fuel, 
weight and space could also be saved as fans for forced draught aboard torpedo 
boats would no longer be needed.1474  In August and early September 1885, 
experiments with liquid fuel were held aboard the British torpedo boat, No. 22, in 
Portsmouth.  The trials were not successful, as the coal oil produced an intense 
amount of smoke, and ‗disagreeable‘ smell, but the main fault was a difficulty in 
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maintaining steam.1475  The ‗revolution‘ of the oil-fired boiler was beginning, but 
technology had to mature before a new fuel would supersede the proven coal 
stockpiles already in place at strategic locations around the world.1476            
     The ownership of these vital coaling stations gave the Royal Navy the ability 
to refuel at will and, combined with the submarine telegraph cable, the ability to 
concentrate at a point of danger when required.  During the last years of the 
nineteenth century, Britain was, in the words of Georges Clemenceau ‗isolated 
from all, but free in every motion‘, largely due to her navy and her interconnected 
coaling stations and communications links.1477    
 
France Resurgent 
 
     Chinese and French moves to occupy positions in northern Vietnam led to 
open conflict with Beijing after the government of Jules Ferry in Paris issued an 
ultimatum to China on 12 July, 1884.  China refused to comply with the demand, 
prompting a French attack which began with a bombardment of the port of 
Keelung on northern Taiwan.  France embarked on an undeclared war with 
China that brought French successes at sea, but her naval operations tested the 
limitations of neutrality.1478  The conflict would place Britain in an uncomfortable 
position as the leading neutral power in the region, with Hong Kong serving as 
the main supply base for the French fleet operating against Chinese coastal 
positions and squadrons.  France made use of Hong Kong to coal, supply, and 
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repair warships, but her logistical undertakings there strained relations with 
London as the conflict continued.   
     Access to Hong Kong was the reason Paris did not declare war on China as 
Britain would have been compelled to enforce neutrality laws during the 
conflict.1479  This was a clever diplomatic tightrope walk, as the British colony 
provided France with an essential base and ‗without the use of Hong Kong the 
war would have been impossible‘.1480  Ironically, Chinese stevedores at 
Singapore and Hong Kong were reportedly compelled to help coal French 
warships en route to the conflict and this drew the attention of M.Ps in 
Westminster as they questioned aspects of British neutrality.1481              
     One officer aboard the French cruiser Primauguet complained that refueling 
had taken three days in Hong Kong, as the British supplied coal was ‗doled out to 
us sparingly, so as not violate their neutrality‘.1482  The French use of Hong Kong 
had generated tensions with the local Chinese and by the autumn of 1884, 
strikes, protests, and rumours of sabotage raised tensions further.  In September, 
Chang Chih-tung, the newly appointed viceroy in Canton, feared a French attack 
on his city, and issued a call for ethnic Chinese workers in the European colonies 
(Penang, Singapore and Vietnam) to kill French personnel through either direct 
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attack or by poison.  Hong Kong was not directly mentioned, but Chinese working 
there and Macao were certainly made aware of the proclamation.1483  
     The tensions with the French squadron in Hong Kong led British authorities 
there to provide an escort of Sikh policemen for the second in command of the 
French fleet, Admiral Sebastian Lespres, when he was ashore in the colony.1484  
Protests against the French led to riots in Hong Kong on 3 October, and the Sikh 
police, imposing in their white uniforms and high red turbans, rushed in to quell 
the disturbances.  When the protestors threw stones, the Sikhs opened fire with 
their carbines and drew swords.  One hundred men from the East Kent Regiment 
(the local garrison) marched to the scene of the riot with fixed bayonets, and the 
warships of the China Station were put on alert.1485  The disturbance had been 
brought to a close, but a detail from the Audacious was to be landed in in the 
event a rumoured arson campaign got underway in the city.1486                
     The French naval build-up caused a stir in British newspapers but with 
warships including the Wivern held in reserve at Hong Kong, Britain had ‗far from 
an ―insignificant fleet‖ out here, in spite of the croaking of alarmists at home‘.1487  
Despite this claim, in a December 1884 London newspaper article, Admiral Sir J. 
C. Dalrymple feared that Britain was unprepared to meet a French surprise 
attack launched on a global scale.  In his fanciful ‗Kreigsspiel‘, he stated ‗that 
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modern wars begin without declaration‘ and then described how Admiral 
Courbet‘s squadron at anchor in Hong Kong would suddenly spring to a pre-
Christmas attack upon receipt of secret sealed orders from Paris.1488  With his 
four ironclads, Courbet would ram the Audacious and the ‗nondescript‘ Wivern, 
sinking both and thus put Hong Kong at his mercy.  The colony would have been 
forced to surrender or the port, dry dock and shipping would have been fired.  
Recoaling from captured stocks, Singapore would have been next to fall under 
the guns of the attacking ironclads.  The fast moving and unhindered French 
would then have charged into the Indian Ocean by early January 1885, seizing 
coal and destroying dockyards as they went.  If the coastal defence ironclads 
Abyssinia and Magdala put up a fight at Bombay, they too would have been sunk 
in a similar attack run to that faced by the hapless Hong Kong ironclads.  This 
was Dalrymple‘s alarmist ‗coup‘ where the ram featured prominently in this 
fictitious surprise thrust against the British Empire.1489      
     British naval officers in the Far East felt they had an advantage in morale and 
training.  One Royal Navy officer at Hong Kong compared the warships of Britain 
with her rivals, calling the foreign ‗specimens‘ of France, Germany and Russia ‗a 
dirty, miserable obsolete lot…one does not know whether to laugh or cry over 
them‘.  He further noted most of the French vessels ‗would not be used for coal 
hulks in the Royal Navy‘.1490  One British correspondent compared the disciplined 
crew of the Audacious with the men of the French ironclad Galisonniere and 
concluded the visitors ‗had a lot to learn‘.  The claim was disingenuous, as the 
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writer also noted France was ‗our greatest and most dangerous rival for maritime 
supremacy‘.1491 
     The French archived victories in China thorough a combination of naval 
actions and amphibious landings, and one western journalist claimed that Paris 
had spread western influence in China with ‗the aid of the chassepot and 
mitrailleuse‘.  Despite these gains, she could not hold key islands in the face of 
determined British diplomatic opposition.1492  Hostilities officially ended on 9 June 
1885, with the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin.  France withdrew from Chinese 
territory, evacuating Keelung on Taiwan on 21 June and the Pescadores on 22 
July, but she achieved her strategic objective as she obtained a free hand in 
Indo-China.1493                                                                 
 
The Royal Navy and Defensive Preparations 1885: The Penjdeh Crisis  
 
     The French undeclared war with China occurred during the siege of General 
Gordon‘s Egyptian forces at Khartoum by the Mahdi‘s army, and during a time of 
increased tensions along the Afghanistan frontier, as Russian forces pushed 
south causing concern for India‘s safety. The possibility of a multi-front war with 
Russia while facing a large-scale colonial campaign of ‗incalculable 
dimensions…in the heart of Africa‘ was a heavy drain on British resources, 
especially manpower.1494  Nevertheless Russian advances into northern 
Afghanistan represented the greater threat and the Royal Navy moved to prepare 
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for hostilities from the Baltic to the Pacific.  Russian troops occupied the frontier 
village of Merv in February 1884, prompting war planning in London should the 
Russians continue south.   
     In March 1885, Russian forces attacked the army position at Penjdeh on 
Afghanistan‘s northern frontier with the Russian Empire and the Gladstone 
Government in London prepared for war.1495  Russian expansionism into 
Afghanistan had come not from individual officers acting rashly, but as part of a 
combined War and Foreign Ministries cooperation which ‗made Russian polices 
unusually flexible and vigorous‘ [sic].1496  The British response to the incursion 
would force the issue in St. Petersburg, and belatedly the Admiralty and the 
Minister of War were compelled to admit to the Czar that Russia was not ready 
for a conflict with the British Empire.1497 
     Britain had flexible responses to Russian aggression.  A plan to provide 
30,000 British troops to reinforce India in the event of heightened tensions with 
St. Petersburg over activities in Central Asia was abandoned, as that would 
(according to General Sir Garnet Wolseley) ‗play Russia‘s game‘.1498  The War 
Office would retain the options of an expeditionary force in Britain, ready to strike 
a Russian weak point.   
     One such place, as proposed by a British Military Intelligence officer, Major J. 
S. Rothwell, was to attack along the Russian railway line at their extreme 
southwestern flank in the Caucasus region, with the goal of threatening their 
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supply lines via the Caspian Sea.1499  Rothwell proposed that maps of the area 
around the Black Sea port of Batumi, ‗should be studied with as much care as is 
bestowed on the military features of a district in England‘.  As those maps did not 
exist in the detail required, the Major suggested that two Russian-speaking 
officers, under cover as sportsmen or artists, travel to the area to collect the 
required intelligence.1500  With updated information on the region, the railway to 
Baku would serve as a likely conduit for British operations into the Caspian, 
cutting a vital Russian supply route to Afghanistan.1501  In May 1885, Demetrius 
R. Peacock, the British Vice-Consul at Batumi was reportedly arrested by 
Russian police while making sketches at a Caspian port.  He had journeyed 
extensively around the Trans-Caucasus and had attracted the attention of the 
Russian police due to his visits to key locations during his travels.1502   
     In July 1885, an article in an Australian newspaper detailed the advantages of 
a British combined arms attack against Russian possessions in the Caucasus 
region, claiming these would prove to be of ‗more service here than in knocking 
its strength out uselessly against the fortifications of the Baltic‘.1503  After an 
amphibious landing at the Georgian ports of Poti or Batumi, an overland 
expedition would move to secure the railway for the transport of a special naval 
unit: 
     „Torpedo-boats, gunboats, armed flats, and other vessels adapted to the     
     circumstances would have been provided, to be taken across on rail and  
                                                                                                                                  
1498
 Johnson, ―Russian at the Gates of India‖?  Planning the Defence of India 1885-1900‘, Journal 
of Military History, 67, (Jul. 2003), 735. 
1499
 TNA, CAB 37/13, ‗England‘s Means of Offence against Russia‘, No. 36, (1884), 4-6. 
1500
 Ibid, 6. 
1501
 Ibid, 4. 
1502
 ‗Reported Arrest of A British Consul in Russia‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 19 May 1885, 5, No 
Subject, Leeds Times, 4 June 1892, 3. 
1503
 ‗A Military Forecast‘, Brisbane Courier, 22 July 1885, 3.  
 383 
     launched on the shallow waters of the Caspian, and the upper hand once   
     gained here would be truly decisive‟.1504  
 
     The concept of using British torpedo boats on the Caspian was later known to 
the naval authorities in St. Petersburg.  A fictitious account of a Russian 
commerce raider (written in 1887), describes how one of the Czar‘s cruisers 
sinks British merchant ships and men-of-war in a series of surprise attacks in the 
South Atlantic and Indian Ocean during a war with Britain, which had begun over 
imperial competition in Central Asia.1505  In this ‗imaginary story‘, the commerce 
raider Russia‟s Hope captured a British steamer carrying pre-fabricated torpedo 
boats and charts of the Caspian.1506    
 
The North American and West Indian Squadron and the Russian War Scare 
of 1885 
 
     The actions of the corvette H.M.S. Garnet on the West Indies and North 
American Station in April 1885 provided an example of Nelson‘s reported maxim 
‗Close with a Frenchman and out manoeuvre a Russian‘.1507  Captain H. Hand of 
the Garnet, exceeded his orders and did both as he closed with and out 
manoeuvred the Russian corvette Strelok from Havana.  The Garnet was under 
orders to proceed to Bermuda via Key West, but Hand trailed the Russian 
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corvette and followed her to Norfolk, Virginia where he anchored close to his 
quarry.1508  Both captains were on cordial terms, but the attitudes of the officers 
were noticeably different.  In interviews published in American newspapers, one 
British officer stated that the men on the Garnet were ‗anxious for a fight‘.  A 
Russian officer aboard the Strelok responded to another American reporter by 
saying that the Russian sailors had ‗no particular desire to fight against England‘, 
but that they would do their duty.  Acting on orders from St. Petersburg, Captain 
Sarydloff escaped his ship‘s British shadow by slipping out of Norfolk after 
midnight on 1 May.  The Strelok steamed at full speed (dropping off the pilot 
beforehand) to ‗cut the water like a swan‘, in order to anchor in New York 
Harbour and temporarily break away from her pursuer.1509  The heavier Garnet, 
delayed by weather, arrived at New York two days later.1510  Her presence 
hampered Russian efforts to obtain key materials from America, as five Russian 
merchant ships stayed at anchor in the harbour as tensions with Britain remained 
high.1511   
     In the early morning hours of 5 May 1885, the Garnet was the target of a 
demonstration to test the utility of another form of torpedo.  After 1 a.m., Paul 
Boyton, the inventor of an early inflatable wetsuit, swam out from Staten Island to 
attach a new weapon to the British corvette anchored less than one third of a 
mile offshore.  This weapon was equipped with a clockwork timer, crushed stone 
to simulate an explosive charge, and empty sub-compartments to aid in floating 
or submerging the torpedo, or as it would be known today, limpet mine.  Boyton 
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succeeded in securing the mine to the ship‘s starboard side undetected, but 
when he swam away, he utilized his paddle and the splashing sound led to his 
discovery by the watch.  Intercepted by the Garnet‟s steam launch, Boyton was 
released, but his stunt had proven his assertion that ‗no ship at anchor is safe 
from certain methods of torpedo warfare‘.1512    
     Repercussions were swift.  By 15 May, a naval inquiry held at Halifax resulted 
in the marine sentry on duty aboard the corvette being sentenced to 45 days 
confinement for failing to detect the swimmer, and the officer of the watch, a 
Lieutenant Gardner, was to be tried by Court-martial for releasing Boyton.1513  
Hand was replaced by the Honourable Victor A. Montague as the ship‘s 
commander within days of the Garnet‟s arrival at Halifax from New York.1514    
     During the night of 25 May, a man rowed near the corvette H.M.S. Canada 
and nearby warships at anchor in Halifax.  When the boatman failed to respond 
to a hail from the sentry, he was fired upon and picked up by a launch from the 
corvette.  Later released for being ‗more stupid than malicious‘, the warships of 
the squadron were on increased alert.1515  Reports of Fenian activity in western 
Canada, (with infiltrators coming from New York City and Buffalo), had raised 
alarms that spring.1516  These reports, combined with Boyton‘s stunt, and 
Russian efforts in North America, compelled British authorities to improve area 
defences to meet the diverse challenges.  
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     As the Garnet was following the Strelok from Havana, the Bermuda garrison 
was strengthening local defences.1517  On 23 April a suspicious fire broke out 
aboard the troopship H.M.S. Wye as she was loading condemned stores at 
Bermuda.  A week later, the Canada also caught fire at the dockyard.  Although 
the fires were extinguished in time and no injuries were reported, these incidents 
led to increased vigilance by the military and naval authorities on the island 
fortress as fears of a Fenian sabotage plot were raised.1518  That summer the 
Scorpion was only mentioned in the navy station lists published in British 
newspapers.  Her readiness can only be guessed at for the Bermuda papers did 
not discuss her during the crisis.1519  Despite the lack of news reporting, the 
warships of the squadron and the gunners of the fortress received over 100 tons 
of ordnance stores as ‗considerable activity‘ occurred at Woolwich to forward 
supplies to Bermuda.1520          
     The Russian minister to Washington was reportedly attempting to induce an 
American naval officer to help him select steamers for purchase, with an eye to 
converting them into auxiliary cruisers.1521  Russia was apparently interested in 
acquiring fast steamers from a Philadelphia shipbuilder in a repeat of the 
Volunteer cruiser acquisitions of 1878.1522  The shipyards along the Delaware 
River gave rise to what was termed ‗The American Clyde‘, as this was the centre 
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of American shipbuilding in the post-Civil War United States.1523  On 3 May 1883, 
Philadelphia shipbuilder John Roach received a contract from Washington 
authorizing his firm to build the first steel warships of the U.S. Navy.  These four 
ships would consist of the small cruisers Atlanta, and Boston, the larger cruiser 
Chicago, and the dispatch vessel Dolphin, the so called ‗ABCD‘ of the U.S. 
fleet.1524  Bogged down by the difficulties of working with steel and additional 
design modifications, Roach reportedly offered to sell the ships to Russia.  The 
New York Times commented on the design failings of the new steel warships by 
referring to them as ‗Mr. Roach‘s marine curiosities‘, noting that they were ‗too 
slow to overtake anything even when their machinery does not breakdown…have 
no guns worth mentioning and are more or less unseaworthy‘.1525   
     The warships of the British North American and West Indian Squadron were 
positioned at key locations near the continent in readiness to respond to a 
Russian corvette or an auxiliary cruiser purchased from American ship owners 
and armed in international waters.  The British warships ‗comprised an effective 
coastguard on duty from Halifax to Havannah [sic], and also in the Gulf of 
Mexico‘, with administrative control from Bermuda.1526  As the island fortress was 
not then connected to the Empire via submarine telegraph, the corvette H.M.S. 
Tenedos was held at Halifax in readiness to steam to Bermuda at short notice 
and carry sealed orders to the colony if war was declared on Russia.1527          
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The China Station and the Russian War Scare of 1885 
            
     The number of warships Russia could hope to employ against British 
commerce or a colonial outpost was never large, but the threat was not only 
against ships or a given locale, but also against a strategic object:  Britain‘s 
submarine cables, which, during times of war, were exposed to ‗special and 
peculiar risks‘.1528  Regarding the supply of spare telegraph cable, on 14 April 
1885, The Earl of Carnarvon warned Parliament: 
     In 1878, when there were great alarms as to a Russian war, the Russian  
     Government, who were, perhaps, more alive to the circumstances of the case  
     than we generally were, had taken measures for cutting the submarine  
     cables, and for equipping ships for that special purpose. It was said at the  
     time and on good authority, and was generally believed, that there was a  
     carefully elaborated scheme for taking measures against our submarine  
     cables in the Eastern waters.1529 
 
     The fear of attack against the cables led to an 1886 circular which warned 
colonial governors that a break in communications via the submarine cable 
during times of international complications, should be interpreted as an apparent 
indication hostiles between the British Empire and the unfriendly power had 
begun.1530  This possible indicator was not a reliable one, as the single Hong 
Kong cable connecting to Saigon occasionally suffered breakdowns and 
remained the only southern link until another cable was laid from Labuan to Hong 
Kong in 1894.1531  One precaution proposed by an Edinburgh newspaper, 
envisioned that cable repair vessels would be protected by cruisers of the Royal 
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Navy during war-time operations when dispatched to repair a severed 
communications link.1532   From Honolulu, one newspaper reported a rumour that 
Russian cruisers were prepositioned at ports in the Pacific ‗in readiness, in case 
of war, to cut the ocean cables connecting England with China, India and 
Australia‘.1533  Although Russia was only a ‗second rate‘ naval power, the Czar‘s 
admirals had ‗made a very good disposition of her forces abroad‘, in preparation 
for a war with Britain.1534     
     During the 1885 Afghan crisis, the Russian Navy sent reinforcements to the 
Pacific in order to add more potential threats to British shipping on the Asian sea 
lanes.1535  The Royal Navy reacted to the increased tensions by following all 
Russian warships at sea in relatively close proximately in a manner that can be 
described as aggressive shadowing.        
     The Russians frantically prepared their coastal defences to offer some 
counter against the British naval bombardments they feared were inevitable: 
‗Russia, if challenged, must fight at Vladivostok‘ and they ‗would fight at a great 
disadvantage‘, according to one British writer.1536  In late April 1885, a rumour 
was reported in St. Petersburg that ‗four English monitors are cruising in the 
vicinity‘ of Vladivostok.  Russian naval authorities were ‗at fever heat‘ over the 
report, and asked for increased funding of 25 million rubles (then approximately 
£5 million), to strengthen their navy.1537  The garrison commander at Vladivostok 
reportedly sent the women and children away from the city, fearing civilian 
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casualties if the Royal Navy commenced a bombardment.  The port was closed 
to foreign ships unless under the control of a Russian pilot, and mines were sown 
in an effort to protect the port from a hostile British squadron.1538   
     In late April, the New York Times speculated that Chinese waters were ‗the 
point where England would suffer‘, and stated that except off the Asian coasts, 
‗the Russian Navy cannot assume the offensive‘.  That article mistakenly claimed 
the peacetime force of British corvettes and gunboats were ‗non-values‘ during 
the threatened war.  These warships in Chinese waters would not assist the 
Royal Navy as those vessels were unarmoured and inadequately armed…‗they 
will do little good and less harm‘.1539  The newspaper had not taken the Wivern 
into account. 
     In Hong Kong, the Wivern had been reconditioned in anticipation for a return 
to active service.  On 11 February 1885, she went out to fire her guns while the 
fleet commander was aboard.  She had been fitted with two iron fighting tops, 
both of which were equipped with a Nordenfelt, as part of the overhaul to render 
her ‗into first class fighting efficiency‘.1540  The masts no longer carried sails but 
were two ‗posts that supported the circular framework‘ of the fighting top.  With 
the machine guns behind iron shields, the Nordenfelts could fire ‗a bullet as big 
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as a pigeon‘s egg‘ against any hostile target within range.1541  The military mast 
of the late Victorian era was considered by one New York journal to be ‗a position 
perhaps the most dangerous in all naval warfare‘.  Describing the difficulties of 
manning that position during  a battle, the newspaper commented: ‗It is no easy 
task to fire from a platform placed at the bob end of a pendulum, swinging 
irregularly, and the results attained testify to the value of the drill and to the 
physique of the individual‘.1542 
     Drill was a strong suit of the Royal Navy.  Although outnumbered by the 
foreign warships on the China Station, one observer wrote: ‗British men-of-wars 
men are superior in physique, discipline, and stamina‘, to the seamen on French, 
Italian and Russian warships.1543  Jan Morris, in her Pax Britannica, made a 
comparison of esprit de corps between British men-of-war and those of her 
nearest rivals during these years: ‗Group photographs of ships‘ companies 
emanate a delightful sense of cocky cheerfulness, very different from the 
moustachio‘d melancholy that seemed to hang around the crews of French or 
Russian ironclads‘.1544       
     The British press reported the Wivern was to be commissioned in preparation 
for steaming to join the British warships off Vladivostok, yet the China Squadron 
needed reinforcements, and was ‗fully occupied‘ with the needs of local 
defence.1545  The land defences of Hong Kong were considered inadequate, and 
the Wivern with her torpedo boats, was in demand.  Nevertheless, her status as 
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a reserve warship escaped the attention of one observer, Charles-Dominique-
Maurice Rollet de I‘Isle, aboard the French warship Primauguet.  The French 
officer wrote: ‗The British do not have a large naval force in the region…they 
have quite a few gunboats in China, but most of them are obsolete, wooden craft.  
They won‘t put up much of a fight against the new Russian cruisers and 
ironclads‘.1546   The local press noted the Royal Navy had only two ironclads on 
station, the Audacious and Wivern, but the Russians had the armoured frigates 
Vladimir Monomakh, and the Minin in nearby Asian waters, and another 
armourclad frigate, the General Admiral was en route.  The new turret ship, 
H.M.S. Agamemnon was steaming for the Far East via the Suez Canal, but the 
advantage in size of the ironclads lay with the Russians as the Hong Kong daily 
felt the ‗contrast is not pleasant‘.1547  
     Russian crews employed a deception known in Russian military parlance as 
Maskirovka, loosely described as camouflage or concealment designed to 
appear stronger than they were.  Russian officers in unprotected warships, were 
known to place false gun shields or ‗dummy armour‘ over their guns in attempts 
to deceive visiting British officers.  As late as 1899, crewmen aboard an 
armoured Russian man-of-war filled in the joints of the ill-fitted plates with wood 
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and putty to give the appearance of a more uniform protective belt around the 
hull.1548    
     In 1885, the numerical advantage in armoured ships in the Far East remained 
with the Russians as the Wivern was to be held back (at least initially), in order to 
be available for ‗judicious use‘ to supplement the Hong Kong fortifications in the 
event of a Russian attack.1549  On 28 March 1885, Rollet de I‘Isle observed the 
‗great commotion‘ aboard the recently arrived Agamemnon as she hoisted her 
two torpedo boats aboard, and weighed anchor.  The Frenchman observed the 
loading with professional curiosity writing: ‗They (the torpedo launches) were 
hoisted aboard by means of a crane mast set up at her stern.  This maneouvre, 
delicate enough in a harbour, would have been impossible at sea.  Why, we 
wonder, has she taken the trouble to load her torpedo launches?‘1550   Rollet de 
I‘Isle again made no mention of the Wivern or her torpedo boats.  The French 
officer likely did not observe the turret ship during his brief visits to the colony; he 
only saw a limited part of Hong Kong, as his ship was assigned to an anchorage 
reserved for warships, whereas the Wivern would likely been anchored closer to 
shore near Kowloon where her guns could protect the coal depot.1551    
     Nevertheless, Lieutenant Gamble would have agreed with his assessment of 
the difficulty in loading the torpedo launches at sea.  Gamble reported his 
concerns that the two TBs carried on the Wivern would have been damaged by 
the blast from the main turret guns, and noted the boats could not be hoisted out 
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unless in a calm sea ‗as the derrick only just-takes the boat clear of the ship‘s 
side‘.  Gamble proposed that a permanent facility be built ashore at Kowloon to 
house the torpedo establishment.  Until that facility was completed, the turret ship 
would continue in her dual role as coastal defence ironclad and depot ship for the 
torpedo boats.1552  
     Despite her limitations, the Wivern was valued in Hong Kong.  An assertion 
made in the Pall Mall Gazette (in late 1884), that British gunboats on the China 
Station were ‗slow tubs mainly manned by Chinese‘, generated some ire in Hong 
Kong.  This article, combined with Sir Edward Reed‘s claim that the Wivern was 
‗a weak old gunboat‘, was met with some surprise in the China Squadron.  The 
retort against the false claims of the London newspaper criticizing the 
preparedness of the China Station was continued in the Hong Kong Telegraph 
which proclaimed the ‗Wivern is undoubtedly the most formidable fighting ship of 
any nation ever seen in Hong Kong Harbour‘.1553 
     The demands of a global conflict meant the Royal Navy could not spare more 
than a few ships for reinforcements to the Far East: ‗little beyond the resources of 
Her Majesty‘s Squadron in China will be available‘ for the intended roles of 
coastal defence, protection of forward operating bases, blockade duty, and 
offensive operations.1554  But the mission of shadowing Russian vessels around 
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East Asia was carried out ‗with diligence‘.1555  In April 1885, the Admiralty sent a 
telegram ordering all commanding officers of British warships to cable the 
commander of each station, details of the movements of any Russian ships they 
observed.1556         
     The tensions had been building for several months.  In late March, China 
Station commander Vice Admiral William M. Dowell, asked the British Consul in 
Manila to inform him if the Russian warships coaling in that harbour had 
departed, and if so, their heading.  The admiral asked the same of the British 
Minister in Tokyo.1557  When the Minin steamed out of Nagasaki in late March 
1885 bound for a Russian base on the Baltic, the band of the Audacious struck 
up God Save the Czar, and Home, Sweet Home, as a sendoff to their rivals.  But 
the men aboard the British ironclad grumbled at having to cheer the ‗oily-wad-
eating, tallow-chowing, sons of guns‘, as they saw their anticipated prize money 
steam over the horizon.  Two hours later, the Audacious and two British corvettes 
weighed anchor and followed the Russian ironclad to confirm she was headed 
away from Japan.1558            
     The submarine cable network gave Dowell and the Admiralty a clear picture of 
Russian naval movements in the Far East, and permitted the deployment of 
forces to ensure an adequate defence of Hong Kong.  This communications 
network also facilitated the assembly of British men-of-war at select positions in 
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order to secure local naval superiority against individual Russian warships or 
squadrons.  The telegraph cable allowed the Royal Navy to mob the Russian 
men-of-war before they could reach a Russian port or while on their voyages to 
and from a neutral one.           
     Regarding the Royal Navy‘s surge in activity in the Far East, one London 
newspaper reported: the ‗British squadron…is displaying considerable activity. 
The English ships follow the Russians in every direction: Indeed, each Russian 
man-of war is followed by several English vessels, so that in case of war the 
Russian squadron could not easily join the fleet at Vladivostok‘.1559  At 
Yokohama, the Agamemnon encountered the Russian ironclad Vladimir 
Monomakh at anchor, ready for action with guns trained on the British warship.  
Like the Garnet in the Atlantic, the Agamemnon had shadowed the Russian 
warship, but the Vladimir Monomakh exhibited a hostile intent as a ‗grudge 
match‘ developed between the two warships.  This incident developed into a 
separate diplomatic flair up, with the British captain protesting the Russian‘s 
belligerent behaviour in a neutral port as being ‗opposed to international 
interests‘, whereas the Russians considered the Agamemnon‟s close shadowing 
into Yokohama to be a ‗menacing and hostile act‘.1560  Steps were taken if 
another ‗misunderstanding‘ occurred between the British and Russian warships 
at anchor in Japanese harbours.  Dowell sent a telegram to the Admiralty asking 
they cable directly to the captain of the Agamemnon if war with Russia was 
declared, as it was feared that the Russian admiral in Japanese waters would not 
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respect the neutrality of those ports.1561 Clearly the tensions had elevated to the 
point where a miscalculation could lead to an elevated response, which could 
unintentionally spark hostiles.   
     Russia was eager to acquire swift steamers, and was anxious for her ships at 
sea near the shadowing corvettes and ironclads of the Royal Navy.  At the 
northern terminus of the Suez Canal, the Russian shipping agent at Port Said 
received orders for the transports Nostronia and Petersburg to coal and steam 
for Vladivostok.  They were under orders to avoid British ports on their long 
voyages to the East.  This order hampered Russian deployments to Asia, as coal 
was not the only vital item of supply needed on the long voyage.  Over a decade 
later, a Russian convict ship bound for the Far East suffered a water shortage as 
the vessel avoided all British ports except Singapore.  The transport did not call 
at Hong Kong, ostensibly to avoid a storm, but when she arrived at Vladivostok, 
her potable water supply was almost exhausted.1562 
     Britain had advantages of coaling stations, and enough ships either in service, 
ready reserve, or fast merchant steamers commissioned for temporary duty.  
With war in the Pacific viewed as increasingly likely, forward bases were needed.  
The remote reaches of Russia‘s Maritimes made ‗Hong-Kong an important 
source of supply and means of refitting…but, now as always, the difficulties of 
carrying on naval war increase with the distance from the central sources of 
national strength‘.1563  
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     The Russian Navy was well aware of Hong Kong‘s strategic value and a 
rough concept for a surprise attack against that colony involved an expeditionary 
force of 2000-3000 men, landed from two troopships at or prior to the start of 
hostilities, while under the guns of two or three Russian men-of-war.1564   A plan 
put forward in 1877 by the Russian Military Attaché in London, Major General 
Alexander Gorlov, envisioned hiring select Chinese living in Hong Kong to 
conduct sabotage attacks against British military and naval targets in the colony 
during wartime.1565   
     The Russians also formulated concepts for an attack against western Canada 
and several Australian ports.1566  A Honolulu newspaper reported in May 1885, 
that a Russian spy posing as a fur trader was observed in Victoria, British 
Columbia, making sketches of the harbour and fortifications there.1567  A 
Sacramento newspaper refuted the story as a 'canard‘, but also claimed that 
statements made by a Canadian militia official were contradictory regarding 
emergency precautions in the colony.1568   
     Concerns of a surprise attack on a distant British overseas port, prompted the 
Colonial Office to issue a confidential memorandum in the late 1880s which 
cautioned against allowing foreign men-of-war and troopships unrestricted 
access to key harbours and coaling stations.  Foreign troopships were prohibited 
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from sending men ashore to drill or exercise at key stations where it was feared 
the local garrison would be outnumbered.  These stations included Bermuda, 
Halifax, Hong Kong, Malta, and Singapore.1569  Several colonies were to restrict 
the number of warships and troopships a foreign power (two warships or one 
troopship) would be granted permission to enter harbour, with the only exception 
being during times of adverse weather.1570   
     The Wivern was recommissioned for active service on 19 April, 1885, with a 
crew gathered from other warships recalled to Hong Kong.  During a short 
gunnery exercise in April 1885, the turret ship conducted target practice although 
the weather conditions were described as ‗unfavourable‘.  The effects of her 
reconstructions and frequent maintenance were telling, as the practice was 
termed ‗very satisfactory‘ despite the bad weather.1571  Commissioning the 
Wivern was a temporary measure to provide security for the port with more 
foreign ironclads on station, but she was placed back into reserve when armed 
merchant steamers were ready to receive their crews at Hong Kong.  Here speed 
was a priority over armour and heavy guns.  The Royal Navy did not have 
enough men to fully crew all ships in reserve and also provide the complements 
for the auxiliary cruisers temporarily acquired to patrol the shipping lanes.1572  
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The Wivern was returned to reserve status, and her improvised crew sent back to 
their ships on 22 July 1885, but the local authorities were ‗very undecided as to 
be the proper course to adopt‘.  The uncertainty was due in part to war tensions 
with Russia, yet health was another consideration, as cholera outbreaks were 
reported along the southern coast of China, and getting men back to sea was 
likely a precaution.1573   
     The Royal Navy needed a convenient harbour from which to blockade, or 
attack Vladivostok and constrict Russian naval activity in the Pacific.  London did 
not wait until Russia presented another fait accompli as it had in Afghanistan, 
and the Admiralty was ordered to occupy a strategic position on the southern 
coast of Korea-the islets of Komundo, collectively referred to as Port 
Hamilton.1574  From this location, the Royal Navy had a forward base from which 
to attack Vladivostok 850 miles to the north.1575  To help secure the anchorage, 
the auxiliary merchant cruiser Pembroke Castle sailed north from Hong Kong 
with marines and stores aboard, ready to disembark as a nascent garrison.1576  A 
detail of eight men (including a Lieutenant) were transferred from the Wivern to 
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provide part of the 150 man crew of the auxiliary cruiser.1577  Britain had taken 
the bold step of occupying Port Hamilton and in a stroke, had forestalled another 
Russian land grab.  Elements of the Royal Navy appeared at Port Hamilton on 15 
April 1885, thus blocking a repeat of the 1861-style Russian temporary 
encampment as on Tsushima Island.  In St. Petersburg, the Russian press 
denounced the British occupation of Port Hamilton as ‗impudent‘, and claimed 
that the Russian operations at Penjdeh was a ‗good answer‘ for the British flotilla 
anchoring at the strategic Korean islands.  In Germany, the news was viewed 
quite differently as one newspaper called the British move ‗a political and military 
masterstroke‘.1578   
 
Mine Warfare and Colonial Defence  
 
     During the 1885 crisis, the naval mine was considered a weapon which  
rendered British ports like Hong Kong ‗reasonably secure‘, but these were not the 
only defence, as it ‗would be dangerous to trust too much in them, (mines) with 
the various means which ingenuity and science are constantly devising to 
circumvent such engines of destruction‘ . 1579  
     In addition to his duties as Torpedo Officer at Hong Kong, Gamble was 
charged with devising methods to both place, and foil mines.  He proposed that a 
mine facility be built ashore at Kowloon to house the mines, cables, associated 
gear, and fuses sent from Britain.  He also requested a steam launch (similar to 
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the type used by the Royal Engineers), be provided for the purpose of training 
the seamen in the proper methods of mining, and for ‗counter-mining‘, the 
approved methods utilized to clear a path through an enemy field near a hostile 
naval base.1580  
     The employment of the submarine mine in British service was largely 
influenced in 1868, when Lieutenant John A. Fisher wrote A Short Treatise on 
Electricity and the Management of Electric Torpedoes, after attending training 
with the Royal Engineers at Chatham.1581  Naval instruction for both torpedoes, 
and submarine mines was conducted aboard the training ship H.M.S. Vernon at 
Portsmouth after that vessel was attached to the gunnery training ship Excellent 
in 1872.1582  In 1882, the Admiralty determined that training in gunnery, and the 
use of torpedoes was ‗an essential qualification for a higher rating of petty 
officers‘.  To obtain these skilled men, trainers such as Gamble were a valued 
asset to the Vernon.1583  Gamble was assigned to the ship from 30 September 
1881 to 16 July 1883, where he gained his 2nd Class torpedo certificate.  
Reassigned to the China Station in 1883, Gamble developed a reputation as an 
‗Excellent Torpedo Officer‘, and was the link between the Royal Navy and Royal 
Engineers, the military organization responsible for mining the waters off Hong 
Kong.1584   
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     Beginning in 1874, the Admiralty limited mining operations to the temporary 
emplacement of minefields (using mines controlled from the shore), and to 
minesweeping.  The mine was considered the ‗weapon of a weaker power‘, and 
the Royal Navy saw the British use of the mine as a defensive, short-duration 
armament for use in emergencies.  This view prejudiced the British development 
of independent contact mines, as those weapons would interfere with fleet 
operations.1585  The mine was also a dangerous weapon in the hands of unskilled 
men.  On 5 March 1881, a boat crew from the turret ship Cerberus, unfamiliar 
with the intricacies of minelaying, took a mine, and associated gear recently 
transferred to the ironclad, offshore at Queenscliff south of Melbourne, for a 
demonstration.  As the mine was put over the side, it exploded, destroying the 
boat and killing the six man crew.  An inquiry found the event was marred by a 
‗general laxity‘, and the cruise of the ironclad ‗resembled more a voyage for 
pleasure than one for the purpose of improving the defences of the colony‘.1586  
Three years later, at a banquet held for foremen from Woolwich Arsenal, War 
Department Professor of Chemistry Sir Frederick Abel, claimed the mine was a 
‗diabolical instrument‘, a device he considered to be sneaking and underhanded.  
He wished it had never been invented.  Despite his loathing of the weapon, Abel 
warned it ‗was destined to play a fearful havoc in the wars of the future‘.1587    
     During the 1885 crisis, the submarine mine was depicted, along with war 
rockets, shot and shell, and ‗other features of modern war‘, in a fireworks 
demonstration held at London‘s Crystal Palace.1588  At Bermuda that year, a 
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civilian team of 30-40 men were hired to assist the Royal Engineers in laying 
mines near key coastal positions.  In November, the Legislative Council of the 
colony acknowledged the role of the naval mine as a weapon ‗which is daily 
growing into greater importance as an indispensable component of the defences 
of our seaports‘.1589  Despite this claim, the mines did not provide sufficient 
protection for Bermuda.  Planned minefields lacked the number of mines, trained 
crews to properly place them, and were not covered by coastal guns.  They 
would have required a gunboat, or one of the local armourclads to protect the 
minefields against enemy clearing operations.1590            
     One area in mine warfare where Britain continued to experiment and likely 
excelled over her European rivals, was in the development of early 
minesweeping techniques.1591  The favoured methods, referred to as ‗Sweeping 
and Creeping‘, were processes whereby steam launches would move into a 
suspected enemy minefield at night and clear a channel for friendly warships to 
move within range of an enemy port or coastal batteries.1592  When ‗Creeping‘, a 
steam launch would ‗fish‘ for an electrical mine cable attached to an 
‗Observation‘ mine controlled from the shore, with a grapple carrying a small 
explosive charge.  When the target was snagged, it was hauled up until the 
mines were pulled together.  An electric battery was connected to the grappling 
cable and the electrical mine(s) were detonated at a distance from the steam 
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launch.  The other method, ‗Sweeping‘, employed a wire hawser between two 
boats.  This hawser would be fitted with three floats to support the line or ‗sweep‘, 
and grappling hooks would be attached between the floats.  Two small 
explosives would be suspended from the sweep as the launches dragged for a 
mine cable. When contact was made, electrical batteries on the launches were 
attached to the sweep and the impulse detonated the small charges, setting off 
the snagged mine.1593   
     The fear of an enemy flotilla employing clearing operations near a friendly 
port, meant the submarine mines would have to be protected.  Torpedo boats 
and steam pickets armed with Nordenfelt guns were required to attack an enemy 
force attempting to clear a minefield.  Coastal fortifications would provide heavy 
gunfire against enemy warships tasked to provide cover for the sweeping steam 
launches.1594  Where the guns of the British forts could not provide fire support, 
the Royal Navy‘s coastal defence ironclads would be available to shift positions 
to protect the minefields and picket boats on patrol.1595  One New York 
newspaper claimed, ‗at best, the armored [sic] vessel is effective only as a 
floating fort for harbor [sic] defence in connection with torpedoes (mines), and 
then is of merely secondary value…‘.1596  In the autumn of 1885, the German 
steamer China failed to observe the red warning flag at Port Possiett in the 
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Russian Far East, and steamed over two rows of mines without any damage, as 
the mines failed to detonate.1597   
     The submarine mine of the mid-1880s was not a reliable weapon and as 
such, could not replace the local coastal defence warships.  The presence of 
Russian ironclads in the Pacific virtually mandated the added security of a local 
British ironclad to confront an armoured attacker in neighboring waters or defend 
within the mined harbour, against a surprise attack.  This layered approach to 
harbour defence was essential as the Royal Navy maintained an offensive policy:    
        
     The Admiralty had always resolutely opposed the principle that any of Her  
     Majesty's ships should be told off to remain stationary at any particular port.  
     They considered it necessary that Her Majesty's ships should be free to go  
     wherever necessary in time of war.1598 
 
And by going to sea instead of protecting British ports, the mission of the lead 
components of the Royal Navy (as repeatedly announced in the Commons), was 
to attack: 
 
     It had been the policy of successive Boards of Admiralty…that Her Majesty's  
     Fleets must be used in attacking the enemy and the enemy's squadrons in all  
     parts of the world.1599 
 
     The Royal Navy prepared for an offensive, but also a defensive war at sea in 
the late Victorian years.  Port visits in distant waters were intelligence collection 
opportunities to assess the strengths and vulnerabilities of a foreign colonial 
harbour or series of coastal fortifications.  Commanders of British warships 
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visiting the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the early 1880s and 
evaluated the positioning of guns within Spanish fortifications, conditions of repair 
and upkeep of the walls, channel buoys, etc. and concluded Spain‘s Caribbean 
colonies were vulnerable to sudden attack from seaward.  For a night attack 
against San Juan Puerto Rico, a British ironclad frigate supported by four 
corvettes from the North American and West Indian Station could reduce the 
coastal batteries in four to six hours by constantly moving and altering the range.  
Boats and small steamers could sweep the channel for mines after the enemy 
guns were silenced.  Once in the harbour, the ships would bombard the garrison 
into surrender.1600   
     An attack against Havana would meet with success, provided it was ‗taken by 
a coup de main if the ships had been sent down the moment war was 
declared‘.1601  Planning considerations for attacking French colonial harbours 
was also an essential focus of British naval intelligence experts during these 
years.  Select warships of the Royal Navy, were to attack key French installations 
including the dry docks, headquarters, government and private dockyards, but 
particularly coal depots.  In a naval attack against French colonies, especially in 
                                            
1600
 TNA, ADM 231/4, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 33, ‗West Indies. 
Foreign Coast Defences (Exclusive of French Colonies)‘, 1881-1884, 19-21.  The plan envisioned 
an attacking force of the ironclad Northampton supported by four (or as few as two) corvettes.  
Machines guns were to be employed in order to sweep the Spanish gun emplacements as the 
ships closed the range.        
1601
 Ibid, 15.  Also see same source, 25-26.  During U.S. tensions with Spain in 1874, Captain W. 
Gore Jones, R.N., the British Naval Attaché in Washington, wrote Havana had attracted ‗much 
interest‘ by American military officials and felt the ‗American ironclad squadron might have 
entered the harbour and destroyed the town without any loss, and the forts would probably have 
been given up to them…‘  As the U.S.N. had no broadside ironclads by this time, an attack on 
Havana would have involved American monitors.  U.S. ironclads had visited Havana before. Two 
Federal monitors, the single turret U.S.S. Canonicus and the double turret, Monadnock with 
wooden escort vessels of the Union ‗Special‘ Squadron, anchored in Havana on 29 May 1865, to 
take possession of the surrendered Confederate ironclad ram Stonewall.  This was the first visit 
of U.S. ironclads to a foreign port.  See: ORN Series I, Volume 3, (Washington, 1896), 535.              
 408 
the Caribbean and Pacific, if the ‗blow was stuck as soon as possible‘, British 
squadrons would be able to destroy French harbour facilities and capture their 
coal stocks for their own use.1602           
     Preparations for a defensive war at sea, provided Britain with secure 
launching points to conduct offensives against enemy harbours.  It was the 
difference between utilizing ironclads for attacking enemy-held harbours and 
defending key ones or ‗the contradiction between coastal assault and coastal 
defence‘.1603   Protected harbours made power projection missions possible: ‗A 
modern navy without proper harbours is somewhat analogous to a modern army 
without a commissariat and transport‘.1604  Defence considerations and attack 
planning for the Royal Navy in the later Victorian years had blended into an a 
series of mutually supporting factors as ‗the fleets of England can no longer be 
independent of them‘.1605                               
     During a lecture at the U.S. Naval War College, Captain Reginald R. Belknap, 
U.S.N., considered the role of logistics in terms of supply, movement, and refit of 
warships from an efficient and secure base.  Belknap observed: ‗Logistics, which 
deal with necessities and possibilities, influence the decisions of strategy, often 
to a controlling degree‘.  The secure base and its peacetime readiness was what 
gave a naval power the ability to exert a ‗sustained military effort‘ during 
wartime.1606   
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     The coastal defence turret ships like the Scorpion and Wivern proved to be 
versatile assets at those key naval bases that provided the Royal Navy with the 
protected logistics centres for power projection capabilities on a global scale.     
T. E. Lawrence remarked: ‗Range is more to strategy than force‘, but that range 
rested on a support base.1607  British naval power was to protect her oceanic 
commerce, but it also served to ‗counterbalance the military supremacy of other 
first-class powers.‘1608  British military operations had to have secure naval ports 
from which to move troops for any mission: 
 
     „Invasions cannot be attempted, nor can we move even a drummer-boy    
     beyond our shores without a naval operation, great or small, being the primary  
     step of military movements so far as we are concerned‟.1609  
 
  
     The ‗range‘ Lawrence spoke of was the logistical capability to maintain a 
balanced military force in the field, or a squadron at sea for a distance and 
duration longer than an enemy was able to counter.  The coastal defence 
ironclads kept in ready reserve at key British bases, provided the essential 
elements of security necessary for those naval stations to make that range 
possible.              
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                        CONCLUSION 
 
                      Exit the Ironclad: The Laird Rams 1885-1923 
  
     In July 1885, a cartoon in Punch depicted a Royal Navy unprepared for 
combat.  Britannia as the figurehead of a British warship, holds only an olive 
branch as two workers discuss how best to prepare her for a return to duty.  The 
carpenter (resembling Prime Minister Lord Salisbury) acknowledges there was 
no time to modernize the warship before she must go to sea.  The carpenter‘s 
helper (Lord Randolph Churchill, the Secretary of State for India) stands on an 
adjacent ladder with paint brush at the ready, and recommends a cosmetic 
change to give the appearance of power.1610  The 1885 crisis revealed a lack of 
coordinated planning to mobilize the reserves in order that both the older men-of-
war, and newly constructed warships of the Royal Navy, were ready to meet the 
contingency of a global war with Russia.1611   
     By the late 1880s, few of the Royal Navy‘s ironclads were similar, as each 
had been built around competing developments of armour and ordnance, and 
were a reflection of the technological moments when they were completed.  
Rapid changes in armoured warship design of the middle Victorian years 
manifested as a peculiar collection of differing types and hybrids, so much so that 
Admiral Sir John Commerell remarked in 1887, that some British warships looked 
like something ‗between a clock case and a bathing machine‘.1612  Many older 
armourclads like the Scorpion and Wivern were refitted, and provided with a few 
modern apparatus to keep pace with technological developments.  If the costs of 
repairs and refits were not excessive, a man-of-war received dockyard attention 
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as it was ‗extremely difficult to draw the line at the precise stage at which a ship 
becomes obsolete as a vessel of war‘.1613  This was especially true for ironclads 
as armour, even if penetrated at close range, offered protection at longer 
distances and gave the armoured ship under fire ‗a utility out of all proportion to 
its ability to withstand shot on the proving ground‘.1614 
     The coastal defence role was the one best suited for the Laird rams, but that 
role had two distinct components,  one was ‗coastal assault‘, and the other was 
for defence of a local area from a seaborne threat.1615  The low-hulled ironclads 
could be used for either mission, but some British low-hulled ironclads were 
intended more for the assault.1616  Which coastal defence vessels would be 
assigned an attack mission, and which were to remain closer to home port, 
depended largely on where these ships were stationed when a conflict 
threatened.  In an 1884 war plan against France, British Naval Intelligence 
detailed which types of ships could be used in a series of rapid global strikes, 
and which would remain behind.  The Cerberus, Scorpion, Wivern, and the 
Bombay coastal defence ironclads, were not to be earmarked for an attacking 
force as ‗they will be required and used for the protection of the several ports 
they are intended for and are allotted to, and will not therefore be available to 
take part in an offensive (italics in original) policy.1617 
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     The types of offensive missions each station was to conduct also restricted 
the role of the coastal defence ironclads, especially for those assigned to colonial 
ports.  While the major British warships assigned to foreign stations were to hunt 
for enemy men-of-war, and attack or blockade their ports, the coastal defence 
armourclads were to provide security for the main British bases.1618  These ships 
were to provide the heavy guns of a ‗coast covering force‘ for the key colonial 
ports they protected.1619  The coastal defence ironclads, with the few 1st and 2nd 
Class torpedo boats remaining at the installation, would comprise the ‗Mobile 
Defences‘ of the base.  As these units were patrolling or engaged off the coasts, 
boats or launches of ‗less speed‘ were to be armed with spar torpedoes for 
defence of the harbour.1620  Another proposal envisioned utilizing fast civilian 
river steamers as improvised torpedo boats and harbour tugs would be available 
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for use as rams and rocket ships if a British harbour fell under attack.1621  Within 
these various concepts of naval attack plans and needs for protection both at 
home and in key colonies, the coastal defence ironclad remained an essential 
element of British naval strategy, both for offensive and defensive purposes, until 
the end of the century.                              
     Size had become a concern for the modern warship of the later Victorian era 
as, according to one writer of that time, ‗you cannot put a quart of power into a 
pint of displacement‘.1622  The Laird rams, fitted with armour plate and the 
heaviest guns in use aboard the warships of the Royal Navy in the mid-1860s, 
had proven it could be done, but technological advances outstripped the pint-
sized Scorpion and Wivern.  Technology transformed the man-of-war into a new 
being.  It became a vessel with steam-powered engines and a host of electrical 
motors for the ever-growing capital warship, a vessel of ‗monster‘ proportions, a 
‗Frankenstein‘ of the sea.1623  The armoured warship in all its forms had, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, become ‗a floating factory‘.  It was, according to 
one Hong Kong newspaper ‗a machine crammed with other machines‘, requiring 
more space to house the new devices.1624       
     In 1901, both the Scorpion and Wivern ended their sea service and became 
surplus.  Scorpion was utilized as a target for gunnery tests beginning on 14 
May, and was later patched up and sold for scrap to shipbreakers in New 
                                            
1621
 Captain R.A.E. Scott, R. N., ‗The Maritime Defence of England including Offensive and 
Defensive Warfare‘, RUSI Journal, 20, 30 June 1876, 6-7.  This force was to ‗supplement‘ the 
turret ships and gunboats, and the river steamers and harbour tugs could ‗under the flag of a 
dashing Commodore, throw a hostile force into confusion and render a landing impossible‘.       
1622
 G. W. Steevens, Naval Policy: With Some Account of the Warships of the Principal Powers. 
(London, 1896), 120. 
1623
 H. W. Wilson, Ironclads in Action; A Sketch of Naval Warfare from 1855-1895, With Some 
Account of the Development of the Battleship in England. Volume, II. (London, 1896), 168, 241. 
1624
 Ibid, 214, ‗Is Our Navy Ready for War?‘, China Mail, 24 April, 1885, 3. 
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Brunswick.1625  She sank on 16 June 1903, in a storm 150 miles east of Cape 
Cod while under tow from Bermuda to the Canadian coast.1626  At Hong Kong, 
the Wivern was at sea for her final gunnery exercise on 4 March 1901, and was 
afterwards converted into a distilling ship to provide fresh water for the China 
Squadron.1627  Sold to Chinese shipbreakers around September 1921, the 
armourclad was stripped of all useful equipment before she was to cast off for the 
last time.  As she was towed away on the morning of 13 March 1923, one Hong 
Kong newspaper referred to her as the ‗old, crippled warhorse‘.1628   
     A photograph taken as the Wivern departed Hong Kong was a testament to 
her true impact.  The ironclad was moved from her moorings by two tugs, and 
had been long deprived of her turrets, guns, funnel, and torpedo boats.  Her two 
masts, fighting tops still fitted, stood above her rust-streaked hull.  The scene 
was not as stark as would normally be imagined for an obsolete warship on her 
way to a cutting torch.  She had a full complement of men lining her sides and 
peering through the stern gunports to send her off, not as a forgotten hulk, but as 
an honoured veteran of a bygone age.  The Wivern was acknowledged as 
representing one of the last of her kind.  It was a suitable tribute for the ‗old 
warhorse‘ and a farewell to the ironclad era.  
                                            
1625
 ‗Old Warship for a Target‘, New York Daily Tribune, 5 May 1901, 2. No Subject, Royal 
Gazette, 12 May 1903, 5, ‗Custom House-St. George‘s‘, Royal Gazette, 13 June 1903, 2, ‗Sinking 
of the Scorpion‘, Royal Gazette, 30 June 1903, 1. During the gunnery tests, one 6-inch shell from 
the armoured cruiser H.M.S. Crescent (the then flagship of the station) burst inside the Scorpion 
and ‗practically wrecked everything on board‘. See:  ‗British Naval Gunnery‘, Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, 28 May 1901, 5, TNA, ADM 53/13180, Log, H.M.S. Crescent, 15 April 1901-24 March 
1902. 
1626
 ‗Sinking of the Scorpion‘ Royal Gazette, 30 June 1903, 1. 
1627
 TNA, ADM 53/16609, Log , H.M.S. Wivern, 11 September 1899-7 March 1901, ‗H.M.S. 
Wivern‘, China Mail, 29 May 1902, 4.. 
1628
 ‗Passing of the ―Wivern‖, Hong Kong Telegraph, 13 March, 1923, 7. This account referred to 
her as ‗a link with the past, and the old days of the Navy in the East‘.  Parkes claims she was sold 
in June 1922.  See: Parkes, British Battleship. (1990), 81. 
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     The primary question of this thesis: were the Laird rams failures?  The answer 
must be no, as they were successful warships when utilized for the colonial 
coastal defence role.  The British coastal defence ironclads of the Victorian navy, 
incorrectly termed as ‗almost valueless,‘ were in fact ‗required‘ as area denial 
weapons on foreign stations.1629  Although as Sondhaus stated, ‗the force which 
best deters is not necessarily the force which has the greatest practical value in 
warfare‘, the Laird rams were essential components of colonial deterrence and 
were well-suited for their roles at their assigned stations.1630  They never fired a 
shot in anger, but like the famous Warrior, ‗it does not matter the battles actually 
fought but those prevented‘.1631  The Laird rams were not failures, as they best 
served the Royal Navy as coastal defence ships, and performed well in that role 
until the modern steel navy arrived.  They proved that iron, steam, and turret, 
when divorced from the weight and tether of sail, could defend the important 
bases at the edges of the British Empire.  They deserve a better reputation than 
that imposed on them in most histories of the ironclad warship. 
   
 
 
 
 
                                            
1629 Buxton, Big Gun Monitors. (1980), 11,.TNA, ADM 231/5, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence 
Committee, Report No. 51, Captain W. H. Hall, R.N., ‗Remarks on a Naval Campaign‘, 24 
September 1884, 25. 
1630
 Sondhaus, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914. (2001), 228. 
1631
 Fuller, ‗The Warrior‘s Influence Abroad: The American Civil War‘, IJNH, 10 (October 2013), 1, 
6. Here the author also notes that the ‗Monitor, like all early ironclads, was expected to fulfil a 
variety of frequently ―urgent‖ yet conflicting roles‘.  The same can be said for the Laird rams.    
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                      Glossary of Terms/ Abbreviations 
 
 
C.S.S.                                                           Confederate States Ship 
 
C.S.N.                                                           Confederate States Navy  
 
DC                                                                 Direct Current 
 
H.M.S.                                                           Her Majesty‘s Ship  
 
ILN                                                                Illustrated London News 
 
IJNH                                                              International Journal of Naval            
                                                                      History 
 
LOC                                                               Library of Congress 
 
M.P.                                                               Member of Parliament  
 
NMM                                                              National Maritime Museum 
 
NYT                                                               New York Times 
 
PSI                                                                 Pounds per Square Inch   
 
ORA                                                              The War of the Rebellion: A   
                                                                      Compilation of the Official  
                                                                      Records of the Union and  
                                                                      Confederate Armies  
 
ORN                                                              The Official Records of the                          
                                                                      Union and Confederate Navies      
                                                                      in the War of the Rebellion 
 
RBL                                                               Rifled Breechloader 
 
RML                                                              Rifled Muzzleloader 
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R.M.A.                                                           Royal Marine Artillery  
 
R.M.L.I.                                                         Royal Marine Light Infantry  
 
R.N.                                                               Royal Navy  
 
RUSI                                                             Royal United Services Institute                                              
 
SA                                                                 Scientific American 
 
SBML                                                            Smoothbore Muzzleloader 
 
S.M.S.                                                           Seiner Majestät Schiff                                                              
                                                                      (His Majesty‘s Ship) 
 
TB                                                                 Torpedo Boat 
 
TNA                                                              The National Archives 
 
U.S.S.                                                           United States Ship  
 
U.S.N.                                                           United States Navy 
 
WA                                                                Wirral Archives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 418 
                           
                              BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
Archival, Official Records  
 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, ‗Papers of Sir John Pope-Hennessy, GB 0162 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.409, Box 8/2.   
 
Library of Congress (LOC), The Abraham Lincoln Papers, Letter from Assistant 
Secretary of the U.S. Navy Gustavus V. Fox, 8 September 1863.  
 
LOC, ‗Correspondence Between Her Majesty‘s Government and Messr. Laird 
Brothers Relative to the Iron-Clad Rams‘. United States Serial Set, Number 
1397, Senate Executive Department  No. 11, Volume 4, 41st Congress Appendix 
No. XIII, (Washington, 1869) 
 
LOC, ‗Proceedings Before the Crown Court at Cork in the Case of the Men 
received on Board the United States Steamer Kearsarge at Queenstown‘. United 
States Serial Set, Number 1397, Appendix No. XIII, (Washington, 1869) 
 
LOC, ‗Report of Trials in England of Various Parties for Violation of the Foreign 
Enlistment Act, in Recruiting for the Rebel Vessels, Case of Jones and Highatt‘. 
United States Serial Set, Number 1397, Appendix No. XIV, (Washington, 1869 
 
National Maritime Museum (NMM), MLN/114/9, 1st Bt., Sir Alexander Milne, 
Admiral of the Fleet. ‗Additional Instructions for the guidance of Cruizers (sic) 
employed in the Protection of British Commerce on the East Coast of America‘ 
 
NMM, Ship Plans, ‗Devonport Yard, ―Wivern‖, Curator 14142, Box 101    
 
NMM, HND/101/3, Journal of Sub-Lieutenant Swinton C. Holland, H.M.S Wivern, 
September-December 1865. 
 
NMM, Navy List 1880, (London, 1880) 
 
NMM, MIL/1, Vice Admiral Charles Blois Miller, Log Book, H.M.S. Audacious, 
1883-1884. 
 419 
 
NMM, VHM/3, Private Letters of Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton 
 
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies (ORA).  Series 1, Volume 6, (Washington, 1882) 
 
The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the 
Rebellion (ORN). Series I, Volume 3, (Washington, 1896) 
 
ORN, Series I, Volume 9, (Washington, 1899) 
 
ORN, Series I, Volume 12, (Washington, 1901) 
 
ORN, Series I, Volume 13, (Washington, 1901) 
 
ORN, Series I, Volume 14, (Washington, 1902) 
 
ORN, Series II, Volume 1, (Washington, 1921) 
 
ORN, Series II, Volume 2, (Washington, 1921) 
 
The National Archives, Kew (TNA), ADM 1/5842, Admiralty Correspondence, 
‗Steam Rams on the Mersey‘, Letter written by James Reed, 17 September 
1863. 
 
TNA, ADM 1/5842, Admiralty Correspondence, ‗Specification of Cowper Phipps 
Coles Masts‘, 10 April, 1862, Patent No. 1027.  
 
TNA, ADM 1/5842, Admiralty Correspondence, Letter by Controller of the Navy 
Rear Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson, dated 6 October 1863. 
 
TNA, ADM 1/6083, Director Naval Ordnance, In-Letters and Papers, 1860-1869 
 
TNA, ADM 1/6083, ‗Diagram Shewing Construction of the Experimental  9 Inch 
12 ton Guns‘ (Gun Nos. 298, 332 & 333) Letters, Director of Naval Ordnance 
1868. 
 
TNA, ADM 50/299, Vice-Admiral George O. Willes, C. B., Commander-in-Chief 
on the China Station, 1 January 1882-31 March 1882  
 420 
 
TNA, ADM 50/299, Journal of Vice-Admiral Sir William M. Dowell, K.C.B. 
Commander-in-Chief on the China Station. 1 January 1885-31 March 1885   
 
TNA, ADM 50/299, Journal of Vice-Admiral Sir William M. Dowell, K.C.B. 
Commander-in-Chief on the China Station. 1 April 1885-30 June 1885   
 
TNA, ADM 53/8205, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Terror, 16 December 1861-31 December 
1862 
 
TNA, ADM 53/8623, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Royal Sovereign, 15 October 1864 to 10 
October 1866 
 
TNA, ADM 53/8418, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Scorpion, 10 July 1865 to 1 January 1866 
 
TNA, ADM 53/9512, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Scorpion, 2 December 1868 to 31 
December 1869 
 
TNA, ADM 53/11329, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Wivern, 14 January 1880-14 June 1880 
 
TNA, ADM 53/11744, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Albatross, 11 August 1882-23 February 
1883 
 
TNA, ADM 53/12239, Ship‟s Log H.M.S. Wivern, 19 March 1885-22 July 1885 
 
TNA, ADM 53/16609, Log, H.M.S. Wivern, 11 September 1899-7 March 1901 
 
TNA, ADM 53/13180, Log, H.M.S. Crescent, 15 April 1901-24 March 1902 
 
TNA, ADM 125/27, China Station Correspondence. General, Inspections, 
Hydrography, Defences, etc., and ships‘, 1880-1883. 
 
TNA, ADM 125/83, China Station Records: Correspondence: Naval 
Establishments, Bases and Stores, Steam Reserve, Ordnance and Torpedoes. 
1880-1883. 
 
TNA, ADM 125/83, China Station Records: Correspondence: Naval 
Establishments, Bases and Stores, Steam Reserve, Ordnance and Torpedoes. 
 421 
1880-1883. ‗H.M.S. Hecla, May and June 1880, Submarine Mine Defences 
Berehaven‘  
 
TNA, ADM 125/83, China Station Records, 72, 1880-1883, Enclosure No. 1 in 
Channel Letter. No.193 of 12th June 1880 Torpedo operations conducted in 
Berehaven 
 
TNA, ADM 125/83, China Station Records, 72, 1880-1883, ‗Remarks by Captain 
of ―Vernon‖ on Special Torpedo Practice in H.M.S. ―Northampton‖ in November 
1880‘ 
 
TNA, ADM 125/83, China Station Records: Correspondence: Naval 
Establishments, Bases and Stores, Steam Reserve, Ordnance and 
Torpedoes.1880-1883. Enclosure No. 3, ‗Suggestions Concerning Torpedo 
Service at Hong Kong‘, 3 January 1884. 
 
TNA, ADM 128/82, North America and West Indies Station: Correspondence, 
Reports and Memoranda. 01 March 1877-31 May 1882. 
 
TNA, ADM 135/417, Office of the Controller of the Navy Ship‘s Book Series 1, 
H.M.S. Scorpion 
 
TNA, ADM 135/512, Office of the Controller of the Navy Ship‘s Book Series I, 
‗Wivern‟ 
 
TNA, ADM 186/869, Manual of Gunnery for Her Majesty‟s Fleet 1885, (London, 
1886) 
 
TNA, ADM 195/5, Bermuda Dockyard. Includes 73 photographs depicting: Royal 
Navy dockyard and naval base, Bermuda. Dated 1868-1899. 
 
TNA, ADM 196/87/69, Officers Service Records (Series III) Admiral Douglas 
Austin Gamble 
 
TNA, ADM 231/2, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 8, 
‗France. Naval Dockyard Ports‘, February 1884. 
 
TNA, ADM 231/2, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, ‗Port Hamilton‘, 
1883-1884.  
 422 
 
TNA, ADM 231/3, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 274, 
Captain Cyprian A. G. Bridge, R.N., ‗Australian Station. Naval Geography and 
Protection of British Ports and Commerce‘, dated 23 October 1883. 
 
TNA, ADM 231/3, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, ‗France Effective 
Armourclads‘, dated 1 January 1884. 
 
TNA, ADM 231/4, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 33, 
‗West Indies. Foreign Coast Defences (Exclusive of French Colonies)‘, 1881-
1884. 
 
TNA, ADM 231/5, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 51, 
Captain W. H. Hall, R.N., ‗Remarks on a Naval Campaign‘, 24 September 1884. 
 
TNA, ADM 231/5, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, Report No. 43, 
‗Eastern Siberian Ports and Anchorages‘, dated January 1885.      
 
TNA, ADM 231/7, Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee, ‗Russia. Naval 
Manoeuvres in Gulf of Finland, between Hango and the Helsingfors‘, August 
1885.       
 
TNA, ADM 268/97, Report of a Committee of Naval Officers, Appointed to 
Examine the Design of a Sea-Going Turret-Ship, submitted by Captain C. P. 
Coles, R.N., (1865) 
 
TNA, CAB 37/13, ‗England‘s Means of Offence against Russia‘, No. 36, (1884) 
 
TNA, CAB 8/1, ‗Measures of Precaution required for the Security of British Ports 
Abroad‘, No. 26, 20 April 1887. 
 
TNA, CAB11/11, Bermuda 1885-1907, no. 89 M, 21 December 1896. 
 
TNA, FO 412/11 ‗Correspondence Respecting Two Iron-Clad Vessels Building at 
Messr. Laird‘s Yard, Birkenhead, February to October 1863‘, dated 11 July 1863, 
No. 70, dated 5 September 1863, No. 101, dated 22 September 1863, dated 28 
September 1863. 
 
 423 
TNA, F.O. 881/1200, ‗United States: Corres. Iron-Clad Vessels Building at 
Messrs. Laird‘s yard Birkenhead‘, Part 1. Feb.-Oct 1863 
 
TNA, F.O. 881/2006, ‗Foreign Office Confidential Print, United States: Corres. 
Iron-Clad Vessels Building at Messrs. Laird‘s yard Birkenhead‘, 1863-1864 
 
TNA, FO 881/2011 ‗Florida‘. No. 70, dated 23 September 1863, No. 71. Dated 1 
October 1863, and No. 73 dated 22 September 1863, Printed November 1871.  
 
TNA, FO 925/2746, ‗Plan of Vladivostock [sic], Showing Defences.‘ 3 December 
1878. 
 
TNA, FO 5/1816 ‗Fenian Brotherhood‘, 32, 1 January 1882-31 March 1882. 
 
TNA, MPI 1/492, A Plan of Gun Boats [sic] Moorings at Kowloon laid down May 
1881.  
 
TNA, PRO 30/22 ‗Private Correspondence. Lord Palmerston (P) Prime Minister 
to Lord Russell, (JR) Foreign Secretary‘, Volume 22, Letter dated 23 August 
1863, Letter dated 4 September 1863, letter dated 21 September 1863. 
 
TNA, TS 25/1274, Letter from Thomas Dudley, United States Consulate, 
Liverpool, 7 August 1863   
 
TNA, TS 25/1285, ‗Treasury Solicitor and HM Procurator General: Law Officers‘ 
and Counsel‘s Opinion. Steam rams, Birkenhead Seizure of iron clad ship, from 
Messrs Laird‘. Letter dated 29 October 1863 
 
TNA, TS 25/1285, ‗IRON CLAD SHIPS: Vessels under seizure: To Determine 
their Destination and Ownership‘, letter dated 29 October 1863. 
 
TNA, WO 55/2182, Records of Ordnance Office, Portsmouth, ‗No. 7 Minute 
Book‟ May to November 1865‘. 
 
TNA, WO 28/348, Defences of Bermuda, ‗Misc Correspondence and Reports.‘, 
letter dated 16 October 1869.   
 
Wirral Archives (WA), Birkenhead, WA, Z/CL2/9/0000/005 ‗Records of Cammell 
Laird and Co. H.M.S. Wivern, Engines No. 81, copy of plans  
 424 
 
WA, 5/195/39 & 40, ‗Captain Coles License for ships 294 and 295‘, 10 December 
1862. 
 
WA, 005/0195, ‗Dimensions and Particulars of Vessels Vol. 2, ‗Green Book No. 
2‘, (No Date), 039-040.  
 
WA, 5/195/39 &40 ‗Terms of Contract with Messrs A. Bravay & Co. 6 Rue de 
Londres Paris/for completing 2 Iron Screw Steamers‘, dated 16 June 1863. 
 
WA, ZCL/005/0195/039/040, Description of Laird Rams, dated July 1863.  
 
WA, Birkenhead Map, Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton (1875) 
 
WA ZCL/005/0270/004, Letter from Admiralty, dated 24 June 1878.  
 
Parliamentary Debates 
 
Hansard, 26 July 1861, 164, cc 1633. 
 
Hansard, 10 July 1862, 168, cc 163. 
 
Hansard, 23 February 1863, 169, cc 669-700. 
 
Hansard, 26 February 1863, 169, cc 798-802, 834. 
 
Hansard, 27 February 1863, 169, cc 887, 888. 
 
Hansard, 12 March 1863, 169, cc 1361. 
 
Hansard, 27 March 1863, 170, cc 33, 38, 69, 70, 71, 72. 
 
Hansard, 23 July 1863, 172, cc 1271. 
 
Hansard, 19 July 1864, 176, cc 1766. 
 
Hansard, 6 April 1865, 178, cc 846. 
 
Hansard, 1 March 1866, 181, cc 1345.    
 425 
 
Hansard, 15 March, 1866, 182, cc 331, 342, 343, 345.   
 
Hansard, 5 June 1866, 183, cc 1940, 1941.   
 
Hansard, 4 August 1866, 184, cc. 2053. 
 
Hansard, 13 June 1867, 187, cc 1790, 1811-1812, 1846. 
 
Hansard, 15 August 1867, 189, cc 1559-1560. 
 
Hansard, 11 May 1868, 192, cc 24, 25. 
 
Hansard, 18 July 1868, 193, cc 1430. 
 
Hansard, 8 March 1869, 194, cc 887, 889, 890.  
 
Hansard, 2 April 1869, 195, cc 110, 111, 118, 119.   
 
Hansard, 16 April 1869, 195, cc. 991-992. 
 
Hansard, 31 May 1870, 201, cc 1759-1760. 
 
Hansard, 24 March 1873, 215, cc 62. 
 
Hansard, 19 May 1873, 216, cc 132, 133. 
 
Hansard, 23 March 1874, 218, cc 212. 
 
Hansard, 12 May 1879, 246, cc 132. 
 
Hansard, 21 July 1879, 248, cc 847. 
 
Hansard, 31 July 1879, 248, cc 1818-1819. 
 
Hansard, 19 February 1880, 250, cc 940.    
 
Hansard, 23 February 1880, 250, cc 1196.   
 
 426 
Hansard, 1 August 1882, 273, cc 435.  
 
Hansard, 7 May 1883, 279, cc76, 84,112, 114, 125, 126, 133. 
 
Hansard, 20 March 1884, 286, cc 339.  
  
Hansard, 8 May 1884, 287, cc 1762.  
 
Hansard, 24 Oct 1884, Volume 293, cc 157-8.   
 
Hansard, 13 November 1884, 293, cc 1536-1540, 1543, 1545-1546.   
 
Hansard, 27 March 1885, 296, cc 817. 
 
Hansard, 14 April 1885, 296, cc 1605-1606. 
 
Hansard, 15 July 1890, 346, cc 1725. 
 
Hansard, 17 July 1885, 299, cc 1030, 1033, 1038, 1039. 
 
Hansard, 22 March 1886, 303, cc 1560-1561. 
 
Hansard, 6 May 1886, 305, cc372. 
 
Hansard, 31 May 1894, 25, cc 11.  
 
Hansard, 18 July 1898, 62, cc 77, 78. 
 
Hansard, 8 November, 1916, 87, cc 165-167.    
 
Magazines & Newspapers 
 
‗Rope Trade‘, Aberdeen Journal, 8 January 1868, 7. 
 
‗Shipbuilding on the Mersey during 1878‘, Aberdeen Journal, 25 December, 
1878, 7. 
 
‗London Correspondence‘, Aberdeen Journal, 19 February 1880, 5. 
 
 427 
‗Admiralty Order for Nordenfelt Guns‘, Aberdeen Journal, 23 October 1880, 6. 
 
‗Mr. Whitworth and the ―Ironsides‖, Aldershot Military Gazette, 4 October 1862, 4. 
 
‗Shoeburyness‘, Aldershot Military Gazette, 20 June 1868, 3. 
 
‗America and Privateering‘, Alnwick Mercury, 15 June 1878, 2. 
 
No Subject, Ashtabula Weekly Telegraph, 26 September 1863, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military‘, Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette, 17 August, 1865, 7. 
 
‗Stations of the British Navy‘, Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette, 29 August 
1867, 2. 
 
‗Russia and China‘, Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette, 22 July 1880, 6. 
 
‗Shipping Intelligence‘, Belfast Morning News, 3 May 1869, 2. 
 
‗Shipping Intelligence‘, Belfast Morning News, 2 August 1869, 4. 
 
‗The Lucky Shoemaker‘, Belfast News-Letter, 5 December 1863, 4. 
 
‗Accident to the Screw-Steamer Balaclava‘, Belfast News-Letter, 25 February 
1865, 3. 
 
‗Arrival of Mason and Slidell‘, Berkshire Chronicle, 1 February 1862, 6. 
 
‗The Hampshire Volunteer Review‘, Berkshire Chronicle, 1 May 1869, 7. 
 
‗Launch of Iron Steam Rams at Birkenhead‘, Birmingham Daily Post, 31 August 
1863, 4. 
 
‗A New Trade in Birmingham, Wire Rope Making‘, Birmingham Daily Post, 2 April 
1866, 5. 
 
‗Prolonged Patents‘, Birmingham Daily Post, 24 June 1881, 6. 
 
‗Dynamite Operations in America‘, Birmingham Daily Post, 6 July 1882, 8. 
 428 
 
‗England and Russia‘, Birmingham Daily Post, 28 April 1885, 8. 
 
‗No Subject‘, Birmingham Journal, 22 April, 1865, 3. 
 
‗Prince Alfred in Liverpool‘, Blackburn Standard, 25 September 1861, p. 4. 
 
‗Preparations for Military and Naval Operations‘, Blackburn Standard, 2 March 
1878, 3. 
 
‗A Military Forecast‘, Brisbane Courier, 22 July 1885, 3. 
 
‗The State of the Navy‘, Bristol Mercury, 8 April 1880, 3. 
 
‗Comic and Gossip Papers‘, Bucks Herald, 30 May 1885, 3. 
 
‗Return of Lord Lyons from Washington‘, Caledonian Mercury, 17 June 1862, 3. 
 
‗The Royal Naval Reserve‘, Carlisle Journal, 6 December, 1861, 8. 
 
‗Commodore Wilkes in Bermuda‘, Carlisle Journal, 24 October 1862, 11. 
 
‗Shipbuilding on the Mersey‘, Chester Chronicle, 29 November 1862, 7. 
 
The Steam Rams at Birkenhead‘, Chester Chronicle, 26 September 1863, 2. 
 
‗Trial of Mr. MacKay‘s New Gun‘, Cheshire Chronicle, 16 April 1864, 3. 
 
‗John Laird‘s Contract for the New Iron-Clad Frigate‘, Cheshire Observer, 14 
September 1861, 5. 
 
‗Mr. J. Laird, M. P., and the United States Government‘, Cheshire Observer, 29 
August 1863, 7. 
 
‗The Week‘s News‘, Cheshire Observer, 25 June 1864, 4. 
 
‗The Collison with the Scorpion‘, Cheshire Observer, 1 April 1865, 7. 
 
‗The Invasion of England‘, Cheshire Observer, 26 August, 1865, 8. 
 429 
 
‗Arrival of the Agamemnon‘, China Mail, 25 March 1885, 3. 
 
No Subject, China Mail, 21 April 1885, 2. 
 
‗Is Our Navy Ready for War?‘, The China Mail, 24 April, 1885, 3. 
 
‗H.M.S. Wivern‘, China Mail, 29 May 1902, 4. 
 
‗Mysterious Murder in Rhenish-Prussia, District of Coblenz, On the Rhine‘, Cork 
Examiner, 10 June 1861, 4. 
 
‗The French Fleet at Portsmouth‘, Cork Examiner, 2 September 1865, 4. 
 
No Subject, Cork Examiner, 23 September 1867, 2. 
 
‗Intended Rescue at Holyhead‘, Cork Examiner, 15 November 1867, 3. 
 
‗The Guard Ship At Queenstown‘, Cork Examiner, 4 May 1869, 3. 
 
‗Cork Drawings-Number One‘, Cork Examiner, 18 June 1869, 2. 
 
‗Queenstown Intelligence‘ Cork Examiner, 27 July 1869, 2. 
 
‗H.M.S. Scorpion‘, Cork Examiner, 20 September 1869, 2. 
 
‗The Scorpion‘, Cork Examiner, 14 October 1869, 2. 
 
‗The Whitworth Gun‘, Daily Dispatch, 22 June 1861, 4. 
 
‗The Confederates iron-clad navy-Yankee information on the subject-What 
England is Doing about it.‘ Daily Dispatch, 22 November 1862, 1. 
 
‗Later from the North‘, Daily Dispatch, 24 November 1862, 1. 
 
‗The Siege of Washington, N.C.‘, Daily Dispatch, 16 April 1863, 1. 
 
‗Correspondence between England and America about British Neutrality‘, Daily 
Dispatch, 1 February 1864, 1. 
 430 
 
‗An Important Confession‘, Daily National Republican, 3 November 1863, 1. 
 
No Subject, Daily Telegraph, 13 February 1871, 5. 
 
‗News from Jackson‘, Dallas Herald, 10 June 1863,1. 
 
‗Russian Naval Activity‘, Derby Daily Telegraph, 27 August 1879, 3. 
 
‗From Our London Correspondent‘, Derby Daily Telegraph, 28 May 1880, 2. 
 
‗England and Russia‘, Derby Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1885, 4. 
 
‗England and the War‘, Derby Mercury, 10 August 1870, 3. 
 
No Subject, Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 22 October 1863, 3. 
 
‗The Volunteer Review‘, Dover Express, 2 April 1869, 4. 
 
‗The Armstrong Gun‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 10 October 1861, 1. 
 
‗The Navy‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 15 July 1862, 1. 
 
 ‗Lord Clarendon at Liverpool‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 16 October 1862, 4. 
 
‗The ―292‖ Dublin Evening Mail, 20 November 1862, 3.  
 
‗The Navy‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 20 January 1863, 2. 
 
‗Compound Ordnance‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 10 October 1863, 4. 
 
‗The Disaster to the Prince Consort‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 31 October 1863, 2. 
 
‗Departure of the Prince Consort for Devonport‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 5 
November 1863, 2. 
 
‗The Late Naval Engagement‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 30 June 1864, 2. 
 
‗The Cruise of the Channel Squadron‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 20 October 1866, 4. 
 431 
 
‗The Great Naval Review‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 16 July 1867, 2. 
 
‗Escape of Colonel Kelly and Capt. Deasey‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 20 September 
1867, 3. 
 
‗Preparations of the Admiralty‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 21 September 1867, 3.  
 
‗Kelly and Deasey-Searching a Greek Vessel‘ Dublin Evening Mail, 2 October 
1867, 4. 
 
‗A Novel Armament‘, Dublin Evening Mail, 18 February 1868, 4. 
  
‗Iron-Plated Frigates‘, Dublin Evening Packet and Correspondent, 2 October 
1860, 2. 
 
‗The Great Exhibition‘, Dundee Advertiser, 10 May 1862, p. 3 
 
‗Visit to Messrs Laird‘s Shipbuilding Yard‘, Dundee Courier, 19 September 1863, 
2. 
 
‗Modern Navies‘, Dundee Courier, 30 August 1865, 3. 
 
‗The Great Volunteer Review at Dover‘, Dundee Courier, 31 March 1869, 3  
 
‗The Romance of the Sea‘, Dundee Courier, 22 October 1878, 7. 
 
No Subject, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 10 June 1878, 2. 
 
‗The Royal Marine Artillery‘, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 4 December 1879, 3. 
 
No Subject, Dundee Courier, 6 February 1882, 3. 
 
‗Immense Naval and Military Preparations‘, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 29 April 
1885, 3. 
 
No Subject, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 16 May 1885, 2. 
 
‗Russia‘s Naval Strength‘, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 13 June 1885, 3. 
 432 
 
‗British Cruisers in Eastern Seas‘, Dundee Evening Telegraph, 6 August 1885, 3. 
 
‗American Slavery and its Abettors‘, Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser, 28 
April 1863, 2. 
 
‗The Federal Government and Mr. Laird‘, Dundee, Perth and Cupar Advertiser, 
25 August 1863, 8. 
 
‗The Steam Ram Mystery‘, Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser, 8 September 
1863,  3. 
 
‗Capture of Mr. Laird‘s Iron Rams‘, Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser, 3 
November 1863, 8. 
 
‗Torpedoes‘, Edinburgh Evening News, 2 June 1876, 4. 
 
‗Russia in the Pacific‘, Edinburgh Evening News, 20 May 1880, 2.  
 
‗Protection of Submarine Cables‘, Edinburgh Evening News, 11 May 1885, 4. 
 
‗Henry H. Laird‘, Engineer. Volume 75, 2 June 1893, 467. 
 
‗John Laird‘, Engineer. Volume 85, 28 January 1898, 88. 
 
‗Haymarket, Theatre Royal‘, Era, 7 June 1863, 8. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Essex Standard, 27 September 1861, 4. 
 
‗The North America and West India Station‘, Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, 6 
December 1861, 10. 
 
‗The Sultan in England‘, Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, 17 July 1867, 9. 
 
‗Proposed Dock Accommodation for Dartmouth‘, Exeter and Plymouth Gazette 
Daily Telegram, 14 December 1882, 4. 
 
‗Manufacture of Armour Plates, Exeter Flying Post, 15 April 1863, 6. 
 
 433 
No Subject, Exeter Flying Post, 8 November 1865, 5. 
 
‗Foreign Intelligence‘, Exeter Flying Post, 2 February 1870, 2. 
 
‗Torpedo Boats‘, Exeter Flying Post, 19 August 1885, 3. 
 
‗A New French Gunboat‘, Falkirk Herald, 7 March 1861, 2. 
 
„Liverpool News‟, Glasgow Herald, 30 September 1861, 5. 
 
‗Liverpool News‘, Glasgow Herald, 13 April 1863, 4. 
 
‗Liverpool News‘, Glasgow Herald, 2 July 1864, 7.  
 
‗The Rolf Krake at Alsen‘, Glasgow Herald, 16 July 1864, 3. 
 
‗The Rolf Krake‘, Glasgow Herald, 12 August 1864, 6. 
 
‗Our Australian Colonies‘, Glasgow Herald, 15 May 1871, 4. 
 
‗Launch of H.M.S. Phaeton‘, Glasgow Herald, 28 February 1883, 10. 
 
‗Fleet Telegraph Ships‘, Glasgow Herald, 3 November 1884, 7. 
 
‗The Evolution of the Fighting Top‘, Globe-Republican, 7 July 1898, 2. 
 
‗The ―Captain‖ Turret Ship‘, Graphic, 19 March 1870, 381. 
 
‗English and American Ironclads‘, Greenock Advertiser, 5 May 1863, 4. 
 
‗America‘, Greenock Advertiser, 1 February 1870, 4. 
 
‗Outlines of the Week‘, Kentish Chronicle, 25 April 1863, 5. 
 
‗Portsmouth, May 30, 1846‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 30 May 1846, 5. 
 
‗Portsmouth, June 6, 1846‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 6 June 1846, 5. 
 
‗H.M.S. Scorpion‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 25 March 1865, 8. 
 434 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 30 December 1865, 12. 
 
‗The Easter Review at Dover‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 31 March 1869, 4. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 1 May 1869, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 19 May 1869, 3. 
 
‗Her Majesty‘s Ship Scorpion‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 21 August 1869, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 23 October 1869, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 1 January 1870, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 25 February 1871, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 17 May 1871, 4. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 8 June 1872, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 21 February 1880, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 28 February 1880, 8. 
 
‗London Gossip‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 6 August 1881, 3. 
 
‗Russian Naval Preparations‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 25 April 1885, 2. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 23 May 1885, 8. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Advertiser, 11 September 1886, 7. 
 
‗Dry Dock at Halifax, Nova Scotia‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 21 August 1886, 2.  
 
‗Cable between Halifax and Bermuda‘, Hampshire Advertiser, 29 September 
1886, 3.  
 
‗The International Exhibition‘, Hampshire Chronicle, 17 May 1862, 3. 
 435 
 
‗Cunningham‘s Self-Reefing Topsails‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 23 May 1857, 5.    
 
‗The Steam Ram of Sartorius‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 18 September 1858, 4. 
 
‗Collison with Her Majesty‘s Ship ―Scorpion‖, Hampshire Telegraph, 1 April 1865, 
4.   
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 26 June 1867, 2. 
 
‗The Review of 1867‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 20 July, 1867, 4. 
 
No Subject, Hampshire Telegraph, 21 August 1867, 1. 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 13 November 1867, 2 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 12 August 1868, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 29 September 1869, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 16 October 1869, 4. 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 20 October 1869, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 15 December 1869, 2. 
 
‗Who‘s to Blame?‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 18 December 1869, 4. 
 
‗The Waste of Gunpowder‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 18 December 1869. 4. 
 
‗Courts Martial on board the Duke of Wellington‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 12 
January 1870, 2. 
 
‗The Loss of H.M.S. Captain‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 17 September 1870, 7. 
 
‗Naval and Military News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 15 October 1870, 4. 
 
‗The Condition of the Navy‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 14 March 1874, 3. 
 
 436 
‗Naval Notes and News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 23 March 1878, 4-5. 
 
‗Naval and Military Preparations‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 1 May 1878, 2. 
 
‗Naval Notes and News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 15 May 1878, 2. 
 
‗Naval Notes and News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 16 November 1878, 5. 
 
‗Naval Notes and News, Hampshire Telegraph, 18 February 1880, 2. 
 
‗Naval Notes and News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 25 February 1880, 2. 
 
‗News from the China Station‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 6 November 1880, 5. 
 
‗Naval Notes & News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 26 July 1882, 2. 
 
‗News from the China Station‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 22 November 1884, 8. 
 
‗Naval News from the China Station‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 4 April 1885, 8. 
 
‗Naval News from the China Station‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 25 April 1885, 8. 
 
‗Naval News from the China Station‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 29 August 1885, 8. 
 
‗The use of armour in the Royal Navy, Hampshire Telegraph, 30 January 1886, 
2. 
 
‗Naval Notes and News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 14 August 1886, 8. 
 
‗Naval Notes & News‘, Hampshire Telegraph, 19 December, 1891, 8. 
 
‗Foreign News‘, Hawaiian Gazette, 27 May 1885, 6. 
 
‗More Electoral Defeats of the French Government‘, Herts, Guardian, Agricultural 
Journal, and General Advertiser, 23 January 1864, 2. 
 
‗Another Ironclad for the China Squadron‘, Hong Kong Daily Press, 20 January 
1880, 2.   
 
 437 
No Subject, Hong Kong Telegraph, 18 July 1881, 2. 
 
No Subject, Hong Kong Telegraph, 20 December 1881, 2. 
 
‗Passing of the ―Wivern‖, Hong Kong Telegraph, 13 March 1923, 7. 
 
‗Our Naval Position in the Event of War‘, Huddersfield Chronicle, 7 December 
1861, 6. 
 
‗The American Monitor Miantonomoh‘, Hull Packet, 22 June 1866, 7. 
 
‗Trial Trip of a New Monitor‘, Hull Packet, 4 November 1870, 8. 
 
‗Great Fire in Hull‘, Hull Packet, 6 May 1870, 5-6. 
 
‗Iron Shipbuilding at Liverpool‘, Illustrated London News (ILN), 25 October 1856, 
417. 
 
‗Mr. John Laird, and the Birkenhead Ironworks and Docks‘, ILN, 27 July 1861, 74. 
 
‗Her Majesty‘s Ship Majestic Keeping Watch over the Steam-Rams in the 
Mersey‘, ILN, 28 November 1863, 552. 
 
 ‗The Double-Turreted Ship Wyvern‘, ILN, 16 December 1865, 594. 
 
‗H.M.S. Wyvern [sic] in a swell of the Atlantic‘, ILN, 27 October 1866, 413. 
 
„H.M. Turret-Ships Wivern and Scorpion‘, Illustrated Times, 4 November 1865, 
282. 
  
‗The Shoeburyness Experiments on Plymouth Fort Shield‘, Illustrated Times, 27 
June 1868, 14-15. 
 
‗The Late Mr. Peabody‘, Illustrated Times, 18 December 1869, 10. 
 
‗International Exhibition‘, Kentish Chronicle, 31 May 1862, 2. 
 
‗Playing at Warfare‘, Lake‟s Falmouth Packet and Cornwall Advertiser, 1 May 
1869, 2.  
 438 
 
‗Miscellaneous‘, Leamington Spa Courier, 23 May 1863, 5. 
 
‗The French Fleet at Portsmouth‘, Leeds Mercury, 1 September 1865, 4. 
 
‗India‘, Leeds Mercury, 21 February 1871, 7.   
 
‗Points‘, Leeds Times, 21 February 1880, 4. 
 
‗Points‘, Leeds Times, 18 May 1882, 4. 
 
 No Subject, Leeds Times, 4 June 1892, 3. 
 
‗The Telegraph in Russia‘, Leicester Journal, 24 May 1861, 3. 
 
‗Mr. John Laird. The Birkenhead Ironworks and Docks‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 29 
July 1861, 3. 
 
‗The Japanese Ambassadors in Liverpool‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 29 May 1862, 5. 
 
‗Progress of the New Railway into Liverpool‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 20 September 
1862, 5. 
 
‗Naval Intelligence‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 1 October 1862, 5. 
 
‗The Fastest Tug-Vessel on the Mersey‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 14 January 1863, 
5. 
 
‗The Spy System in Liverpool‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 17 April 1863, 4. 
 
‗Ship Launches on Saturday‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 6 July 1863, 5. 
 
„For Sale, The Fine Paddle Tug Steamer Lion‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 29 July 
1863, 8. 
 
‗News of the Day‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 29 August 1863, 4.  
 
‗Another ―Ram‖ for a ―French‖ House‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 31 August 1863, 5. 
 
 439 
‗The Fleet and the Rams‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 15 September 1863, 5. 
 
‗The Mersey Steel and Iron Company, Limited‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 26 
September 1865, 7. 
 
‗H. M. S. Wyvern [sic]‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 10 October, 1865, 10. 
 
‗Squandering the Taxes‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 13 October 1866, 7. 
 
‗Naval Armaments‘, Liverpool Daily Post, 25 September 1867, 10. 
 
‗Launch of a Yacht at Birkenhead‘, Liverpool Mercury, 17 July 1858, 9. 
 
‗Multum In Parvo‘, Liverpool Mercury, 7 October 1861, 7. 
 
‗Launch of a Government Troopship at Birkenhead‘, Liverpool Mercury, 24 
November 1862, 3. 
 
‗Lectures on the American Crisis‘, Liverpool Mercury, 7 February 1863, 6. 
 
‗Vessels Building for the Confederates‘, Liverpool Mercury, 13 February 1863, 6. 
 
‗Southern Views of American Affairs‘, Liverpool Mercury 18 April 1863, 5. 
 
―Times‖ Telegram‘, Liverpool Mercury, 15 June 1863, 5. 
 
‗Confederate Cruisers‘, Liverpool Mercury, 2 December 1863, 3. 
 
‗The Steam Rams Seized at Birkenhead‘, Liverpool Mercury, 10 March 1864, 6. 
 
‗Trial Trip of One of the Mersey Steam Rams‘, Liverpool Mercury, 31 August 
1864, 6. 
 
‗Departure from the Mersey of the Ram Scorpion‘, Liverpool Mercury, 20 March 
1865, 7. 
 
‗Explosion on Board H.M.S. Wivern‘, Liverpool Mercury, 21 November 1867, 5. 
 
‗The Cerberus‘, Liverpool Mercury, 29 March 1871, 7.   
 440 
 
‗Our Power by Sea‘, Liverpool Mercury, 4 February 1876, 7.    
 
‗Shipping‘, Liverpool Mercury, 20 March 1880, 7. 
 
‗Stations of the British Navy for July‘, Liverpool Mercury, 13 July 1885, 3. 
 
‗Launch of the Valiant‘, Lloyd‟s Weekly Newspaper, 18 October 1863, 1. 
 
‗Navy Stations for May, 1885‘, Lloyd‟s Weekly Newspaper, 3 May 1885, 3. 
 
‗The Franco-Chinese War‘, Lloyd‟s Weekly Newspaper, 31 May 1885, 12. 
 
‗Reefing Topsails‘, London Daily News, 16 September 1861, 2.  
 
‗Naval and Military‘, London Daily News, 2 October 1861, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military‘, London Daily News, 27 January 1862, 2. 
 
‗France‘, London Daily News, 2 June 1864, 5. 
 
‗Naval and Military‘, London Daily News 30 October, 1865, 2. 
 
‗The Martyrs of Poland‘, London Daily News, 21 March 1867, 5. 
 
No Subject, London Daily News, 19 April 1867, 4. 
 
‗The Launch of H.M.S. Monarch‘, London Daily News, 26 May 1868, 5. 
 
‗Plymouth Breakwater Fort‘, London Daily News, 23 June 1868, 5. 
 
‗Sea-Going Turret Ships-III‘, London Daily News, 18 October 1870, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military, London Daily News, 28 July 1885, 6. 
 
„Launch of the Resistance‘, London Evening Standard, 12 April 1861, 3 
 
‗Marriages‘ London Evening Standard, 5 June 1861, 7 
 
 441 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 14 August 1862, 6. 
 
‗Iron-Cased Shipbuilding‘, London Evening Standard, 10 February 1863, 3. 
 
‗Yankee Espionage in England‘, London Evening Standard, 23 April 1863, 5. 
 
‗Letter from ―Manhattan‖, London Evening Standard, 8 May 1863, 5. 
 
‗Arrival of the Russian Frigate General Admiral, and trial of the Russian Battery 
Pervenetz‘, London Evening Standard, 7 August 1863, 3. 
 
‗The Armstrong Guns‘, London Evening Standard, 2 November 1863, 2. 
 
‗Launch of the Agincourt‘, London Evening Standard, 28 March 1865, 6. 
 
‗Trial Trip of Her Majesty‘s Ship Wivern‘, London Evening Standard, 6 October 
1865, 3, 
 
‗Turret Ships‘, London Evening Standard, 11 November 1865, 5. 
 
‗Turret Ships‘, London Evening Standard, 10 January 1866, 3. 
 
‗Imperial Parliament‘ London Evening Standard, 21 July 1866, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 24 August 1867, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 5 August 1868, 6. 
 
‗Russia‘, London Evening Standard, 20 November 1868, 5. 
 
‗From our Naval Correspondent‘, London Evening Standard, 29 March 1869, 6. 
 
‗From our Naval Correspondent‘, London Evening Standard, 30 March 1869, 2. 
 
‗The Review at Portsmouth‘, London Standard, 27 April 1869, 6. 
 
‗An Ex-Confederate Ship of War‘, London Evening Standard, 6 August 1869, 3. 
 
‗The Turret Ship Scorpion‘, London Evening Standard, 24 September 1869, 3. 
 442 
 
‗Harvey‘s Sea Torpedo‘, London Evening Standard, 24 September 1869, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 12 October, 1869, 6.  
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 20 December 1869, 
3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 21 December 1869, 
3. 
 
‗Turrets v. Broadsides‘, London Evening Standard, 2 February 1870, 1. 
 
‗The Loss of H.M.S. Captain‘, London Evening Standard, 29 September 1870, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 26 December 1870, 
6. 
 
‗The New Steamship Adriatic‘, London Evening Standard, 3 April 1872, 3. 
 
‗Gunnery Trials of the Devastation‘, London Evening Standard, 17 July 1873, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 2 April 1878, 3. 
 
No Subject, London Evening Standard, 14 May 1878, 5. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 9 November 1878, 2. 
 
‗Russia and China‘, London Evening Standard, 5 May 1879, 5. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, London Evening Standard, 12 January 1880, 3. 
 
‗War Rockets‘, London Evening Standard, 27 September 1883, 2. 
 
‗The War Preparations‘, London Evening Standard, 4 May 1885, 2. 
 
‗Crystal Palace‘, London Evening Standard, 15 July 1885, 1. 
 
‗The Financial Crisis‘, London Evening Standard, 21 November 1890, 5. 
 443 
 
‗Naval Manoeuvres‘, London Evening Standard, 22 July 1896, 3. 
 
‗The Vote by Ballot‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 22 
January 1864, 3. 
 
‗Trial of Her Majesty‘s Turret Ram Scorpion‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire 
General Advertiser. 31 August, 1864, 3. 
 
‗Collison with the Scorpion‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General 
Advertiser. 30 March, 1865, 2. 
 
‗Trial Trip of H.M.S. Wivern‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General 
Advertiser, 10 June, 1865, 11. 
 
‗The Birkenhead Rams, Scorpion and Wyvern [sic]‘, Manchester Courier and 
Lancashire General Advertiser. 12 September, 1865, 4. 
 
‗The Channel Fleet‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser. 9 
October 1866, 3. 
 
‗Colonel Kelly the Fenian Leader, in Manchester‘, Manchester Courier and 
Lancashire General Advertiser, 18 September 1867, 3.     
 
‗The Portsmouth Review‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General 
Advertiser, 27 April 1869, 5.   
  
The Disastrous Fire at Hull‘, Manchester Evening News, 5 May 1870, 4. 
 
‗Projected Increase to the Russian Pacific Fleet‘, Manchester Courier and 
Lancashire General Advertiser, 14 February 1880, 11. 
 
‗Russia‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 6 April 1880, 6. 
 
No Subject, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 6 November 
1880, 6. 
 
‗The Defences of Hong Kong‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General 
Advertiser, 26 December 1884, 6. 
 444 
 
‗Suspicious Fires aboard the Wye and Canada. Supposed Fenian Plots‘, 
Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 23 May 1885, 15. 
 
‗General News‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 13 June 
1885, 11. 
 
‗Arrest of a Russian Spy in Canada‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire 
General Advertiser, 18 November 1886, 3. 
 
 ‗Obituary‘, Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, 15 
September 1894, 13. 
 
‗The Experimental Squadron‘, Morning Chronicle, 5 June 1846, 3. 
 
‗The Premier Gas‘ Morning Chronicle, 18 September 1858, 7.  
  
‗Insolvent Debtors‘ Court‘, Morning Chronicle, 8 April 1861, 8 
 
‗The New M.P.‘s‘. Morning Chronicle, 25 December 1861, 6. 
 
‗Launch of Her Majesty‘s Iron-Cased Screw Frigate Resistance‘, Morning Post, 
12 April 1861, 5. 
 
‗Central Criminal Court‘ Morning Post, 9 May 1861, 7. 
 
‗Stations of the Royal Navy in Commission‘, Morning Post, 5, December 1861, 6. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 21 March 1862, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 19 January 1863, 3. 
 
‗America‘, Morning Post, 27 July 1863, 5. 
 
‗Ireland‘, Morning Post, 23 September 1867, 8.    
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 18 November 1867, 3. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 7 September 1869, 2.   
 445 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 11 November 1869, 3. 
 
‗Assize Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 23 August 1870, 7. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 23 March 1878, 6. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 24 March 1880, 5. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 29 March 1880, 6. 
 
‗The Kuldja Frontier‘, Morning Post, 1 April 1880, 5. 
 
‗The Fisheries Exhibition‘, Morning Post, 22 June 1883, 3. 
 
‗England‘s Peril in Case of War‘, Morning Post, 6 December 1884, 3.   
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 28 July 1885, 5. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 3 September 1885, 5. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Morning Post, 25 July 1888, 7.   
 
‗Like a Big Mosquito Menacing Our Coast‘, Morning Times, 17 May 1896, 18. 
 
‗The Navy that is Needed‘, National Republican, 31 January 1885, 1. 
 
‗Latest Foreign News‘, National Republican, 2 May 1885, 1. 
 
‗Revolt of the Exiles in Siberia‘, Newcastle Courant, 31 August 1866, 6. 
 
‗Naval and Military‘, Newcastle Courant, 22 March 1878, 7. 
 
‗The Alarm on H.M.S. Garnet‘, Newcastle Courant, 22 May 1885, 3.  
 
‗Heburn‘, Newcastle Courant, 21 August, 1885, 5.    
 
‗Launch of the Ironcased [sic] Frigate ―Resistance‖, Newcastle Journal, 13 April 
1861, 3. 
 446 
 
‗The Yankee Blockade of Bermuda‘, Newcastle Journal, 30 October 1862, 3. 
 
‗Heavy Guns for the Navy‘, Newcastle Journal, 22 November 1867, 4.  
 
‗Secretary Welles and Mr. Laird‘, New York Daily Tribune, 10 August 1863, 4 
 
‗The Monarch‘, New York Daily Tribune, 10 February 1870, 2. 
 
‗Against the Garnet‘s Side‘, New York Daily Tribune, 7 May 1885, 1. 
 
‗Captain Hand to be Tried‘, New York Daily Tribune, 16 May 1885, 1. 
 
‗Old Warship for a Target‘, New York Daily Tribune, 5 May 1901, 2. 
 
‗British Monitor Founders‘, New York Daily Tribune, 18 June 1903, 3. 
 
‗Miscellaneous‘, New York Times (NYT), 28 June 1855, 1 
 
‗Passengers Arrived‘, NYT, 22 May 1861, 8. 
 
‗The Rebel Pirates. Ironclads on the Mersey. Description of the Vessels‘, NYT, 
16 September, 1863, 1, 2. 
 
‗The Rebel Rams A Fit Case for Aid‘, NYT, 17 October 1864, 2. 
 
„Miscellaneous, Return of a Blockade-Runner, Departure of the Scorpion‘, NYT, 8 
April 1865, 2.  
 
‗The Asiatic Telegraphs‘, NYT, 17 February 1867, 4.    
 
‗The Russian North Pacific Fleet‘, NYT, 1 January 1877, 3.  
 
‗The Russian Pacific Fleet‘ NYT, 14 May 1877, 1. 
 
‗The British Lion at Rest‘, NYT, 12 March 1878, 4-5. 
 
‗The British Army‘, NYT, 27 March 1878, 7. 
 
 447 
‗The Russian Volunteer Fleet‘, NYT, 17 May 1878, 1. 
 
‗British Men-of-War‘, NYT, 26 May 1878, 9. 
 
‗The Russian Cruiser Fleet‘, NYT, 30 May 1878, 1. 
 
‗Furious Hurricane at Bermuda‘, NYT, 9 September 1878, 8. 
 
‗The Russian Cruisers‘ NYT, 13 September 1878, 1. 
 
‘Russia‘s New Cruisers‘ NYT, 22 December 1878, 1. 
 
‗Departure of A Russian Cruiser‘, NYT, 9 June 1879, 1. 
 
 ‗An American Decorated‘, NYT, 3 August 1879, 9. 
 
‗Sickness on a British War-Ship [sic]‘, NYT, 12 January 1880, 5. 
 
‗Russia in the North Pacific‘, NYT, 26 September 1880, 3. 
 
‗Russian Designs on Corea [sic]‘, NYT, 19 December 1881, 6. 
 
‗Our Neutrality in Danger‘, NYT, 16 April 1885, 4.   
 
‗Asking a Vote of Credit‘, NYT, 22 April 1885 1. 
 
‗The Anglo-Russian Quarrel, NYT, 25 April 1885, 1. 
 
‗Ready for a Fight‘, NYT, 25 April 1885, 1. 
 
‗The Strelok in Our Port‘, NYT, 1 May 1885, 1. 
 
‗Arrival of the Garnet‘, NYT, 3 May 1885, 9. 
 
‗Ships Ready for War‘, NYT, 18 May 1885, 5. 
 
‗Russian Cruiser Watched‘, Nottingham Evening Post, 29 April 1885, 2. 
 
‗London Sketches‘, Northampton Mercury, 15 February 1862, 4 
 448 
 
‗Miscellaneous‘, North Wales Chronicle, 25 March 1865, 2. 
 
‗Value of Plain Talk‘, Omaha Daily Bee, 1 March 1898, p. 4. 
 
‗In British Columbia‘ The Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 9 May 1885, 5. 
 
‗British Coal and Coaling Stations‘, Pall Mall Gazette, 3 January 1877, 2-3. 
 
‗Letters about the Navy and Its‘ Coaling Stations‘, Pall Mall Gazette, 1 Oct 1884, 
2. 
 
‗Is Our Navy Ready for War?‘, Pall Mall Gazette, 13 March 1885, 1. 
 
‗Petroleum for Steamers‘, Peterhead Sentinel and Buchan Journal, 20 May 1885, 
3.  
 
‗The Baltic Fleet‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 13 May 1878, 3. 
 
‗H.M.S. Dreadnought‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 15 June 1878, 2. 
 
‗The Russian Torpedo Fleet‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 4 November 1878, 3. 
 
‗The Royal Marine Artillery‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 10 October 1879, 2. 
 
‗News of the Day‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 17 February 1880, 2. 
 
‗The Moscow Cruisers‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 11 March 1880, 3. 
 
‗Movements of Queen‘s Ships‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 20 March 1880, 2. 
 
‗Movements of Queen‘s Ships‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 8 April 1880, 2. 
 
‗Movements of Queen‘s Ships‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 22 May 1880, 2. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 30 March 1882, 2. 
 
‗A Naval Intelligence Department‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 11 Dec 1882, 2. 
 
 449 
‗The English Fleet in the China Seas‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 17 March 
1883, 2. 
 
‗The West Indian Station‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 8 June 1883, 2. 
 
‗The China Station‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 7 January 1885, 4. 
 
‗Naval News from the China Station‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 31 January 
1885, 4. 
 
‗Russian War Cruisers‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 26 March 1885, 2. 
 
‗Excitement in India. Active War Preparations‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 13 
April 1885, 3. 
 
‗The Defence of Hong Kong‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 23 May 1885, 4. 
 
‗Naval News from the China Station‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 23 May 1885, 
4. 
 
‗Naval News from the China Station‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 29 August 
1885, 8. 
 
‗News of the Day‘, Portsmouth Evening News, 9 September 1885, 2. 
 
‗The Portsmouth Volunteer Review‘, Portsmouth Times and Naval Gazette, 1 
May 1869, 7. 
 
‗Miscellaneous Naval‘, Portsmouth Times and Naval Gazette, 7 August 1869, 4. 
 
‗Iron-clad Jack: A Sea-Song of the Future‘, Punch, 12 April 1862, 146. 
 
‗Vulcan Arming Neptune‘, Punch, 19 April 1862, 157.  
 
‗A Trifling Chronological Error‘, Punch, 26 April 1862, 163. 
 
‗Fresh Paint‘, Punch, 4 July 1885, 5. 
 
‗The French Fleet at Portsmouth‘, Reading Mercury, 2 September 1865, 2. 
 450 
 
‗Military and Naval‘, Reading Mercury, 16 October 1869, 7. 
 
‗Royal Proclamation‘, Reynold‟s Newspaper, 19 May 1861, 10. 
 
‗The Launch of the Monarch‘, Reynold‟s Newspaper, 31 May 1868, 2. 
 
‗A Naval Revolution‘, Reynolds‟s Newspaper, 9 November 1873, 2. 
 
‗The Navy‘, ‗H.M. Gun-battery ―Terror‖, Royal Gazette, 20 October 1857, 2. 
 
No Subject, Royal Gazette, 19 October 1869, 2. 
 
‗Very Latest‘, Royal Gazette, 23 April 1878, 5. 
 
‗The Recent Hurricane‘, Royal Gazette, 7 September 1880, 5. 
 
‗Fenian Plots‘, Royal Gazette, 14 February 1882, 2. 
 
‗Bermuda Dock‘, Royal Gazette, 13 November 1883, 1. 
 
‗Fenian Warfare‘, Royal Gazette, 24 March 1885, 3.  
 
‗A Fenian Expedition‘, Royal Gazette, 14 April 1885, 5. 
 
‗Proceedings of the Honorable Legislative Council‘, Royal Gazette, 17 November 
1885, 1. 
 
No Subject, Royal Gazette, 12 May 1903, 5. 
 
‗Sinking of the Scorpion‘, Royal Gazette, 30 June 1903, 1.   
 
‗British Columbia‘, Sacramento Daily Record-Union, 29 April 1885, 1. 
 
‗A Visit to the Strelok‘, Sacramento Daily Record-Union, 11 May 1885, 4.   
 
‗Britain‘s War-Ships [sic]‘, Salt Lake Herald, 17 April 1885, 1. 
 
 451 
‗The Man in the Military Mast Fills a Post of Deadly Peril‘, Salt Lake Herald, 1 
May 1898, 20.  
 
‗Passes through Great Perils‘, San Francisco Call, 17 October, 1896, 1. 
 
‗Patent Railway Axles-Interesting Chance in Extending a Patent‘ Scientific 
American (SA), 4, 14 April 1849, 235. 
 
‗War News‘, SA, 10, 21 July 1855, 355. 
 
‗Mechanics for Russia‘, SA, 10, 25 August 1855, 395. 
 
‗Experiments with Bessemer‘s Process‘ SA, 12, 1 November 1856, 64. 
 
‗New Steel Wire‘, SA, 14, 12 March 1859, 221. 
 
‗Science and Modern Warfare‘, SA, 14, 4 June 1859, 325. 
 
‗To Make Steel from Pig Iron‘, SA, 3, 20, 10 November 1860, 308. 
  
‗Semi-Steel Locomotive Tires (sic)‟ SA, 4, 5 January 1861, 3. 
 
„The Ericsson Battery‘, SA, 6, 1 February 1862, 73.  
 
„The Steam Battery ―Monitor‖, SA, 6, 22 March 1862, 177. 
 
‗The Last Phase of the Armstrong Gun‘, SA, 6, 10 May 1862, 297. 
 
‗Ordnance in the London Exhibition‘, SA, 6, 21 June 1862, 391. 
 
‗The Science of Iron and Steel‘, SA, 8 (New Series), 14 February 1863, 105. 
 
‗The ―Dunderberg‖, SA, 8, 14 March 1863, 162. 
 
‗The New Iron-clads in England‘, SA, 9, 3 October 1863, 214. 
 
‗The Confederate Rams in England‘, SA, 9, (New Series), 28 November 1863, 
343. 
 
 452 
‗The Wonders of the Port of London‘, SA, Volume 9, 5 December 1863, 357. 
 
‗The Foreign Iron-Clads‘ SA, 9, 12 December 1863, 377. 
 
‗Defects of the British Ironclads‘, SA, 10, 13 February 1864, 101. 
 
‗Who Cast the Screws for the Italian Frigate?‘, SA, 11, 3 September 1864, 150. 
 
‗The Laird Rams‘, SA, 11, 1 October 1864, 224. 
 
‗The Last Rebel Ram‘, SA, 12, (New Series), 27 May 1865, 335. 
 
‗Steel Ropes‘, SA, 13, (New Series) 23 December 1865, 405. 
 
‗The Exhibition of Iron and Steel‘, SA, 16, 15 June 1867, 374. 
 
‗The Great Floating Dock for Bermuda‘, SA, 1 January, 1869, Volume 20, 7. 
 
‗The German Corvette Augusta‘, SA, 20, 7 November 1885, (No page) 
 
‗Experiments at Shoeburyness‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 2 August 1864, 7. 
 
No Subject, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 31 March 1865, 2. 
 
‗Launch of Her Majesty‘s Ironclad Frigate Lord Warden‘, Sheffield Daily 
Telegraph, 30 May 1865, 3. 
 
‗A Coming Event‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1880, 5. 
 
‗War Preparations‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1885, 5. 
 
‗Patriotic Proposal in Australia‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 7 May 1885, 5. 
 
‗Reported Arrest of A British Consul in Russia‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 19 May 
1885, 5. 
 
‗British Naval Gunnery‘, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 28 May 1901, 5. 
 
‗A New Confederate Iron-clad‘ Sheffield Independent, 18 August 1862, 4. 
 453 
 
‗Launch of Iron Steam ―Rams‖ at Birkenhead‘, Sheffield Independent, 31 August 
1863, 3. 
  
‗Iron Cased Forts‘, Sheffield Independent, 17 June 1868, 2. 
 
‗The Dover Volunteer Review‘, Sheffield Independent, 29 March 1869, 2. 
 
‗Our American Letter‘, Sheffield Independent, 17 June 1878, 3. 
 
‗English and French Naval Forces in the East‘, Sheffield Independent, 10 
December 1883, 2.   
 
No Subject, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1885, 8. 
 
‗Torpedo Nets‘ Sheffield Independent, 12 May 1885, 2. 
 
‗The Channel Fleet‘, Sherborne Mercury, 9 October, 1866, 5. 
 
‗Marine Engines and Engineering‘, Shields Daily Gazette, 6 September 1882, 5. 
 
‗Telegraphic Codes‘, Shields Daily Gazette, 6 Sep 1882, 7. 
 
‗Weather and Navigation‘, Shields Daily Gazette, 28 April 1883, 4. 
 
‗Weather and Navigation‘, Shields Daily Gazette, 6 July 1883, 4. 
 
‗Port Hamilton‘, Shields Daily Gazette, 14 May 1885, 3. 
  
‗Telegraphic‘, Shreveport Weekly News, 4 May 1863, 1. 
 
‗Russian Cruisers in America‘, Somerset County Gazette, 1 June 1878, 7. 
 
‗Harbour Defences‘, South Australian Register, 3 June 1875, 5. 
 
‗The Easter Review at Dover‘, South London Press, 3 April 1869, 11. 
 
‗The Neutrality Proclamation‘, The Spectator, 18 May 1861, 521. 
 
 454 
‗The Cruise of the Lords of the Admiralty‘, Star, 5 October 1869, 2. 
 
‗The Armaments of England‘, St. James‟s Gazette, 29 September 1884, 12.    
 
‗A Russian Torpedo Scandal‘, St. James Gazette, 14 November 1885, 10. 
 
‗The Danger to British Commerce‘, The Sun, 27 April 1885, 2. 
 
‗Another British Cruiser‘, The Sun, 8 May 1885, 1. 
 
‗The Corvette Canada Keeps a Look Out for Dynamite‘, The Sun, 10 May 1885, 
1. 
 
‗Goodbye to the Canada‘ The Sun, 16 May 1885, 2. 
 
‗Built for the Confederacy‘, The Sun, 28 June 1903, 2 
 
‗Russian War Vessels in the Suez Canal‘, Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping 
Gazette, 13 April 1885, 3. 
 
‗Magistrates Office-Tuesday‘, Surrey Advertiser, 27 January 1866, 2. 
 
‗Ship Launch‘, Sussex Advertiser, 18 January 1859, 6. 
 
‗Epitome of News‘, Tamworth Herald, 15 September 1883, 7. 
 
‗Birmingham Arms for Russia‘, Tamworth Herald, 9 May 1885, 6 
 
‗The Fleet at Cherbourg‘, Times, 15 August 1865, 7. 
 
‗Her Majesty‘s Ship Captain‘, Times, 28 September 1870, 12. 
 
‗The Accident on the Thunderer‘, Times, 13 January 1879, 10. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Times, 12 February 1880, 10. 
 
‗Naval and Military Intelligence‘, Times, 14 February 1880, 8. 
 
‗H.M.S. Wivern‘, Times, 20 February 1880, 12. 
 455 
 
‗The Fortifications of Hong Kong‖, Times, 28 October, 1884, 3. 
 
‗English Policy and National Defence‘, Times, 26 May 1885, 11. 
 
‗The Change of Ministry‘, Times, 29 June 1885, 5. 
 
‗A Reclassification of Her Majesty‘s Ships‘, Times, 6 September 1892, 9. 
 
‗H. M. S. Warrior‘, West Middlesex Advertiser and Family Journal, 11 July, 1863, 
3. 
 
 ‗French and Sardinian Preparations‘ Western Daily Press, 25 February 1859, 3. 
 
‗The Royal Sovereign‘, Western Daily Press, 11 November 1864, 3. 
 
‗Russian Cruisers‘, Western Daily Press, 4 June 1878, 6. 
 
„War Notes‟, Western Times, 25 August 1870, 4. 
 
 ‗German Prize at Plymouth‘, Western Times, 19 January 1871, 3.    
 
‗Gunboat Building on the Mersey‘, Westmorland Gazette, 22 November 1862, 8. 
 
‗The Federal Government and England‘s Neutral Rights‘, Westmorland Gazette, 
26 September 1863, 2. 
 
‗Note on Naval Estimates‘, Wrexham Advertiser, 23 March 1861, 3. 
 
‗Great Fire at Hull‘, York Herald, 7 May 1870, 3. 
 
‗Military and Naval‘, York Herald, 1 June 1878, 12. 
 
‗Summary‘, York Herald, 8 July 1880, 4. 
 
‗The British Forces on the North American & West India Station‘, Yorkshire 
Gazette, 7 December 1861, 11. 
 
‗A British War Ship [sic] on Fire‘, Yorkshire Gazette, 23 May 1885, 10. 
 456 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
Ph.D Thesis 
 
Johnson, Robert , The Penjdeh Crisis and its impact on the Great Game and the 
Defence of India, 1885-1897. University of Exeter, Sept, 1999. 
 
Oliver, David Harold, (2001), Staatkaperei: The German Navy and Commerce 
Warfare 1856-1888. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), University of 
Saskatchewan  
 
Snyder, David Allan, (2001), Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and 
the Anglo-American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922. (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation), Texas A&M 
 
Articles 
 
Alden, Commander John D. U.S.N. (Ret.), ‗The Old Navy: Monitors ‗Round Cape 
Horn‘, Proceedings Magazine, 100, (September, 1974).        
 
Allen, Matthew, ‗The Deployment of Untried Technology: British Naval Tactics in 
the Ironclad Era‘, War in History, 15, (July 01, 2008) 
 
Anderson, Bern, ‗The Naval Strategy of the Civil War‘, Military Affairs, 26, (Spring 
1962) 
 
Ashworth, William, ‗Aspects of Late Victorian Naval Administration‘, The 
Economic History Review, 22, (Dec., 1969)  
 
Baffa, Richard, ‗The Writing on the Wall: E. G. Browne and the Constitutional 
Revolution in Persia‘, Cambridge, May, 2015. 
 
Baldwin, Henry, ‗Farragut in Mobile Bay‘, Scribner‟s Monthly 13, (February 1877) 
 
Ballard, Admiral G. A. ‗The First Mastless Capital Ship H.M.S. Devastation‘. The 
Mariner‟s Mirror, XXII, (1946) 
 
 457 
Barratt, Glynn, ‗The Visit of the Russian Cruiser ―Afrika‖ to Auckland (1881)‘, New 
Zealand Slavonic Journal, 1, (1978) 
 
Bastable, Marshall J., ‗From Breechloaders to Monster Guns: Sir William 
Armstrong and the Invention of Modern Artillery, 1854-1880‘. Technology and 
Culture, 33, (Apr, 1992) 
 
Baugh, Daniel A. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 27, (Summer 1996), 
review of C. I. Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry 1840-1870, (New York, 
1993) 
 
Baxter, Colin F., ‗Lord Palmerston: Panic Monger or Naval Pacemaker?‘ Social 
Science, 47, (autumn, 1972)  
 
Belknap, Captain Reginald R., U.S.N, ‗The Study of Strategy‘, Naval War College 
Review, (spring, 1997) 
 
Berryman, John, ‗British Imperial Defence Strategy and Russia: The Role of the 
Royal Navy in the Far East, 1878-1898‘, IJNH, 1, (April 2002)  
 
Berube, Lieutenant Commander (USNR) Claude G. ‗American Thunder Childs‘ 
Naval History, 24, (June, 2010) 
 
Brassey, Thomas, M. P., ‗On a Colonial Naval Volunteer Force‘, RUSI Journal, 
22, (17 May 1878). 
 
Bjerg, Hans Christian, ‗When the Monitors Came to Europe: The Danish Monitor 
Rolf Krake, 1863‟ International Journal of Naval History (IJNH), 1, (October 2002) 
 
Blair, Dan, ―One Good Port: Beaufort Harbor [sic], North Carolina, 1863-1864‘, 
The North Carolina Historical Review 79 (July 2002)  
 
Blumenthal, Henry, ‗Confederate Diplomacy: Popular Notions and International 
Realities‘, The Journal of Southern History, 32, (May 1966) 
 
Bonsal, Stephen, ‗Eastern Siberia‘, Harper‟s New Monthly Magazine, 97, (July 
1898) 
 
 458 
Bridge, Horatio, ‗Personal Recollections of Nathanial Hawthorne, Harper‟s New 
Monthly Magazine, 84, (March 1892)  
 
Bristol, Charles L. ‗Notes on the Bermudas‘, Bulletin of the American 
Geographical Society, 33, (1901)   
 
Brown, Alexander Crosby, ‗The John Randolph: America‘s First Commercially 
Successful Iron Steamboat‘.  The Georgia Historical Quarterly. 36, (March 1952) 
 
Brown, William Garrott, ‗The Resources of the Confederacy‘, The Atlantic 
Monthly, 88, (December 1901) 
 
Brown, William O. Jr. and Burdekin, Richard C. K. ‗Turning Points in the U.S. 
Civil War: A British Perspective‘, Journal of Economic History, 60, (Mar. 2000)  
 
Chere, Lewis M., ‗The Hong Kong Riots of October 1884: Evidence for Chinese 
Nationalism‘, Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, 20, (1980) 
 
Clemenceau, Georges, ‗The French Navy‘ The North American Review. 164, 
(Feb, 1897) 
 
Colomb, Captain J. C. R., ‗Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in 
War‘, RUSI Journal, 25, 13 May 1881 
 
Connah, Graham and Pearson, David, ‗Artifact of Empire: The Tale of a Gun‘, 
Historical Archaeology, 36, (2002) 
 
Davis, Lance E. and Huttenback, Robert A. ‗Public Expenditure and Private 
Profit: Budgetary Decision in the British Empire, 1860-1912‘, American Economic 
Review, 67, (Feb. 1977) 
 
De Leon, Edwin, ‗Ismail Pacha of Egypt‘, Harpers New Monthly Magazine, 39, 
(October 1869) 
 
De Heere, R. F. Scheltema, ‗The Prins Hendrik Der Nederlanden‘, The Mariner‟s 
Mirror.  Volume 17, (Cambridge, 1931) 
 
Dorr, Julia C. R., ‗Bermudian Days‘, Atlantic Monthly, 52, (December 1883)   
 
 459 
Ekoko, A. E., ‗The Theory and Practice of Imperial Garrisons: The British 
Experiment in the South Atlantic 1881-1914‘, Journal of Historical Society of 
Nigeria, 12, (Dec. 1983-Jun 1984)  
 
Ferreiro, Larrie D. ‗The Social History of the Bulbous Bow‘. Technology and 
Culture, 52, (April, 2011) 
 
Fuller, Howard J. ‗John Ericsson, the Monitors and Union Naval Strategy‘, IJNH, 
2 (December 2004) 
 
Fuller, Howard J. ‗Chilean Standoff‘, Naval History, 25, (June 2011). 
 
Fuller, Howard J, ‗The Warrior‘s Influence Abroad: The American Civil War‘, 
IJNH, 10 (October 2013) 
 
Gentry, Judith Fenner, ‗A Confederate Success in Europe: The Erlanger Loan‘, 
The Journal of Southern History, 36, (May 1970) 
 
Gordon, Donald C., ‗The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial 
Collaboration: 1884-1904‘. Political Science Quarterly, 77, (Dec., 1962) 
 
Gould, Richard A. ‗The Archaeology of HMS Vixen, an early ironclad ram in 
Bermuda‘. The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 20, (1991) 
 
Gould, Richard A. and Souza, Donna J. ‗History and Archaeology of HM Floating 
Dock, Bermuda‘. The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, 25, (1996) 
 
Guernsey, A .H, ‗Iron-Clad Vessels‘, Harpers New Monthly Magazine, 25, 
(September 1862) 
 
Guernsey, A .H.  ‗The Revolving Iron Tower and Its Inventor‘, Harper‟s New 
Monthly Magazine, 26, (January 1863)   
 
Halvorsen, Peter F., ‗The Royal Navy and Mine Warfare, 1868-1914‘, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 27, (2004) 
 
Hamilton, C. I., ‗The Victorian Navy‘, The Historical Journal, 25, (Jun., 1982) 
 
 460 
Headrick, Daniel R. and Griset, Pascal, ‗Submarine Telegraph Cables: Business 
and Politics, 1838-1939‘. The Business History Review, 75, (autumn, 2001)  
 
Hernon, Joseph M. Jr. ‗British Sympathies in the American Civil War: A 
Reconsideration‘, Journal of Southern History, 33, (Aug. 1967) 
 
Hobart, Admiral Pasha, Imperial Ottoman Navy, ‗Systems of Offense and 
Defense [sic] in Naval Warfare‘, The North American Review, 127, (November-
December 1878) 
 
Holley, Alexander L. ‗Iron-Clad Ships and Heavy Ordnance‘ Atlantic Monthly, 1, 
(January 1863) 
 
Horres, C. R., Jr. ‗Charleston‘s Civil War ―Monster Guns‘, the Blakely Rifles‘, The 
South Carolina Historical Magazine, 97, (April 1996) 
 
Jarvis, Adrian, ‗Protection and Decoration: A Tentative Investigation into Painting 
Ships Before the Great War‘, The Great Circle, 22, (2000) 
 
Johnson, R. A., ―Russians at the Gates of India‖?  Planning the Defence of India 
1885-1900‘, Journal of Military History, 67, (Jul. 2003) 
 
Kennedy, P. M., ‗Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914‘, 
English Historical Review, 86, (Oct., 1971) 
 
Knowles, Anne Kelly, ‗Labor, Race, and Technology in the Confederate Iron 
Industry‘, Technology and Culture 42 (Jan., 2001) 
 
Knox, Thomas W., ‗European Influences in Asia‘. The North American Review, 
141, (July 1885) 
 
Kubicek, Robert V. ‗The Design of Shallow-Draft [sic] Steamers for the British 
Empire, 1868-1906‘. Technology and Culture, 31, (Jul. 1990) 
 
Lack, Clem, Russian Ambitions in the Pacific, Australian War Scares of the 19th 
Century, (Queensland, 1968)  
 
Lambert, Andrew, ‗Economic Power, Technological Advantage, and Imperial 
Strength: Britain as a Unique Global Power, 1860-1890‘.  IJNH, 5, (August 2006) 
 461 
 
Lautenschlager, Karl, ‗Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare‘ 
International Security, 8, (fall, 1983) 
 
Lawrence, T.E. on ‗Guerrilla Warfare‘. (2016). In Encyclopædia Britannica. 
Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/topic/T-E-Lawrence-on-guerrilla-
warfare-1984900 
 
Lebergott, Stanley, ‗Why the South Lost: Commercial Purpose in the 
Confederacy, 1861-1865‘, The Journal of American History, 70, (June 1983)   
 
Loy, Wesley, ‗10 Rumford Place: Doing Confederate Business in Liverpool‘. The 
South Carolina Historical Magazine, 98, (October 1997)  
 
Matuszato, Kimitaka, ‗The Creation of the Priamur Governor-Generalship in 1884 
and the Reconfiguration of Asiatic Russia‘, Russian Review, 71, (Jul, 2012) 
 
Maynard, Douglas H. ‗The Forbes-Aspinwall Mission‘. The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, 45, (June 1958)  
 
Middleton, Lt. Cdr. H. G., ‗H.M.S. Scorpion‘, Bermuda Historical Quarterly, 
XXXVII, (Spring 1980) 
 
Moncrieff, Major (Alexander), ‗On Harbour Defence‘, Royal United Services 
Institute Journal, 19, (1 May 1875)        
 
Morris, Peter, ‗The Russians in Central Asia 1870-1887‘, The Slavonic and 
Eastern European Review, 53, (Oct. 1975) 
 
Morus, Iwan Rhys, ‗The Nervous System of Britain‘: Space, Time and the Electric 
Telegraph in the Victorian Age‘. The British Journal for the History of Science. 33, 
(Dec. 2000)  
  
Mullins, Robert E., ‗New Ways of Thinking: The Intelligence Function and 
Strategic Calculations in the Admiralty, 1882-1889‘ Intelligence and National 
Security, 15, (autumn 2000) 
 
Muraviev, Alexey D., ‗The Russian Pacific Fleet: From The Crimean War to 
Perestrokia‘. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, 20, (Canberra, 2007). 
 462 
 
Neblett, Thomas R. ‗Major Edward C. Anderson and the C.S.S. Fingal‘, The 
Georgia Historical Quarterly, 52, (June 1968) 
 
Nish, Ian, ‗Politics, Trade and Communications in East Asia: Thoughts on Anglo-
Russian Relations, 1861-1907‘, Modern Asian Studies, 21, (1987) 
 
O‘Dea, W. T., ‗A Century of British Engineering‘, Journal of the Royal Society of 
Arts, 99, (4 May 1951) 
 
Oliphant, Lawrence, ‗A Visit to Tsusima [sic]: An Incident of Russian Aggression‘, 
The Living Age, 168, (2 January 1886) 
 
Oppenheim, P. T., ‗The Paper Fleet or the Ships that Never Were, Part Two: 
1870 to 1900. The Great Circle, 12, (1990) 
 
Otte, T. G., ‗Great Britain, Germany, and the Far-Eastern Crisis of 1897-1898‘, 
The English Historical Review, 110, (November 1995) 
 
Owsley, Harriet Chappell, ‗Henry Shelton Sanford and Federal Surveillance 
Abroad, 1861-1865‘. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 48, (Sep. 1961) 
 
Page, Captain Thomas J. C.S.N, ‗The Career of the Confederate Cruiser 
―Stonewall‖. Southern Historical Society Papers, 7, (Richmond, 1879) 
 
Pollard, S.  ‗The ‗Decline of Shipbuilding on the Thames‘. The Economic History 
Review. 3, (1950)   
 
Pollard, S., ‗Lassez-Faire and Shipbuilding‘ The Economic History Review. 5, no. 
1 (1952) 
 
Preston, Antony, ‗Creating an Inshore Navy: Royal Navy Littoral Warfare Forces 
in the Russian War 1854-56‘. Warship 1999-2000.  Edited by Antony Preston. 
(London, 1999) 
 
Putnam, Arnold A., ‗The Building of Numbers 294 & 295: The Laird Rams‘. 
Warship 1999-2000. Edited by Antony Preston, (London, 1999) 
 
 463 
Roberts, Steven, ‗Captain Alexander Blakely, RA, ―Original Inventor of 
Improvements in Cannon and the Greatest Artillerist of the Age‖ (London, 2012) 
 
Roberts, William P., ‗James Dunwoody Bulloch and the Confederate Navy‘.  The 
North Carolina Historical Review, 24, (July 1947) 
 
Rodger, N.A.M., ‗The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part I: ‗Business 
Methods‘, 1869-74‘ Mariners Mirror, 61, (1975) 
 
Rodger, N.A.M., ‗The Dark Ages of the Admiralty, 1869-85, Part III: Peace, 
Retrenchment and Reform, 1880-85‘ Mariners Mirror, 62, (1976) 
 
Rowland, Buford, ‗Revolution in Nets: An Unglamorous but Essential Phase of 
Naval Warfare‘ Military Affairs, 11, (autumn, 1947)  
 
Sandler, Stanley L. ‗The Day of the Ram‘, Military Affairs, 40, (Dec. 1976) 
 
Saul, S. B. ‗The Market and Development of the Mechanical Engineering 
Industries in Britain 1860-1914‘.  The Economic History Review, New Series, 20, 
no. 1 (April, 1967)  
 
Scott, Captain R.A.E, ‗The Maritime Defence of England including Offensive and 
Defensive Warfare‘, RUSI Journal, 20, 30 June 1876.   
 
Scheltema de Heere, R.F. ‗The Prins Hendrik Der Nederlanden‘ The Mariner‟s 
Mirror. 17 (Cambridge, 1931) 
 
Setzekorn, Eric, ‗The First China Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 
1878-1900‘, Intelligence and National Security, 28, (2013) 
 
Sinn, Elizabeth, ‗The Strike and Riot of 1884-A Hong Kong Perspective‘, Royal 
Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, 22, (1982) 
 
Sleeman, C. Lieutenant, R.N, ‗The Development of Machine Guns‘, North 
American Review, 139, (October, 1884), 367. 
 
Strakhovsky, Leonid I., ‗Russia‘s Privateering Projects of 1878‘, Journal of 
Modern History, 7. (Mar., 1935)  
 
 464 
Surdam, David G., ‗Northern Naval Superiority and he Economics of the 
American Civil War‘, The Journal of Economic History 56 (Jun., 1996) 
 
Taylor, Amos E., ‗The Role of Washington in the National Economy during the 
Civil War‘, Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington D. C., 53/56, 
(1953/1956)   
 
Thurston, The Hon. Lorrin A., ―The Growing Greatness of the Pacific‖, The North 
American Review, 160, (April 1895) 
 
‗W‘, ‗The Alleged Failure of the Armstrong Gun‘, Living Age, 80, (20 February, 
1864) 
 
Wilmshurst, David, ‗Hong Kong during the Sino-French War (1884-1885): 
Impressions of a French Naval Officer‘, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong 
Kong Branch. 50, (2010) 
 
 (No Author), ‗Visit to Birkenhead‘ Living Age, 6, (5 July, 1845) 
 
(No Author), ‗British Neutrality‘, The Living Age, 77, (18 April, 1863) 
 
(No Author), ‗The Ram of Liverpool‘, Living Age, 79, (12 December, 1863) 
 
(No Author) ‗The American Navy in the Late War‘, The Living Age, 90, (8 
September, 1866) 
 
(No Author) 'The Mechanics of Modern Naval Warfare‘ The North American 
Review, 103, (July 1866) 
 
(No Author) ‗Description of the Birkenhead Iron Works‘ The Practical Magazine, 
(London, 1874) 
 
Illustrations and Photographs 
 
‗The Anglo-Rebel Pirates-One of Laird‘s Steam-Rams‘, Harpers Weekly, 17 
October 1863, 661.  
 
‗One of the Steam-Rams in Course of Construction in Messrs. Laird‘s [sic] Ship-
Building Yard, Birkenhead‘, ILN, 26 September 1863 
 465 
 
‗Her Majesty‘s Ship Majestic Keeping Watch over the Steam-Rams in the 
Mersey‘, ILN, 28 November 1863 
 
‗H.M.S. Wivern, Double-Turreted Iron-Clad [sic] Steam-Ram‘, ILN, 16 December 
1865 
 
‗H.M.S. Wyvern [sic] in a Heavy Sea in the Channel‘, ILN,  27 October 1866, 413. 
 
‘The Volunteer Review at Dover: View of Dover from the Sea-The Naval 
Squadron Attacking the Forts‘, ILN 10 April, 1869, 356- 357. 
 
‗Armour-Plated Iron Turret Ship, The Scorpion‘, Illustrated London Almanack for 
1869, 34. 
 
U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, (USNHC), photo #NH 61923, ‗U.S.S. 
Monitor (1862)‟  
 
(USNHC) Photo #NH 48145, ‗Engraving of Confederate ironclad built by John 
Laird during the Civil War‘  
 
USNHC Photo #NH 52526, ‗H.M.S. Wivern At anchor in the Hamoaze River, off 
Plymouth, England, in 1865‘ 
 
USNHC Photo #NH 71211, ‗HMS Wivern off Plymouth, England‘ (1865)  
 
USNHC Photo #NH 65901, ‗H.M.S. Wivern, probably during the 1870s or 1880s‘ 
 
Author‘s collection.  Photograph of Royal Navy 2nd Class Petty Officer, taken by 
A. King at his studio, 20A Queen‘s Road East, Hong Kong, circa 1885  
 
Books 
 
Anonymous, ‗The “Russia‟s Hope” or, Britannia No Longer Rules the Waves: 
Showing How the Muscovite Bear got at the British Whale‟, Translated from the 
original Russian by Charles James Cooke, (London, 1888)  
 
Archibald, E. H. H. The Fighting Ships in the Royal Navy AD 897-1984. (Poole, 
1984) 
 466 
 
Ballard, Admiral G. A. The Black Battlefleet. (Greenwich, 1980)  
 
Barry, Patrick. Dockyard Economy and Naval Power. (London, 1863, reprinted, 
2005) 
 
Bastable, Marshall J., Arms and the State: Sir William Armstrong and the 
Remaking of British Naval Power 1854-1914. (Aldershot, 2004) 
 
Baxter III, James Phinney. The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship. (Originally 
published Cambridge, MA, 1933, Annapolis, 2001) 
 
Beeler, John, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era 1866-1880. 
(Stanford, 1997) 
 
Beeler, John, Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881. 
(London, 2001) 
 
Bennett, Terry, Korea: Caught in Time. (Reading, 2009) 
 
Bonham, Milledge Louis, The British Consuls in the Confederacy, (New York, 
1911) 
 
Bowcock, Andrew, CSS Alabama: Anatomy of a Confederate Raider.  (London, 
2002) 
 
Brassey, Thomas Allnutt, The Naval Annual, 1886. (Boston, 2005) 
 
Brassey, Thomas, The British Navy: Its Strength, Resources, and Administration. 
Volumes 2, 4 (Cambridge, 2010) 
 
Brodie, Bernard, Sea Power in the Machine Age. (Princeton, 1941) 
 
Brooke, George M. Jr. John M. Brooke; Naval Scientist and Educator. 
(Charlottesville, 1980) 
 
Brown, David K., Warrior to Dreadnought: Warships Design and Development 
1860-1905.  (Barnsley, 1997)  
 
 467 
Bucknill, John Thompson, Submarine Mines and Torpedoes as Applied to 
Harbour Defences. (Uckfield, 2009 Reprint of 1889 edition) 
 
Bulloch, James Dunwoody, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in 
Europe; or, How the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped.  Vol. I. (London, 
1883, reprinted 2012) 
   
Bulloch, James Dunwoody Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate 
States in Europe; or, How the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped.  Vol. II.  
(London, 1883, reprinted 2009) 
 
Buxton, Ian, Big Gun Monitors: The History of the Design, Construction and 
Operations of the Royal Navy‟s Monitors. (Annapolis, 1980) 
 
Chesneau, Roger (editor) Conway‟s All the World‟s Fighting Ships 1860-1945. 
(London, 1979) 
 
Chesneau, Roger, (editor) Conway‟s All the World‟s Fighting Ships 1860-1905. 
(Greenwich, 1979) 
 
Church, Roy (ed.), The Dynamics of Victorian Business: The Problems and 
Perspectives to the 1870s. (New York, 2006) 
 
Clarke, Colonel Sir George Sydenham, Russia‟s Sea-Power Past and Present or 
the Rise of the Russian Navy. (London, 1898), 156. 
 
Concubhair, Padraig O, The Fenians Were Dreadful Men: The 1867 Rising. 
(Cork, 2011) 
 
Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. (Uckfield, 2006) 
 
Crossley, Jim, Monitors of the Royal Navy: How the Fleet Brought the Great 
Guns to Bear. (Barnsley, 2013).          
 
Davis, Charles S., Colin J. McRae: Confederate Financial Agent. (College 
Station, 2008) 
 
Davis, Lance E & Engerman, Stanley L., Naval Blockades in Peace and War. 
(Cambridge, 2006) 
 468 
 
De Leon, Edwin, Secret History of Confederate Diplomacy Abroad. Edited by 
William C. Davis. (Lawrence, 2005) 
 
Desjardin, Thomas, Joshua L. Chamberlain, A Life in Letters, (Harrisburg, 2012) 
 
Dufour, Charles L. The Night the War Was Lost. (Lincoln, 1994) 
 
Eardley-Wilmot, Captain S, RN. Our Fleet To-Day and Its Development during 
the Last Half-Century. (London, 1900) 
 
Embree, Michael, Bismarck‟s First War: The Campaign of Schleswig and Jutland 
1864. (Solihull, 2006)  
 
Evans, David, Building the Steam Navy. Dockyards, Technology and the 
Creation of the Victorian Battlefleet 1830-1906. (London, 2004) 
 
Fitzgerald, Admiral C. C. Penrose, Memories of the Sea. (London, 1913) 
 
Fitzgerald, Admiral C. C. Penrose, From Sail to Steam: Naval Recollections, 
1878-1905, (London, 1916) 
  
Foreman, Amanda, A World on Fire. Britain‟s Crucial Role in the American Civil 
War.  (New York, 2010)   
 
Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus Vasa Fox, Volumes I, II, (New York, 
1918)  
 
Fowler, Will & Sweeney, Patrick, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Rifles and 
Machine Guns. (London, 2007) 
 
Fuller, Howard J. Clad in Iron, The American Civil War and the Challenge of 
British Naval Power. (Annapolis, 2008)  
 
Fuller, Howard J. Empire, Technology and Seapower: Royal Navy crisis in the 
age of Palmerston.  (New York, 2013) 
 
Gardiner, Robert (ed.) Conway‟s All the World‟s Fighting Ships 1860-1905. 
(Greenwich, 1979)  
 469 
 
Gardiner, Robert (ed.) Steam, Steel & Shellfire. The Steam Warship 1815-1905. 
Consultant Editor Dr. Andrew Lambert. (London, 1992)   
 
Gardiner, Robert (ed.) The Advent of Steam: The Merchant Steamship before 
1900. (Edison, 2000) 
 
Gibbons, Tony, Warships and Naval Battles of the Civil War. (New York, 1989) 
 
Gilbert, Martin, Routledge Atlas of Russian History.  (New York, 2010) 
 
Goodwin, Doris Kearns, Team of Rivals, The Political Genius of Abraham 
Lincoln. (New York, 2005) 
 
Groner, Erich, German Warships 1815-1945 Volume One. (Annapolis, 1990) 
 
Greene, Jack and Massignani, Alessandro, Ironclads at War: The Origin and 
Development of the Armored [sic] Warship 1854-1891.  (Boston, 1998) 
 
Greenhill, Basil and Gifford, Ann, Steam Politics and Patronage: The 
Transformation of the Royal Navy, 1815-1854.  (London, 1994). 
 
Hagan, Kenneth G., American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-
1889. (Westport, 1973) 
 
Haigh, K. R., Cableships and Submarine Cables. (London, 1968). 
 
Harland, Kathleen, The Royal Navy in Hong Kong since 1841. (Liskeard, 1985) 
 
Hattaway, Herman, and Beringer, Richard, Jefferson Davis Confederate 
President. (Lawrence, 2002) 
 
Headrick, Daniel R., The Tools of Empire. (Oxford, 1981). 
 
Heald, Henrietta, William Armstrong: Magician of the North, (Newcastle, 2010) 
 
Hearn, Chester G, Naval Battles of the Civil War, (San Diego, 2000) 
 
Hill, Richard, War at Sea in the Ironclad Age. (London, 2002) 
 470 
 
Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. (New 
York, 1994) 
 
Hoogenboom, Ari, Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy. (Baltimore, 2008) 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Capital 1848-1875.  (New York, 1996)  
 
Humble Richard, Before the Dreadnought: The Royal Navy from Nelson to 
Fisher. (London, 1976).  
 
Hunter, Alvah Folsom Hunter, A Year on a Monitor and the Destruction of Fort 
Sumter. Edited by Craig L. Symonds, (Columbia, 1987) 
 
Jane, Fred T., The Imperial Russian Navy. (London, 1983) 
 
Jones, Colin, Australian Colonial Navies. (Canberra, 1986) 
 
A Naval Life: The Edited Diaries and Papers of Admiral John Locke Marx 1852-
1939. Edited by Mary Jones. (Dulverton, 2007) 
 
Keegan, John, The American Civil War: A Military History. (New York, 2009) 
 
Kelly, J. D. Jerrold, The Question of Ships: The Navy and the Merchant Marine, 
(New York, 1884, Reprinted 2009), 128, 130, 209. 
 
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. (New York, 1976) 
 
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. (New York, 1989) 
 
King, Chief Engineer J. W, (USN). European Ships of War and Their Armament, 
Naval Administration and Economy, Marine Constructions and Appliances, Dock-
Yards, Etc. (Washington, 1877) 
 
Kinnaman, Stephen Chapin, The Most Perfect Cruiser. (Indianapolis, 2009). 
 
Kyriakodis, Harry, Philadelphia‟s Lost Waterfront.  (Charleston, 2011), 34. 
 
 471 
Lambert, Andrew, Battleships in Transition: The Creations of the Steam 
Battlefleet 1815-1860. (London, 1984) 
 
Lambert, Andrew, ‗The Development and Education of the Royal Navy 1854-
1914‘, The Development of British Naval Thinking. Edited by Geoffrey Till, 
(Abingdon, 2006) 
 
Lambert, Andrew, Admirals: The Naval Commanders who made Britain Great. 
(London, 2008) 
 
Lloyd, Christopher, The Nation and the Navy: A History of Naval Life and Policy. 
(London, 1954) 
 
Luraghi, Ramondo. A History of the Confederate Navy.  (Annapolis, 1996) 
 
Lyon, David & Winfield, Rif, The Sail & Steam Navy List: All the Ships of the 
Royal Navy 1815-1889. (London, 2004)   
 
Marder, Arthur J. The Anatomy of British Sea Power.  (New York, 1976) 
 
Melson, Commodore P.J., CBE, RN (Editor), White Ensign & Red Dragon: The 
History of the Royal Navy in Hong Kong 1841-1997. (Hong Kong, 1997) 
 
Merli, Frank J. The Alabama, British Neutrality, and the American Civil War. 
Edited by David M. Fahey. (Bloomington, 2004). 
 
Millman, Richard, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian 
War. (Oxford, 1965). 
 
Milton, David Hepburn, Lincoln‟s Spymaster: Thomas Haines Dudley and the 
Liverpool Network. (Mechanicsburg, 2003). 
 
Moore, Patrick A., The Greenie: The History of Warfare Technology in the Royal 
Navy. (Stroud, 2011) 
 
Morris, Jan, Pax Britannica: Climax of an Empire. (New York, 2002) 
 
Murray, William M. The Age of Titans: The Rise and Fall of the Great Hellenistic 
Navies. (Oxford, 2012). 
 472 
 
Niven, John, Gideon Welles: Lincoln‟s Secretary of the Navy. (Baton Rouge, 
1994) 
 
Nordenfelt, Thorsten, The Nordenfelt Machine Guns, (Uckfield, Reprint of 1884 
edition)   
 
O‘Connell, Robert L, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of 
the U.S. Navy. (Oxford, 1991) 
 
Ogilvy, John, M. D., An Account of Bermuda Past and Present. (Hamilton, 1883) 
 
Olender, Piotr, Sino-French Naval War 1884-1885. (Sandomierz, 2012)  
 
Papastratigakis, Nicholas, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military 
Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-Japanese War. (London, 2011) 
 
Parkes, Oscar,  British Battleships “Warrior” 1860 to “Vanguard” 1960 A History 
of Design Construction and Armament, (London, 1966) 
 
Parkinson, J. R. The Economics of Shipbuilding in the United Kingdom. 
(Cambridge, 2011) 
 
Parkinson, Roger, The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the 
Origins of the First World War. (Woodbridge, 2008) 
 
Penn, Commander Geoffrey, R.N. ―Up Funnel, Down Screw!” The Story of the 
Naval Engineer.  (London, 1955) 
  
Persson, Gudrun, ‗Russian Military Attachés and the Wars of the 1860s‘, 
Reforming the Tsar‟s Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the 
Great to the Revolution. Edited by David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and 
Bruce W. Menning, (Cambridge, 2004) 
 
Philbrick, Nathaniel, In the Heart of the Sea: The Tragedy of the Whaleship 
Essex. (New York, 2000)   
   
Preston, Antony, and Major, John, Send A Gunboat! A Study of the Gunboat and 
its role in British policy, 1854-1904. (London, 1967) 
 473 
 
Rafferty, Oliver P., The Church, the State and the Fenian Threat, 1861-75, 
(London, 1999) 
 
Ramsey, David, „Blinker‟ Hall Spymaster: The Man who Brought America into 
World War 1. (Stroud, 2009) 
 
Reed, Edward James, Our Iron-clad Ships. Their Qualities, Performances, and 
Costs. (London, 1869, reprinted Cambridge, 2011) 
 
Reed, E. J., Shipbuilding in Iron and Steel.  (London, 1869)  
 
Roberts, Richard, Schroders Merchants & Bankers, (London, 1992) 
 
Roberts, William H., Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial 
Mobilization. (Baltimore, 2002) 
 
Roksund, Arne, The Jeune Ecole: The Strategy of the Weak.  (Boston, 2007)  
 
Rolt, L.T.C., Victorian Engineering, (London, 1970) 
 
Ropy, Theodore, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 
1871-1904. Edited by Stephen S. Roberts, (Annapolis, 1987) 
 
Ross, FitzGerald, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States. (Urbana, 1997) 
 
Sandler, Stanley, The Emergence of the Modern Capital Ship. (Newark, 1979)    
 
Scharf, J. Thomas, History of the Confederate States Navy. (New York, 1996) 
 
Schurman, Donald Mackenzie, Imperial Defence 1868-1887. Edited by John 
Beeler, (London, 2000) 
 
Scott, Admiral Sir Percy, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, (London, 1919) 
 
Sennett, Richard and Oram, Henry J. The Marine Steam Engine: A Treatise for 
Engineering Students, Young Engineers, and officers of the Royal Navy and 
Merchant Marine.  (Reprint of London, 1898 version, Bremen, 2012) 
 
 474 
Sergeev, Evgeny, The Great Game, 1856-1907: Russo-British Relations in 
Central and East Asia. (Baltimore, 2014) 
 
Sexton, Jay, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the 
Civil War Era, 1837-1873. (Oxford, 2005) 
 
Silverstone, Paul H. Civil War Navies, 1855-1883. (New York, 2006) 
 
Smith, Edgar C, A Short History of Naval and Marine Engineering. (Cambridge, 
1938 reprinted 2013) 
 
Sondhaus, Lawrence, Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power Before the 
Tirpitz Era. (Annapolis, 1997) 
 
Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914. (New York, 2001). 
 
Spencer, Warren F. The Confederate Navy in Europe.  (Tuscaloosa, 1983) 
 
Steevens, G. W., Naval Policy: With Some Account of the Warships of the 
Principal Powers. (London, 1896) 
 
Still, William N.  Jr. Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads [sic]. 
(Columbia, 1971) 
 
Still, William N. Jr.  (ed.) The Confederate Navy: The Ships, Men and 
Organization. (London, 1997) 
 
Stranack, Ian, Lt. Cdr. RN (Ret.) The Andrew and the Onions. The Story of the 
Royal Navy in Bermuda 1795-1975, (Bermuda, 1990) 
 
Standage, Tom, The Victorian Internet. (New York, 1998) 
 
Stapleton, N. B. J., Lieutenant Commander, R.N.R (Retired) Steam Picket Boats, 
(Lavenham, 1980) 
 
Thomas, Timothy L., Recasting the Red Star; Russia Forges Tradition and 
Technology Through Toughness.  (Fort Leavenworth, 2011)  
 
Tunstall, Brian, The Realities of Naval History. (London, 1936) 
 475 
 
Van Doren Stern, Philip.  The Confederate Navy. (New York, 1962) 
 
Various Authors, The Nautical Magazine and Naval Chronicle for 1864. 
(Cambridge 2013) 
 
Verne, Jules, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea. (New York, 1966) 
 
Verne, Jules, Paris in the Twentieth Century. (New York, 1996) 
 
Wade, Stephen, Victoria‟s Spymasters: Empire and Espionage. (Stroud, 2009) 
 
Ward, J. H. Commander, U.S. N. Steam for the Million: A Popular Treatise on 
Steam and its Application to the Useful Arts Especially to Navigation. (New York, 
1860) 
 
Warren, Kenneth, Steel, Ships and Men: Cammell Laird, 1824-1993. (Liverpool, 
1998) 
 
Watson, William, Life in the Confederate Army, Being the Observations and 
Experiences of an Alien in the South during the American Civil War. (1887, 
reprinted, New York, 1983) 
 
Watts, Anthony J.  The Imperial Russian Navy. (London, 1990)  
 
The Diary of Gideon Wells, Volume I. 1861-30 March 1864, (Boston, New York, 
1911) 
 
Wells, Captain John, R.N., The Immortal Warrior: Britain‟s‟ First and Last 
Battleship.  (Hampshire, 1987)   
 
Williams, Hamilton, Britain‟s Naval Power: A Short History of the Growth of the 
British Navy. 2. (New York, 2009)   
 
Wilson, H. W.  Ironclads in Action; A Sketch of Naval Warfare from 1855-1895, 
With Some Account of the Development of the Battleship in England. Volumes I, 
II. (London, 1896) 
  
 476 
Wilson, Walter E. & McKay, Gary L, James D. Bulloch: Secret Agent and 
Mastermind. (Jefferson, 2012)  
 
Winter, Frank H., The First Golden Age of Rocketry, (Washington, 1990) 
 
Wise, Stephen R. Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil 
War. (Columbia, 1988)  
 
Woodward, David, The Russians at Sea, (London, 1965) 
 
No Author, Particulars of the War Ships [sic] of the World. (London, 1893) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
